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Abstract 
 
Political Deficits: The Dawn of Neoliberal Rationality and the Eclipse of Critical Theory 
 
By 
 
William Andrew Callison 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 
and the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Wendy Brown, Chair 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines the changing relationship between social science, economic 
governance, and political imagination over the past century. It specifically focuses on neoliberal, 
ordoliberal and neo-Marxist visions of politics and rationality from the interwar period to the 
recent Eurocrisis. Beginning with the Methodenstreit (or “methodological dispute”) between 
Gustav von Schmoller and Carl Menger and the subsequent “socialist calculation debate” about 
markets and planning, the dissertation charts the political and epistemological formation of the 
Austrian School (e.g., Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich A. von Hayek), the Freiburg School (e.g., 
Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow), the Chicago School (e.g., Henry Simons, 
Milton Friedman, Gary Becker), and the Frankfurt School (e.g., Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. 
Adorno, Jürgen Habermas). Combining archival research, textual interpretation, and theoretical 
reflection on these schools, it shows how critical theorists and political economists battled over 
the future of capitalism and socialism by redefining state, economy, and subjectivity in terms of 
their (ir)rationality. It also demonstrates the significance of the Austrian, Freiburg, Chicago and 
Frankfurt Schools’ free appropriation of Max Weber’s binary typologies, including markets vs. 
planning, formal calculation vs. substantive values, and rationality vs. irrationality. In turn, the 
dissertation argues that these and related approaches to political and economic rationalization 
displaced more radical visions of the political as collective struggle and self-rule—with profound 
implications for the “anti-political” crises of democracy today.  
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Introduction: 
Political Rationality in the Twentieth Century 
 
We have to start by trying to define the political sensibility of the period.            
Or rather, the absence of a political sensibility. – Stuart Hall1   
 
 
 For over a half century, the Western political imagination has turned on the “rationality” 
and “stability” of liberal democracy, or what Marxists called the unhappy marriage of democracy 
and capitalism. Briefly shaken by the 2008 financial crisis, faith in the durability of (neo)liberal 
capitalism was seemingly restored by the dramatic measures taken by governmental and monetary 
institutions. The recent success of rightwing forces, however, has proven more difficult to explain 
using established notions of politics and the theories built around them. The postwar consensus is 
dying off, its neoliberal transformation is sputtering along, and a Janus-faced phoenix—
reactionary ethno-authoritarianism and market techno-futurism—is rising from the smoke and 
ashes. Striving to respond to these new configurations, critical and political theorists relying on 
once foundational assumptions stand on increasingly shaky ground. 
Witnessing liberalism’s subversion, both its faithful defenders and longtime critics have 
entered the battle against rightwing forces. But how did we arrive at this struggle, and what exactly 
is at stake? How did neoliberalism emerge as a governing rationality, and why has the right proven 
more capable of inducing its ostensible crisis than the left? How might a genealogy of select 
twentieth-century transformations—including in liberalism’s relationship to capitalism, 
capitalism’s relationship to democracy, and the relationship between political and economic power 
more generally—provide critical orientation to our embattled present?  
To explore these questions, Political Deficits charts theoretical constructions of 
neoliberalism and neo-Marxism from the crises of interwar Europe to the recent Eurocrisis. The 
dissertation specifically examines the dueling politics of rationality in different branches of 
neoliberalism (the Austrian, Freiburg, and Chicago Schools) and a dominant current of neo-
Marxism (the Frankfurt School). Through textual and contextual readings of these adversarial 
traditions, the dissertation seeks to rethink the shifting relations between social science, 
governmental strategy, and democratic possibility over the past century. When read as 
interventions into historic crises, I suggest, these traditions recast pressing questions of knowledge 
and power, economics and politics, and liberalism and authoritarianism today. 
By linking these historical developments to contemporary transformations, the dissertation 
observes how conventional conceptions of capitalist (ir)rationality have not only failed to 
apprehend competing modes of “crisis management” that occasioned the rise of far-right political 
forces. They have also blinded critical theorists to the specificity of neoliberalism as a particular 
form of rationality that cuts through dialectical binaries of capitalism and democracy, market and 
state, reason and unreason, and materiality and ideology. “Systematic” approaches to 
understanding political and economic rationalization have, in this way, unwittingly mirrored the 
                                                
1 Stuart Hall, “Political Commitment,” in The Great Moving Right Show: Select Political Essays (Durham: Duke 
University Press), p. 85. 
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logic of the processes they are studying. Specific processes of rationalization tracked by this 
dissertation, such as ordoliberalization, neoliberalization and financialization, have displaced 
alternative visions of collective struggle and self-rule—with profound implications for current 
crises of liberal democracy and the “anti-political” reactions they are eliciting. From the “value 
neutral” self-representations of neoliberal programs through the totalizing conception of “state 
capitalism” in the first-generation Frankfurt School to the recent debate between Jürgen Habermas 
and Wolfgang Streeck about “democratic capitalism” in the EU, the dissertation tracks the 
limitations of Weberian-inflected paradigms that imagine politics as a rationally delimited sphere 
of formal or functionalist legitimation. 
Against these and other common accounts, the dissertation also shows that neoliberalism—
when read against the naturalism of classical liberalism—was radically constructivist in both its 
epistemic principles and political strategies. Like many other interwar social scientists, the 
neoliberal intellectuals and critical theorists believed that a proper understanding of both the 
promise and limits of human rationality—whether as scientific planning, technological 
manipulability, or market calculability—would help resolve the manifest irrationality of interwar 
capitalism. Though this Enlightenment-inflected ideal of rationality was hardly new, its 
relationship to both scholarly and popular conceptions of politics changed during and after WWI. 
It was the rise of socialism in particular that helped initiate the epistemic and political 
constructivism of this era, though Keynes and the neoliberals quickly became even more 
constructivist than the socialists themselves. By constructivist I mean that, rather than seeking to 
realize the inner truth or rationality of Man, these schools of thought and practice understood the 
task to be one of actively (re)constructing social institutions and individual subjects in and through 
their own form of rationality. Through an analysis of socialism’s counterhegemonic struggle, 
neoliberal strategists like Friedrich von Hayek identified a model for their own paradigm shift: 
“chang[ing] the meaning of the words describing political ideals is not a single event but a 
continuous process, a technique employed consciously or unconsciously to direct the people.”2 At 
the time, Hayek warned, “planning” and “collectivism” were overtaking “liberalism” and 
“individualism” as common-sense categories and ideals. It was thus against the practical success 
of socialist movements and scholars that neoliberalism—variously called “constructive 
liberalism,” “neocapitalism” or “the neoliberal offensive”—arrived at a strategy based on 
constructivist rather than naturalist premises.3   
Thus at its basis, my project argues, neoliberalism began as an epistemological program 
aimed at restricting the political imagination and at institutionally delimiting the openings for 
political action. To this end, I trace the genesis and mutation of neoliberal rationality from the 
Austrian School’s socialist calculation debate through the West German “social market economy” 
up to the divergence between ordoliberal and neoliberal approaches to the Eurocrisis one decade 
                                                
2 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 175. Hayek criticized Karl Mannheim’s “misleading” use of the word “collective 
freedom,” leading people to believe that there is such a thing as freedom beyond the economic choices of individual 
subjects and thus lending greater legitimacy to the “planners” of socialism. 
3 See Louis Rougier, “Le libéralisme constructif” (conference paper at the Union pour la Vérité, May 28, 1938), 1-2; 
and CIRL, Compte rendu des séances du Colloque Walter Lippmann, 7, cited in François Denord, “Aux origines du 
néo-libéralisme en France: Louis Rougier et le Colloque Walter Lippmann de 1938,” Le Mouvement Social (195) 
2001/2; Louis Rougier, “L’offensive du néo-libéralisme,” Le Figaro, October 29, 1938. See also Milton Friedman, 
“Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects,” Farmand, 17 February 1951, p. 3. Though based upon a very different theory of 
socio-historical development, Karl Polanyi made a similar point about paleoliberalism: the state was always 
involved in constructing and propping up capitalist dynamics. See the discussion below and in the Conclusion. 
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ago. In examining texts and contexts through which neoliberalism emerged, the individual chapters 
suggest that neoliberal rationality was one “form of rationality” among others—rather than, say, 
an “ideology” that can be equated with neoclassical economics or with capitalism as such.4 Its 
construction aimed at redrawing the line between the rational and the irrational—a political 
transformation premised on an epistemological transformation, and not the other way around. Not 
despite but precisely because of neoliberalism’s political deficits (about which more shortly), I 
contend, could its counterhegemonic strategies become so effective in the postwar era. 
 
 At the heart of our current predicament, Political Deficits suggests, is the problematic of 
the political itself—or rather, a lack thereof, as Stuart Hall submitted long ago. My analysis of this 
problematic differs from conventional accounts of “depoliticization” and “economization,” which 
often target the “naturalization” of economic inequalities and inegalitarian arrangements.5 Though 
apt for interpreting the effects of specifically neoliberal policies—defunding welfare state 
programs, privatizing public goods, quantifying once qualitative spheres of life according to 
economic (as opposed to cultural, social, or political) value—these accounts barely scratch the 
surface of the twentieth-century struggles that produced their conditions of possibility. For the 
“political” in depoliticization and the “economic” in economization presuppose but do not 
problematize the constitutive oppositions constructed by neoliberal rationality, including 
economy-state, market-planning, rationality-irrationality, and other conceptual pairs. An account 
of their transformative functions is thus imperative if they are to be the objects rather than the 
assumptions of critical analysis today.  
When speaking of “the political,” this project draws from at least three different theoretical 
traditions.6 First, the Western tradition of political thought, as exemplified by thinkers like 
Aristotle and Machiavelli, has long understood the political as an artificial construct of belonging 
and rule, such as a polis or a state, through which a community constitutes shared principles, 
procedures, and values.7  Second, neo-Marxist cultural theorists like Antonio  Gramsci and Stuart 
Hall have conceived the political as encompassing discursive strategies that contest hegemony 
over state and non-state institutions, rearticulate existing identities, and reconfigure common 
sense.8 And third, democratic theorists like Hannah Arendt and Sheldon Wolin have conceived the 
                                                
4 As Jamie Peck has illustrated, neoliberal rationality has no pure form, but has been differently constructed and 
materialized across time and space. See Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
5 Traditionally, Marxist theory criticized political liberalism’s naturalization of economic inequality via formal 
equality and economic liberalism’s naturalization of class domination via social subordination. Tellingly, much of 
recent scholarship tends to understand neoliberalism as an intensification of the same dynamics once attributed to 
liberal capitalism. 
6 For a discussion of the concept, see below. For a broader examination of Stuart Hall and Sheldon Wolin’s accounts 
of the political in relation to neoliberal currents of the contemporary far right, see the Conclusion. As I explain later, 
these accounts, like the one I develop in the dissertation, are not derived from the well-known formulation of Carl 
Schmitt, which bases the political on the friend-enemy distinction. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932/2007). 
7 See Aristotle, Politics; Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, eds. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
8 See Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks; Stuart Hall, The Great Moving Right Show; see also Oliver 
Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007); and James Wiley, Politics and the Concept of the Political: The 
Political Imagination (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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political in terms of the background conditions and public practices—above all, cooperation and 
conflict over the common—without which democracy is impossible.9 Each of these approaches 
poses unique questions of politics, power and freedom to any critical political theory of the present. 
While contemporary theorists describe neoliberalism as “depoliticizing,” Political Deficits draws 
from these three traditions to interrogate what is at stake in understanding our current political 
deficits and the eruption of an “anti-politics” that is immanent to them. 
 What would it mean to speak of a lack or deficit of the political in particular orders of 
governmental rationality? By “political deficits” I refer to different restrictions on the political as 
theorized by the three traditions described above. In this sense, political deficits signify the 
subordinate position or diminished place of the political in larger orders of power, knowledge, and 
action. Such restrictions can be implicit or explicit in their articulation and can be epistemological 
or ontological in their form; this is because their construction not only takes hold in social practices 
and institutions, but in the conceptual schemas, philosophical anthropologies, and scientific 
strategies that program them. In short, the notion of political deficits offers a starting point to 
examine how the political is constituted and curtailed in theory and in practice. If the political 
designates dynamics of world-making and power-sharing, of conflict and negotiation over the 
common, then the notion of political deficits registers the deferral, denial, or severe delimitation 
of such practices. 
To speak of “deficits,” however, is not to speak of an absolute or irresolvable condition. 
Definitionally, a deficit is relational in form; it is registered in terms of and in relation to something 
else. The question, then, is not just how popular discourses or scientific disciplines figure various 
dimensions of the political for their own purposes but how, in so doing, they also reconfigure its 
relation to other concepts and spheres, such as the social and the economic, rationality and 
morality, or technology and democracy. By charting the methodological strategies behind such 
processes, this dissertation reconsiders the politics of knowledge production and the logics of 
governmental practice, or what I will call political rationality. Let us define this third and final 
term in the dissertation’s frame. 
If contemporary conditions are shaped by the political deficits of twentieth-century 
epistemic formations, as the following chapters argue, then political rationality signifies orders of 
knowledge and power that drew on and operated through them. Following Michel Foucault, this 
dissertation uses the concept of political rationality to examine particular modes of government 
with distinct forms of legitimation, techniques of rule, and principles of limitation. According to 
this critical method, as elaborated below, orders of knowledge and power presuppose a particular 
kind of subject that they govern in turn. Several lines of questioning are involved here: What are 
the assumed conditions of subjective conduct on which power must work? How are these 
conditions and subjects conceptualized, and with what techniques are they modified? In the name 
of what are knowledge and power wielded, and to what end? Together these questions will provide 
an initial analytic prism to conceptualize political rationality.  
 
 
                                                
9 See Sheldon Wolin, Fugitive Democracy and Other Essays, edited by Nicholas Xenos (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016); and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 
1958/1998). 
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In the remainder of this introductory chapter I discuss in greater detail the historical and 
theoretical stakes of understanding neoliberalism as a form of political rationality. The first section 
presents an overview of the thinkers and schools examined in the following chapters, identifies 
their shared heritage in strands of Weberian methodology, and explains why my account represents 
a novel way of conceptualizing their formation. The second section sketches the historical 
backdrop of neoliberalism’s genesis as an epistemology and discourse of (political) economy, 
underscoring its double impetus as a scientific creed and anti-socialist strategy. In the third section 
I elaborate the neoliberal, Keynesian, and neo-Marxist reconceptualization of “reason” and 
“rationality” against the backdrop of capitalist crisis and socialist ascendance; in particular, I show 
how the neoliberal assault on “socialist planning” provided the occasion for epistemological and 
methodological innovations that were essential to neoliberalism’s rollout in the postwar era. The 
fourth section maps different approaches to the critique of political rationality (as opposed to the 
critique of capitalist irrationality) and explains how critical theory attempted (and largely failed) 
to apprehend neoliberal rationality apart from totalizing accounts of state capitalism and the culture 
industry. Here I also elaborate Foucault’s notion of political rationality and contrast it with the 
Frankfurt School’s critique of instrumental reason. Although Foucault’s account provides this 
dissertation with a mode of genealogical critique attuned to the programming of neoliberal 
rationality in theory and practice, this section concludes by considering the limitations of 
Foucault’s own mode of conceptualizing the political dimensions of political rationality. In turn, 
the next section supplements Foucault’s account with notions of the political found in both cultural 
theory (Hall) and democratic theory (Wolin). After discussing the dissertation’s unique approach 
the question of political rationality with a more robust notion of the political, the final section 
offers a brief overview of the individual chapters. 
Inspired in part by Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism, this dissertation uses and 
problematizes particular features of his method. In doing so, it addresses different stakes and yields 
divergent conclusions from Foucault’s own genealogy and recent historical scholarship on 
neoliberalism. Among the central concerns of my project is the shift, largely passed over by 
Foucault and other scholars, from liberalism to neoliberalism. The concept of neoliberalism is 
significant, I suggest, because it designates a form of rationality that crystalized a half century 
before the policies now attributed to it—privatization, deregulation, austerity, price stability, 
regressive taxation—were implemented around the globe. Depending on how we understand its 
formation, the concept may help illuminate more complex questions about the relationship 
between liberalism and capitalism, politics and economy, and science and technology today. It 
may also explain the political deficits that captured not only rightwing formations but critical 
theory and the left more broadly. A wealth of insights and lessons are buried in the formation of 
neoliberal rationality, I argue, yet where and how they are excavated can make a world of 
difference for how we understand our political present.  
 
The Dawn of Neoliberal Rationality and the Eclipse of Critical Theory 
 
In contrast to both Foucault’s genealogy and recent historical scholarship, this dissertation 
traces the birth of neoliberalism to interwar Europe and, in particular, to Red Vienna and Weimar 
Germany. The beginning of my project focuses specifically on the significance of Austrian 
marginal utility theory, the so-called socialist calculation debate in economic theory, as well as the 
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constructivist programs that emerged from the existential crisis of interwar liberalism. It shows 
how, in the wake of WWI’s radical political transformations, neoliberalism as well as other 
(Keynesian, state socialist, revolutionary Marxist) intellectual formations pursued “rationality” as 
common conceptual ideal. After the short-lived experiments of revolutionary workers’ councils 
were crushed by brand new liberal democratic states, intellectual currents increasingly displaced 
the ideal of radical democracy to overcome the “irrationality” of state politics and capitalist 
economies.10  For (neo)liberals and (neo)Marxists alike, the ills of political-economic order had 
technically rational (that is, evaluatively neutral and technocratically resolvable) cures. Despite its 
different valences, “rationality” was widely perceived as the solution to economic crisis and to the 
problem of politics itself; a shared vision was formed around the rationalization of the political 
itself. Put another way, the turbulence of interwar Europe created a panoply of constructivist 
currents which, captured by the modern promise of technology and rationality, sought to control 
or overcome various dimensions of the political (state, conflict, and democracy); in doing so, each 
new formation created their own kinds of political deficits, which disseminated in the postwar era 
and which continue to contour our institutions and imaginations to this day.  
The protagonists of this story include neoliberal theorists (the Austrian, Freiburg and 
Chicago Schools) as well as the socialist and critical theorists against whom they did battle (such 
as the Frankfurt School), whether implicitly or explicitly. Why speak of neoliberal theory in the 
same breath, much less the same dissertation, as critical theory? To be sure, each would cringe at 
the suggested proximity. Yet all of these “schools” formed in response to capitalist crisis and 
socialist ascendance during the interwar years.11 While interwar and wartime developments led the 
Frankfurt School to revise “historical materialism,” the same developments led the Austrian, 
Freiburg and Chicago Schools to revise what they called “historical liberalism.” At stake for each 
circle was not only the (ir)rationality of economic liberalism, but the relationship between 
knowledge and politics more generally, not to mention the worldly powers their combination can 
produce. Before blazing influential trails into the latter half of the century, all of these schools 
were involved in a debate over the (ir)rationality of “market competition” and “socialist planning.” 
Frankfurt School critical theory was among the first and most creative currents in the 
Marxist tradition to examine the revolutionary failures of the interwar period by combining core 
tenets of Marxism with supplements from Weber, Freud, Nietzsche, and others. Members of this 
tradition—Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and others in 
later generations like Jürgen Habermas—pursued “Critical Theory” as a collective project of 
interdisciplinary knowledge production about existing political struggles. From the beginning, 
then, this approach to critique established a reflexive link between theoretical and political activity. 
Critical theory was distinct from what Horkheimer called “traditional theory” because it rejected 
any claim to “value neutral” knowledge and affirmed that its activity carries a practical, even 
emancipatory intent. Defined by reflexivity and partiality [Parteilichkeit], critical theory was thus 
forced to account for the historical conditions of its own activity in existing struggles over 
intellectual and material production. Its core commitment was to a more free, equal, and “rational” 
social order beyond liberal capitalism. Originally inspired by the Weimar workers’ movement, the 
Frankfurt School fused a Marxian-inspired critique of capitalism with a Weberian-inspired critique 
                                                
10 On the significance of corporatism and fascism in this history, such as Mussolini’s Italy, see Charles Maier, 
Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
11 The revolutionary threat that connected the Soviet Union to Red Vienna, as discussed in Chapter 1, was decisive 
for Ludwig von Mises’ anti-socialist activities and the birth of neoliberalism more generally. 
  7 
of rationality to argue that new fusions of the economic, the political, and the cultural had dissolved 
the requisite conditions for revolutionary change.  
Neoliberal theory, by contrast, began as an interwar counter-movement to delegitimize 
state socialism and to reprogram economic liberalism. Its earliest practitioners included scholars 
of the Austrian School (Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek), the Freiburg School (Walter 
Eucken, Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow), and the Chicago School (Henry 
Simon, Frank Knight, Aaron Director, Milton Friedman, Gary Becker), as well as scholars from 
France (Louis Rougier, Jacques Rueff) and Britain (Lionel Robbins, John Jewkes). Mises and 
Hayek did not found the Austrian School, but were the first generation of Austrians to be 
considered “neoliberal.” The early Freiburg School composed a loose network of German social 
scientists that formed in the late 1920’s, joined the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, and founded the 
journal Ordo (which yielded the concept of ordoliberalism) in 1948. Finally, the Chicago School 
also began in the interwar period, though its early thinkers like Simons and Knight more closely 
resembled “ordoliberal” positions than those of postwar scholars like Friedman and Becker, who 
are more commonly associated with the term “neoliberal” today. Epistemologically, each of these 
groups coalesced around a formalist theory of market rationality, marginal utility, and price 
formation.12 Politically, their reinvented liberalism was pitted against the “Marxist or Keynesian 
planning sweeping the globe.”13  
Between the neoliberal and neo-Marxists camps lay one figure—Max Weber—whose 
vision of science and politics set the terms of the century. The Weberian notion of instrumental 
rationality and value neutrality is what enabled their respective modes of theorizing the 
(ir)rationality of capitalism and totalitarianism.14 The Weberian schema not only offered novel 
ways to draw a line between “the rational” and “the irrational”; it also informed how each group 
would form the political deficits in their own theory. In the neo-Marxist case, the political deficits 
included an inability to go beyond an antimony of “instrumental” and “value” rationality, to 
conceive of political identity and collectivity after the dissolution of the proletariat, and to analyze 
political strategy beyond a totalizing concept of “state capitalism.” In the neoliberal case, the 
political deficits ranged from a “value neutral” binary between science and politics that 
delegitimated socialist discourse to a broader epistemological and institutional strategy that 
delimited the political (in the second and third sense discussed above) by political means (in the 
first sense discussed above). Beyond highlighting these Weberian legacies, my project draws 
lessons from the formation and trajectory of neoliberal and critical theory. 
 
                                                
12 In examining specific forms of “epistemology,” I will at times reference the classical meaning of the term as 
Erkenntnistheorie, which encompasses the theory of the knowing subject, the possibility of knowledge, and the 
cultural, psychic and material condition of this subject and this knowledge. My own use of the term, however, will 
often hew to meanings employed by Michel Foucault and recent scholars of science and technologies who reference 
the epistemological, institutional, discursive and performative features of knowledge production. 
13 Hayek in Mont Pelerin Society Inventory of the General Meeting Files (1947–1998), Ghent, Liberaal Archief, 
2005. 
14 As will become clear, I am primarily referencing Weber’s writings on social scientific method and economic 
sociology. The focus on and incorporation of certain “Weberian” typologies effectively bowdlerized Weber’s own 
concern with both the autonomy of the political and the potential violence of politics, which appear in his 
“Vocation” essays and in his account of political power later in Economy and Society. It is also worth noting that an 
alternative substantive idea of “objective reason,” largely Hegelian in inspiration, made possible the Frankfurt 
School’s critique of this Weberian category of instrumental rationality. 
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Political Economy without the Political 
  
To arrive at our current political deficits through the twentieth-century processes that 
produced them, it is also necessary to consider their conditions of possibility in the development 
of political economy. Particularly significant to this development are the epistemic transformations 
that turned “political economy” into “economics” (unmodified by the “political”) as it is known 
today. The term epistemic refers to the theory of knowledge, that is, to the theoretical predicates 
that form and legitimate particular modes of knowledge. In the human sciences, the theory of 
knowledge, or epistemology is intertwined with background presuppositions about methodological 
procedure, philosophical anthropology, historical development, and other related matters. Because 
they are intertwined with specific historical conditions, epistemic principles can be altered by 
internal as well as external transformations. Before a series of changes unfolded in the twentieth 
century, for example, nineteenth-century presuppositions about science and rationality were rooted 
in a distinctly historical logic, as Timothy Mitchell argues: 
 
Nineteenth-century Europe learned to understand the modern world as the outcome of 
history. People came to believe that the pattern of human affairs manifested neither the 
working of a divine will nor the self-regulating balance of a natural system, but the 
unfolding of an inner secular force. There were several ways of accounting for this inner 
dynamic, all of them referring to the increasing power of human reason to order social 
affairs. The movement of history could be ascribed to the growing control that reason 
acquired over the natural and social world, to the power of reason to expand the scope of 
human freedom, or to the economic forms that were said to flow from the spread of 
rational calculation—the exchange relations of modern capitalism.15 
 
Like other forms of knowledge, nineteenth-century political economy sought to identify the laws 
that govern socio-historical processes and to formulate universal principles “true in every country,” 
including those colonized by European nation states.16 Political economy designated “the 
knowledge and practice required for governing the state and managing its population and 
resources.”17 Moreover, as a scientific discourse, political economy emerged as “the intellectual 
instrument, the type of calculation or form of rationality that made possible the self-limitation of 
governmental reason.”18 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth-century centuries, political economy was a historical and 
empirical mode of inquiry that informed the “art” of government. Political economy was 
concerned with power, and was directly implicated in it. The discipline joined political philosophy 
in criticizing the “rationality” of the state; but political economy, by contrast, criticized so as to 
strengthen political power or raison d’État.19 Possessing the ear of the sovereign, political 
                                                
15 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (University of California Press, 2002), p. 1. 
16 See Chapter 2 in Mitchell, Rule of Experts. 
17 Timothy Mitchell, “Rethinking Economy,” Geoforum 39 (2008), p. 1116. 
18 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 13.  
19 See Foucault, Security, Territory, Population; see also Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren 
Geschichte (1924); translated as Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’État and Its Place in Modern 
History (New York: Praeger, 1962). 
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economy prescribed principles, objectives, and limits for governmental practice. In German-
speaking territories, political economy (Nationalökonomie) was a branch of knowledge parallel to 
the scientific study of the state (Staatswissenschaft) and the scientific practice of the police state 
(Polizeiwissenschaft).20 Meanwhile, in France, the physiocrats (from physis, meaning “nature”) 
offered governmental principles in accord with “natural” economic processes. Economic 
liberalism soon emerged as a critique of mercantilist political rationality, challenging the premise 
that a state’s power rested in its trade surplus. Yet liberal political economists like Turgot, Smith, 
and Ricardo also used political economy to criticize wide-ranging practices from international 
trade to strategic warfare. Significantly, economic rationality qua “natural” self-interest 
established grounds for this criticism. As challenges to state power, they emerged “from below,” 
as it were, through working-class movements, colonial resistance, and socialist scholars. With his 
critique of classical political economy, for instance, Karl Marx formulated a counter-science of 
capitalist development that pointed to its immanent contradictions and to future upheavals.  
In the twentieth century, increasingly specialized scientific disciplines divided up the study 
of society while inheriting the assumption that a logic specific to their own domain provided the 
unseen dynamic of social life. Some disciplines sought to isolate the law-like features of their own 
logic; some sought to borrow the methods and examine the logics of others.21  This was the general 
movement through which political economy shed its “political” skin and birthed the increasingly 
formal, mathematical science of “economics.” In the process, many economic theorists walled 
themselves off from neighboring disciplines like economic sociology.22 Aspiring to the status of 
the natural sciences, this approach to economics was no longer a form historical knowledge, much 
less an “art” of governmental practice.23 Rather, with the help of marginal utility theory and 
Robbins’ Weberian definition of the discipline, economics epistemologically bracketed messy 
matters of social and political “values,” and thus allowed the discipline to climb, if not to the level 
of the natural sciences, then at least to the summit of the social sciences.24 Atop its perch, the 
discipline narrowed its focus to the formal rationality of price formation and economic behavior. 
“In earlier times,” as Schumpeter explained in 1908, “economics was conceived as doctrinal art, a 
way of teaching practical economics and politics.”25 By the early twentieth century, however, “the 
                                                
20 Located between “political economy” and “state science,” German scholar Adam Müller considered 
Staatswissenschaft “the most important art of all” because it showed officials how to apply certain principles in the 
practice of government and how to defend the form of government that existed in his own country: “Die 
Staatengeschichte kann freilich dargestellt werden als die Entwickelung der Mißgriffe, deren sich die Menschen in 
Entwerfung der Gesetze haben zu Schulden kommen lassen: wir gewinnen auf diesem Wege gewisse Grundsätze 
über den Bau der Staaten. Das ist schön und gut. Aber wo lernen wir denn die viel wichtigere Kunst, die Grundsätze 
anzuwenden? — Gegen alle Regeln, die Ihr mir aus der Weltgeschichte über Regierungsformen ableiten könnt, will 
ich Euch die Regierungsform meines Landes, welche aus den Umständen dieser bestimmten Letalität entstanden und 
gewachsen ist, vertheidigen.” Adam Müller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst: Oeffentliche Vorlesungen vor Sr. 
Durchlaucht dem Prinzen Bernhard von Sachsen-Weimar und einer Versammlung von Staatsmännern und 
Diplomaten (Berlin: J. D. Sander, 1809), p. x. 
21 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, pp. 1-2.  
22 Exceptions could of course be found in variety of institutionally oriented economists, though even scholars of this 
kind, like Thorstein Veblen, were driven by deeply technocratic visions of science and society. 
23 See Philip Mirowski, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's Economics 
(Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
24 See Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and 
France, 1890s to 1990s (Princeton University Press, 2009). 
25 Joseph A Schumpeter, Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie (Leipzig: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1908), p. 607 (translation mine). Schumpeter, Weber, Polanyi, Drucker and other major figures in the 
  10 
classical system of political economy lay in ruins,” and could thus be “surpassed” by a “pure 
economics” (reine Ökonomie) that uses “the procedure of an exact discipline” similar to “technics” 
(Technik). Each field, after all, concerned the “objective” question of economic and technical 
efficiency.26 With the birth of marginal utility theory, a formalist and “value neutral” practice of 
economics would rise from the ruins political economy. 
It was no accident that scientific transformations of the early century unfolded alongside 
political upheavals. A new kind of double movement was emerging between science and politics, 
“rationality” and “irrationality,” technological and demotic struggle. “Rationality” and its others 
were no longer the same old Enlightenment concepts, however. Taken together, scientific 
specialization and political uncertainty left the substantive layers of Reason [Vernunft] behind. 
Through this movement the majestic concept of reason “lost its mind” even before rational choice 
theory and game theory arose to reprogram the political strategy of the postwar world.27 In turn, 
worldly forms of knowledge and rationality promised to revolutionize state capacities; WWI’s 
death toll made the promise and perils of state technology devastatingly clear.28 While the Great 
War stoked the flames of both nationalist and socialist identification, it also endowed the 
centralized state with powerful technologies of calculation and measurement that only expanded 
into peacetime.  
In the wake of the war, democratic reforms and radical movements challenged the 
legitimacy of state power, subjecting capitalist economies to popular decision-making like never 
before.29 On the one hand, doctrines of political economy, along with extant political rationality, 
fell into crisis. On the other hand, the “irrationality” (or unpredictability) of the masses only 
bolstered the “rationality” (or legitimacy) of technopolitical solutions. As market crashes and 
hyperinflation shook the Euro-Atlantic, elites sought solutions in objective, not democratic 
solutions. From the technocratic point of view, the “irrationality” of the masses became both a 
threat and a necessary object of manipulation, if only to the end of “neutralization.” Such political-
economic turbulence increasingly allowed “a certain form of reasoning—that of economic 
calculation—to occupy the space of democratic debate.”30  
Socialism was no longer a mere specter haunting Europe; it was now a transnational force 
contending for state power. Revolutionary ideas spread rapidly across tongues, texts, and borders. 
Their largest wellspring was German-language socialist discourse, including writers like Otto 
                                                
social sciences stood somewhere between the historicism of the German Historical School and the formalist 
universalism of the Austrian School. 
26 To which he added: “We want to try to find answers here. Not through general arguments that would be true but 
ultimately lead us nowhere, nor through ‘dialectics’ with which one can prove anything, but rather out of our own 
work. We will try to clarify what each of our theorems mean, to be clear about what their value and nature are. From 
this we will develop something like an epistemological theory of economics (Erkenntnistheorie der Ökonomie), or at 
least try to move in that direction.” Joseph A Schumpeter, Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen 
Nationalökonomie [1908], pp. xi-xii (translation mine). 
27 For accounts of this development in the postwar and Cold War period, see Sonja Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist 
Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (University of Chicago Press, 2003); Judy L. 
Klein, Lorraine Daston, Michael Gordin, Paul Erickson, Rebecca M. Lemov, and Thomas Sturm, How Reason 
Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013). 
28 For one example, see Walther Rathenau, Der neue Staat (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1919). 
29 On the rise of the “social question” in this context, see Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, 
and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).  
30 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, p. 11. For a reading of interwar liberalisms in crisis, see Jens Hacke, Existenzkrise 
der Demokratie: Zur politischen Theorie in der Zwischenkriegszeit (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2018). 
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Bauer, Eduard Bernstein, Rudolf Hilferding, Karl Kautsky, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa 
Luxemburg, and Clara Zetkin. One year after the Russian Revolution, workers’ councils swept 
across Central Europe. Council and unionist movements were briefly institutionalized in Red 
Vienna, but were stomped out by a newly democratic state in major cities like Berlin and Munich, 
helped by reactionary paramilitary forces like the Freikorps. Nonetheless, the tidal wave of 
socialist demands rolled on; calls for full socialization, economic democracy, and rational planning 
increased until the fascist right, suddenly surging thanks to the Great Depression, redeployed them 
to counterrevolutionary ends.31 Yet even then the greatest critics of socialism still believed it might 
inherit the future. Witnessing the “disintegration of capitalist society” and the “crisis of the tax 
state,” one hostile economist remarked that the “march to socialism” was all but certain.32 
“Socialism,” another decried, “is the slogan of our day.”33 “Socialism,” yet another observed, “has 
displaced liberalism as the doctrine held by the great majority of progressives.”34   
Enter neoliberalism: a transnational movement to challenge socialism at the moment of its 
ascendance and to reinvent liberalism at the moment of its demise. While historians have recently 
identified the origin of neoliberalism at the Walter Lippmann Colloque in 1937 or the founding of 
the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947,35 it should be located at an earlier time and place: the interwar 
years of Weimar Germany and Red Vienna. Neoliberalism began as an explicitly anti-socialist 
program of avowedly “value-neutral” scholars who understood, in the spirt of their time, that the 
authority of scientific knowledge could be used to reprogram political forms. Theirs was a 
constructivist project to reshape society, economy, and subjectivity—and to restrict the political 
by political means.  
 
Interwar Constructions of Political Rationality 
 
To trace the transformation of neoliberal and critical theory, I will examine marginal utility 
theory, the socialist calculation debate, and the constructivist programs of the interwar period. My 
account begins with the Methodenstreit, a dispute in nineteenth-century political economy that 
created the Austrian School around Carl Menger and his students, including Eugen von Böhm-
Bawerk, Friedrich von Wieser, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich von Hayek. The Austrians’ 
                                                
31 The right-wing shift was ascendant in Italy well before the crash, however. See Charles Maier, Recasting 
Bourgeois Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
32 Despite his personal preferences for the future, Schumpeter divined the triumph of state socialism. Colleagues 
who disagreed with this view were so few, he remarked, in a nod to the neoliberals, that their isolation only further 
supported his case: “I believe that there is a mountain in Switzerland on which congresses of economists have been 
held which have expressed disapproval of all or most of these things. But these anathemata have not even provoked 
attack.” Joseph Schumpeter, “The March to Socialism” (1950), p. 449. 
33 Ludwig von Mises in 1922. And Keynes agreed: “The battle of Socialism against unlimited private profit is being 
won in detail hour by hour.” John Maynard Keynes, “The End of Laisser-Faire” (1926). 
34 Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 76.  
35 See for example, Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds: The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Daniel Stedman Jones, 
Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2012); Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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influence rested not only in a formalist theory of marginal utility and a critique of Marxist 
economics, but also in polemic strategies of scientific intervention. 
The Austrian tradition began with Menger’s attack on Gustav von Schmoller and his 
German Historical School in the form of sixteen “letters to a friend.”36 The “Austrian School” was 
an insult that stuck after Schmoller responded to Menger in their Methodenstreit, a dispute between 
“historicist” and “formalist” methodology.37 At the time Schmoller enjoyed institutional 
hegemony over German-speaking economics as head of the Verein für Socialpolitik and the so-
called “Socialists of the Chair.”38 But as the reign of the Historical School declined by WWI, its 
feud with the Austrian School ironically offered an anti-socialist blueprint for the early neoliberals. 
The lesson of this Austrian intervention, I argue in the following chapter, represents an overlooked 
point of origin in neoliberal historiography; another overlooked point in this history was Max 
Weber himself, who became an unlikely Austrian School ally at the end of his life. By 
promulgating typological accounts of subjective instrumentality, value neutrality, and socialist 
irrationality, Weber played a key politico-methodological role in the early neoliberals’ critique of 
socialism.  
The dawn of neoliberal rationality can be dated to this critique of socialism, better known 
as the “socialist calculation debate” popularized by Hayek. The debate was a neoliberal retort to 
the momentum of socialism after the first World War. Mises officially commenced the debate in 
a widely-read essay, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” which appeared in 
the 1920 issue of Weber’s journal.39 In it, Mises made a scientific case for the impossibility of 
socialist planning due to its inherent irrationality. Based on Austrian conceptions of marginal 
utility and the price mechanism, Mises defined market competition as “rationality” and collectivist 
alternatives as “irrationality.” Here Mises twisted an already widespread binary in economic theory 
to new ends: the market or exchange economy (Marktwirtschaft or Verkehrswirtschaft) vs. the 
communal or planned economy (Gemeinwirtschaft or Planwirtschaft) were not just types, in 
Mises’ view, but [mutually exclusive] opposites.40 Previously, economists and sociologists 
explored a range of different “types” of economic order, including “mixed” economies that 
combined features of each type; now, such mixtures were deemed irrational, scientifically null and 
void.41 For socialism implies, in Mises’ famous line, “the abolition of rational economy.”42 Or, in 
a more direct translation of the German original, “socialism is the abolition of the rationality of 
the economy.”43 Having equated “economic rationality” with the price mechanism, itself premised 
on market competition, the early neoliberals insisted that socialism, when implemented, would 
                                                
36 See Carl Menger, Die Irrthümer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie (Wien: Hölder, 1884). See 
also, Carl Menger, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Ökonomie 
insbesondere [1883] in F. A. Hayek (ed.), Carl Menger: Gesammelte Werke (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1969). 
37 Working through institutions like the Verein für Socialpolitik, their success illustrated the power of formalistic 
scientism in establishing new paradigms and infiltrating political institutions. In many ways, this debate anticipates 
the feud between rational choice theory and historical institutionalism three-quarters of a century later. 
38 On these school and the Methodenstreit, see the first section in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
39 Mises’ essay, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” appeared in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft 
und Sozialpolitik, the journal Weber founded and in which Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” first appeared as two essays. 
Mises’ essay appeared in the 1920 issue, the same year of Weber’s death. Weber acknowledged Mises’ article in the 
second chapter of Economy and Society. See Chapter 1 of the dissertation. 
40 For an overview of Central European economics, see Joanna Bockman, The Socialist Origins of Neoliberalism. 
41 Earlier formulations of the binary can be found, for example, in Carl Menger, Collected Works, p. 170. 
42 Ludwig von Mises, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” p. 23. 
43 “Sozialismus ist Aufhebung der Rationalität der Wirtschaft” (emphasis mine).  
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collapse on its own irrationality. Thus the calculation debate became a methodological centerpiece 
from Freiburg and Chicago to London and Paris—even if the neoliberals were split over just how 
to build upon it. On one side was Mises of the Austrian School, a skeptic of all “interventionism”; 
on the other was the Freiburg School, which proposed a “Third Way” between laisser-faire and 
socialism. 
Mises’ was in many senses a classical liberal move: the political and the economic must be 
kept apart, he insisted. But the conditions in which he made his move were new: state and economy 
were mixed like never before, increasingly organized by interventionist technologies guided by 
constructivist epistemologies. Liberal laisser-faire, as Keynes himself declared, was no more.44 
The questions now were: Will capitalism be abolished by communism or evolve into socialism? 
Or could it still, perhaps, be saved from itself and thus preserved? Any answer amounted to a tacit 
acknowledgement that the “natural laws” of the market were neither natural nor laws at all—or, if 
they were, they included a death drive. In any case, it was conceded, analysis must confront their 
“production” through different legal, cultural, and institutional forms.  
This double movement between science and politics yielded another seeming paradox. At 
the same time that interwar “economics” constituted “the economy” as the central object of 
inquiry, “the primacy of the political” was increasingly acknowledged.45 In 1921, Walter Rathenau 
could still claim that “Economy is destiny.” But by 1932, German neoliberal Alexander Rüstow 
was not alone in observing that “the economy is not our destiny; the state is our destiny, and the 
state is also the destiny of the economy.”46 Keynes, too, believed that capitalism could be altered 
by “the agency of collective action”—by which he meant political technology, not radical 
democracy.47 Frankfurters like Horkheimer and Pollock likewise observed “the transition from a 
predominantly economic to an essentially political era.”48 The question, as ever, was: What is to 
                                                
44 More elaborately, Keynes wrote: “I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an 
economic doctrine which a rational and instructed person could not doubt but almost as a part of the moral law. I 
regarded departures from it as being at the same time an imbecility and an outrage… But today one country after 
another abandons these presumptions. Russia is still alone in her particular experiment, but no longer alone in her 
abandonment of the old presumptions. Italy, Ireland, Germany have cast their eyes, or are casting them, towards new 
modes of political economy. Many more countries after them will soon be seeking, one by one, after new economic 
gods. Even countries such as Great Britain and the United States, though conforming in the main to the old model, 
are striving, under the surface, after a new economic plan. We do not know what will be the outcome. We are—all 
of us, I expect—about to make many mistakes. No one can tell which of the new systems will prove itself best.” 
John Maynard Keynes, “The End of Laisser-Faire” (1926). 
45 “[E]conomics established its claim to be the true political science. The idea of ‘the economy’ provided a mode of 
seeing and a way of organizing the world that could diagnose a country’s fundamental condition, frame the terms of 
its public debate, picture its collective growth or decline, and propose remedies for its improvement, all in terms of 
what seemed a legible series of measurements, goals, and comparisons.” Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts, p. 272. 
46 In the same year as Rüstow, Werner Sombart, the renowned historian of capitalism and socialist-turned-proto-
Nazi, also argued “the economy is not our destiny.”  
47 “These reflections have been directed towards possible improvements in the technique of modern capitalism by 
the agency of collective action. There is nothing in them which is seriously incompatible with what seems to me to 
be the essential characteristic of capitalism, namely the dependence upon an intense appeal to the money-making 
and money-loving instincts of individuals as the main motive force of the economic machine.” John Maynard 
Keynes, “The End of Laisser-Faire” (1926). 
48 Friedrich Pollock, “State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations” [1941] in Critical Theory and Society: A 
Reader, Bronner and Kellner, eds. (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 101. See also Franz Neumann, "Über die 
Voraussetzungen und den Rechtsbegriff einer Wirtschaftsordnung" in Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie: Aufsätze 1930-
1954 (Frankfurt: Alfons Söllner, 1978). 
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be done? The answers each offered can be gleaned from their philosophical anthropologies and 
their political rationalities, whether implicit or explicit as propositions. 
The “primacy of the political” was theoretically inimical but strategically essential for the 
neoliberals’ vision. That the political had overtaken the economic already revealed the historical 
failure of classical liberalism. For the neoliberals, then, the state became a means to an end: 
cultivating the “competitive” or “spontaneous” order of the market and constructing 
“entrepreneurial” and “economizing” individual subjects. The neoliberal program sought to 
inscribe a modified form of economic rationality into political rationality. The subject to be 
fashioned by this rationality was, under neo-liberalism, not political or social but economic Man. 
This was not the homo oeconomicus of yesteryear, however, but an alternate mold of subjectivity 
more immune to “politicization” and “collectivization.” Contra “paleoliberalism,” neoliberalism 
did not seek to realize the hidden truth of Man, but to construct a new kind of subject. If the task 
of “construction” was undoubtedly part of a political project, it did not necessarily aim at spreading 
the ethos of democracy or the political more generally. In fending off socialism, Röpke used the 
word “depoliticization” before it entered popular usage: the worker, he warned, must be 
“spiritually and materially deproletarianized,” just as “the economy must be depoliticized.”49 
Neither Lockean nor classically liberal in their justification of private property, theirs was a 
strategic move to blunt the very desire for revolution.50 Political technique, in their eyes, could 
combine economic science with psychological engineering.51  
If the “world of to-day is nothing but interventionist chaos,”52 as Hayek declared, Röpke 
offered the first step toward an alternative: “constructing in our imagination an economic order 
built on principles which are exactly the opposite of those of our present economic order.”53 Such 
a deliberate act of imagination, they realized, would first need to be a scientific creed, then a 
political rationality, and only then a global order and way of life. The neoliberal task, as articulated 
by Hayek and his colleagues, amounted to “the dethronement of politics” by political means.54  
In opting to save liberal capitalism from itself through political means, Keynes joined the 
neoliberals and parted ways with those like Schumpeter and Polanyi who believed the future 
                                                
49 Röpke evaluated widespread socialist proposals for socialization: “den Arbeiter seelisch und materiell zu 
entproletarizieren.” Wilhelm Röpke, “Sozialisierung,” in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 4. Auflage, 7. 
Bände (Jena 1926), p. 577 (translation mine). 
50  “The misery of ‘capitalism,’ we must point out to the socialists, is not due to some men owning capital, but rather 
to others not owning any, and thus being proletarians.” Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 178. “As distinct from income which 
everybody wants as a matter of course, property requires a certain exertion on the part of the will and a particular 
attitude of mind, things which are anything but matters of course.” Röpke, Moral Foundations, p. 156. 
51 “We have before us a very fertile field of co-operation between the social sciences and the science of 
engineering,” Röpke argued. For a technological development could ensure that the “most rational organization” of 
enterprises coincides with “the balance of society itself.” A “countermounted socio-political effort” [widergelagerte 
Gesellschaftspolitik] must stabilize the market economy, and a “structural policy” must “no longer assume the social 
preconditions of the market economy… as given, but modify them with a specific intent.” Röpke, Civitas Humana 
(1944/1946), p. 146. 
52 See Friedrich von Hayek (ed.), Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism 
(1935). 
53 Wilhelm Röpke, “Socialism, Planning, and the Business Cycle” in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 44, No. 3 
(June, 1936), p. 318. 
54 Friedrich von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3: The Political Order of a Free People (1979), p. 
128. For the far-reaching history of this project, see Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth 
of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). 
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belonged to socialism.55 This interventionist solution to liberalism’s crisis is why some at the time 
called Keynes himself a “neoliberal.”56 And from this perspective, Keynes did share more with the 
neoliberals than is commonly recognized. For he too saw liberalism as a political technique and 
institutional form of capitalism, albeit one on life support. Keynes was neither a socialist nor an 
egalitarian, but perceived the creative means socialist planners had at their disposal. Popular 
anxieties and “animal spirits,” Keynes observed, induced reckless speculation and harmful 
hoarding. To reign in the irrationality of capitalism while securing its great achievements, as he 
saw them, new methods and techniques were required. Here the state represented a tool and 
interventionism a technique, though an underlying rationality was needed to guide to their 
application. Conducting the conduct of animal spirits from above meant reprogramming economic 
psychology down below; to this end, Keynes proposed counter-cyclical strategies of state spending 
to foster consumer demand, secure full employment, and power the economic engine into the 
future. Keynes’ method worked “both as a description of the human condition and as an ethos 
aimed at optimizing humanity’s potential.”57 Keynes’ philosophical anthropology was not one of 
competitive entrepreneurialism, utilitarian hedonism, or class solidarity, but one of aristocratic 
leisure;58 this form of life was already practiced by the elite but was tendentially available to each 
and all—if only they desire it and behave accordingly. 
Before Keynesianism became the political rationality of the postwar Euro-Atlantic (with 
the important exception of West Germany), the approach to political economy had high ambitions 
indeed. Long after Marx and long before Fukuyama, Keynes likewise sought the end of history. 
Keynesian rationality intended to (re)rationalize subjective conduct away from the classical homo 
oeconomicus and toward a different kind of jouissance: it aimed at “setting the proper conditions 
for the slow and painless death, the ‘euthanasia,’ not only of the ‘rentier,’ but of the subject of 
interest” that was classical homo oeconomicus.59 A new form of political rationality would produce 
a new form of subjectivity. But here Keynes’ vision of a harmonious “end state” more closely 
resembled the dream of social democracy than that of neoliberal technocracy.  
As Keynesianism took the reins of economic theory and governmental practice, the 
neoliberals observed jealously from the sidelines. Most of them believed that a “rule-bound” and 
“market-conforming” approach to state intervention would be necessary, though only if placed 
within a legal and technocratic straightjacket. In the neoliberal diagnosis, Keynes’ solution was no 
solution at all: rational saving was a virtue, deficit spending a vice. The chief causes of interwar 
                                                
55  “These reflections have been directed towards possible improvements in the technique of modern capitalism by 
the agency of collective action. There is nothing in them which is seriously incompatible with what seems to me to 
be the essential characteristic of capitalism, namely the dependence upon an intense appeal to the money-making 
and money-loving instincts of individuals as the main motive force of the economic machine.” John Maynard 
Keynes, “The End of Laisser-Faire” (1926).  
56 For one example, see Röpke’s mocking remark in his essay on Keynes: “It really seems grotesque that recently a 
French author, J. Cros, in a study entitled ‘Le Néo-Libéralisme,’ contrasted Keynes as ‘le véritable néo-libéral’ with 
such muddle-headed writers as Lippmann and Röpke.” Wilhelm Röpke, Against the Tide, p. 176. Röpke is referring 
to Jacques Cros, Le Néo-libéralisme: étude positive et critique (Librairie de Médicis, Editions M. Th. Génin, 1951). 
57 Michel Feher, “Hastening the Decline of Deferred Gratification: Notes on Keynes’ Moral Anthropology” 
(forthcoming). 
58 See Geoff Mann, In the Long Run We Are All Dead. Keynesianism, Political Economy, and Revolution (New 
York: Verso Books, 2017). 
59 Jouissance is not Keynes’ own terminology, of course, but a psychoanalytic way of reading his orientation to 
desire and pleasure beyond mere instrumentality. See Feher, “Hastening the Decline of Deferred Gratification” 
(forthcoming). 
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crisis, moreover, involved reckless monetary and fiscal policies, the dissolution of the social fabric, 
the irrationality of the proletarian masses, and the democratic state’s kowtowing to expansive 
social demands.60 For the Freiburg School ordoliberals, only a “strong state” could prove capable 
of securing a “free economy” on the basis of an “economic constitution” and a “market police.” 
Theirs would be an independent state, in other words, with technocratic, monetary, fiscal, and 
constitutional safeguards against democratic and corporate influence. Keynes may have struck 
first, but Ludwig Erhard and the ordoliberals ensured the British paradigm would never enter West 
Germany. “The competitive market order,” the interwar Germans argued, could be instituted and 
governed from above—and, in 1948, so it was. Upon the rubble of WWII, a new state would be 
constructed with a rationality of their making—the first “neoliberal” government, properly so 
called. 
Having considered neoliberal rationality and Keynesian rationality, what, we might ask, 
about socialist rationality? Was Foucault right to claim that socialism had failed to create an 
“autonomous governmental rationality,” that its future task lay in “inventing” one?61 What did 
neo-Marxists, and the Frankfurt School in particular, have to say about this kind of struggle—that 
is, the struggle not only to resist the status quo but to produce an alternative rationality that would 
transform it? Marx and Engels, after all, never longed for state power in the way Keynes and the 
neoliberals did. For them, the state was the guarantor of merely formal equality, the site of a false 
universality, and the violent instrument of capitalist interests. 
While a “truth” of radical democracy animated Marx’s critique of political and economic 
liberalism,62 his radical historicism came with epistemological modesty about the details of any 
future ontology. For if all modes of thought and organization are conditioned by specific historical 
and material relations that make them possible, who can say what future forms of subjectivity and 
sociality would look like under socialism, much less communism? Marx articulated his most 
concrete aspirations for political (qua social) organization in his reflections on the Paris Commune, 
and his most general vision of collective freedom came in the third and last volume of Capital. 
Here he pointed to a possible future of “socialized man, the associated producers, rationally 
regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control.”63 Collective 
                                                
60 “The solution, we hope, is gradually taking more definite shape: the problem of an anti-collectivist alternative 
program… The non-collectivist world will only be able to deal with the dangers of collectivism successfully when it 
knows how to deal in its own way with the problems of the proletariat, large scale industrialism, monopolism, the 
multitudinous forms of exploitation and the mechanizing effects of capitalist mass civilization. Economic freedom as 
an essential form of personal liberty and as a premise of everything that follows belongs undeniably to the total 
picture of a society which is diametrically opposed to collectivism.” Wilhelm Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time, 
p. 177. 
61 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79 (New York: Picador, 
2008), p. 194. 
62 Many meditations on political theory can be found in Marx’s own writings, but none better articulated the 
animating insight of radical democracy than his early observation that “all forms of the state have democracy for 
their truth, and for that reason are false to the extent that they are not democracy.” Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s 
‘Philosophy of Right’, trans. James O’Malley (Cambridge, 1970), p. 31. Marx’s most sustained and complex 
treatment of this subject is found, of course, in his early essay, “On the Jewish Question.” 
63 “Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised 
man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development 
this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production 
which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated 
producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of 
being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under 
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ownership, in short, would produce a new form of subjectivity and collective rationality. This was 
less a political rationality, however, than a social rationality. 
It was an honest observation of Horkheimer’s, then, when he said that Marx had left the 
question of design and implementation—that is, what would be done after the revolution—to 
August Bebel, the first head of the German socialist party.64 To acknowledge that Marx and Engels 
birthed a tradition of thought for which state power was but a means to an end beyond it is not a 
matter of immediate judgment, but rather the beginning of a sustained reflection on the meaning 
of the political itself. As a locus of class power, the state was to be seized by the proletariat. Yet 
the epistemological premise of this movement was that the state could be ontologically 
overcome—that it could “wither away,” in Engel’s famous phrase, perhaps dissolving the 
conflictual realm of the political along with it.65 The process of transcending class conflict through 
the first truly universal class, and thus achieving a “harmonious” form of sociality and a higher 
level of truth, at least tendentially implied the overcoming power and conflict as such.66 The 
promise to materialize Man’s social or communal nature provided the foundations, after all, of 
social-ism and commun-ism ever since its so-called “utopian” beginnings. At their best, these 
traditions offered a vision of collective freedom secured by cooperative need provision, 
materializing a new human condition beyond narrow self-interest; at their worst, they sought to 
realize this vision through scientistic techniques and a distinct political rationality in which the 
New Man functioned more like a machine than a subject of democratic freedom. 
My depiction of these traditions is meant to register the potential for political deficits in 
socialist thought as well67—lest we assume that (neo)liberalism and Keynesianism alone had a 
vision in which political power was a means to delimit or eliminate democratic action and 
disharmony, or what I called restricting “the political” by political means. In accounting for the 
nature of these deficits, it is important to ask of the Marxist and socialist traditions: What becomes 
of the political ideal of radical democracy—of democratic self-determination—when society is the 
(universal) subject that consciously regulates itself? If the state and the political are irreducible to 
one another, what becomes of the latter through seizing the former? If a “universal class” were 
realized, could other forms of collective identification potentially spell danger for a socialized 
body of free and equal subjects?  
                                                
conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of 
necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, 
which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day 
is its basic prerequisite.” Marx, Capital, Volume III. 
64 See Max Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State,” The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, Arato and Gebhardt, 
eds. (New York: Continuum, 1990). 
65 The phrase appears in Engels, Anti-Dühring (1878) and Lenin, The State and Revolution (1917). For the 
contention that such a “withering away” of the state is based on a misreading of Marx and Engels’ original 
understanding of universality, and that the positive features of bureaucracy could be preserved in a Marxist notion, 
see Paul Thomas, Alien Politics: Marxist State Theory Retrieved (Routledge, 1994). 
66 Or, if not overcoming conflict, then at least resolving collective (qua class) conflict while personal conflicts 
persist. 
67 Even if, in the Italian context, thinkers like Gramsci were actively theorizing the political as a revolt against 
capital and a war of position. 
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At the heart of socialism lay a tension between the political and the social, one that many 
approached as a question of reconciliation.68 Along with the questions above, this core tension will 
remain important in considering twentieth-century theories of state rationality, which (with the 
exception of fascism) originally aimed at transcending the concentrated forms of power that 
plagued the interwar period. This was true despite the “technical” problems that haunted various 
kinds of programs. Their means included rationalizing, regulating, and automatizing the political; 
their ends foresaw a process in which the “society” or the “market” could become a (potentially) 
universal, self-reflective, self-regulating subject—a constructivist ideal, though not entirely unlike 
the naturalist organicism found in strands of classical liberalism and German idealism.69 In any 
case, a tension between the social and the political ran through Frankfurt School, too, whose 
approach to politics I will consider before treating their approach to critique below.  
A tension between the social and the political ran through Frankfurt School, too. If, for 
Keynesians and neoliberals, rationality represented the new puzzle and lasting solution of 
capitalist crisis, the same could be said, from the inverse angle, for the Frankfurters. For the latter, 
if capitalist rationality was the disease—and indeed, a form of irrationality itself—then a social 
rationality promised the only cure. The means of politically realizing a social rationality, however, 
has been a more ambiguous matter, long deferred by Marxist theory and socialist practice. The 
revised approach that emerged out of Frankfurt was neo-Marxist and neoWeberian at the same 
time. 
If a political theory can be found in critical theory, it would likely stem from its founders’ 
double inspiration: workers’ councils and state socialism. Both political forms were found in 
WWI’s aftermath. In 1918 Munich was among the largest sites of revolutionary activity, where 
the workers’ council placed Otto Neurath in charge of a wartime-inspired system of rational 
planning. Meanwhile, at the university, Max Weber lectured on the typologies of workers’ councils 
and, more famously, the tension between science and politics as vocations. Though Weber’s 
lecture hall brimmed with revolutionary energy, young students in attendance like Max 
Horkheimer and Friedrich Pollock were left disappointed by his “value-neutral” analysis. After a 
close encounter with the Munich police, the leftist students fled to continue their studies in 
Frankfurt, where they would eventually build an interdisciplinary Marxist research center, the 
Institut für Sozialforschung. 
As thinkers of their moment, the Frankfurt circle first approached the problem of political 
rationality through the same socialist calculation debate which Mises and Hayek had launched and 
in which other socialists, like Karl Polanyi and Oskar Lange, were taking part. When implemented, 
these theorists asked, what higher form of rationality would socialism possess? The answer offered 
by the Frankfurt circle’s more orthodox members, which Horkheimer and Pollock found appealing 
at first, was a form of centralized rational planning on the model of state socialism.70 This gave 
the Soviet experiment even greater import for the neo-Marxist group: the technical problem of 
planning would determine the political possibilities of socialism, and a world historic case study 
                                                
68 In their consideration of council communism, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Korsch, Henriette Roland-Holst and others 
did not understand the question of political organization in terms of reified opposites. Georg Lukács was also an 
early proponent of council communism before discarding this ideal for a more Leninist vanguardism. 
69 For an account of the latter—the nation as organism in German idealism, see Pheng Cheah, Spectral Nationality: 
Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
70 For a discussion, see the first section of Chapter 4. 
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was already underway to the east.71 In the Frankfurters’ discourse, “society” comprised an agent 
of great spontaneity, while “politics” largely meant the Revolution or the Party. Meanwhile 
Marxist political economy was bifurcated into the science of socialist planning and the study of 
the workers’ movement: the former formulated schemes of rationalized need-provision for the 
revolution-to-come; the latter studied the obstacles and openings that workers would encounter 
along the way. For having seized the state, political rationality would be a technical means to a 
liberatory end: the realization of the first truly universal class, the harmonization of human 
relations, the self-regulation of society according to the principle of need rather than profit. 
The transition, however, did not come to pass. Early on the Frankfurters realized “[i]t is 
not capitalism but its liberal phase that has come to an end.”72 The political was not just dominating 
the economic; their pernicious fusion in Nazism, Stalinism and Keynesian capitalism was spelling 
a definite end to proletarian consciousness.73 Once the highest hope of socialist politics, rational 
planning had become the means of unceasing domination. For the exiled Frankfurt circle, this was 
not only an overlooked impetus for their totalizing philosophy of history in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment; it also became a totalizing truth equally applicable to the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and the entirety of their historical moment.74 Accordingly, critical theory became as dark 
and totalizing as wartime itself. 
The typical narrative about the postwar Frankfurt School underscores their increasing 
pessimism and conservatism, and for good reason.75 In this project I will instead focus on their 
vision of the political, their lapsed faith in worldly rationality, and their changing relationship to 
liberalism and capitalism. It is with these concerns that I will parse similarities and differences 
between its members, with the goal of offering a broader perspective on the insights and limitations 
of their project. Beyond the usual dialectic of pessimism and utopianism, this may better grasp 
how their visions of politics and instrumentality conditioned their perspectives on revolutionary 
and socialist (im)possibilities.76 
A loss of faith in “objective” or “emphatic” reason [Vernunft], I argue, mirrored a loss of 
faith in socialist political rationality. If the socialist conversion began in Munich for Horkheimer 
                                                
71 For this reason Pollock traveled to the Soviet Union for a multiyear study of “rational planning” in practice. 
For the results, published as his 1928 Habilitation, see Friedrich Pollock, Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der 
Sowjetunion 1917-1927 (Leipzig, 1929) [Attempts at a Planned Economy in the Soviet Union 1917-1927]. See also 
Pollock, "Die gegenwärtige Lage des Kapitalismus und die Aussichten einer planwirtschaftlichen Neuordnung," in 
Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 1 (1932). 
72 Thus the broad and influential appellation of “State Capitalism” that Pollock gave to each. See Friedrich Pollock, 
“Bemerkungen zur Wirtschaftskrise” in Friedrich Pollock: Stadien des Kapitalismus, ed. Helmut Dubiel (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1933/1975), p. 68. See also Rolf Wiggershaus, “Friedrich Pollock: der letzte Unbekannte der Frankfurter 
Schule," Die Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte 8 (1994), pp. 750-56. 
73 The question of whether consciousness or structure “came first” was central to the ordoliberals, examined in 
Chapter 2. But it was also important to thinkers like Erich Fromm who argued—like Arendt, Gasset, Canetti, and 
others—that this dissolution was a product of massification, whereas the Frankfurt School sought to hold onto the 
distinction between mass culture and mass society. For the first-generation Critical Theorists, the latter preserved the 
existence of class, thus one could still speak of a class society. 
74 Pollock understood this concept as “a Weberian ideal type.” See the first footnote in Pollock, “State Capitalism.” 
Pollock’s understanding of state capitalism and Nazism more specifically different from Franz Neumann, member of 
the Frankfurt School and author of Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (1942). 
75 See the discussion toward the end of Chapter 4. 
76 The “Culture Industry” may have become the focus of Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique, but this was possible 
because of a prior account of “State Capitalism” that led them down this road of analysis. 
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and Pollock, it had lapsed by the end of their stay in the United States. The idea that rational 
planning was shot through with instrumental rationality fundamentally altered Horkheimer’s 
notion of political possibility—and even his notion of critical theory.77 It also motivated Marcuse 
and Habermas to return to Max Weber, as both a target and an inspiration, to think through 
questions of technology, ideology, and “political rationality” (though the latter carried a different 
valence than Foucault’s approach).  
Even at the most radical moments of Marcuse and Habermas’s theorizing, the political was 
hardly perceived as a realm of collective creativity irreducible to the cultural or as a site of 
historical change irreducible to the economic. The political was rather seen a kind of hardware 
programmed by seemingly inscrutable “ultimate values”; the coercive apparatus of the state, 
Marcuse suggested, was a “neutral technology” that could be seized and “inverted” by socialist 
revolution. If this was a materialist vision of politics, it was one that called for turning the apparatus 
of instrumental rationality on its head—by appropriating and using, no less, the very same 
instrumental apparatus for truly human ends. Before critical theory took a normative turn toward 
political liberalism, then, its slogan was “the administration of things without the administration 
of men.” Such a theory of power and politics set limits on their political theorizing well into 
Habermas’ nuanced adoption of systems theory. And among its central features, I argue, was a 
Weberian vision of instrumentality and a dialectic of ideal types. This form of critique put into 
dialectical motion a set of sociological categories and ideal types that did not ossify into positivist 
facticity. Neither did these categories and types yield strategic insights into existing fields of 
political power and collective struggle, however. What they ultimately constructed was a critique 
of rationality absent the political, in the robust sense of the term.  
 
The Critique of Political Rationality 
 
“Since the nineteenth century,” observed Foucault, “Western thought has never stopped 
laboring at the task of criticizing the role of reason—or the lack of reason—in political 
structures.”78 Forged for this task, reason wielded a double-edged sword that struck at its own 
overreach. While philosophy aimed to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of experience 
and knowledge, it simultaneously sought to keep watch over the excesses of political rationality. 
Around this task emerged a critical disposition that submitted political power—de facto and de 
jure—to the tribunal of reason. This was not the sole purview of philosophy, as we saw above, but 
of political economy, public law, and other discursive formations as well.79 
In the Kantian tradition, the concept of reason underwrites critique, though it also 
comprises critique’s target. Despite his rejection of dialectical reason, Kant’s idea of critique 
                                                
77 See Chapter 2 of the dissertation as well as Abromeit’s argument that “Horkheimer’s adoption of the state 
capitalist argument – an earlier and different version of which had already been developed by Friedrich Pollock – 
was the primary cause of the shift in his thought during this time. Once Horkheimer had worked out his new 
position, many of Adorno’s arguments, which he had viewed skeptically until then, began to seem more appealing.” 
John Abromeit, “State Capitalism: The End of Horkheimer’s Early Critical Theory” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
78 Michel Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of ‘Political Reason,’” p. 58. 
79 In this respect different parts of Habermas’ Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Foucault’s 
Security, Territory, Population could productively be paired together to theorize the different valences of politics 
and critique from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into the twentieth century. 
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already presupposes some kind of contradiction or crisis in the world, some kind of limit or breach 
of reason itself. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant dispelled traditional approaches to 
metaphysical questions and offered a general outline for the critical procedure. In doing so, he 
used reason to draw a line around the limits of reason and to delineate the structural conditions 
that make knowledge possible. At the basis of Kantian reason, in other words, is a reflexive 
principle connecting the method of critique to the object of critique. In turning to the “impure” 
realm of history, or what could be called “historical reason,” however, Kant ran up against the 
non-rational basis of reason. Here he found it necessary to supplement the perspective of the 
reasoning Subject with a liberal teleology of Nature and a progressive arc of History.80 As we will 
see, the Kantian dilemmas—rational critique and (ir)rational history—would prove enduring. 
In examining different approaches to “political rationality” it is useful, I think, to 
distinguish between two currents of the critical tradition that followed in Kant’s wake. 
Schematically, these could be called the Kantian-Weberian and Hegelian-Marxian modes of 
analysis. The former is characterized by formal antinomy and value critique, the latter by 
dialectical logic and ideology critique. Each will prove significant for the various approaches to 
politics and rationality examined in this project, and for the Frankfurt School and Foucault in 
particular. 
By the end of the nineteenth century historicism had broken from Hegelianism, as neo-
Kantianism became the dominant scientific [wissenschaftlich] paradigm in and beyond the 
German-speaking world.81 The problem of “pure reason” vs. “historical reason” remained as each 
discipline increasingly treated it in neo-Kantian fashion. Thus did neo-Kantian disciples like 
Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber continue to grapple with antinomies of rationality-irrationality, 
order-chaos, and fact-value. For Durkheim, society is a form and system of constraints that gives 
shape to individual drives, which in turn animate the social form writ large.82 For Simmel, thought 
and life itself are externalized through cultural forms, which in turn set constraining conditions on 
individual freedom. For Weber, a form of rationalization departs from a particular (social, 
religious, or political) perspective but does not circle back to where it began; viewed within a 
historical process, it is not reflective in the critical sense but creates islands of rationality in an 
otherwise chaotic sea of irrationality. The (neo-)Kantian schema thus sets formal limits but 
confronts them in aporetic turns. The disciplinary founders of modern social science could offer 
pathbreaking studies of specific forms of rationality; yet stripped of an emphatic concept of reason, 
they could not claim a transcendent tribunal from which to judge them. While the scientific 
heritage of this tradition posits an unbridgeable gap between rationality and value, its normative 
heritage is driven by the desire to unite them through moral justification. 
The dialectical procedure seeks to move beyond Kantian aporias through a different 
perspective on contradiction and change. In dialectical methods, binary entities and opposing 
forces do not exist in a static relation; they develop in dynamic tensions that yield their own 
                                                
80 For a rich and more nuanced reading of Kant’s essays on history, see Chapter 2, “Kant: Reason as Critique; the 
Critique of Reason,” in Martin Jay, Reason After Its Eclipse: On Late Critical Theory (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2016). 
81 Neo-Kantianism came in many forms, and not all were universal or positivist notions of science. Thinkers like 
Windelband and Rickert, who juxtaposed the natural and the human sciences, profoundly influenced Weber. For a 
discussion, see Chapter 1. 
82 There are different readings of Durkheim’s debt to Kantianism vs. Comteanism. In any case, for Durkheim, there 
is no Kantian, transcendental mind; transcendental conditions are the effects of the social, which can in turn be 
investigated by positivist social scientific methods. 
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rearticulation or sublation, implying the emergence of new forms that embody and overcome each 
side of the prior contradiction. For Hegel, this is the work of Reason itself, whose operation is not 
outside but inscribed into history. History is here thought’s own dialectical movement, Reason’s 
own progressive realization. Once historicized, reason is no longer pure in the Kantian sense, but 
must account for its own conditions of possibility in past forms of reason. While Marx praised 
Hegel for being the first to present the dialectic’s “general forms of motion in a comprehensive 
and conscious manner,” he insisted the Hegelian method be “de-mystified” and “stood on his head” 
with a new, materialist foundation.83 Historical development is not driven by thought and ideas, 
Marx argued, but by the forces and relations of material production through which humans 
reproduce their means of subsistence. To counter speculative critique, Marx also placed theory and 
practice in a dialectical relationship, designating the theorist as the historical visionary, the 
proletariat as the historical subject, and the revolution as the historical process through which 
capitalist contradictions could be overcome. 
In the twentieth century, Marxist currents like the Frankfurt School held tightly to the 
Hegelian-Marxian method while also drawing selectively from the Kantian-Weberian reservoir. 
In this way the Frankfurters creatively fused the dialectical critique of capitalism with the critique 
of instrumental rationality. The Frankfurt School retained the central concepts of Marxist 
theorizing—ideology, reification, and commodity fetishism—but twisted other parts of the model. 
Traditionally, Marxist critique diagnosed socio-economic or material conditions as primary and 
political or ideological features as secondary in determining the course of historical development. 
That capitalism had not only found political and cultural reinforcement but blended the so-called 
“base” and “superstructure” meant ideology critique needed to be reconsidered, as already implied 
by their concepts of “culture industry” and “state capitalism.” To this end the Frankfurt School 
took a modified and potentially totalizing concept of instrumental rationality from Max Weber and 
György Lukacs. This concept would later be modified into what Marcuse and Habermas would 
call “political rationality,” a fusion of instrumentality and politics based on a conception of 
“technology as ideology.” Here as before, critical theory held out for emphatic reason, substantive 
value, or spontaneous revolution that could overturn a world of totalizing instrumentality.84 The 
insights and blind spots in this account, as we will see, open up new avenues into Marxist and 
Weberian questions, including the relationship between ideational and material production, 
between scientific and practical rationality, and between political and economic order.85 
Foucault entered an explicit, if ambivalent, relation to Weber and the Frankfurt School for 
the first time when he embarked on a genealogy of political power midway through his career.86  
                                                
83 See Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1, pp. 102-103. 
84 “Neither science nor technics have values in themselves; they are ‘neutral’ with respect to value or ends that might 
have been attributed to them from outside… Being assumes the ontological character of instrumentality; by its very 
nature this rationality is susceptible to any use and to any modification… The absence of an ultimate purpose in 
technology manifests itself equally in politics, where it becomes open to suspicion and contestation… pure 
instrumentality, deprived of its ultimate purpose, has become a universal means for domination.” Herbert Marcuse, 
“From Ontology to Technology,” p. 124. 
85 That is, until Habermas rejected the first generation’s “philosophy of consciousness,” adopted in part the 
perspective of systems theory, and asserted critical theory would henceforth dispense altogether with the critique of 
ideology and political economy. 
86 In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s Foucault spoke about his relationship to Weber and the Frankfurt School on 
multiple occasions. See Foucault, “Introduction” in Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, pp. 11-12; 
Foucault, “‘Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason” (p. 299) and “Space, Knowledge, and 
Power” (pp. 357-58) in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 3: Power, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: 
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This relation compelled Foucault to recast the stakes of his previous writings: “I have tried to 
analyze forms of rationality: the different foundations, creations and modifications with which 
rationalities engender, oppose and pursue one another.”87 In doing so, Foucault carved new paths 
within and alongside the two critical traditions discussed above. While “materialist” concerns 
consistently contoured Foucault’s work,88 his modified conception of “forms of rationality” is 
better read in relation to the critical procedure of Kantian-Weberianism. Thus his claim that the 
ever-changing objects of his research—truth, power, and the subject—turned on questions of 
“form” rather than “value.” And hence his insistence, guided by Nietzschean and Deleuzian tactics, 
on a “strategic logic” rather than a “dialectical logic” in matters of method.89 Tracking specific 
forms of rationality allowed Foucault, much like Weber and Habermas at their best, to pluralize 
practical reasoning into diverse domains of knowledge and power. Yet despite these Kantian-
Weberian problematics, Foucault eschewed the moralistic tendency of Kantianism to equate 
rationality (qua practical reason) and value and the formalistic tendency of Weberianism to work 
through ideal types.90 That Foucault’s modified method centered on historical or “impure”91 forms 
of rationality illuminates how concepts are translated and practices are transposed between 
different knowledges, institutions, and spheres of life.  
Foucault thus began thematizing his relation to both the Frankfurt School and his mentors, 
Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem.92 “In the French history of science as in German 
critical theory,” he explained, “the same kinds of questions… are addressed to a rationality which 
makes universal claims while developing in contingency, which asserts its unity and yet proceeds 
only by means of partial modification when not by general recastings.”93 At stake in each case is 
                                                
The New Press, 2000); Foucault, “Structuralism and Post-structuralism,” Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, 
Vol 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 440-
443; Foucault, Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori, trans. R. James Goldstein and James 
Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), pp. 115-20 (interview held in 1978); Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que la 
critique?” pp. 42-43; Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p. 27; 
Foucault, “Questions of Method” in The Foucault Effect, p. 79. 
87 Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History” (translation altered), p. 79. 
88 Elsewhere I call this Foucault’s “materialist” alternative to ideology critique. See “Michel Foucault’s Materialist 
Methods: On the Way to Political Rationality” (in preparation for publication). 
89 “Heterogeneity is never a principle of exclusion; it never prevents coexistence, conjunction, or connection. And it 
is precisely in this case, in this kind of analysis, that we emphasize, and must emphasize a non-dialectical logic if 
want to avoid being simplistic. For what is dialectical logic? Dialectical logic puts to work contradictory terms 
within the homogeneous. I suggest replacing this dialectical logic with what I would call a strategic logic. A logic of 
strategy does not stress contradictory terms within a homogeneity that promises their resolution in a unity. The 
function of strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. 
The logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization 
of the contradictory.” Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 42. 
90 On the question of “Weberianism,” see Foucault, Essential Works of Foucault, Vol. 3: Power, p. 229. 
91 See Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989); and Thomas McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School” in Ideals and 
Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). 
92 For methodologically relevant works of the latter, see Gaston Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Boston: Beacon, 1934/1985); Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind: A Contribution to a 
Psychoanalysis of Objective Knowledge, trans. Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester: Clinamen, 1938/2002); 
Georges Canguilhem, Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); and, on the development of Bachelard’s core concept, see Étienne Balibar, 
“From Bachelard to Althusser: The Concept of the Epistemological Break” in Economy and Society 7:3 (1978). 
93 Foucault adds that, despite their differences, for each tradition “what we are to examine essentially is a reason 
whose autonomy of structures carries with itself the history of dogmatisms and despotisms—a reason which, 
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the historical transformation of rationality and power. The trans-formation of existing forms is 
characterized by displacement rather than sublation, contingency rather than necessity, epistemic 
breaks rather than natural progression. This in turn informs the task of critique more generally: 
 
What reason perceives as its necessity, or rather, what different forms of rationality claim 
as their necessary existence, can perfectly well be shown to have a history; and the 
network of contingencies from which it emerges can be traced. Which is not to say, 
however, that these forms of rationality were irrational. It means that they reside on a 
base of human practice and human history; and that since they have been made, they can 
be unmade—assuming, of course, that we know how they were made.94  
 
The difference between the critique of ideology and the critique of forms of rationality, then, is 
that the latter does not yield truth by revealing untruth; emphatic reason [Vernunft] is not required 
to show a particular form of reason to be unreason. In tracking a given rationality—that is, forms 
and norms of practical reason that come to dominate in particular periods—critique excavates its 
own imbrication with knowledge and power. Critique likewise opens up strategic visions for 
making a given form of rationality otherwise.95 Because it is immanent to a particular historical 
formation, this is perhaps the greatest strength of Foucault’s notion of political rationality. But as 
we will see, it may also indicate the limitations of his own approach to the political.  
Methodologically, Foucault is reconfiguring the Hegelian-Marxian and Kantian-Weberian 
architectonics at one and the same time. Following the Weberian more than the Marxist line of 
critique, Foucault focuses on the material production of “form” rather than “value.”96 Likewise, 
his approach to economic and political forms of rationality prioritizes a non-dialectical logic that 
runs against fundamental Frankfurt School assumptions. Take, for instance, his distinction 
between Marxist and Weberian models of analysis: 
 
If Marx tried to define and analyze what could be summed up as the contradictory logic 
of capital, Max Weber’s problem, and the problem he introduced into German 
sociological, economic, and political reflection at the same time, is not so much the 
contradictory logic of capital as the problem of the irrational rationality of capitalist 
                                                
consequently, has the effect of emancipation only on the condition that it succeeds in freeing itself of itself.” 
Foucault, “Introduction” in Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, pp. 11-12.  
94 Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History” (translations altered). 
95 For an overview and assessments of the debate between Foucault and Habermas about whether critique requires a 
normative basis or a “better” form of rationality, see Michael Kelly (ed.), Critique and Power: Recasting the 
Foucault/Habermas Debate (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994). 
96 “One readily believes that a culture is more attached to its values than to its forms; that the latter can be easily 
modified, abandoned, reworked; that it is only meaning that is deeply rooted. This would be to misunderstand how 
much forms, when they come apart or when they are born, can provoke astonishment or hate; it is to misunderstand 
that people hold dearly to their ways of seeing, of saying, of doing and of thinking, more than what one sees, says 
and does. The battle of forms in the West has been hard fought, if not more than that of ideas and values. This battle 
has taken a singular shape in the twentieth century: it is ‘the formal’ itself, it is the reflective work on the system of 
forms that has become the stakes of the battle. Form has become a remarkable object of moral hostilities, aesthetic 
debates and political confrontations.” Michel Foucault, cited in Paul Rabinow, Unconsolable Contemporary: 
Observing Gerhard Richter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), p. 1.  
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society. I think, again very schematically, that what characterizes Max Weber’s problem 
is this movement from capital to capitalism, from the logic of contradiction to the division 
between the rational and the irrational.97 
 
The division of the rational and the irrational is the paradigmatically Weberian problem around 
which critical theory also revolved—a division understood dialectically, a logic of both/and rather 
than either/or. What Foucault is suggesting, though, is that the division should be examined 
“strategically” rather than “dialectically.” In other words, he does not ask how rational technique 
or instrumentality produce irrationality as their opposite. Instead he asks: How does this specific 
form of rationality split the rational and the irrational in this particular way, and what are its 
historical effects?  
In this way, the critique of capitalism can be recast and reconfigured as a critique of forms 
of rationality. For Foucault’s displacement of a “dialectical” for a “strategic logic” retains central 
concerns of the Marxist tradition—e.g., the critique of the science of political economy, the 
materiality of power, and the oppressive effects induced by their inegalitarian institutionalization. 
The critique of political rationality does not displace the critique of capitalism, then; it identifies 
specific forms of power through which the former (e.g., a political rationality like liberalism) 
institutes and transforms the latter (e.g., an economic order like capitalism). Seen from this angle, 
liberalism and neoliberalism may have “ideological” dimensions in the Marxist sense, but are not 
simply or primarily ideologies. A critique of political rationality would thus pursue its construction 
and effects at levels other than mystification and false consciousness; it opens a different 
theoretical angle into how modes of conduct are “rationalized” and sets of practices are 
“programmed” such that various forms of power possess a materiality of their own—a materiality 
that intersects the modes of production that Marxism has seen as “mattering” the most. 
Understanding political technologies and economic orders as intertwined, this mode of critique 
can offer greater appreciation for the world-making effects of paradigms of scientific qua rational 
knowledge. By discarding the epistemological baggage of ideology critique, I am suggesting, 
Foucault provides critical theory a path (back) to political power and political economy.98  
The historical arc of Foucault’s own study runs from the ancient Athens and the Roman 
Empire, to St. Thomas and Machiavelli, through raison d’État, Polizeiwissenschaft, classical 
liberalism and to the precipice of neoliberalism.99 At each turn Foucault marks a shift in the theory 
and practice of “rational” government, or the fusion of thought and action in a more expansive 
conception of techne. Ultimately, Foucault is interested in understanding epistemologies and 
practices that legitimate the powers of modern states. “Rather than wonder whether aberrant state 
                                                
97 Michel Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 105. Though Foucault parses the difference through a range of twentieth 
century economic and social theorists, including the neoliberals, the distinction implies just as well to his own 
procedure. However, he also notes that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive; see Foucault, Birth of 
Biopolitics, p. 70. See also Foucault’s discussion: “Basically, all of these economists, Schumpeter, Röpke, or 
Eucken, all start… from the Weberian problem of the rationality or irrationality of capitalist society. Schumpeter, 
like the ordoliberals, and the ordoliberals like Weber, think that Marx, or at any rate, Marxists, are wrong in looking 
for the exclusive and fundamental origin of this rationality/irrationality of capitalist society in the contradictory logic 
of capital and its accumulation. The differences begin at this point.” Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 176-77. 
98 For a discussion of the difference between ideology critique and political rationality, see my “Michel Foucault’s 
Materialist Methods.”  
99 I am specifically referencing Foucault, Security, Territory, Population; Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, and 
Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim.” 
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power is due to excessive rationalism or irrationalism,” Foucault advised, “it would be more 
appropriate to pin down the specific type of political rationality the state produced.”100 This move 
complicates the internal and external rationale of state power; for it reveals that “political practices 
resemble scientific ones: it’s not ‘reason in general’ that is implemented, but always a very specific 
type of rationality.”101 One of Foucault’s core contributions, then, is marking the relation between 
different forms of rationality in historically specific orders of power.  
As a mix of material and ideational dynamics, the modern state neither rose from the earth 
nor fell from the sky. Its objectives and its limits were constructed in relation to changing objects 
and activities. Reason of state, for instance, was considered a technique of government that was 
different than but could conform to the art of political economy. Yet Foucault traces another “art” 
of government to the ancient practice of “pastoral power,” which consists in “fostering the life of 
a group of individuals” rather than “forming and assuring the city’s unity.” So while “the political 
problem is the relation between the one and the many in the framework of the city and its citizens… 
the pastoral problem concerns the lives of individuals.”102 In modern political rationality, however, 
“a series of complex, continuous, and paradoxical relationships” paired pastoral power and 
political power together. The modern state, Foucault submits, was both “individualizing and 
totalizing right from the start.”103 
Modern political rationality not only comprises technologies of overt violence but also a 
Kantian-Weberian kind of reflexivity; in it, the rationality of “method” intersects with the “object” 
of rationality. For reason of state, in particular, “the art of governing is rational if reflexion causes 
it to observe the nature of what is governed—here, the state.”104 Following Foucault, critical 
analysis thus targets the legitimating interstices—or “regime of veridiction”—between political 
economy and political rationality. This would mean examining how “a particular form of 
reflection, analysis, and calculation” is incorporated into existing practices of political reasoning. 
Critical analysis would likewise excavate out of these conditions the possibility of “a different type 
of calculation, a different system of thought, and a different practice of power.”105 The question at 
hand is thus “how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and 
what role they play within them, because it’s true that ‘practices’ don’t exist without a certain 
regime of rationality.”106  
                                                
100 Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim.” 
101 Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim.” 
102 Foucault adds: “The idea that the political leader was to quiet any hostilities within the city and make unity reign 
over conflict is undoubtedly present in Greek thought.” Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (Routledge, 1990), p. 67 (emphasis mine). 
103 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p. 84. The title and conclusion of his last lecture on political rationality, 
“Omnes et Singulatim,” suggest all the ambiguities and concerns of Cold War liberalism: totalization and 
individualization. Before a shift in focus around 1980, the arc of Foucault’s reflections on political rationality 
pointed toward a study of totalitarianism. The totalitarian dimensions of state power was a timely topic being 
examined by others at the time, including Poulantzas, Castoriadis, and Lefort. It was also the planned theme for a 
research seminar Foucault was to co-organize, though it ultimately never crystalized.  
104 “Nowadays, the expression reason of state evokes ‘arbitrariness’ or ‘violence.’ But at the time, what people had 
in mind was a rationality specific to the art of governing states. From where does this specific art of government 
draw its rationale? The answer to this question provokes the scandal of nascent political thought. And yet it’s very 
simple: the art of governing is rational, if reflexion causes it to observe the nature of what is governed – here, the 
state.” Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim.” 
105 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 59. 
106 Foucault, “Questions of Method” in The Foucault Effect, p. 79. 
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Through scientific discourse and governmental techne, political rationality constitutes 
normative modes of reasoning about political-economic “reality.” Part of what Foucault’s 
genealogy shows is how different forms of economic rationality have informed political rationality 
in constituting particular objects as “real,” in circumscribing modes of apprehension deemed 
“legitimate,” and in shaping “conduct” that corresponds to each. Drawing from this account, the 
following chapters argue that epistemological formations themselves comprise enabling 
conditions for different ontological orders. For epistemology and ontology cut both ways: 
epistemology may be conditioned by historical experiences and material developments, but 
epistemic shifts also provide an impetus for ontological transformations. The political deficits that 
contour contemporary reflection and imagination are thus themselves an important object of 
critique.  
Did Foucault, in his study of political rationality, follow his own imperative to “cut off the 
head of the king in political theory and analysis?”107 Did he finally drain the mythical fount from 
which all power allegedly flows, the sovereignty of the people, the monarch, the state? Certainly, 
Foucault’s nominalist approach troubled the conventional notions of the state as a more or less 
stable, ontological entity across time and space. His analysis pointed to the “rationalization” of 
governmental practice, the “governmentalization” of the state, and the processes of “statification” 
that produce a “state effect.”108 Sovereignty was not the outcome of a social contract, and state 
power did not result from the mechanisms of sovereign legitimation. The state came into being as 
an art of government and practice of (self-)reflection on its own power. Thus beyond political 
rationality, Foucault explored the intertwined notion of governmentality, defined as “the conduct 
of conduct” or “governing at a distance.”109 His distinction between “sovereignty” (which has the 
people as its subject/object) and “government” (which considers the population as its 
object/subject) helps chart a history in which practices of government displace representations of 
sovereignty as the central object of analysis.110  Such a displacement is necessary, according to 
Foucault, to rethink liberalism as a practice and rationale of the government of economic subjects 
and objects rather than an outcome of natural rights, communal agreement, or individual consent. 
It also incorporated a fleeting critique of socialism, which Foucault claimed failed to create “an 
autonomous governmental rationality” as opposed to liberalism and neoliberalism.111  
When read against traditional political theory, “regicide” would seem a plausible result of 
Foucault’s analysis.112 Yet so would “democide”: the killing of “the people.” Political rationality 
displaces sovereignty—“popular” sovereignty included. For though political rationality concerns 
                                                
107 See Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, p. 89. 
108 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 77. 
109 See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics; Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution 
(New York: Zone Books, 2015); Thomas Lemke, Eine Kritik der politischen Vernunft: Foucaults Analyse der 
modernen Gouvermentalität (Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 1997); Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: 
Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology (New York: Routledge, 1994); and Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne 
and Nikolas Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of 
Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
110 “In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the 
population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health etc... it is the population 
itself on which government will act either directly or indirectly.” Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 100. 
111 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 92-93. 
112 See also Hans Sluga, Politics and the Search for the Common Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014); Jon Simon, Foucault and the Political (Routledge, 1995); and Barry Hindess, “Politics as Government: 
Michel Foucault’s Analysis of Political Reason,” in Alternatives 30 (2005), pp. 389-413. 
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both power and its limitations, both the expansion and delimitation of the political field, the 
heuristic may come with limits of its own. Foucault’s use of the “political” in these lectures, for 
example, largely modifies only the productions and entailments of the modern state. Thinking the 
political today, however, requires more than an account of politics as power beyond sovereignty. 
What, we must ask, is the political, if not the state? 
 
The Political in Political Deficits 
 
“A method is a path,” and though one method may help blaze through a certain terrain, the 
same one may prove less pathbreaking when exploring another.113 Above I marked the difference 
between the Kantian-Weberian and Hegelian-Marxian paths and followed them into the Frankfurt 
School and Foucault’s reformulation of political rationality. Now I briefly turn to the difference 
between the Foucauldian notion of the political and an alternative conception at the basis of this 
dissertation that also helps reveal its limitations. Together with the discussion above and the 
extended meditation in the Conclusion, this will fill out the meaning of the titular concept, 
“political deficits,” and clarify how and why the historical stakes of the dissertation pertain to the 
task of thinking the present.  
State power, cultural hegemony, radical democracy—the introduction began with these 
three dimensions of the political to clarify a key objective of the dissertation: to register the 
constitution and the delimitation of the political in particular epistemic and governmental 
formations. As I suggested above, Foucault’s work foregrounds the question of power, and thus 
the potential for power’s politicization, in every part of human relations.114 In turn, Foucault’s 
methods may appear pertinent to all three dimensions of the political. Yet as Foucault’s critique 
of political rationality moved toward the present, it yielded some antinomic and totalizing turns—
not entirely unlike those of the Frankfurt School. At times, Foucault’s critique targeted political 
(qua state) rationality as a seeming totality, or rather pointed to “the roots” that produced the 
double character of modern state power.115 At other times, Foucault individualized the political to 
questions of ethics and aesthetics,116 or rather turned critique into a question of counter-conduct, 
i.e., “how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of principles such as that, in view of 
                                                
113 I borrow this from Rancière but twist his meaning. “A method is a path,” Rancière wrote, “and examining a 
method means examining how idealities are materially produced.” My “method” here suggests that ideality and 
materiality cut both ways. In exploring the social scientific origins of neoliberal rationality that preceded the 
political and economic crises with which they are commonly associated, I hope to complicate the conventional 
concept of “ideality” in Marxist critiques. At the liminal space of epistemological production, where forms of 
scientific and practical reason generate embodied and institutional practices, different forms of power and politics 
may come into view. 
114 It should be added that though power is “everywhere,” because of its relational character, the political is neither 
constitutive nor omnipresent in the same way.  
115 See for example the last sentence in Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim.” 
116 When asked about his views on the Arendtian version of the political, Foucault responded: “I would more or less 
agree with the idea that in fact what interests me is much more morals than politics or, in any case, politics as an 
ethics.” Foucault, “Politics and Ethics: An Interview,” in The Foucault Reader, p. 375. 
From these tendencies Hans Sluga identifies Foucault’s abandonment of any conception of the pursuit of the 
common good: “The late Foucault thus appears to have been drifting towards a liberal, individualistic mode of 
conception of human existence with a non- or even anti-political conception of the good.” Sluga, Politics and the 
Search for the Common Good, p. 200. 
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such objectives and by the means of such procedures.”117 In each case critique kept to a largely 
individualist, limited or negative function as in the Kantian-Weberian tradition, where the critic 
sheds light on the historical present by setting limits on the legitimate operation of power within 
it. Yet in neither case is Foucault primarily concerned with broader senses of the political, such as 
the second or third dimensions discussed above.  
Foucault’s limited notion of the political could be explained in various ways. Typical 
reasons include his well-known allergy to psychoanalysis, the above discussion of sovereignty, his 
well-documented interest in the constitution of subjectivities rather than collectivities, and his 
association of politics with the Maoist left of which he had grown exhausted. Another reason may 
be philosophical consistency, which is to say, his effort to keep to the immanent limits of his 
(genealogical and archaeological) methods, including the explicitly nominalist character of his 
later work.118 Foucault did not focus on political relations of power between collectivities—whose 
very existence he wanted to track rather than presuppose—as part of his methodology for 
examining political rationality. In this way, his method could even be said to mirror the political 
deficits of twentieth-century epistemological formations discussed thus far—perhaps above all, the 
German strains of the Frankfurt and Freiburg Schools. After all, Foucault’s definition of liberalism 
as a political technology relies on the same terms—rationality qua calculability—deployed and 
popularized by the neoliberals in the socialist calculation debate. Among his most famous 
statements in these lectures concerned the absence of an “autonomous” socialist governmental 
rationality, as well as the desire to invent one à la neoliberalism. If Foucault’s genealogies used 
the historical archive to disrupt subjective experience in the present,119 then, they did not 
necessarily intervene at the level of political sensibilities or emergent collectivities.120 Though the 
latter may be foreclosed by Foucauldian methods, his work remains indispensable for any (critical) 
political theory of the present.121 
Stuart Hall and Sheldon Wolin help to chart the outline of this problematic, as the 
Conclusion of this dissertation explains in greater depth. The challenge is to take Foucault’s path 
to its limits and to supplement it with perspectives that transgress and point beyond them. Such a 
combination would cross multiple axes of the political, grasping its state-centered features while 
also following discursively strategic and radically democratic paths that evade narrower notions 
of politics and rationality. To this end, Hall had already begun to note that one of Foucault’s limits 
lay in a hesitation to connect historical processes of subject-constitution to related processes of 
collective (dis)identification.122 If Foucault’s later work revealed the double-sided character of 
                                                
117 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?” in The Politics of Truth, Lotringer and Hochroth, eds. (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1997), p. 28. 
118 In his later work Foucault attempted to rework and stitch together these two approaches to inquiry, recasting 
them as mutually informing rather than precluding one another. 
119 For an elaboration of genealogy’s effective (and affective) methodologies, see Martin Saar, “Understanding 
Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self” in Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008), pp. 295-314. 
120 For a counterexample, see Martin Saar, “Spinoza and the Political Imaginary,” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities 
and Social Sciences, 23.2 Spring/Summer 2015: pp. 115-133. 
121 Foucault was a political thinker, and his work remains indispensable to political theory. Whether or not he was a 
political theorist himself is best left open. In any case, I am suggesting, his notion of the political falls short of what 
a critical political theory of the present requires. For an account of the transdisciplinary nature of this question, see 
Wendy Brown, “The Future of Political Theory,” Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 
122 “In the area of the theorization of the subject and identity, however, certain problems remain… It has never been 
enough—in Marx, in Althusser, in Foucault—to elaborate a theory of how individuals are summoned into place in 
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subjectification—the subjection of and by the subject herself (assujettissement)—his methods did 
not link such dynamics to broader questions of political action qua collective self-constitution, 
strategy, and struggle.123 For similar reasons Sheldon Wolin asserted that, from a political 
theoretical perspective, “Foucault has no place for action, only practice,” which in turn led him to 
“consistently confuse politics with the political.”124 Irrespective of whether this contention 
accurately characterizes Foucault’s work, Wolin’s distinction remains crucial for grasping the 
multiple valences of the political, and of political deficits, in a way that Foucauldian methods alone 
cannot.125  
What Hall and Wolin help us see is how “the political” pertains not just to the circulation 
of power as diagnosed by Foucault, but also to the cultivation of shared power as a form of 
collective freedom. Whereas politics inflects the powers that govern individual and collective life, 
according to Hall and Wolin, the political concerns the conditions of possibility for both reshaping 
and sharing in these powers collectively. As I will discuss at greater length in the Conclusion, both 
of these thinkers conceptualize the political as a collective disposition and practice of making a 
world-in-common. Contra the state-centric visions of the political, which are normally identified 
with Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, Hall and Wolin center their notions on forms of discourse and 
modes of action that (re)frame the common (including but not limited to the state) as a shared 
domain—a domain, as I will suggest, that is poorly conceived, and perhaps easily constrained, 
when understood in terms of its (ir)rationality.  
From Schmitt to Laclau and Mouffe, many theorists of the political have proven themselves 
prone to “substantialize” and “existentialize” collective identities and evaluative conflicts in ways 
that reinforce an imaginary of sovereign finality and closure, and that are thus easily reduced to a 
decisionistic horizon of state power.126 By contrast, Hall and Wolin’s respective formulations 
                                                
the discursive structures. It has always, also, required an account of how subjects are constituted… Foucault has 
gone a considerable way in showing this, in reference to historically-specific discursive practices, normative self-
regulation and technologies of the self. The question which remains is whether we also require to, as it were, close 
the gap between the two: that is to say, a theory of the mechanisms by which individuals as subjects identify (or do 
not identify) with the ‘positions’ to which they are summoned; as well as how they fashion, stylize, produce and 
‘perform’ these positions, and why they never do so completely, for once and all time, and some never do, or are in 
a constant, agonistic process of struggling with, resisting, negotiating and accommodating the normative or 
regulative rules with which they confront and regulate themselves.” Stuart Hall, “Who needs ‘Identity’?,” pp. 12-13. 
123 Or, if and when he did, Foucault’s gestures were of a political yet fleeting character. See for example his 
discussion of Abeille’s notion of the “collective political subject” between “the population” and “the people” in 
Foucault, Security Territory, Population, pp. 65-66 (I am grateful to Zeynep Gambetti for bringing this passage to 
my attention); see also the notion of a “collective will” in the Iranian Revolution in Foucault, “Iran: The Spirit of a 
World without Spirit” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p. 215. 
124 “Action is not identical with practice. Practice signifies doing things competently according to the appropriate 
received canons. Action is often role-breaking or custom-defying, for frequently it seeks to defend the collectivity 
against evils that are sanctioned by rules and traditions. Action can only play this role if it is free to respond to 
experience and is guided by theory only to a limited extent.” Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, p. 299. A full exploration 
of Foucault on this question would return to the distinction between the population and the people, where the latter 
traditionally includes citizens and excludes non-citizens, while the former makes neither this distinction nor posits 
any particular form of (non-biopolitical) belonging. 
125 For a related critical treatment of Foucault’s notion of politics, see Santiago Castro-Gómez, Historia de la 
gubernamentalidad: Razón de estado, liberalismo y neoliberalismo en Michel Foucault (Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre 
Editores, 2010). 
126 For an excellent volume on decisionism that follows parallel histories of social science to those examined in this 
dissertation, see Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot, eds., The Decisionist Imagination: Sovereignty, Social Science 
and Democracy in the 20th Century (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018). 
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underscore the necessary ephemerality of even the most robust and participatory political forms, 
such as radical democracy or democratic socialism. The latter are understood, however, as 
particularly dependent on robust versions of the political, including mass mobilization and public 
deliberation directed at principles of collective rule and problems shared in common. 
Hall and Wolin’s accounts of the political are not easily defined in brief form, as they are 
both diagnostic rather than formalistic in character and are both concerned with the conditions of 
possibility for collective freedom. For this reason, their notions of the political—and particularly 
that of Wolin—often equivocate with the meaning of democracy or the democratic “form” of 
politics. However distinct they might be conceptually, “the political” and “the democratic” refer 
to the articulation of collectivities and the negotiation of the common, with the latter more 
specifically designating “the people” or “the many” as the subjects of (self-)rule. What Hall and 
Wolin ultimately help us to understand, as I argue in the Conclusion, is not just the importance of 
harnessing historical and contemporary analysis to a robust notion of the political. They also 
demonstrate the necessity of forging “theoretical” and “popular” visions of the common, one the 
one hand, and of accounting for the effects of such visions in their more robust or anemic forms. 
Neoliberalism not only represents the latter (whence the concept of political deficits). It also 
comprised a political project—commencing with epistemological constructions of rationality—
that aimed to subdue the political itself: that is, to constrain robust forms of commonality beyond 
its own form of rationality, particularly those contoured by democratic values and socialist 
aspirations. Thanks to this double valence of “political,” Hall and Wolin could account for 
Thatcherism and Reaganism as political and even populist programs in ways Foucault could not—
despite the fact that depoliticization was one of their core objectives. Through this same frame, the 
Conclusion will suggest that contemporary far-right forces are better understood as an anti-
political product of than as a political reaction to the forms of neoliberal rationality and political 
deficits examined in this dissertation. 
Both the Foucauldian approach to political rationality and Hall and Wolin’s approach to 
the political, I am suggesting, are crucial to grasp the historical construction of political deficits 
that are not being radically challenged but instead continue to shape our collective imagination 
today. In the following four chapters I take cues from each of these thinkers in charting the 
formation of neoliberal rationality prior to its dissemination through both left- and right-wing 
trajectories. My primary reason for placing critical theorists alongside neoliberal theorists in this 
genealogy is not just a matter of historical empirics or leftist polemics. It rather resembles Hall’s 
own explanation for interrogating “the crisis of the left” in his own time as “a sort of mirror-image 
of Thatcherism.” For a diagnostic account and strategic response to the political deficits of the 
twentieth- and twenty-first century is impossible, as Hall suggested, “if we go on thinking the same 
things we have always thought and doing the same things we have always done—only more so, 
harder, and with more ‘conviction.’”127 In reconsidering the Frankfurt School’s interwar origins—
specifically, its foundational link between social science and political struggle—I hope to provide 
this tradition greater critical purchase the present, however disorienting it may be. Supplemented 
                                                
127 “[W]hat I want to say about the crisis of the left is a sort of mirror-image of what I say about Thatcherism. The 
only way of genuinely contesting a hegemonic form of politics is to develop a counter-hegemonic strategy. But this 
cannot be done if we go on thinking the same things we have always thought and doing the same things we have 
always done—only more so, harder, and with more ‘conviction.’ It means a qualitative change: not the recovery of 
‘lost ground’ but the redefinition, under present conditions, of what the whole project of socialism now means.” 
Hall, “Introduction,” The Hard Road to Renewal, p. 11. 
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by approaches to the political qua discursive strategy and democratic commonality, the critique of 
political rationality may offer an apt method for reconceptualizing crises past and present. 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
The first chapter follows the dawn of “neoliberal rationality” through scientific and 
political struggles that preceded the well-known gatherings in Paris and Mont Pèlerin that are 
commonly understood as the birth of neoliberalism. It begins by examining the Methodenstreit, a 
late nineteenth-century dispute over economic methodology between the German Historical 
School and the Austrian School. The Austrian School founder Carl Menger’s attack on the German 
“socialists of the chair,” like Eugen Böhm-Bawerk’s critique of the Marxist labor theory of value, 
taught the younger generation of Austrians an important lesson: scientific methods can be also 
wielded as political weapons. The chapter then offers a close reading of an overlooked part of Max 
Weber’s work in Economy and Society, which based its typological study of capitalism (“market 
economy”) and socialism (“planned economy”) upon the epistemic foundations of Austrian 
marginalism and a conception of “formal rationality” qua market calculability. I then turn to Mises’ 
influential essay on “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” which radicalized 
the Mengerian and Weberian concept of formal rationality, reducing rationality to market 
calculation and declaring socialist planning impossible. Amidst the post-WWI threat of socialist 
revolution, Mises sought to redefine the rationality of markets against the irrationality of socialists 
who wished to abolish them—a strategy that Hayek successfully popularized by coining “the 
socialist calculation debate” in the 1930’s. The concepts and strategies of the socialist calculation 
debate helped frame a “counter-revolutionary” program shared by the Freiburg School and the 
Chicago School and an ideal of “rational politics” shared even by members of the early Frankfurt 
School. By turning homo oeconomicus “inward” through marginalist analysis and equating social 
science with “value neutral” knowledge, the early neoliberals not only made a seemingly strange 
bedfellow of Max Weber; they also split “the economic” from “the political” in order to cultivate 
the former and circumscribe the latter. Before this neoliberal strategy—or what I call the politics 
of the rational—shaped the theory and practice of postwar governance, it grew embryonically in 
the discourses of the early century. 
The next chapter examines Freiburg School ordoliberalism’s theoretical foundations in the 
same interwar crises and debates, and follows its development through Ludwig Erhard’s 1948 
liberalization reforms—the first ever “neoliberal” experiment, properly so called. Though just as 
anti-socialist as the Austrians, the Freiburgers more actively embraced the primacy of the political 
as a means to realize their own form of rationality—i.e., the rationality of entrepreneurial subjects 
in what they called the “competitive market order.” While drawing on various aspects of Menger, 
Weber, Mises and others to make their own methodological interventions, the ordoliberals 
developed a political program that approached the calculation debate in a different way—namely, 
a “Third Way” or “social market economy” between laisser-faire capitalism and rationally planned 
socialism. The ordoliberals specifically called for a “strong state” with a technocratically designed 
“economic constitution” such that politics would be insulated from the so-called irrationalities of 
concentrated corporate power and democratic decision-making. After contrasting the Austrian and 
Freiburg approaches to state intervention, the chapter explores the ordoliberals’ philosophical 
anthropology of the “economizing” subject, their racially-inflected typology of non-Western 
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societies, their appropriation of leftist discourse about “the social question,” and what I call the 
“inverted Marxism” of their theory of history. Rooted in principles of stability, growth, 
competitiveness, and austerity, the ordoliberals constructed a distinct form of rationality that 
continues to animate the political imagination in and beyond Germany today.128 
The third chapter explores the shared theoretical foundations of the Freiburg School and 
the early Chicago School, and then follows their divergence as the latter evolved into a more 
deregulation and monetarist-oriented program from the 1950s onwards. Increasingly shaped by 
Friedman’s “positive” economic methodology and Aaron Director’s approach to “law and 
economics,” the Chicago School was more open to speculative free-market finance and less 
concerned about monopoly and balanced budgets than the Freiburg ordoliberals. The chapter 
argues that placing these divergences in context can help elucidate an epistemic incongruity that 
emerged between their respective approaches to the European sovereign debt crisis. The latter half 
of the chapter focuses on this crisis as an exemplary scene of ordoliberal vs. neoliberal governance 
in practice, the key features of which were overlooked by many critics. Their disagreements on 
both principles and styles of governance become particularly acute in the conflict between the U.S. 
Treasury Secretary under the Obama administration, Timothy Geithner, whom I describe as a 
bearer of neoliberal rationality, and the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, whom I 
interpret as a practicioner of ordoliberal rationality. While Geithner condemned Schäuble and other 
EU officials for disrespecting the speculative “truth” of financial markets and an “Old Testament 
faith” in balanced budgets, the latter saw Geithner as the walking, talking embodiment of “moral 
hazard” (taking riskes without suffering the consequences). What Geithner’s account unwittingly 
reveals, I suggest, is the distinctly ordoliberal framework underpinning the EU’s economic 
governance. Budgets balanced by debt breaks, an inflation-focused central bank, a disregard for 
structural inequalities, a Union built upon principles of “stability,” “growth” and 
“competitiveness,” and yet dominated by a single export-oriented economy—there is an order and 
a rationality to this “economic constitution” that is greater than the sum of its parts. By showing 
the dueling rationalities of “crisis management” shaped by ordoliberal and neoliberal legacies, this 
chapter also serves a link between the account of the Freiburg School in Chapter 2 and the 
Frankfurt School’s approach to the EU’s  “legitimation crisis” in Chapter 4. 
The final chapter tracks the evolving critique of instrumental rationality and subsumption 
of the political in the Frankfurt School tradition. It begins by recapitulating the recent Habermas-
Streeck debate about the crisis of the EU to register the political deficits that underwrite this post-
crisis analysis and to place it within a longer methodological legacy. Like the Austrian, Freiburg 
and Chicago Schools, the Frankfurt School was founded upon political and methodological 
reorientations to critique amidst interwar crisis. The chapter tracks the origins of the group in an 
orthodox Marxist rejoinder to the socialist calculation debate—commenced by Ludwig von Mises, 
as examined in Chapter 1—and in Critical Theory’s practical relation to collective liberation 
movements, linking theoretical activity to proletarian struggle and rational socialist planning. It 
then follows Horkheimer and Pollock’s discovery of “the primacy of the political” amidst WWII, 
a phenomenon they increasingly equated with the instrumental logic of “state capitalism.” 
                                                
128 Thus Biebricher’s term, the “ordoliberalization of Europe” and Slobodian’s history of the “ordoliberalization of 
the world.” See Thomas Biebricher, “Zur Ordoliberalisierung Europas – Replik auf Hien und Joerges,” in Leviathan, 
46(2) (January 2018), pp. 170-188; Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). See also William Callison and Quinn Slobodian, “Ordosocialism” 
(forthcoming). 
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Inasmuch as “politics” referred to collective ambitions to control state institutions, the concept 
gradually came to represent a problem rather than a solution to ideals of freedom and rationality. 
The chapter locates the slippage between politics and rationality in Critical Theory’s 
methodological reconfiguration in what I call a Weberian dialectics of “instrumental” vs. 
“substantive” rationality—that is, a kind of fusion of Weberian ideal types with neo-Marxist 
dialectics. I follow this approach to the critique of “irrational rationality” through select essays by 
Adorno and Marcuse on culture and technology. Deriving “planning” from a logical rather than 
political operation, Critical Theory’s postwar ideal manifested what they called “a rational 
administration of things.” 
Next this chapter examines Habermas’ reconstruction of rationality and politics through an 
evolving Weberian dialectics and a growing faith in economic and political liberalism understood 
in terms of systemic and deliberative legitimation. No matter of the relative success of his theory 
of discourse ethics, his incorporation of systems theory reconstituted the same Weberian binaries 
used by the neoliberals and first-generation Critical Theorists: formal (procedural) vs. substantive 
rationality, instrumental (administrative) vs. normative reason, which Habermas imported into a 
theoretically untenable distinction between “the system” and “the lifeworld.” The narrowing of his 
later political vision was largely limited to the dual aims of securing normative legitimation for 
law “between facts and norms” and of domesticating systemic irrationality through institutional 
stability. Each of these goals were in turn projected onto the EU’s supranational institution-
building process, which he called the birth of a political union through “the cunning of economic 
reason.” That the Frankfurt tradition subsumed politics – viz. collective struggles among evolving 
identities yielding contingent outcomes – to modest goals of system rationalization qua 
legitimation and of taming irrationality does not make it an outlier in postwar intellectual history. 
The Frankfurt School’s trajectory can instead be read as a kind of effect of the technocratic 
imagination produced, inter alia, by the Austrian, Freiburg and Chicago Schools: the gradual 
detachment from political struggles in the name of formal rationality qua liberal democratic 
stability. Such political deficits do not condemn this or other traditions of critical thought tout 
court, but rather compel greater reflection on the misadventures of a tradition that was founded on 
an expressly political connection between critique and crisis and that remains deeply relevant 
today. 
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Chapter 1 
The Politics of the Rational: 
The Austrian School, Max Weber, and the Socialist Calculation Debate 
 
 
Socialism is the abolition of the rationality of the economy.  
– Ludwig von Mises, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” (1920)  
 
Like Professor Mises, [Max Weber] insisted that the in natura calculations proposed by the leading 
advocates of a planned economy could not possibly provide a rational solution… and might make 
it impossible to maintain alive the present populations of the more densely populated countries. 
– Friedrich August von Hayek, Collectivist Economic Planning (1935) 
  
Capitalism will survive the current depression as it did the Great Depression of the 1930s. It will 
survive because there is no alternative that hasn’t been thoroughly discredited, which wasn’t as 
clear in the 1930s. It is clear now.  
– Richard Posner, A Failure of Capitalism (2009)129  
 
 
Whence neoliberalism? In the decade-long shadow of the global financial crisis, this 
question has been posed with understandable urgency. In the precise sense of the term, 
neoliberalism began as a movement to revive and reinvent liberalism amidst its twentieth-century 
crises. Most intellectual historians have located its birthplace in the gathering of key figures—
Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, among others—at 
the 1937 Walter Lippmann Colloque and the 1947 founding of the Mont Pèlerin Society.130 Yet in 
examining the political-epistemological constructions of early neoliberalism, even deeper roots 
come into view. This chapter argues that the Austrian School crafted a set of social scientific 
concepts and anti-socialist strategies, first articulated in the interwar “socialist calculation debate,” 
which formed the trunk for different branches on neoliberalism’s family tree. Initiated by Mises in 
1920 and popularized by Hayek in the 1930’s, this debate concerned the nature and function of 
economic value in a (hypothetical) socialist state that would, to greater or lesser extent, socialize 
the means of production, plan the distribution of goods, and either fix prices or abolish money 
                                                
129 Richard Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’o8 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 234.  
130 See for example Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters 
of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); 
Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015). 
  36 
altogether.131 At the end of WWI, these were pressing questions for ascendant workers’ councils 
and socialist parties, which hoped to construct a “rational” economy using wartime planning—to 
establish a Planwirtschaft using techniques of a Kriegswirtschaft. Yet the terms of debate were not 
set by socialists, but by their free-market critics.  
Mises and Hayek premised the possibility of socialism on a strict set of binaries, such as 
formal rationality vs. substantive rationality, economics value vs. political values, market 
exchange vs. state planning, capitalism vs. socialism. The underexplored roots of these binaries 
come not only from the formalist methods of Austrian School founder, Carl Menger, but also from 
Max Weber’s lesser-known examination of the “real types” [Realtypen] of the market economy 
vs. the planned economy. For Menger and Weber, like the younger Mises and Hayek who followed 
them, the marginalist model of “market calculation” was the most formal and effective type of 
rational calculation, as opposed to the value-laden (ir)rationality of economic planning. Long 
before the Cold War and “rational choice theory,” then, the political battle between capitalism and 
socialism was framed, at the social scientific register, as an economic battle between rationality 
and irrationality. What much of the recent scholarship on neoliberalism overlooks is the significant 
role played by the nascent disciplines of sociology and economics—and the “politics of the 
rational” within them—in recasting the scientific precepts that later underwrote its institutional 
agenda. Seen in this light, the neoliberal attempt to reinvent liberalism depended on taming the 
political “irrationality” of socialism and on refounding the “rationality” of markets via the radical 
subjectivism and formalism found in Austrian epistemologies and Weberian typologies.  
This chapter begins by sketching an overview of the Methodenstreit, the late nineteenth-
century dispute between Gustav Schmoller’s German Historical School and Carl Menger’s 
Austrian School. Through this decades-long methodological grudge match, Menger not only laid 
the epistemic foundations for Weber, Mises and Hayek’s construction of “rationality” qua market 
calculability. His attack on the German “socialists of the chair,” like his student Eugen Böhm-
Bawerk’s critique of the Marxist labor theory of value, also taught the younger generation an 
important lesson: scientific methods can be wielded as political weapons.132 The next two sections 
of the chapter respectively examine Weber’s typological study of capitalism and socialism in the 
second chapter of Economy and Society and Mises’ influential essay on “Economic Calculation in 
the Socialist Commonwealth,” both of which appeared in 1920. While Weber offered a putatively 
value-neutral and explicitly Austrian-inspired study of the “types” of rationality employed by 
capitalist and socialist economies, Mises radicalized both the Mengerian and Weberian concept of 
formal rationality, reducing rationality to market calculation and declaring socialist planning 
impossible. Although other early neoliberals understood state and market as a spectrum rather than 
a binary, the Austrian School’s intervention worked through methodological moves that, as 
following chapters will show, made allies of the Freiburg School ordoliberals and the Chicago 
School neoliberals. Before their meetings in Paris and Mont Pèlerin, the neoliberals had already 
                                                
131 Though championed by contemporary libertarians, historians have largely treated his debate as a minor dispute of 
little import. Exceptions can be found in the work of Johana Bockman and Julia Elyachar, who underscore the 
importance of early-century debates in central Europe, and of the calculation debate in particular, for neoliberal 
intellectuals and the economic discipline more generally. The argument of this chapter, however, importantly differs 
from each. See Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); and Julia Elyachar, “Before (and After) Neoliberalism: Tacit 
Knowledge, Secrets of the Trade, and the Public Sector in Egypt,” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 27, Issue 1 (2012). 
132 For a reflection on this topic in Weber’s own work, see Sheldon S. Wolin, “Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, 
and the Politics of Theory” in Political Theory 9/3 (1981): 401-424. 
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begun to identify the threat of “socialist irrationality” through a “value-neutral” conception and 
justification of market rationality. 
Nearly a century later, neoliberal notions of rationality traverse scientific inquiry, 
institutional practice, and everyday conduct. Yet buried within such “value neutral” concepts are 
deeper assumptions about the character of human conduct, the nature of “the economy,” and the 
alleged impracticality of alternative arrangements. Their normative assumptions and political 
underpinnings are revealed not simply by careful historical analysis. They also come to light when, 
in times of crisis, commentators like Richard Posner and Gary Becker justify the same principles 
and policies using the same argumentative strategies. Seemingly undisturbed by the 2008 crash, 
Posner and Becker sought to rehabilitate the “rationality” of financial markets. And they did so by 
doubling down on a “politics of the rational” which began, as Posner notes in the epigram, with 
the interwar struggles between liberal capitalism and its socialist adversaries.133 Such scientific 
strategies of “depoliticization” have continuously delegitimized socialist programs by casting all 
but minor reforms as “irrational” and “impossible.” The socialist calculation debate could thus be 
understood not only as an early intervention and lasting rallying cry of neoliberalism, but also as 
its first declaration of TINA: there is no alternative. For this reason alone, we would do well to 
consider the question whence neoliberalism once more.  
 
The German Historical School, the Austrian School, and the Politics of Method 
 
The outward sign of the emergence of the concept of Economic Man as the basis of society was 
the emergence of economics as a science. As soon as the concept of Economic Man had been 
accepted as representing the true nature of man, the development of a science of economics became 
not only possible but imperative and essential. Economics as a social or ‘moral’ science dealing 
with the social behavior of man and with institutions devised by him, can only claim to be a science 
if the economic sphere is regarded as autonomous, if not as supreme, and economic aims as 
desirable over and above all others.  
– Peter Drucker, The End of Economic Man (1939)134 
 
A child of Wilhelmine and Bismarckian Germany, Max Weber was trained in law, 
philosophy and economics. Already decades after Hegel’s death, this was a new era shaped by 
neo-Kantianism and historicism. The post-Hegelian paradigm shift took hold across the human 
sciences, and Weber was particularly drawn to neo-Kantians like philosopher Heinrich Rickert and 
economic historians Wilhelm Roscher and Karl Knies. It was through Rickert that Weber 
                                                
133 Posner’s post-crisis support for Greenspan’s monetary policy comes in similar form: “Alan Greenspan’s 
monetary policy offered prospects of great wealth to smart people willing to take large risks. Such people are not 
irrational… It is risky but not irrational to follow the herd. (It is also risky to abandon the safety of the herd—ask 
any wildebeest.) That is why buying a stock because others are buying it and thus forcing up its price is not 
irrational.” Posner, A Failure of Capitalism, 84-5.  
134 Peter Drucker, The End of Economic Man: The Origins of Totalitarianism (1939), 46-7. 
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encountered the concept of the “ideal type”135 and, as H. Stuart Hughes observed, it was from 
Roscher and Knies that he first encountered 
 
a brand of economics that embraced virtually the whole field of social science and that 
was energetically committed to ethical judgments and practical applications. For in 
Germany the study of economics was intimately involved in social reform, and the 
professors who were facetiously called ‘socialists of the academic chair’ devoted their 
talents to the problems of the relations between capital and labor in their newly 
industrialized nation.136  
 
Weber would soon become one of the leading methodologists of the fin de siècle, making his most 
famous interventions in debates about social scientific objectivity. And it was through the German 
Historical School and Verein für Sozialpolitik that he encountered the deeply political valences of 
scientific method.137   
At the time it was commonplace to blend academic arguments with policy prescriptions, 
and the Verein für Sozialpolitik openly advocated social policies meant to curb the revolutionary 
prospects of the Socialist Party. These scholars considered political economy an inherently 
normative mode of inquiry based on the combined study of philosophy, history, and state policy.138 
Out of deep disagreement with the group, Weber eventually sought to separate science from 
politics to the greatest extent possible. To this end he elaborated the meta-doctrine of Wertfreiheit. 
Variously translated as “value freedom” or “value neutrality,” the concept drew an epistemological 
line between the domains of fact and value and a practical line between the vocations of science 
and politics.139 For Weber, “value neutrality” characterized an approach to scholarship and 
pedagogy that acknowledges the inescapable role of values for choosing an initial set of research 
                                                
135 See Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Volume 1 appeared in 1896 and Volume 
2 in 1902. 
136 “In 1873 they had founded the Verein für Sozialpolitik, of which Weber became an active and enterprising 
member. Thus at the very start of his academic career he was prepared for the inevitable confrontation with Marx: to 
achieve by more conservative means the social justice at which the Marxists aimed had become the major purpose 
of the Verein.” Hughes, Consciousness and Society, 293-4. 
137 This is also where Weber explored what he saw as the troubling intersections of economics (science) and politics 
(values). See also Wilhelm Hennis, “The pitiless ‘sobriety of judgment’: Max Weber between Carl Menger and 
Gustav von Schmoller—the academic politics of value freedom” in History of the Human Sciences, 4/1, 1991, p. 
34; and Patrick Mardellat, “Max Weber’s critical response to theoretical economics,” The European Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought (Volume 16, Issue 4, 2009). For an account and defense of the Austrian position, see 
also Peter Boettke, Calculation and Coordination: Essays on Socialism and Transitional Political Economy (New 
York: Routledge, 2001).  
138 “The historical emphasis in German economics was almost as old as the German historical tradition itself. Adam 
Müller and Friedrich List, the historical jurist F.K. Savingy, and even Hegel and Ranke may be counted among its 
precursors during the early nineteenth century.” Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German 
Academic Community, 1890–1933 (Wesleyan University Press, 1990), 144. See also Kenneth Dyson, The State 
Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).  
139 See Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” in On Max Weber. On Weber’s fatalism, see also Stefan Eich and 
Adam Tooze, “The Allure of Dark Times: Max Weber, Politics and the Crisis of Historicism” in History and Theory 
56 (2), 2017, 197-215. 
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questions but that in turn completely brackets values from science’s methodological makeup and 
argumentative conclusions.140  
Long before Weber’s rise to prominence, the Historical School had made its name by using 
historical and statistical sources in order to understand variables that determined human action, 
institutional design, and economic development. Under the broad umbrella of 
Staatswissenschaften, the scholars produced culturally-specific knowledge applicable to the 
practice of state administration.141 Despite its reign over the scholarly kingdom,142 political 
economy (or national economics, Nationalökonomie) existed to serve state power—or, more 
precisely, the “police” and “reason” of state (Staatsräson and Polizeiwissenschaft).143 In the 1870s 
the German Historical School became embroiled in a disciplinary debate with their Eastern 
equivalent, the Austrian School. This conflict between dueling approaches to the study of history, 
society and economics was dubbed the Methodenstreit, or “the dispute over method.”  
The Methodenstreit commenced when Austrian School founder Carl Menger attacked 
Schmoller’s historicist methodology for its unsystematic character. Schmoller responded with a 
defense of the historical paradigm and a jab at Menger’s axiomatic approach to economic action, 
which he dismissed as a simplistic revision of the classical fiction: ahistorical “Economic Man.”144 
                                                
140 Among Weber’s most pointed formulations of Wertfreiheit is the following: “Whenever the person of science 
introduces his personal value judgments, a full understanding of the facts ceases.” Max Weber, “Science as 
Vocation.” 
141 Staatswissenschaften was the dominant theory and practice of statecraft before liberalism was “imported” from 
“the West.” According to Tribe, Staatskunst (the art of governing) was replaced by Staatswissenschaft (the science 
of governing in the early eighteenth century). “The science was taught in universities to prospective state officials, 
and was at first dominated by a purely descriptive approach. The teachings of Natural Law soon modified this 
towards the inherent regularities in society and economy, and it was here that Cameralism, as the science of 
governing with respect to economic processes, play an important part. In so far as the reform of administrative 
practice represents an attempt to establish an effective symbiotic relationship between these economic processes and 
the activity of governing, the ‘Cameralistic sciences’ play a strategic role in the constitution of Prussian bureaucratic 
rule and, by extension, in the modern bureaucratic state.” Keith Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of 
German Economic Discourse, 1750-1840, 9.  
142 Schmoller’s Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche was arguably the 
most prestigious journal in the German-speaking social sciences at the time. 
143 Namely, in the broadest, now antiquated sense of each concept. In a speech for Kaiser Wilhelm’s birthday in 
1896, Schmoller describes the principles as follows: “The objective of the King’s entire policy is perfectly evident in 
the instruction [the Political Testament of 1722]: the internal and external strength of the state.” The parts of state 
power Schmoller lists next are a large army, orderly administration, flourishing management, money, increasing 
population and manufacture, and lively traffic between town and country. See Schmoller, cited in Keith Tribe, 
Governing Economy, 9. On Staatswissenschaft in Germany, see also Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order; and 
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population; and Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. 
144 The vast majority of German economists objected to the utilitarian methods and laisser-faire prescriptions of 
classical English political economy. In a way that also sheds light on Max Weber’s private, scientific and political 
endeavors,  
Ringer explains that Germans believed the English “enshrined the accumulation of wealth by selected individuals as 
the ultimate goal of mankind. They subordinated social and political concerns to the requirements of industry and 
commerce, and they gave no place at all to the intellectual and cultural, the ‘nonproductive,’ aspects of human 
endeavor. All this was heresy to the mandarins, not because they agreed with the Marxist critique of capitalism, but 
because they refused to regard economic activity as anything but a means to higher ends. Their viewpoint was 
neither that of the entrepreneur not that of the worker. To them, the whole productive sector of industry and 
commerce was just one of several parts of society’s machinery, and a relatively subordinate one at that. This 
accounts for their noneconomic emphasis upon the noneconomic context of economic life. It also helps to explain 
why they would not allow ‘the economic man’ to impose his preferences upon the rest of the nation… and the 
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Menger replied in turn with pamphlets titled Errors of Historicism in German Economics (1884), 
written in the form of letters to a friend. In what today would be called “trolling the enemy,” these 
papers belittled the Historical School and—if Hayek is to be believed—“ruthlessly demolished 
Schmoller’s position.”145   
Menger’s writings won him disciples like Eugen Böhm von Bawerk and Friedrich von 
Wieser, who helped pioneer a distinctly “Austrian” method against Schmoller’s circle of influence. 
Theirs was a non-historical, formalist approach to economic theory with a “revolutionary” thesis 
about the origin of economic value.146 Menger’s Principles of Economics (1871) introduced the 
radical approach, later called “marginal analysis,” that laid the groundwork for the Austrian School 
to this day. Through logical axioms or “principles,” Menger explained how formerly “non-
economic” objects take on an “economic” character. Beyond a distinction between “the economic” 
and “the non-economic,” his theoretical apparatus was built on a series of interconnected 
assumptions: a philosophical anthropology of the “economizing” individual; a logical division 
between “higher” and “lower” order goods;147 and a civilizational history of ever-increasing 
economization.148 This subjectivist and economistic philosophical anthropology, inscribed within 
a larger philosophy of history, underwrote the book’s most significant contribution: a redefinition 
of economic value.149  
                                                
general objectives of the legal and cultural state.” Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German 
Academic Community, 1890–1933 (Wesleyan University Press, 1990), 145-6. See also Tribe, Governing Economy, 
74. 
145 Friedrich Hayek, “Introduction” in Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, 24.  
146 “They cleared the ground for a general departure from the notion of the inherent value of an economic good, 
since they based their analysis of prices directly upon the quantitative ratios at which any two commodities are 
actually exchanged. They thus focused attention upon market relationships which might or might not be expressed in 
monetary terms. One could say that the marginal method prepared the ground for modern equilibrium analysis, for 
the emphasis upon exchange functions, and for the use of mathematical models of such functions.” Ringer, The 
Decline of the German Mandarins, 151. 
147 “We have defined an economic good as a good whose available quantity does not meet requirements completely, 
and thus we have the principle that the existence of requirements for goods of higher order is dependent upon the 
corresponding goods of lower order having economic character.” Menger, Principles of Economics, 78-9. See also: 
“Initially, man experiences needs for goods of first order… while he finds no practical inducement to bring the other 
goods into the sphere of his economic activity. Later, thought and experience lead men to ever deeper insights into 
the causal connections between things, and especially into the relations between things and their welfare. They learn 
to use goods of second, third, and higher orders. But with these goods, as with goods of first order, they find that 
some are available in quantities exceeding their requirements while the opposite relationship prevails with others. 
Hence they divide goods of higher order also into one group that they include in the sphere of their economic 
activity, and another group that they do not feel any practical necessity to treat in this way. This is the origin of the 
economic character of goods of higher order.” Menger, Principles of Economics, 107-9. 
148 That is, a distinction between the relative level of rationality of the “civilized” and “uncivilized”: “Even an 
Australian savage does not postpone hunting until he actually experiences hunger. Nor does he postpone building his 
shelter until inclement weather has begun and he is already exposed to its harmful effects. But men in civilized 
societies alone among economizing individuals plan for the satisfaction of their needs, not for a short period only, 
but for much longer periods of time. Civilized men strive to ensure the satisfaction of their needs for many years to 
come. Indeed, they not only plan for their entire lives, but as a rule, extend their plans still further in their concern 
that even their descendants shall not lack means for the satisfaction of their needs.” Menger, Principles of 
Economics, 78-9, 107-9. 
149 “Value is the importance that individual goods or quantities of goods attain for us because we are conscious of 
being dependent on command of them for the satisfaction of our needs. Value is therefore nothing inherent in goods, 
no property of them, but merely the importance that we first attribute to the satisfaction of our needs, that is, to our 
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Contra the German Historical School, Marxist economics, and classical English political 
economy, Menger argued that there is nothing particularly historical, material, or objective about 
economic value. Rather, there is something radically subjective about it. “Value is nothing inherent 
in goods, no property of them,” he wrote. Value is simply the importance subjects attribute to 
satisfying their needs and desires. “Man,” asserts Menger, “is himself the point at which human 
economic life both begins and ends.” And economizing [Wirtschaften] is the orderly activity of 
human desiring that imputes value onto a world of scarce objects. For Menger, the logic of 
subjective desire and objective scarcity [Knappheit] are thus two sides of the same coin, the double 
requirement for economic rationality as well as monetary calculation. Together these tenets formed 
a methodological line that ran through Mises, Hayek, and even Weber, eventually altering the 
discipline of economics. Lionel Robbin’s formalist reconceptualization later recast the discipline 
in Mengerian-Weberian terms: “Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.”150 
With his subjectivist and formalist turn, Menger was in the vanguard of a “marginalist 
revolution” alongside Léon Walras, William Stanley Jevons, and Alfred Marshall. Separately but 
concurrently, they opened paths for statistical and mathematical applications, filling the tributaries 
of neoclassical economics. Wieser coined the concept of “marginal utility” (Grenznutzen) to 
characterize Menger’s theory of value as the basis of the Austrian School.151 Böhm-Bawerk, for 
his part, used Menger’s psychologistic formalism as weapon of combat against Marx’s labor 
theory of value.152 Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk also popularized Menger’s work in seminar rooms, 
scientific publications, and the Austrian Ministry of Finance. The torch was then passed to younger 
generations from Mises, Hayek, and Schumpeter through Fritz Machlup, Oskar Morgenstern, and 
Karl (son of Carl) Menger.153  
By turning the philosophical anthropology of homo oeconomicus in on itself and the 
objective theory of economic value against itself, new forms of knowledge and discourse emerged, 
reprogramming what Keith Tribe described as “strategies” and “styles” of economic reasoning;154 
what Michel Foucault called as the “circuit” between political economy and the art of 
government;155 and what Timothy Mitchell characterized as a twentieth-century effort “to simplify 
the world, attempting to gain for itself the powers of expertise by resolving it into simple forces 
                                                
lives and well-being, and in consequence carry over to economic goods as the exclusive causes of the satisfaction of 
our needs.” Menger, Principles of Economics.  
150 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932), 15. The footnote 
appended to this sentence is a citation of Menger and Mises. 
151 See Wieser, “The Austrian School and the Theory of Value,” The Economic Journal, Volume 1, 1891. 
152 This intervention ran parallel to Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall’s work at the same time. It should also be 
noted that, although the Historical and Austrian Schools rejected Marxist materialism, their respective economic 
theories departed from an engagement with Marx’s critique of political economy, one that left discernable traces in 
their own conceptual architectures. See Eugen Böhm von Bawerk, Karl Marx and the Close of his System [1896] 
and Rudolf Hilferding Böhm-Bawerk’s Criticism of Marx [1904], Paul Sweezy (ed.), (New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1949). See also Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism; Biddiss, Age of the Masses, 131. 
153 All three scholars studied in Vienna in the 1890’s though, unlike Mises and Hayek, Schumpeter still shared some 
commitments with the Historical School. His influential Theory of Economic Development can be seen as bridging 
them by using the Historical School’s perspective on historical development, the Austrians’ methodological 
individualism, and a Weberian approach to rationalization and ideal types. The Austrian lineage lives on in the 
present with figures like Israel Kirzner, Hans-Hermann Hoppe and other radical libertarians centered in the Mises 
Institute in the United States and the Adam Smith Institute in Britain. 
154 Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750-1950, 94. 
155 See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. 
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and oppositions.”156 The turn also affected the opposition between “the economic” and “the 
political” which, as I argue in this and subsequent chapters, became constitutive for interwar and 
postwar currents of thought. In many ways, the marginalist reformulation of “the economic” both 
preceded and coincided with deeper structural shifts in capitalism and with its institutional 
transformation in the twentieth century. Transformations of political and economic power, then, 
not only result from “material” processes like industrialization, but are also reprogrammed by 
forms of rationality and knowledge and immanent within them. 
 
Weber’s Calculation: The Irrational Rationality of Economic Order 
 
If Marx tried to define and analyze what could be summed up as the contradictory logic of capital, 
Max Weber’s problem, and the problem he introduced into German sociological, economic, and 
political reflection at the same time, is not so much the contradictory logic of capital as the problem 
of the irrational rationality of capitalist society. I think, again very schematically, that what 
characterizes Max Weber’s problem is this movement from capital to capitalism, from the logic of 
contradiction to the division between the rational and the irrational. 
 – Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics157 
 
Max Weber “never observed boundaries that social scientists usually draw,” Schumpeter 
once recalled.158 Though Weber is now understood as a founding figure in the discipline of 
sociology, all his academic appointments were in economics. And as an avid reader and teacher of 
economic methodology, he followed his discipline toward Menger through the Methodenstreit.159 
Austrian methods informed Weber’s views on economic theory, making appearances in his 
writings on formal rationality and scientific universality.160 For despite his famously ambivalent 
                                                
156 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002), 34. In the same spirit, these scientifico-political interventions codified relations of power through a new set of 
terms and binaries for the fin de siècle formalization of state administration and (post)colonial governance. This was 
particularly the case in Germany where, as Giocoli notes, “changing requirements in the organization of scientific 
work… called for a new kind of scientist to support the country’s industrial and technological development: no 
longer the typical 19th-century ‘comprehensive’ scientist interested in the whole of physics, chemistry, mathematics 
and so on, but rather a specialized professional capable of thoroughly mastering a very restricted field.” See Nicola 
Giocoli, Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory (Edward Elgar, 
2003), 15. 
157 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79, p. 105. 
158 Joseph A. Schumpeter, “Max Weber’s Work” in Richard Swedberg, ed., Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Economics 
and Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 220. 
159 Weber’s first full appointment was in Freiburg and his second was in Heidelberg. Although Weber is often 
associated with the “youngest” generation of the German Historical School, Tribe correctly notes that his letters, 
lectures and manuscripts betray an ever-increasing devotion to the Austrian School. See Tribe, Strategies of 
Economic Order, 80. 
160 Before Mises held his own weekly seminars, Menger and Böhm-Bawerk’s seminars were attended by both socialist 
and (neo)liberal economists, such as Otto Bauer, Otto Neurath, Rudolf Hilferding, Joseph Schumpeter, Ludwig von 
Mises, and Friedrich von Hayek. And before receiving its anchor in Mengerian methodology, and later in Mises’ and 
Hayek’s pro-market perspectives, “the initial formation of the Austrian School was a loose collective of social 
scientific thinkers with little more in common than an interest in the latest economic theory and its potential for social 
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metaphor of the “iron cage” or “steel-hard casing” [stahlhartes Gehäuse] of modernity, Weber 
stoically affirmed the “progressive” character of knowledge production and what he considered its 
cultural conduit, Western science. Weber considered the crown jewel of science to be its formal 
rationality—i.e., the rational qua abstract, generalizable or quantifiable character of its 
knowledge.161 The logic of scientific research, in other words, assumes the same form as the 
“technical” and “economizing” form of rationality outlined by Menger. Put another way, 
economic, technical and scientific rationality are of the same type: “‘Rational’ technique is a choice 
of means which is consciously and systematically oriented to the experience and reflection of the 
actor, which consists, at the highest level of rationality, in scientific knowledge.”162 
 Weber was a brilliant historical sociologist and a founder of that discipline, but his 
typological construction of formal rationality, as Walter Mignolo has noted, unwitting erected an 
epistemic hierarchy in which the West prevails over “peoples without history”—a developmental 
vision premised on the universal value of distinctly Occidental scientific knowledge.163 “In 
Western civilization, and in Western civilization only,” Weber wrote, particular “cultural 
phenomena have appeared which lie in a line of development having universal significance and 
value.” What characterizes these phenomena, he suggested, is the specifically formal type of 
rationality that guides them. Despite the “knowledge and observation of great refinement that 
existed elsewhere, above all in India, China, Babylonia, Egypt,” he continued, “only in the West 
does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize today as valid.” Although 
sciences like astronomy developed “elsewhere,” admitted Weber, they nevertheless lacked “the 
mathematical foundation which it first received from the Greeks.” In India, moreover, geometry 
“had no rational proof” and the natural sciences “lacked the method of experiment.”164 A 
fundamental difference characterizes scientific and cultural development, then, and the relative 
“stage” of scientific rationality is what make possible “universal history”—not just potentially 
universalistic “forms of rationality” but also the (knowledge) claim to universality itself. The same 
logic applies to capitalist rationality, too, though Weber did not make this as explicit.165 Seen from 
the perspective of ideal types, the universality of history and rationality alike are formal in 
character, aspirationally insulated from (non-scientific, non-economic) matters of “substantive 
value.”166   
                                                
and political application.” Janek Wasserman, “Building a Movement: Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, Friedrich Wieser and the 
Quest for Influence in Fin-de- Siècle Vienna” (Duke History of Political Economy Workshop Draft, 2017). 
161 The malleable character of the term “formal” makes it scientifically problematic and powerful at the same time. 
With his economic-sociological typologies in Chapter 2 of Economy and Society, examined below, Weber equates 
“formal rationality” with the instrumental, economic, calculative and technical forms of conduct; in his other studies 
of state administration, however, “formal law” carries different meanings, referring to the abstracted, general, and 
rule-bound character of political structures. 
162 Weber, Economy and Society, 65. 
163 On Weber, science and colonialism, see Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, 
Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 3; Antonio Vazquez-
Arroyo, Political Responsibility, 234-37; and Pankaj Mishra, “How colonial violence came home: the ugly truth of 
the first world war” in The Guardian (November 10, 2017). 
164 See Weber, Protestant Ethic (1904/1992), 13.  
165 “[T]his traditionalistic attitude had to be at least partly overcome in the Western World before the further 
development to the specifically modern type of rational capitalistic economy could take place.” Max Weber, 
Economy and Society, 71. 
166 In this way they could be said to parallel the twentieth century’s great adjective-turned-noun, “the economic” and 
“the economy,” in contrast to the revolutionary vision of global communism. 
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Weber’s scientifico-civilizational distinctions already were indebted to both the neo-
Kantian epistemology and economic theory of his day, which, like most social sciences, both 
treasured the status and mimicked the methods of the natural sciences.167 At the turn of the century, 
economics was increasingly ascribed such a privileged status, thanks in no small part to the 
Austrians’ advocacy. Weber affirmed the Austrian model himself in “Marginal Utility Theory and 
‘The Fundamental Law of Psychophysics’” (1908),168 an influential essay praised by Eugen von 
Böhm-Bawerk, F. A. Hayek, Lionel Robbins and George Stigler, among others.169 In this long 
forgotten methodological intervention, Weber distinguished marginal value theory from other 
methods that rooted “economic rationality” in biological traits or “psychophysical” laws.170 But 
even if Weber was more “reluctant to attribute universality to the assumptions of economic theory, 
including rationality,” than Austrians economists, as Milan Zafirovski observed, this was true in a 
fundamental but not a practical sense. 171 For though Weber believed, as Schumpeter later echoed, 
that economic life is “ontologically irrational,”172 he considered it the mission of economic theory 
to apply ideal types as if the opposite were the case.  
Although Weber countered interpretations of economic rationality as a biological fact, he 
nonetheless made it a typological “pole” against which all existing practices can be measured. In 
this sense Weber concurred with Menger that economic theory must accept and operate upon an 
assumption of economizing and instrumentalizing rationality, even if he also saw it as the role of 
economic sociology to inquire into the cultural and historical variability of this construct. He 
likewise favored Menger’s praxeological (or aprioristic) approach to “the human economy” over 
Schmoller’s “national economy.” “Specifically economic motives,” Weber wrote, “operate 
wherever the satisfaction of even the most immaterial need or desire is bound up with the 
application of scarce material means.”173 By linking together methodological individualism, value 
neutrality, and a revised concept of homo oeconomicus as the paradigmatic foundations of the 
discipline, Weber thus stood firmly on the Austrian side of the Methodenstreit.174 
                                                
167 Philip Mirowski, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's Economics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
168 Max Weber, “Marginal Utility Theory and ‘The Fundamental Law of Psychophysics,’” translated by Louis 
Schneider, Social Science Quarterly 56 (1), 1908/1975, pp. 21-36. 
169 See Stefan Kolev, “The Weber-Wieser Connection: Early Economic Sociology as an Interpretative Skeleton 
Key,” The Center for the History of Political Economy Working Paper Series No. 22 (2017). 
170 “[B]y and large, the most general hypotheses and assumptions of the ‘natural sciences’ (in the usual sense of the 
term) are the most irrelevant ones for our discipline. But further, and above all, precisely as regards the point which 
is decisive for the peculiar quality of the questions proper to our discipline: In economic theory (‘value theory’) we 
stand entirely on our own feet.” Max Weber, “Marginal Utility Theory and ‘The Fundamental Law of 
Psychophysics,’” 31. Nicolo Giocoli does not mention Weber but describes this movement as the “escape from 
psychology.” See Giocoli, Modeling Rational Agents. 
171 Milan Zafirovski, “Max Weber’s Analysis of Marginal Utility Theory and Psychology Revisited: Latent 
Propositions in Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Economics” in History of Political Economy, 33/3, Fall 
2001. 
172 Joseph A. Schumpeter, “The Meaning of Rationality in the Social Sciences” in Richard Swedberg, ed., Joseph A. 
Schumpeter: The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 337. 
173 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 65. 
174 Weber was among the most active “young rebels” in his open confrontation with the preceding generation, 
initiating the “Werturteilsstreit” at the 1909 Vienna Meeting. Here he also found common cause with Austrian 
economists like Wieser. Having taught “‘at the first university of the Empire, the university of my hometown,’ 
[Wieser] initiated the application of marginal utility theory to monetary theory [at the 1903 Meeting]. Wieser 
proceeded and extended this endeavor in his presentations at the Verein für Socialpolitik’s Meeting in Vienna 1909 
– the same Verein Meeting which would prove of utmost importance not only for Max Weber’s career, but also for 
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While teaching at the University of Vienna in 1918, Weber became good friends with the 
younger Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises. Having already placed “value neutrality” 
(Wertfreiheit) at the center of German-language debates, Weber led the charge in a battle over 
value judgements (Werturteilstreit) that nearly tore the Verein apart. And Mises stood firmly on 
his side. Together in Vienna, Weber instructed Mises: “You do not like the Verein für Sozialpolitik; 
I don’t like it much either. But the only remedy is for us to take an active part in the work of the 
society.” Mises took the message to heart, took the group under his wing, and took the lead in 
discussing “problems relating to the theory of value” with members of the Verein.175  
Weber was also party to less amicable exchanges during his stay in Vienna. The Russian 
revolution—and the prospect of European socialism—was the subject of a coffeehouse quarrel 
with Schumpeter. Much like Schumpeter’s view of the Soviet experiment, Weber believed that 
“the road will lead over unparalleled human misery and end in a terrible catastrophe.” But when 
Schumpeter responded as an (ironic) practitioner of value neutrality, bracketing normative 
considerations from his assessment, Weber flipped, in an instant, from scientific sobriety to moral 
passion.176 Months later, while teaching in Munich, Weber tried to sublimate his bleak political 
outlook into the abstract economic models of his massive manuscript. Guenther Roth, the co-editor 
of Economy and Society, detailed this development as follows:  
 
In the last months of his life Weber withdrew in utter perplexity from politics. Reluctantly 
he accepted an economics chair at the University of Munich, since he could no longer 
live as a capitalist rentier and needed a job. A few months before his death at fifty-six he 
vented his frustration by telling his seminar students in Gustav Stolper’s presence: ‘I have 
no political plans except to concentrate all my intellectual strength on one problem, how 
to get once more for Germany a Great General Staff.’ That was hyperbole. In reality, 
Weber calmed his political nerves by writing the abstract casuistry of Economy and 
Society… He poured most of his energies into the longest chapter of the new (unfinished) 
version, the ‘Sociological Categories of Economic Action’ (Chapter 2), a chapter that 
despite its abstractness reflects the economic policy issues of the day… [T]his chapter 
                                                
the further development of the social sciences well beyond Vienna or German-language economics. The Verein’s 
Meeting in Vienna 1909 has been widely studied in the context of the ‘Werturteilsstreit’ debate on value judgments 
which, after some precursor clashes, openly unfolded there, and has occupied the social sciences ever since.” See 
Stefan Kolev, “The Weber-Wieser Connection: Early Economic Sociology as an Interpretative Skeleton Key,” p. 6. 
175 Recalling his conversation with Weber, Mises notes that “I followed his advice. Beginning in 1919, I was on the 
board of directors, and from 1930 I also served on the board of governors. I promoted the discussion of problems 
relating to the theory of value.” Ludwig von Mises, Monetary and Economic Policy Problems Before, During, and 
After the Great War (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 2012). 
176 “Schumpeter remarked how pleased he was with the Russian Revolution. Socialism was no longer a discussion 
on paper, but had to prove its viability. Max Weber responded in great agitation: communism, at this stage in 
Russian development, was virtually a crime, the road would lead over unparalleled human misery and end in a 
terrible catastrophe. ‘Quite likely,’ Schumpeter answered, ‘but what a fine laboratory.’ ‘A laboratory filled with 
mounds of corpses,’ Weber answered heatedly. ‘The same can be said of every dissection room,’ Schumpeter 
replied. Every attempt to divert them failed. Weber became increasingly violent and loud, Schumpeter increasingly 
sarcastic and muted. The other guests listened with curiosity, until Weber jumped up, shouting ‘1 can't stand any 
more of this,’ and rushed out... Schumpeter, left behind, said with a smile: ‘How can a man shout like that in a 
coffeehouse?’” Karl Jaspers, Karl Jaspers on Max Weber (Paragon House, 1989), 172. 
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belongs to the least read and least utilized parts of the oeuvre, but it is in a sense Weber’s 
economic testament.177  
 
In the posthumously published material in Economy and Society (1921), which soon shaped the 
trajectory of entire disciplines, Weber’s contribution to contemporary economic theory was 
concentrated in the second chapter. Though comparatively little known, it became the neoliberals’ 
chapter of choice. Mises and Hayek found in Weber’s scientifically hypostatized “real types” 
[Realtypen] fitting concepts for their critiques of planning. As revolutionary movements sprouted 
up across Europe, a binary choice seemed to be at hand: capitalism vs. socialism or, in Weber’s 
terminology, “market economy” vs. “planned economy.”  
For Weber, ideal types are revisable heuristics, not axiomatic principles or assumed realities. 
But if ideal typologies are the method to study the (relative) rationality of individual conduct, any 
interpretation will depend on how the line between the rational and the irrational is drawn. Here is 
one of Weber’s definitions: 
 
For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, 
affectually determined elements of behavior as factors of deviation from a conceptually 
pure type of rational action… The construction of a purely rational course of action in such 
cases serves the sociologist as a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear 
understandability and lack of ambiguity. By comparison with this it is possible to 
understand the ways in which actual action is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts, 
such as affects and errors, in that they account for the deviation from the line of conduct 
which would be expected on hypothesis that the action were purely rational.178 
 
But what kind of conduct would be (however hypothetically) “purely rational”? All roads lead 
back to Weber’s four-part typology of social action in the first chapter of the manuscript: 
tradition-oriented, affectually-oriented, value-oriented, and instrumentally-oriented action.179 
Yet implicit in Weber’s taxonomy is a “hierarchy of increasing voluntarism,” and it clear to 
all readers that “purely rational” action lay at the top of this pyramid—that is, in an ideal type 
of instrumentality [Zweckrationalität].180 Like the introduction to his Protestant Ethic, cited 
                                                
177 Roth continues: “On various occasions he opposed the moves toward Gemeinwirtschaft, that is, socialized or 
collectivized economy. He objected to efforts to socialize key industries primarily because Germany needed to 
attract foreign capital and secondarily because nationalized industries could be seized more easily by the Allies. He 
wanted to see the war economy end quickly and the currency stabilized as soon as possible. This included the 
reintroduction of a functioning gold standard.” Guenther Roth, “The Near-Death of Liberal Capitalism: Perceptions 
from Weber to the Polanyi Brothers,” Politics and Society, Vol. 31 Number 2 (2003), 270. 
178 “For example a panic on the stock exchange can be most conveniently analysed by attempting to determine first 
what the course of action would have been if it had not be influenced by irrational affects; it is then possible to 
introduce the irrational components as accounting for the observed deviations from this hypothetical course.” Weber, 
Economy and Society, 6. 
179 Weber, Economy and Society, 108. 
180 See Levine (2005), 14-5. This taxonomy can be read against Weber’s own ideal. For as Levine points out, Weber 
advocated “a heroic ethic of self-awareness and self-determination.” Yet “in the great majority of cases,” as Weber 
notes himself, “actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its 
subjective meaning… In most cases his action is governed by impulse or habit.” Weber, Economy and Society, 21. 
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above, Economy and Society also depicted rationality in such a developmental prism, with 
Western (capitalist) modernity at the peak. 
The manuscript’s second chapter follows the example of Menger, Wieser and Mises. Here 
Weber explained that economic action is the primary and most conscious form of “rational social 
action,” and that “the definition of economic action must be as general as possible.” Weber 
likewise provided a tautological definition of the “economic” as a rational desire for utilities, based 
only on a subjective meaning which “alone defines the unity of the corresponding [economic] 
processes.”181 Ideal types may span a typological spectrum of the rational and the irrational, but 
“in economic theory they are always rational.”182 “‘Economic action’ (Wirtschaften),” Weber 
elaborated, “is any peaceful exercise of an actor’s control over resources which is in its main 
impulse oriented towards economic ends. ‘Rational economic action’ requires instrumental 
rationality in this orientation, that is, deliberate planning.”183 Yet following Austrian price theory, 
conscious, deliberate and rational “planning” is already [and only] subjective rather than 
collective, already individual rather than institutional. It is less on a classical basis of self-interest 
than one of subjective desire that actors calculate value and order preferences in a “rational” 
way.184 Economic rationality and market rationality are equivalent; political and socialist 
rationality fall outside the gambit of scientific exposition.  
The second chapter of Economy and Society took the premises of marginalist theory for 
granted and spelled out their entailments via a binary typology of formal rationality (formelle 
Rationalität) and substantive rationality (materielle Rationalität). While the former is inherently 
“economic” and “technical,” the latter is “non-economic” and “political” in orientation.185 Formal 
rationality is specifically defined as quantitative calculation or capital accounting.186 Money and 
profit are, according to Weber, based on such formal calculability—not the substantive rationality 
of a particular (socialist) worldview. By definition capitalist exchange is likewise formal rather 
than substantive because it relies on purely monetary “means” without predetermined “ends.”187  
By itself, Weber explained, formal rationality “does not tell us anything about the actual 
distribution of goods.”188 Substantive rationality, by contrast, is based on “value-postulates” that 
determine the distribution of goods and resources. Based on criteria other than capital accounting 
and market calculation, substantive rationality is thus inherently political, and possibly even 
                                                
181 “Action will be said to be ‘economically oriented’ so far as, according to its subjective meaning, it is concerned 
with the satisfaction of a desire for ‘utilities’ (Nutzleistungen).” Weber, Economy and Society, 63-4. 
182 Weber, Economy and Society, 21. 
183 “We will call autocephalous economic action an ‘economy’ (Wirtschaft), and an organized system of continuous 
economic action an ‘economic establishment’ (Wirtschaftsbetrieb).” Weber, Economy and Society, 63. 
184 There are profound, unbridgeable differences between the Marxist conception of desires, needs and values as 
socially conditioned and the Austrian understanding of desire (or interest) and value (or price). For the latter, 
economic rationality does not depend on desires being rational, much less subject to rational deliberation, but 
logically connects subjective desire to the “spontaneous order” of the world through the information-gathering and 
scarcity-registering functions of the “price mechanism.” 
185 “Economic theory, the theoretical insights of which provide the basis for the sociology of economic action, might 
(perhaps) be able to proceed differently.” Weber, Economy and Society, 69. 
186 Weber juxtaposes “the formally most perfect rationality of capital accounting” with all “substantive postulates.” 
Since money is the “most rational” means to “steer” economic activity, formal rationality is “optimized” by this 
calculable medium of exchange.  
187 For the definition of profit as non-substantive, see Weber, Economy and Society, 90.  
188  Weber, Economy and Society, 108. 
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metaphysical.189 Individuals or groups may value social justice and equality, or state and military 
power, for instance, and thereby act upon substantive rationality. Yet these criteria are only 
significant as “bases from which to judge the outcome of economic action,” since their “approaches 
may consider the ‘purely formal’ rationality of calculation in monetary terms as of quite secondary 
importance or even as fundamentally inimical to their respective ultimate ends.”190 Revolutionary 
movements are substantive in orientation, too, because political (non-economic) values are placed 
above market (economic) value in assessing and determining possible courses of action. Whether 
due to Böhm-Bawerk’s marginalist critique of Marx or his own methodological differences,191 
Weber does not countenance the idea—discussed in Chapter 4 on the Frankfurt School—that an 
emphatic or collective form of reason would be embodied by a centralized, planned, or self-
organized economy.192 
The division between formal and substantive rationality parallels Weber’s more famous 
distinction between instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value rationality 
(Wertrationalität). But whereas these are defined as “ideal types” (Idealtypen), the second chapter 
posits “real types” (Realtypen) to construct capitalism and socialism as opposing economic 
orders.193 Each type comprises its own “rational” features; and each produces its own kinds of 
“irrational rationalities.”194 
Capitalism prioritizes Zweckrationalität through private ownership of property and private 
management of “free” labor. In the production process, Weber explains, these conditions yield the 
“most technically rational” organization of training, supervision, incentives, and standardization 
(e.g., Taylor system). As structures of power, they also provide “the most rational” way of 
adjusting to shifts in market situations.195 Analytically, “market rationality” is “a force which 
promotes the orientation of the economic activity of strata interested in purchase and sale of goods 
on the market to the market situations.”196 Historically, the capitalist “voluntary market 
organization” is set against “the primitive, irrational forms of regulation,” where status and 
tradition have the “rationality-impeding effect” of limiting “market freedom” and “the 
                                                
189 Depending on context, these ideal type concepts are analytically independent yet empirically intertwined: 
“Formal and substantive rationality, no matter by what standard the latter is measured, are always in principle 
separate things, no matter that in many (and under certain very artificial assumptions even in all) cases they may 
coincide empirically.” Weber, Economy and Society, 108. Weber defines the “formal” (formell) in terms of the 
“technical” (technisch), and each become more or less synonymous with the “rational” and “calculable” (rational, 
zweckrational rechnen, rechenhaft, moderne Rechnungsart). “‘Material’ ist hier also auch selbst ein ‘formaler’, d.h. 
hier: ein abstracter Gattungsbegriff.” Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 45. 
190 Weber, Economy and Society, 86. 
191 Weber critically engaged aspects of Marx’s materialism in his 1918 lectures in Vienna: “1918 übernahm Weber 
probeweise den Lehrstuhl für Nationalökonomie an der Universität Wien. Er hielt Vorlesungen über ‘Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft’ mit dem erläuternden Untertitel ‘Positive Kritik der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung’ 
(Sommersemester).” Kaesler, Dirk (ed.) Klassiker des Soziologischen Denkens: Zweiter Band von Weber bis 
Mannheim (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1978), 53. 
192 For a reading of Marx that focuses on this aspect in his work, see Alan Megill, Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason 
(Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market) (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). 
193 Weber, Economy and Society, 109.  
194 Weber, Economy and Society, 84; on the influence of “outside interests,” see 140. 
195 Weber, Economy and Society, 138. 
196 Weber, Economy and Society, 84. Unsurprisingly, Weber does not coin a “socialist rationality” to mirror “market 
rationality.” Nor does he nor designate any rationalities that would match quantitative considerations with principles 
of value such as common interest.  
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marketability of goods.”197 Once again, Weber’s distinction is constructed around the “pure” or 
“modern” type of economic order embodied by Western capitalism. 
Socialism, by contrast, entails the “appropriation of jobs or the existence of rights to 
participate in management.” This comes with significant costs, Weber claimed, as “it is generally 
possible to achieve a higher level of economic rationality if the management has extensive control 
over the selection and the modes of use of workers.” Private ownership is more rational, in other 
words, even if market rationality may “produce technically irrational obstacles as well as economic 
irrationalities.”198 Weber offered two examples for how market orders can engender irrationalities 
of their own: the domination of workers and the “substantive” effect of “outside” interests. “The 
fact that the maximum of formal rationality in capital accounting is possible only where the 
workers are subjected to domination by entrepreneurs,” wrote Weber, “is a further specific element 
of substantive irrationality in the modern economic order.”199 The domination of workers is thus 
irrational only if one presupposes a “substantive” perspective rather than a purely “formal” (and 
thus scientific) approach to the matter—or, as the Frankfurt School later put it, from the perspective 
of particular groups rather than “the whole.” If and when management or “speculative interests” 
become “sources of the phenomena known as the ‘crises’ in the market economy,” observed 
Weber, then market rationality may also drive capitalism to more systemic irrationalities. His 
point, however, is not nearly as Marxist as it might seem. For here Weber only meant: “The fact 
that such ‘outside’ interests can affect the mode of control over managerial positions, even and 
especially when the highest degree of formal rationality in their selection is attained, constitutes a 
further element of substantive irrationality specific to the modern economic order.”200 As Mises 
later noted himself, formal rationality can only be deemed irrational from a moral perspective 
external to its own logic. On its own terms, this kind of rationality is simply achieving its purpose. 
Functionalist interpretations of Weber in the postwar era could thus assert “systems theory” as a 
meta-account, but not a critique, of rationalization qua formalization and modernization.  
Given the methodologically self-imposed constraints on “value neutral” analysis, it is 
unclear what criteria Weber and fellow economists could use to scientifically designate the 
“irrationality” of domination.”201 Within a formalist, functionalist or Austrian framework, Weber’s 
point about “irrational rationality” is not critical, but mundane: political actors with “value 
postulates” can only assert the irrationality of market rationality from their own (non-scientific, 
non-economic) point of view. If economic liberals chose to do so, however, theirs would be a 
technical and scientific, not a moral assessment of the matter. 
As will become clear, Weber was ahead of the neo-liberal curve in scientifically flanking 
socialist opponents like Otto Neurath.202 Having studied under members of the Austrian School, 
like many other socialists and Austro-Marxists of the time, Neurath was an idiosyncratic thinker: 
a Vienna Circle positivist, a physicalist, a believer in “the essential rationality of ‘modern man’ 
                                                
197 Weber, Economy and Society, 84. 
198 Weber, Economy and Society, 138.  
199 Weber, Economy and Society, 138. Most interpreters attribute this to the influence of Capital for Weber’s 
analysis of capitalism as a “pure type.” That is, Weber appears to offer a critique of the “irrational” conditions of 
workers under a formally rational economic order. 
200 Weber, Economy and Society, 140. 
201 Prefiguring the German ordoliberals’ critique of monopoly power elaborated upon in just five years’ time, the issue 
will rear its head again at the top of a list of concerns debated by the Mont Pèlerin Society. See chapter three of the 
dissertation. 
202 For Weber’s personal letter to Neurath, see Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order. 
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and his ability purposefully to order the world in a socially optimal fashion.”203 For Neurath, it 
was not market calculation but centralized planning—a distinct form of political rationality—that 
would secure optimal conditions for social and economic life. Neurath outlined his own “rational 
economic theory” to provide technocratic administrations with a detailed plans, with the hope of 
achieving the results of socialist revolution without the strain of class conflict. 
As WWI came to a close, Weber rejected supposedly rational schemes for socialization, 
nationalization, or wartime provision of “money in kind.” Like Mises and later neoliberals, he 
believed that “a limit to the possible degree of socialization would be set by the necessity of 
maintaining a system of effective prices.”204 Neurath was thus blind to the identity of formal 
rationality and market calculability. “Nothing is gained by assuming that, if only the problem of a 
non-monetary economy were seriously enough attacked, a suitable accounting method would be 
discovered or invented. The problem is fundamental to any kind of complete socialization. We 
cannot speak of a rational ‘planned economy’ so long as in this decisive respect we have no 
instrument for elaborating a rational ‘plan.’”205  
Whereas Weber’s text renders political rationality inherently “substantive,” economic 
rationality turns into liberalism’s “non-substantive” measuring stick. Assuming this economic 
schema, socialist rationality is substantive, whereas (neo)liberal rationality is formal, scientific, 
functional, and calculative in character. From any “formally rational” standpoint, then, socialism 
is an irrational order. Such distinctions between economic value and political values was not new 
to the world; but the neoliberals would make a new world out of it. Weber’s typology became a 
means to this end. For one, Weber helped separate out socialism as a political project premised on 
(non-economic) value postulates—a worldview, if you will, inapplicable to economic questions—
from liberalism as a form of (economic) rationality that makes this its foundational premise. 
(Neo)liberalism, in this way, could soon cast itself as a worldview that is not one.206 In addition to 
serving as custodian of market liberalism’s alleged non-worldview, Weber affected a discursive 
equivalence between economics, markets and rationality tout court.  
As we observed, the task of Weber’s chapter in Economy and Society was to “determine 
the optimum conditions for the formal rationality of economic activity and its relation to the 
various types of substantive demands which may be made on the economic system.”207 Yet its 
conclusions are more or less fixed by the axioms from which it starts. “Economic theory, the 
theoretical insights of which provide the basis for the sociology of economic action, might 
(perhaps) be able to proceed differently,”208 Weber wrote. But by affirming Austrian methodology 
against “particularistic” projects in the political sphere, the market is made the “formally most 
rational” and “most scientific” order of things from the start. Even if he only partially adopted their 
principles in this chapter, Weber reached more radical conclusions about socialism than the 
                                                
203 See Otto Neurath, Economic Writings: Selections 1904-1945. 
204 Weber, Economy and Society, 104. 
205 Weber, Economy and Society, 103. Read alongside Foucault’s claim that socialists never established an 
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Viennese founders (Menger, Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk) themselves.209 In a word, Mises and the 
Austrian School both influenced and took their formal typological division from Weber. 
 
From Liberal to Neoliberal Rationality  
 
So far as [socialist calculation] has a genuinely economic character—that is, so far as it takes 
account of alternative ends and not only of means for a given end—it is restricted to what is, from 
the standpoint of careful monetary calculation, a relatively primitive level of calculation on the 
marginal utility principle. – Max Weber210  
 
Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses. – Lionel Robbins211 
 
“Socialism is the slogan of our day,” decried Mises in 1922. “The battle of Socialism 
against unlimited private profit,” echoed Keynes in 1926, “is being won in detail hour by hour.”212 
Mises wrote these lines in Red Vienna, surrounded by revolutionary activity and under the first 
democratic government in Austrian history. Keynes, by contrast, was referring less to an imminent 
socialist takeover than to ever-increasing interest in state mechanisms for provisioning and 
planning under peacetime. Rational state planning was emerging as the solution to the so-called 
“irrational” forces and crises—war, inflation, poverty, revolution—that plagued the Euro-
Atlantic.213 While Keynes welcomed “the end of laisser-faire capitalism” and penned his General 
Theory to address these woes with a new welfare state strategy, Mises sought to flip the script. By 
inverting the terms of debate—the (ir)rationality of the market vs. the state—Mises aimed to 
destroy socialism and Keynesianism in a single, scientific blow. 
                                                
209 In the Austrians and other Eastern European economists Bockman claims to discover “the socialist origins of 
neoliberalism,” a historical account that is instructive and intriguing but whose argument, in my reading, ultimately 
proves flawed. See Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism. 
210 Weber, Economy and Society. 
211 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932), 15. The footnote 
appended to this sentence cites Menger and Mises. 
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Revolutionsideale. Ullstein, 1919; David E. Barclay, “A Prussian Socialism? Wichard von Moellendorff and the 
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  52 
Mises’ work was part of a trans-disciplinary sea change in social scientific epistemology. 
In contrast to theories that once employed interdisciplinary knowledge of historical dynamics, the 
task of science was now to formalize (so as to potentially stabilize) human conduct. Scientific 
models were placed above research questions and the detailed knowledge relevant to answer them; 
for only the former, not the latter, could secure “success” in any measurable and quantifiable sense. 
This differentiated “classical” from a self-proclaimed “modern” approach to economics that now 
goes by the label of “neoclassical.” But like all umbrella concepts, this label tends to obscure the 
great variety of positions sheltered under it—particularly the methodological pluralism that 
preceded the grand consolidation of just a few tenets (marginal utility, perfect information, and 
general equilibrium).214 
One of the first to base economic science on the idea of scarcity, Carl Menger had pursued 
a uniform theory of price under which phenomena like interest, wages, and rent would fall. In 
doing so, Menger displaced the structural analysis of historical dynamics and recentered it on 
subjective valuations of scarce economic goods. Subjective preferences are ranked according to 
their relative importance for a given individual; in turn, the value (price) of goods and labor are 
derived from their overall desirability and scarcity. Less a philosophical anthropology of 
“maximization” than one of “economization,” Menger recast human behavior in terms of 
methodological subjectivism.215 To this day, economists of various stripes maintain that Menger’s 
“Law” of marginal utility “resolved” the paradox of value in classical political economy.  
Austrian and neoclassical theory discarded the labor theory for the marginalist or price 
theory of value. This came at the moment when capitalism faced its most powerful challenge yet: 
an increasingly organized socialist opposition reaching for state power. The methodological shift 
thus resulted less from the inevitable contradictions of capital than from the threat of emergent 
collective struggles. The Austrian economic theorists interrogated the theoretical validity of both 
classical and Marxist theories, and they probed the relationship between the state and a realm that 
was only beginning to be called “the economy.” Previously, in the classical tradition, the capitalist 
division of labor “naturally” entailed free trade, so long as state rationality was limited by the rule 
of laisser faire. In neoclassical theory, however, economic rationality was no longer “a certain 
propensity in human nature” that Adam Smith posited as homo oeconomicus’s natural drive, 
namely “to “truck, barter, and exchange.” With Menger and his disciples, economic rationality 
became more formal and less “natural” than Smithian philosophical anthropology. The 
“economic” was now attached to all goods deemed desirable but scarce, and “economical” conduct 
to all action, conscious or subconscious, that evaluated these goods by preference. The subjective 
or “inner” features of economic rationality linked up with its structural or “outer” manifestations. 
The former, rooted in desire, was translated and externalized into the former via market exchange 
and price formation. The “mechanism” of valuation—the market form itself—was seen as the sole 
bearer of “rationality.” With this as its truth, the subjectivist turn rendered an inherently political 
question in formalistic, scientific terms. The question for its rivals was whether this form of 
rationality is the sole province of capitalism, or whether the market is compatible with other kinds 
                                                
214 Put another way, today’s axiomatic assumptions were proliferated by scholars—Menger, Jevons, Walras, Marshal, 
Pareto, among others—whose methodological and “substantive” commitments diverged radically at the time.  
215 And it was from Menger, surely, that Schumpeter took inspiration in writing his book on Methodological 
Individualism. For excellent studies of the role of this idea, see Colin Bird, The Myth of Liberal Individualism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Annie McCalahan, “Methodological Individualism and the 
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of organization as well. Are markets inherent to capitalist order, or are markets more universal and 
thus compatible with other kinds of order? 
The neoclassical rupture in classical economic theory thus refigured the “politics of the 
rational,” preparing the interwar transformation from liberalism to neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, 
itself an umbrella concept encompassing various methodological and theoretical frameworks, 
should not be equated with any of its unique iterations. Put another way, though marginalist 
“economization” planted the seeds for what we have called “neoliberal rationality,” neoliberalism 
is not reducible to neoclassical economics, rational choice theory, game theory, public choice 
theory, or other methodological programs associated with the concept.216 For none can claim to 
represent “neoliberalism” in its entirety or across its diversity of forms. Aside from the family 
resemblances that give solidity to the term, its validity lay in a certain historical and theoretical 
capaciousness: the historical effort to reinvent classical liberalism and the theories that underwrote 
it, and the theoretical effort to grasp the new ways of ordering the world and understanding 
ourselves engendered along the way. 
Though not autonomous from “material” conditions, methodological and epistemic shifts, 
I am suggesting, formed the conditions of possibility of neoliberal rationality. These shifts also 
engendered other philosophical anthropologies and modes of reasoning, many of which never 
materialized into governing rationalities. In theory and practice, socialism proposed more than one 
such form of rationality or “counter-rationality.” Within and without economics, socialism was 
also a discourse that believed itself scientific. According to its adherents, Scientific Socialism 
offered a counter-program—a socialist rationality whose truth could contest and overcome that of 
liberal rationality.  
Rejecting the labor theory of value in both its classical and Marxist forms, a new generation 
of “modern” economists asked whether socialism might indeed contain ideal conditions for market 
exchange within itself. Many of them did so by separating the market form from different 
institutional orders (e.g., liberalism and socialism) with which it was more or less (in)compatible. 
If only as a scientific experiment, many of the early marginalists implanted markets within their 
models of state socialism. In this way socialist institutions—e.g., “state or social ownership of 
certain parts of the economy, worker ownership of firms, workers’ self-management, cooperative 
ownership, and various forms of democracy, as well as antimonopoly laws and company 
autonomy”217—might establish rather than abolish ideal conditions for market competition.  
Leon Walras, for instance, believed that neoclassical assumptions, mathematical models, 
perfect competition, and a socialist state “did not just complement each other, but in fact made 
each other possible.”218 In 1893 Friedrich von Wieser likewise used a perfect “communist state” 
as a model for the kind of economic value that would be “recognized by a completely organic and 
most highly rational community.”219 Vilfredo Pareto and Enrico Barone, too, fused similar 
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assumptions with socialist models of economic order.220 Using the Weberian type-concept, 
Swedish economist Gustav Cassel modeled the “theoretically simplest Socialist economy, a pure 
type.”221 Built upon neoclassical rather than Marxist precepts, a young guild socialist, Karl Polanyi, 
advanced his own “positive economic doctrine” for rational planning.222 Because the wage levels 
and distribution of goods determined by monopoly and free market mechanisms are “unjust and 
irrational,”223 Polanyi argued that a scientific effort must base socialism on an alternative 
economic theory in order to counter capitalism—a scientific omission he traced back to Marx and 
Engels themselves. “We offer here to the dogmatists of the economy without markets, such as 
those of the Kautsky-Neurath-Trotsky tendency,” Polanyi wrote, “just as little that is 
fundamentally new as we offer to the dogmatists of the pure exchange economy.”224 One of 
Polanyi’s addressees, fellow Austrian and scientific socialist Otto Neurath, was already under 
attack by “calculation debate” forerunners, Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises.225 A former 
student of Böhm-Bawerk, Neurath not only wrote scientific texts but also implemented economic 
socialization schemes himself. During the Räterepublik of 1919, he served as the director the 
Bavarian Zentralwirtschaftsamt that helped plan workers’ councils in the “soviet” phase of the 
German revolution.226 After these movements were overthrown on a national scale by the Social 
Democrats themselves, now atop the newly democratic yet still repressive state, Neurath continued 
to argue for a centralized, moneyless regime of rational state planning.227  Neurath soon lost favor, 
however, and became a favorite target of scholars and politicians on both the left and right—
including a group of the earliest “neoliberals.” 
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The Market for Rationality: Mises, Hayek and the Calculation Debate 
 
Like Weber, Mises gave Neurath the honor of being the representative socialist for his 
critique. But Mises took his critique to an entirely different level. Neurath’s proposal for a planned 
socialist economy called for the abolition of money, a prevalent but by no means unanimous 
position among socialist thinkers and politicians, as we saw above. Though Neurath’s idiosyncratic 
model could not have been more different from those of the debate’s actual interlocutors, Mises 
let it stand in for “socialism” of every kind. With Neurath’s socialism as the “pure type” against 
which to do battle, Mises rolled out a series of rhetorical equations, or equivocations, between 
“planning,” “socialism,” “intervention” and other underspecified terms of art.228 It was through 
this maneuver that Mises, like Hayek after him, initiated a semantic slide that became a century-
long signature of neoliberalism. 
Mises’ essay on “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” appeared in the 
1920 issue of Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, the journal Weber founded and in 
which “The Protestant Ethic” first appeared as two essays. Unlike Mises’ later libertarian screeds, 
this early essay garnered wide interest and serious discussion from friends and foes alike. And 
because Mises struck his unsuspecting adversary first, he was afforded some latitude in his framing 
definitions. His essay simply assumed the axiomatic principles and “value neutral” veneer of the 
Austrian School. But now Mises pushed its formal features to their logical and political limits: a 
scientific demonstration of socialism’s practical impossibility. Proceeding from Mengerian 
distinctions, Mises’ essay differentiated goods of higher and lower order; distinguished “the 
economic” from the “extra-economic”; equated marginal value theory with calculation tout court; 
asserted money as necessary for economic calculation and exchange; and questioned whether 
socialism could function absent these conditions. Answering the latter question in the negative, 
Mises radicalized Mengerian epistemology. At the core of human behavior, he claimed, lay a 
formally rational constant: the economic orientation and economizing capacities of “man.” In other 
words, individuals “economize” by evaluating the real and imagined objects of their action 
according to their subjective value. To deny this would be to not act at all. Though possible in 
principle, Mises explained, the “non-acting man” effectively suspends human rationality, thereby 
reducing humankind to a “plant-like” status and portending its “suicide” [Selbstmörder].229 
Mises’ axiomatic equations of socialism with irrationality paralleled those of Max Weber, 
albeit with far less subtlety and qualification. But as a disciple of Menger and an a priori rationalist 
of his own kind, Mises did not believe such principles actually needed much hermeneutic or 
contextual qualification. “Historically,” as Mises had already suggested in Theory of Money 
                                                
228 As Caldwell notes, outside of a surprisingly warm scholarly reception, The Road to Serfdom’s critics focused on 
this equivocation: Hayek’s unwillingness to specify just where the line is to be drawn between state planning and 
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nicht mit einem zur Pflanze gewordenen." See Mises, Nationalökonomie (1940), 74. 
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(1912), “human rationality is a development of economic life.”230 Having equated the rational and 
the economic, Mises asked if, absent “the economy,” there could be “any such thing as rational 
conduct at all, or, indeed, such a thing as rationality and logic in thought itself?” Not in the strict 
sense, he replied, since rationality and economy are co-constitutive. Rational conduct is rooted in 
economic calculation, and “without economic calculation there can be no economy.”231 By 
“economy” Mises meant monetary economy, and by monetary economy he meant market 
economy.232 If Neurath’s model for central planning and in natura exchange represented 
socialism’s typological core—as Weber and Mises assumed—then a socialist economy is in fact 
no economy at all.233 “Socialism” implies, in Mises’ famous line, “the abolition of rational 
economy.”234 Or, in a more direct translation of the German original: “Socialism is the abolition 
of the rationality of the economy.”235  
So began the so-called “socialist calculation debate,” a term Hayek popularized a decade 
later. Though hardly “value neutral,” Mises’ scientific strategy was well designed for his purposes. 
The “modern” theory of rationality qua instrumental or market calculation was already half a 
century in the making. By the turn of the century, both orthodox scientific socialists and reform-
minded social democrats had foregrounded the rationality of their programs as well. The discourse 
of rationality simultaneously operated at the level of functionality and legitimacy, and it named 
pressing questions as socialists set their sights on state power. The question was what kind of 
rational framework could be designed and institutionally implemented so as to achieve particular 
ends, such as meeting basic needs, securing freedom and equality, and overcoming the “irrational 
rationality” of capitalism. 
In the 1920’s the debate attracted a variety of perspectives—(neo)liberal capitalist, 
Keynesian welfarist, market socialist, guild socialist, orthodox communist—each of which 
prescribed their own form of rationality. Yet in doing so, nearly all of these interventions, including 
that of Neurath, focused their prescriptions on technocratic rather than democratic cures for the 
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ills of political-economic order. Even decentralized programs for workers’ councils, or “soviets,” 
for instance, presupposed a political epistemology with “rational” and scientific solutions of their 
own, though they did not dare to avow “value neutrality.” These included policies like abolition 
of money, propounded by Trotsky and many others, and the model of distribution provided by the 
German post office, which comprised Lenin’s famous model for efficient planning. In contrast to 
the “organismic” visions of earlier eras—from naturalistic liberalism and Physiocracy to Owenite 
socialism—these solutions were rationalist, modernist, and constructivist to their core. The world 
would become rational when it reflected the design of the rational mind. But for most of these 
twentieth-century movements, this was not a matter of laisser faire, of letting history or (human) 
nature “be.” It was a matter of making the world rational through rationally-designed reforms and 
plans. 
By putting a radically subjectivist spin on such questions, Mises put socialists on the 
defensive. Hailing from a newly conceived discipline of economics,236 market socialists mounted 
powerful responses, with scholars like Oskar Lange, Carl Landauer, H. D. Dickinson and Fred 
Taylor leading the way.237 To disprove Mises’ charge of socialism’s necessary failure, market 
socialists sought to model an alternative order upon the very same “modern” or “neoclassical” 
assumptions as the marginalists. Such programs would not abolish “the” economy, they argued, 
but secure a more stable and rational basis for functional markets within a socialist order. Woken 
from their dogmatic slumber (to use Kant’s acknowledgement of Hume), market socialists saw 
Mises’ work as a genuine inspiration, a scientific call to arms. Perhaps a better parallel than Kant’s 
awakening is Marx’s dialectical appropriation of Hegel. For if Mises posed the question and 
method from which they departed, the market socialists answered with what they deemed the most 
advanced and scientific means of their day. While teaching at the University of Chicago, before 
becoming the head of central planning in Poland, Lange showed his monumental appreciation for 
Mises by proposing to place his form at the very center of the socialist future:  
 
Socialists have certainly good reason to be grateful to Professor Mises, the great 
advocatus diabol [sic] of their cause. For it was his powerful challenge that forced the 
socialists to recognize the importance of an adequate system of economic accounting to 
guide the allocation of resources in a socialist economy. Even more, it was chiefly due to 
Professor Mises’ challenge that many socialists became aware of the very existence of 
such a problem… [T]he merit of having caused the socialists to approach this problem 
systematically belongs entirely to Professor Mises… Both as an expression of recognition 
for the great service rendered by him and as a memento of the prime importance of sound 
economic accounting, a statue of Professor Mises ought to occupy an honorable place in 
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the great hall of the Ministry of Socialization or of the Central Planning Board of the 
socialist state.238  
 
It could thus be said, with some hyperbole, that Mises’ polemical interventions spawned early 
neoliberalism and market socialism.  
 But these were not the only positions in the socialist calculation debate. The young Karl 
Polanyi, shaped by the Austrian School and Historical Schools, instead proposed “guild 
socialism.” This he understood as a critique of liberalism that provided a mid-level solution 
between workers’ councils and central planning.239 Orthodox Marxists were satisfied with none of 
the above. For instance, Felix Weil, a co-founder and financial sponsor of Frankfurt’s Institut für 
Sozialforschung, argued that such “half way” solutions were just as bad as the (neo)liberal 
analyses, as they denied the necessity (and inevitability) of proletarian revolution. In Weil’s eyes, 
Mises was right about one thing, and one thing only: the political path ahead was a binary, either 
free market capitalism or rationally planned socialism. Thus rather than target Mises, Weil 
concentrated his critique on Polanyi’s “attempt to abandon real [wirklichen] socialism.”240   
Mises provided early neoliberalism with a scientific strategy for subduing socialism—
impose a binary frame on his opponents. But it was Hayek who would soon perfect the maneuver. 
In 1931 Hayek joined the LSE economics faculty at Lionel Robbins’ invitation.241 Upon arrival, 
Hayek was surprised to find that British students were largely market socialists working on 
neoclassical assumptions. The young Ronald Coase, for instance, melded neoclassical methods 
with a strong political predilection for socialism.242 It seemed the question of formal calculation 
was alive and well in Britain, though this repeat of the Methodenstreit was farcically tilting in the 
socialists’ direction. Hayek thus took it upon himself to show his students and colleagues the 
                                                
238 Oskar Lange, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism” (emphasis mine). 
239 In “Sozialistische Rechnungslegung” [1922], Polanyi developed a future model of a socialism in which the 
economy is subordinated to society. See Johanna Bockman, Ariane Fischer, and David Woodruff, “Socialist 
accounting” by Karl Polanyi: with preface “socialism and the embedded economy” in Theory and Society, 45 (5) 
2016, 385-427. Two years later he responded to Mises and Weil. See also Karl Polanyi, “Die funktionnelle Theorie 
des gesellschaft und das Problem des sozialistische Rechnungselegung eine erwiderung an Pr L. von Mises und Dr 
F. Weil” (1924). 
240 Felix Weil, “Gildensozialistische Rechnungslegung: Kritische Bemerkungen zu Karl Polányi: 'Sozialistische 
Rechnungslegung'” in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. 52 (1924), 202. See Chapter 4 of the 
dissertation for a discussion of Weil’s position in the debate. 
241 “Well, what converted me is that the social scientists, the science specialists in the tradition of Otto Neurath, just 
were so extreme and so naive on economics that it was through [Neurath] that I became aware that positivism was 
just as misleading as the social sciences. I owe it to his extreme position that I soon recognized it wouldn’t do… It 
was only after I had left Vienna, in London, that I began to think systematically on problems of methodology in the 
social sciences, and I began to recognize that positivism in that field was definitely misleading. In a discussion I had 
on a visit to Vienna from London with my friend [Gottfried] Haberler, I explained to him that I had come to the 
conclusion that all this Machian positivism was no good for our purposes.” Hayek, “The UCLA Interviews with 
Friedrich Hayek” (1978); 17-18 [link]. 
242 In 1930 the future Chicago School economist Ronald Coase took a class on price theory with Arnold Plant at the 
LSE. Coase did not find a way to pair his socialist sympathies with Plant’s approach, but he did come to realize that 
a corporate firm was a “little planned society.” Bockman notes that, “[e]merging from the debates in Vienna about 
centralized planning versus the market, Hayek found the socialist students at LSE espousing free markets and 
socialism, which sounded familiar to the contemporary German market socialists,” such as Landauer and Heimann. 
“In response to their embrace of market socialist, Hayek repacked older Central European debates for his new 
audience.” Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism, 30.  
  59 
light—and logical conclusions—of market rationality, to show the road to socialism was the road 
to irrationality, and ultimately the road to Western civilization’s own undoing. 
Hayek’s first move was telling. In 1933 he penned a memorandum, “Nazi-Socialism,” 
which argued, as the title indicates, that Nazism represents a “genuine socialist movement.” 
Hayek’s reasoning returned to the epistemic roots of the Austrians, but added a concern about the 
political and cultural character of the problem. “Socialism and Nazism,” he explained, “both grew 
out of the antiliberal soil that the German Historical School economists had tended.”243 The 
significance of Menger’s methodological battle had thus always been more than an insular debate 
in the pursuit of objective scientific truth. “[T]though the German Historical School economists 
were conservative imperialists, cheerleaders for a strong German Reich and opponents of German 
social democracy,” as Caldwell explained of Hayek’s thinking, “they also were the architects of 
numerous social reform policies.”244 From Hayek’s perspective, the socialist calculation debate 
was Methodenstreit 2.0, a scientific dispute with “civilizational” stakes. 
Beyond his extension of Menger, Hayek also borrowed from Weber and Mises’ strategy: 
frame the question of “the rational” through a market-planning binary. Weber’s unacknowledged 
influence on Hayek has been described as a “curious relation”: though Hayek had missed much of 
Weber’s time in Vienna between 1917-18 due to the former’s participation in WWI, he “intended 
to follow Weber to Munich as a student after the war”—a plan that did not ultimately 
materialize.245 Now Hayek advanced a modified form of Weber and Mises’ argument about 
socialist irrationality. State planning may not collapse by necessity, he suggested, but will almost 
surely fail due to its inherently inferior economic rationality. Hayek made this argument in an 
edited volume entitled Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of 
Socialism (1935), which he edited, introduced and concluded himself.246 Though designed to 
dissuade true believers, the volume included both proponents and critics of market socialism, all 
of whom assumed the market (price) mechanism as the necessary condition of economic 
rationality. In defense of position, Hayek leveraged the second chapter of Max Weber’s Economy 
and Society, discussed above, as well as another unlikely ally in Russian economist Boris 
Brutzkus: 
 
Like Professor Mises, [Max Weber] insisted that the in natura calculations proposed by 
the leading advocates of a planned economy could not possibly provide a rational 
solution… and that the wastes due to the impossibility of rational calculation in a 
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completely socialized system might be serious enough to make it impossible to maintain 
alive the present populations of the more densely populated countries.247 
 
Alongside Mises,248 Hayek claimed, Weber and Brutzkus had independently arrived at the same 
conclusion: “the impossibility of a rational calculation in a centrally directed economy from which 
prices are necessarily absent.”249 
The formative role of this “debate” for the trajectory of Hayek’s thinking has been 
overlooked by most scholars of Hayek. Beyond its clear relation to The Road to Serfdom (1944), 
Hayek admitted the debate also shaped his arguments in “Economics and Knowledge” (1936) and 
“The Use of Knowledge in Society” (1945) for which he won the Nobel Prize in economics three 
decades later.250 The capacity for economic rationality—not alone as an a priori cognitive capacity 
but together with the culture and knowledge-bearing activities of dispersed individuals—
underwrote Hayek’s theory of decentralized information, market discovery, and in the 
“spontaneous” or “extended” order. Hayek not only credited the calculation debate, but also the 
political arguments and intellectual mentorship of Mises himself. As Hayek explained later in life, 
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Markets in the Name of Socialism, 31. 
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“[Mises] wrote that article, and then particularly a book [Socialism] which had the decisive 
influence of curing us [of our infatuation with socialism], although it was a very long struggle… 
The question of why Mises’ argument hadn’t persuaded most other people became important to 
me, so I became anxious to put it in a more effective form… without accepting his apriorism.”251 
Hayek thus followed the general principle and argumentative strategy of Weber and Mises—that 
the rationality of the market stands in contradiction with that of state planning—without sharing 
the full scope of their respective epistemologies.252  
Weber may have ultimately been a pawn in the long-game of neoliberalism. But his 
skeptical position on capitalist and socialist (ir)rationality gave inspiration and leverage to the early 
project. Ultimately it was Mises and Hayek who epistemologically programmed an anti-socialist 
perspective into neoliberal discourse, with legacies that run into the present.253  
 
The Economic Constitution of Political Deficits  
 
It may well be that there may exist differences as regards ultimate ends in modern society which 
render some conflict inevitable. But it is clear that many of our most pressing difficulties arise, not 
for this reason, but because our aims are not coordinated… As public citizens we sanction 
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  62 
arrangements which frustrate the achievement of this distribution. We call for cheap money and 
lower prices, fewer imports and a larger volume of trade. The different ‘will-organisations’ in 
society, although composed of the same individuals, formulate different preferences. Everywhere 
our difficulties seem to arise, not so much from divisions between the different members of the 
body politic, as from, as it were, split personalities on the part of each one of them. To such a 
situation, Economics brings the solvent of knowledge… [and] provides a technique of rational 
action. This is the sense in which Economics can be truly said to assume rationality in human 
society. – Lionel Robbins254 
 
The interwar politics of rationality shaped the postwar social scientific imagination. And 
the socialist calculation debate was the first neoliberal intervention to connect (and reduce) 
economic theory to a pro-market framework. Before it became a political project of its own, then, 
neoliberalism worked to impute methodologically “substantive” political projects with 
“irrationality.” This strategy was extended by other early neoliberals like Lionel Robbins, an anti-
Keynesian economic theorist at the LSE and an avid reader of German and Austrian political 
economy.255 In 1930, as a member of Britain’s powerful Economic Advisory Council, Robbins 
opposed state spending on public works and import restrictions as means to counter economic 
depression. In 1932, he wrote what soon became a definitive text in the discipline, The Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science, which implanted a host of Weberian and Austrian assumptions 
into the “nature and significance” of economic science. 
A touchstone of the discipline to this day, Robbins’ concise definition of economic science 
as the formalist study of behavior “as a relationship between ends and scarce means” cited 
Menger’s book on method and Mises’ book on socialism.256 “Without economic analysis it is not 
possible rationally to choose between alternative systems of society,” Robbins explained, since “it 
is not possible to regard [a particular system] as rational unless it is formulated with a full 
consciousness of the nature of the sacrifice which is thereby involved.”257 Throughout his magnum 
                                                
254 Robbins, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 139-40. 
255 Whereas most economists found some kind of flaw in Mises’ critique of socialism—only the eventual members 
of the Mont Pèlerin Society were truly compelled by his conclusions—there is a sense in which the debate was 
“won” over a longer period of time, with the help of Cold War science and geopolitics, as evidenced by socialism’s 
relative disappearance as an object of discursive focus and popular enthusiasm. Importantly, the terms and 
assumptions of the debate were disseminated not only in the Mont Pèlerin Society, but in the work of scholars as 
various as Peter Drucker, Henry Simon, and Daniel Bell. See for example Henry A. Simon, Chapter 2 in The 
Sciences of the Artificial; Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (Basic Books, 1976); and Drucker, 
The End of Economic Man (1939), as well as numerous discussions of the debate in Drucker’s later books. For a 
biographical note about Drucker’s childhood experience of Mises, Hayek and Schumpeter in Vienna, see Richard 
Brem, “Wien als Lebensprinzip und Erfolgsgeheimnis”; 
http://www.druckersociety.at/index.php/peterdruckerhome/commentaries/richard-brem?start=2. 
256 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932), 15. This definition was 
widely embraced and operationalized by economists like Paul Samuelson in Foundations of Economic Analysis 
(1947). 
257 “And we cannot do this unless we understand, not only the essential nature of the capitalistic mechanism, but also 
the necessary conditions and limitations to which the type of society proposed as a substitute would be subject. It is 
not rational to will a certain end if one is not conscious of what sacrifice the achievement of that end involves. And, 
in this supreme weighing of alternatives, only a complete awareness of the implications of modern economic 
analysis can confer the capacity to judge rationally.” Robbins, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 
138-9. For a similar formulation, see the following: “Faced with the problem of deciding between this and that, we 
are not entitled to look to Economics for the ultimate decision. There is nothing in Economics which relieves us of 
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opus, he established formal rationality and value neutrality as the bedrock of economics. Whereas 
Robbins subtlety parsed out economics from politics in Weberian spirit, Mises pressed the 
distinction even harder: “we may say that economics is apolitical or nonpolitical, although it is the 
foundation of politics and of every kind of political action. We may furthermore say that it is 
perfectly neutral with regard to all judgments of value, as it refers always to means and never to 
the choice of ultimate ends.”258  
At the basis of early neoliberalism, we find an economic theory that programs a pro-market 
political rationality at the same time it undercuts the scientific legitimacy of political theory and 
of politics itself. On the one hand, Mises and Robbins avowed the neutrality of “rational” policies 
that followed the “economic point of view.” On the other hand, they were forced to admit that 
economics may contain an “ultimate value” or “substantive end” of its own. “The affirmation that 
rationality and ability to choose with knowledge is desirable,” Robbins wrote, is the substantive 
value presupposed by economic science. “If irrationality, if the surrender to the blind force of 
external stimuli and uncoordinated impulse at every moment is a good to be preferred above all 
others, then it is true the raison d’etre of Economics disappears.”259 According to Robbins, the 
rationalist can look Weber’s “polytheism of values” in the face so long as economics provides 
scientifically neutral criteria for individuals to choose—a criteria of choice, not for choice. But the 
question then becomes how to most rationally (i.e., consistently) order “our” individual and 
collective ends. The early neoliberal answer entailed a governmental imperative: the market form, 
as the most rational and generalizable mode of human interaction, must be privileged above all 
others. The crucial difference with classical liberalism was the frank dependence on state 
intervention to support the market and the entrepreneurial rationality it requires. 
Robbins explained that “our most pressing difficulties” do not stem from conflicting 
political visions, but from insufficient recourse to the panacea of Economics—to economic 
rationality as defined by Mises. “Is it not the burden of our time that we do not realise what we are 
doing,” Robbins asked on the final page of his famous treatise. “Are not our difficulties due to just 
this fact, that we will ends which are incompatible, not because we wish for deadlock, but because 
we do not realise their incompatibility?”260 Economics, he contended, resolves this question with 
the neutrality of social scientific technique, with economic rationality qua scientific rationality. 
Contra Keynes, Robbins and his Austrian colleagues thus argued that the irrational crises of the 
interwar period resulted from the fact that “our aims are not coordinated” in an economically 
rational, consistent fashion. They concluded, via the calculation debate, that though “historical” 
                                                
the obligation to choose. There is nothing in any kind of science which can decide the ultimate problem of 
preference. But, to be rational, we must know what it is we prefer. We must be aware of the objective implications 
of the alternatives of choice. For rationality in choice is nothing more and nothing less than choice with complete 
awareness of the alternatives rejected.” Robbins, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 36. 
258 Ludwig von Mises, “Economics and Judgements of Value” in Human Action: A Treatise on Economics 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1949), 881. As works like works like The Road to Serfdom make clear, “contradiction” 
between theory of practice here was of relatively little concern. See, for example, Hayek’s comment after winning 
the Nobel: “After The Road to Serfdom, I felt that I had so discredited myself professionally... I wanted to be 
accepted in the scholarly community. To do something purely scientific and independent of my economic view.” 
Hayek, cited in Gabriel Söderberg, Avner Offer and Samuel Bjork, “Hayek in Citations and the Nobel Memorial 
Prize” in Robert Leeson (ed.), Hayek: A Collaborative Biography (Part 1: Influences from Mises to Bartley), 
Palgrave Macmillan, 65. 
259 Robbins, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 141. Note also the subtle difference between this 
formulation and Hayek’s notion of “spontaneous order.” 
260 Robbins, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 141. 
  64 
liberalism may be part of the problem, a revised liberalism is the only solution. Reinvented on a 
more “rational” basis, (neo)liberalism was the only cure for interwar irrationality. “There is no 
alternative” did not mean “socialism or barbarism,” as Rosa Luxemburg would have it, but 
“neoliberalism or totalitarianism.”261 
The problem solved by economic reason, then, is nothing less than conflict or disagreement 
itself. From the Dewey-Lippmann debate in the U.S. to the critique of “the masses” across Europe, 
the fact of political disagreement, and the lack of “coordination” it implies, were seen as the 
constitutive dilemma of early-century capitalist democracies. According to many scholars of the 
time, “irrational” solutions to the problem arose from the nature of modern democracy itself. Lest 
value pluralism and non-coordination spell the downfall of democracy—or, worse still, 
capitalism—states needed recourse to a more “rational” and “automatic” order, not to mention 
governmental principles and techniques for securing it. To address the seemingly intractable 
problems inherent to democratic politics, interwar and wartime intellectuals thus prepared rational 
fixes for the postwar era—from neoliberal theories examined here to its relatives in game theory, 
rational choice theory, systems theory and cybernetics. The irrationality of state planning and the 
myth of a common “will” needed to be replaced by rational knowledge and governmental 
expertise. This is why the American liberal and public intellectual Walter Lippmann was embraced 
by the international cohort that met in Paris in 1937. And it’s why Hayek believed the Austrian 
strategy provided the surest path to victory. It was Carl Menger, after all, “who did more than any 
other writer to carry beyond [Adam] Smith” the most significant question of the social sciences: 
“how is it possible that institutions which serve the common welfare and are most important for 
its advancement can arise without a common will aiming at their creation”?262 The different 
branches of neoliberals, as the following chapters will show, provided a plethora of new answers 
using the foundational strategies examined here. 
Milton Friedman, for example, built his method upon the formal rationality of “value free” 
inquiry. The Chicago School’s intervention will be examined in Chapter 3, though it is worth 
noting one related, Weberian-inflected issue here. In his 1953 essay on “The Methodology of 
Positive Economics,” now considered one of the most influential methodological tracts of the 
century, Friedman also doubled down on the distinction between positive and normative social 
science:  
 
Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or 
normative judgments. As Keynes says, it deals with ‘what is,’ not with ‘what ought to 
be.’ Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct 
predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances. Its performance is to 
                                                
261 As one of the first indications of non-necessity of communism, this phrase was coined in 1916 in Luxemburg’s 
“Junius Pamphlets.” Luxemburg’s formulation, as well as Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort’s “tendency” and 
journal modeled upon it, Socialisme ou barbarie (1949-1967), was that there is an even worse order to which 
capitalism can give birth: barbarism. 
262 “As it was put a hundred years after Smith by Carl Menger, who did more than any other writer to carry beyond 
Smith the elucidation of the meaning of this phrase, the question ‘how it is possible that institutions which serve the 
common welfare and are most important for its advancement can arise without a common will aiming at their 
creation’ is still ‘the significant, perhaps the most significant, problem of the social sciences.’” Hayek, “‘Purposive’ 
Social Formations” in Studies on the Abuse and Decline of Reason: Text and Documents (The Collected Works of F. 
A. Hayek, Volume 13, Bruce Caldwell, ed., 2010), 145. 
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be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it 
yields. In short, positive economics is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in precisely the 
same sense as any of the physical sciences.263 
 
Friedman’s essay propelled an existing trend toward marginalist assumptions, axiomatic 
definitions, and mathematical formalization in the social sciences.264 Compatible with the 
technocratic strain of neo-Keynesianism up to its 1970’s crisis, such trends helped secure 
economics’ place atop the value-free pyramid.265 
Prior to establishing any set of neoliberal policy prescriptions—austerity, debt brakes, tax 
cuts, privatization, marketization—these self-proclaimed “modern” theorists turned classical 
liberalism on its head. The relation between nature and artifice, or physis and techne, had been 
inverted by interwar transformations. The market was no longer ontologically embedded in nature, 
but had to be rationally constructed and institutionally secured. Unlike the classical liberals, the 
neoliberals recognized market rationality as a cultural product and a political construct. Market 
competition and entrepreneurial conduct had to be cultivated by scientific and governmental 
principles, they argued, if they were to survive hostile conditions and existential threats.266 
Neoliberalism birthed an economic qua political theory that disavowed its own political character. 
 
Conclusion 
  
Something is not of itself ‘irrational,’ but rather becomes so when examined from a specific 
‘rational’ standpoint… This essay, if it can make any contribution at all, aims to expose the 
multifaceted nature of a concept—the ‘rational’—that only appears to be a simple one.  
– Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905)267 
 
                                                
263 Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics” [1953] in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1966), 4. 
264 Unhinged from any substantial notion of “truth” or any interrogation of its formalistic assumptions, the criteria of 
success for positive economics, Friedman argued, were its “simplicity” and “fruitfulness.” For a reading of 
Friedman that discusses the tensions between different moments and models in his philosophy of science, see 
Thomas Biebricher, The Political Theory of Neoliberalism.  
265 See Friedman’s 1976 Nobel speech: “One of my great teachers, Wesley C. Mitchell, impressed on me the basic 
reason why scholars have every incentive to pursue a value-free science… Positive scientific knowledge that enables 
us to predict the consequences of a possible course of action is clearly a prerequisite for the normative judgment 
whether that course of action is desirable. The Road to Hell is paved with good intentions, precisely because of the 
neglect of this rather obvious point. The point is particularly important in economics… because of erroneous 
judgments about the consequences of government measures: errors that at least in principle are capable of being 
corrected by the progress of positive economic science.” Milton Friedman, “Nobel Lecture: Inflation and 
Employment” in Milton Friedman on Economics: Selected Papers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 3.  
266 Thus the aim of scientifically delimiting a field of political possibility before entering it through intellectual, 
philanthropic, corporate, and political allyships. See Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the 
Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983 (London: Fontana Press, 1995). 
267 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Lodon: Routledge, 1905/1992), 140. 
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[T]he line between the rational and the irrational is at best unclear, and this is one reason for not 
placing much weight on the irrational aspect of economic behavior. A more important reason is 
that the current depression can be explained without hypothesizing irrationality, though not 
without assuming a certain amount of randomness (fortuity, ‘bad luck’). 
– Richard Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’o8 and the Descent into 
Depression (2009)268  
 
This chapter located the genesis of “neoliberal rationality” in an epistemic formation, or a 
political epistemology, that preceded and guided the intellectual gatherings in Paris and Mont 
Pèlerin. It suggested that the Methodenstreit laid the basis for interwar Austrian interventions 
which sought, amidst the threat of socialist revolution, to redefine the rationality of markets against 
the irrationality of socialists who wished to abolish them. Turning homo oeconomicus “inward” 
through marginalist analysis and equating social science with “value neutral” knowledge, the early 
neoliberals not only made a seemingly strange bedfellow of Max Weber; they also split “the 
economic” from “the political” in order to cultivate the former and circumscribe the latter. But 
before this neoliberal strategy—or what I have called the politics of the rational—shaped the theory 
and practice of postwar governmentality, it grew embryonically in the scientific and political 
discourses of the early century. 
As the following chapters show, the concepts and strategies of the socialist calculation 
debate helped frame a “counter-revolutionary” program shared by the Freiburg School and the 
Chicago School and an ideal of “rational politics” that was also embraced by the Frankfurt 
School.269 In contrast to the naturalism of classical liberalism, this was a quasi-constructivist 
project that radicalized Menger’s subjectivist philosophical anthropology of “economizing” 
conduct. With the help of Weber’s concepts, the neoliberals deployed marginal value theory to 
split formal economic value from substantive political values, with the intended effect of 
delegitimizing the rise of “Keynesian and Marxist planning.”  
The Austrian neoliberals did not practice what Wertfreiheit preached.270 They rather used 
Weber’s doctrine of value neutrality, together with his typology of (ir)rationality, in their efforts 
                                                
268 Richard Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’o8 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 85. This chapter has suggested not only that there are lines of continuity between Weberian 
and neoliberal analyses, but that Weber shaped the methodological conditions of possibility for Posner’s logic. Recall 
that Weber’s first example of the scientific use the ideal type of rationality was the study of financial crises: “For 
example a panic on the stock exchange can be most conveniently analysed by attempting to determine first what the 
course of action would have been if it had not be influenced by irrational affects; it is then possible to introduce the 
irrational components as accounting for the observed deviations from this hypothetical course.” Weber, Economy and 
Society, 6. 
269 In 1919, Mises harkened back to the rationalistic ideals of 1789, not in the name of a socialist revolution but one 
that aimed at a form of “rational politics” and “rational economy” [die rationale Politik und die rationale Wirtschaft]. 
See Ludwig von Mises, Nation, Staat und Wirtschaft (Wien: Manzsche Verlag, 1919), 175.  
270 This was also true of Schumpeter, who embraced a technocratic social-democratic or “Third Way” conception of 
science in politics long before its postwar dominance: “Schumpeter unconditionally endorsed Weber’s stance, as he 
understood it, on the issue of value-judgements. He reminded his readers that the principle of avoiding value-
judgements had never been disputed by the classical economists. By sweeping away obscurantist German notions of 
science as an arbiter in matters of practical life, Weber had simply restored an almost trivial classical convention. 
Schumpeter showed little interest in the Neo-Kantian intricacies of Weber’s position on value-orientation, and he 
chose to disregard the epistemological and ethical implications involved. To him, refraining from value-judgements 
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to reprogram the form and direction of twentieth-century capitalism.271 Through their interwar 
interventions, they scientifically reconstructed economics such that politics itself was modeled 
upon economic epistemology and market rationality. This was not only an economic theory that 
sought to restructure so as to “dethrone” politics, as the following chapters will show, but also a 
cryptopolitical project with a (comparably superior) grasp of the contingent and performative 
dimensions of knowledge, science and technology. While contemporaneous critics of 
neoliberalism like Horkheimer and Schumpeter wrote off the neoliberal challenge at the moment 
it was being mounted,272 these thinkers built their own theory of history upon the success of 
interwar socialists, which acknowledged the political significance of scientific knowledge and elite 
action. 
The uniquely political features of human existence—struggle and conflict, plurality and 
judgment, deliberation and action—are not opposed to “modern” philosophy and science. The 
strict separation of politics and science bequeathed to the postwar period was an effect of, not a 
solution to political struggle. Politics is not a foreign if structurally necessary intruder into a more 
rationally pure domain, as Weber’s neoliberal disciples contended, but woven into how social 
science perceives and affects a shared world. 
 
                                                
merely meant objectivity of reasoning and political neutrality of action. He rejected the notion that the scholar had 
any public responsibility or political role. When he joined the cabinet of Chancellor Karl Renner as a non-party 
minister of finance in 1919, he apparently regarded himself as a mere expert and mouthpiece of undiluted economic 
logic. This self-conception contrasted sharply with the highly controversial policies that he introduced or 
recommended. In the end, he was forced to resign, having antagonized almost all the relevant political forces in 
Austria. Schumpeter's self-image of being a neutral financial technician in the midst of party politics and social 
antagonisms was sometimes regarded as the cause of an unprincipled opportunism. Professor Schumpeter, as the great 
satirist Karl Kraus remarked, was a man ‘with more different views than were necessary for his advancement.’ Putting 
aside both the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction and ignoring the tension-ridden nature of politics, 
Schumpeter predicated his practice of Werturteilsfreiheit on threadbare Weberian credentials.” Jürgen Osterhammel, 
“Varieties of Social Economics: Joseph A. Schumpeter and Max Weber” in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen 
Osterhammel (eds.), Max Weber and his Contemporaries (London: German Historical Institute, 1987), 109. 
271 “While certainly the majority of researchers working in the tradition of Mises and Hayek would not deny that 
their work is decidedly market-oriented… they would also argue that their critique of government interventionism 
and socialism was completely value-free… The value-free posture and the search for ‘objective’ knowledge within 
the Austrian camp (or any school of economics for that matter) may be an epistemological chimera, but that does not 
mean that the fiction fails to serve a useful purpose. Classical liberalism and libertarianism, as an underlying vision, 
in turn provide the questions on which Austrian economists tend to focus. Analysis is not invariant to the underlying 
vision which the analyst adopts. That does not mean that we should not make honest efforts at ideologically 
untainted assessments of the economic world. The analytical propositions of the Austrians can be employed as part 
of a critical theory framework for assessing the effectiveness of chosen means for given ends.” Peter J. Boettke, 
Calculation and Coordination Essays on Socialism and Transitional Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 
2001), 16-19. 
272 “The bureaucracy has taken control of the economic mechanism, which slipped away from the control of the 
bourgeoisie’s pure profit principle. The specialist concept of economics, which in contrast to its critics deals with the 
decline of the market system, contains no further objections to the capability of the existence of state capitalism than 
the objections which Mises and his associations raised against socialism. These people live on today for the fight 
against social reforms in democratic countries, and they have completely lost their influence. The essence of liberal 
criticism consists of economic-technical considerations.” Max Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State” (1940) in 
Essential Reader, 110. See also: “I believe that there is a mountain in Switzerland [Mont Pelerin] on which congresses 
of economists have been held which have expressed disapproval of all or most of these things. But these anathemata 
have not even provoked attack.” Joseph Schumpeter, “The March to Socialism” (1950), 449. I am grateful to Michel 
Feher for bringing this essay to my attention. 
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Chapter 2 
Constructions of Ordoliberal Rationality:  
The Freiburg School, the Competitive Order, and the Social Question 
 
 
Even the best ideas only bear fruit when they are put into practice. One could perhaps say that it 
was a stroke of luck in German history that, after the Second World War, the right principles of 
Walter Eucken met the right politician in Ludwig Erhard. The economic model sketched by 
Eucken also proved itself to be a firm pillar in practice while the Federal Republic of Germany 
was still in its infancy. Indeed, Erhard came upon the genius idea to set prices free, thereby also 
sending signals of scarcity and kicking economic initiatives into gear. This principled decision to 
turn from an economy of distribution and rationing to one of free activities proved to be a 
groundbreaking paradigm shift. The miracle occurred: the success of the social market economy 
did not take long. The shelves filled themselves with commodities, the economy’s circulatory 
system was set in motion, and the German economic miracle, as we call it today, took its course. 
– Angela Merkel (CDU), German Chancellor and former Party Chair273 
 
The great promise of Ludwig Erhard and of the social market economy was ‘prosperity for all.’ 
This promise has been broken… The neoliberalism of that time was the opposite of the mindless 
faith in the blessing of deregulated markets associated with the term today. Economists like 
Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken and Alfred Müller-Armack were convinced that the market cannot 
fix everything; the state has to set the rules and the regulatory framework… The ordoliberals’ 
central thesis was that concentrated economic power cannot be controlled, though it can be 
prevented from emerging in the first place. Once it’s there, it buys off politics. And then it’s all 
over—for the market economy and for democracy. 
– Sahra Wagenknecht (Linke), German Bundestag Party Co-Leader274 
 
The entire political problem is that the state… is controlling areas that should be governed by 
rational economic policy: the social market economy. As I mentioned, Ludwig Erhard stood in the 
tradition of the Freiburg School and the ordoliberalism of Walter Eucken. And in postwar 
Germany, Eucken said as much himself: If economic policy is to be rational, it needs to work 
through a legal framework that creates the conditions for economic activity, which is then the 
condition for social policy. This is the politics we need to offer the working population. It requires 
offering them relief—relief for both employee and employer. 
– Alice Weidel (AfD), German Bundestag Party Leader275 
 
                                                
273 Angela Merkel, "Rede beim Walter Eucken Institut in Freiburg" (Jan. 13, 2016, my translation). 
274 Sahra Wagenknecht, "Wir brauchen Märkte," Interview in Spiegel (Dec. 31, 2012, my translation). 
275 Alice Weidel, "Wirtschaft und Soziales," AfD Vortrag Fürth Neustadt Aisch (Dec. 8, 2017, my translation). 
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A good idea does not belong in the antique shop; it must remain alive and assert itself in praxis. 
And that’s why it’s important what—Mr. Salomon, in this case not Jesus, but Walter Eucken—
tells us about the challenge of today.   
– Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), former Economy Minister & Party Chair276 
 
We need to make it crystal clear once more that we stand in the tradition of German ordoliberalism. 
– Christian Lindner (FDP), Party Chair277  
 
I see my party entirely in the tradition of Ludwig Erhard.  
– Cem Özdemir (Grüne), former Party Co-Chair278 
 
 
If ordoliberalism is “Germany’s Iron Cage,” as Le Monde Diplomatique described it in 
2015, few observers were able to perceive, much less name, the steely entrapment that surrounded 
them—that is, until the “return” of the term with the 2008 financial crisis.279 From the far-right 
Alternative für Deutschland to the leftwing Linke, the leaders of Germany’s five major political 
parties have publicly embraced the ordoliberal tradition over the past decade. In academic and 
public discourse, the term has been used by left critics who denounce the EU’s German-style 
economic policy and by proponents who contrast the allegedly time-tested principles of Freiburg 
School ordoliberalism with the crisis-prone policies of Chicago School neoliberalism. Yet these 
post-crisis affirmations and trans-Atlantic juxtapositions not only conceal the complex genealogy 
of the Freiburg School vis-à-vis the Austrian School, as examined in the previous chapter, and the 
Chicago School, as explored in the following chapter; they also effectively write off the political 
deficits on which this technocratic mode of reasoning was founded—a governmental mode of 
reasoning, claiming effective and affective support of the governed. 
To examine these political deficits, this chapter interrogates the theoretical and 
epistemological constructions of the early Freiburg School, a group of German social scientists 
that formed in the late 1920’s, joined the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, and founded the journal 
Ordo in 1948 from which the concept of ordoliberalism is derived. Properly understood, 
ordoliberalism is a “branch” or a “variety” of neoliberalism. Beginning in the interwar period, 
these ordoliberal intellectuals—Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, 
                                                
276 Sigmar Gabriel, "Ordnungspolitik auf der Höhe der Zeit," Rede beim Walter Eucken Institut in Freiburg (June 
23, 2015, my translation). See also Sigmar Gabriel, "Sozialmarktwirtschaft," Rede in der Plenarsitzung (Feb. 13, 
2014). 
277 Christian Lindner, "Interview" in Frankfurter Rundschau (January 10, 2010, my translation). 
278 Cem Özdemir in Margarete van Ackeren and Olaf Opitz, "'Vielleicht landen wir in Jamaika'" in Focus (July 3, 
2017).  
279 See François Denord, Rachel Knaebel and Pierre Rimbert, “Germany’s Iron Cage,” Le Monde Diplomatique 
(August 2015); Thomas Biebricher, “The Return of Ordoliberalism in Europe – Notes on a Research Agenda,” in: i-
lex, 21, 2014, pp. 1-24; and Thomas Biebricher (interviewed by William Callison), “Return or Revival: The 
Ordoliberal Legacy,” Near Futures Online Issue 1 “Europe at a Crossroads” (March 2016). I am grateful for 
Thomas Biebricher’s comments on the first draft of this chapter in fall of 2016 and for conversations with Quinn 
Slobodian about historical and contemporary strands of ordoliberalism. 
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Alfred Müller-Armack, Leonhard Miksch and others—sought to use social scientific knowledge 
capable of reconstructing institutions to secure what they called the “competitive market order.” 
Their vision for a new order sought, inter alia, to privilege the price mechanism; maintain 
conditions of competition; establish the legal order upon formalized “rules of the game”; promote 
entrepreneurial subjectivity through “de-proletarianization”; insulate technocratic monetary 
authorities who secure price stability against the ever-present threat of inflation; and base the larger 
order, in the first and last instance, upon on a strong and independent state. In turn, the strong state 
would function as a “market police” to minimize monopoly and suppress the irrational influence 
of “pluralist” interests. Premised on a critique of both laisser-faire capitalism and socialist 
collectivism, ordoliberalism called for a “Third Way” pro-market alternative. 
In the next chapter I will consider the Freiburg School’s evolving relationship with the 
Chicago School and their importance in governmental responses to the 2008 financial crisis. In 
this chapter I will focus on the Freiburg School’s theoretical foundations from the interwar period 
to its 1948 implementation by Ludwig Erhard—the first ever “neoliberal” experiment, properly so 
called.  
The chapter situates the origins of ordoliberalism in what Foucault called a “field of 
adversity.” Out of this field the ordoliberals made their opening wager for the “Third Way” and 
“social market economy,” a strategic approach to both the Methodenstreit and the socialist 
calculation debate examined in Chapter 1. The chapter then examines ordoliberalism’s notion of 
the “competitive order”; its philosophical anthropology of the “economizing” subject; its racially-
inflected typology of non-Western orders; its appropriation of leftist discourse on “the social 
question”; and what I call the “inverted Marxism” of its theory of history. Interrogating the 
theoretical construction of ordoliberalism is not only necessary to understand how the Freiburg 
School produced a distinctive if mutable political rationality. It is also necessary for a politically-
oriented critique of the EU’s “economic constitution,” which has been rooted in the principles 
prescribed by ordoliberal rationality: stability, growth, competitiveness, austerity, and technocratic 
governance. 
 
Out of the Abyss: Ordoliberalism between Interwar and Postwar Strategy 
 
The task before us may be defined as one involving critical analysis. We need only to turn our 
criticism into a positive force in order to identify clearly the lines along which we must work if 
we are to return law and economics to their proper place… [W]e wish to bring scientific 
reasoning, as displayed in jurisprudence and political economy, into effect for the purpose of 
constructing and reorganizing the economic system.  
 – Böhm, Eucken, Grossmann-Doerth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936”280 
 
                                                
280 This co-authored piece was originally entitled “Unsere Aufgabe” (“Our Task”) in Ordnung der Wirtschaft 2 
(Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1936), and translated as “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936.” Franz Böhm, Walter 
Eucken and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936.” in Alan T. Peacock and Hans Willgerodt 
(eds.), Germany’s Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1989), pp. 22-23. 
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Whether we shall be able to rebuild something like a common European civilization after this war 
will be decided mainly by what will happen in the years immediately following it… [T]he future 
of Europe will largely be decided by what will happen in Germany.281 
– Friedrich Hayek, speech on February 28, 1944 
 
“[I]n the second half of the twentieth century, liberty, or more accurately, liberalism, is a 
word that comes to us from Germany.”282 It is with this curious claim that Michel Foucault 
concluded the first of his twelve influential lectures at the Collège de France in 1978-79. 
Foucault’s opening gesture toward Germany highlighted a political and economic reprogramming 
of liberalism which, by the 1970’s, had begun to displace the “rationality” of Keynesianism. Like 
Angela Merkel in her speech commemorating Walter Eucken’s 125th birthday, cited in the 
epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, Foucault saw the transformational moment of postwar 
liberalism in the 1948 decrees designed and implemented by Ludwig Erhard and the German 
ordoliberals. With these reforms (Leitsätzegesetz and Währungsreform)—the economic and 
currency reforms that introduced the Deutsche Mark and lifted nearly all price controls—Erhard 
not only bucked the dominant trend toward social-welfare-oriented “state planning,” but did so by 
almost single-handedly overruling his social democratic colleagues and the Keynesian-influenced 
Allied authorities who oversaw the British and American occupied zones.283 
At the time, this was a non-sovereign, divided, and occupied territory. Split into two by the 
Allies and the Soviet Union, Germany had no single body that could stake a claim to sovereignty—
much less, as Foucault pointed out, any historical, legal, or moral grounds on which one could be 
legitimately made. And so Erhard and his ordoliberal comrades approached the puzzle of political 
founding—the well-documented paradox of initiating sovereignty in the history of political 
thought—in a novel way. Theirs was not a social contract forged by deliberatively-engaged 
citizens, but an economic constitution established by what they called a juridico-political “event” 
or “decision.”284 Like the later “shock doctrine” of Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile, these West 
German decrees were made with minimal democratic inputs or checks, without any popular 
legitimation, before the institution of the Basic Law, and justified solely on criteria of economic 
“success,” or what political scientists now call “output legitimacy.” 
 Before the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), then, West German liberalism began with an anti-
Keynesian economic and monetary policy. Amidst dire economic conditions, the ordoliberal 
decrees abolished the rationing of even the most basic goods needed for survival, liberalized 
                                                
281 Friedrich Hayek, quoted in Ronald M. Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1995), 27-8. 
282 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 22 (translation modified). 
283 The following exchange between Erhard and General Clay was recorded the same month of 1948 when Erhard 
made his unapproved decree: “General Clay: ‘Herr Erhard, my advisers tell me what you have done is a terrible 
mistake. What do you say to that?’ Ludwig Erhard: ‘Herr General, pay no attention to them! My advisers tell me the 
same thing.’” Alfred C. Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard: A Biography, p. 67. See also Nichols, Freedom and 
Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918-1963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
284 In their early conception of the “economic constitution,” Eucken and Böhm wrote: “The treatment of all practical 
politico-legal and politico-economic questions must be keyed to the idea of the economic constitution. In this way 
relativist instability and fatalist acceptance of facts are overcome… [T]he economic constitution must be understood 
as a general political decision as to how the economic life of the nation is to be structured.” Böhm, Eucken and 
Grossmann-Doerth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936,” pp. 23-4. See also Böhm, Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als 
geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung (1937); Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, p. 206. 
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commodity prices, and “unleashed” the market forces of competition. The defeat of the Nazi 
regime was not just the Stunde Null (“hour zero”) of postwar history, as commonly narrated, but 
also provided the ordoliberals a tabula rasa for a new competitive market order.285 Disbarred of 
sovereignty due to wartime atrocities and total surrender, postwar West Germany’s economic 
legitimation prefigured political self-determination. In 1948, this was a real discursive and 
institutional transformation that used the economic means of the market toward the political ends 
of a post-Nazi liberal era.286  
However controversial and economically disastrous in the months after they were 
introduced,287 the liberalization measures soon proved effective at generating market competition 
and growth. Though historians continue to debate to what degree the mythical origin story of the 
“economic miracle” can credited to Ordnungspolitik rather than a great deal of remaining industrial 
infrastructure or the U.S. Marshall Plan, contemporary narratives on the left and the right—as the 
epigraphs make clear—embrace the “thirty glorious years” of the German Wirtschaftswunder as a 
matter of national pride. 
Whether supranational and forward-looking or nationalist and backward-looking—two 
perspectives represented in the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck, examined 
in Chapter 4—what these postwar narratives tend to erase is how profoundly constitutive 
ordoliberal rationality was for postwar Germany. What they also erase is how, beyond its rightly 
exalted Basic Law, postwar West Germany emerged from a technocratic, anti-Keynesian and pro-
market mode of governance, one that instituted an economic, monetary and banking framework 
under conditions of economic and social crisis. 
After the West German elections, Erhard became the first Minister of the Economy and 
second Chancellor of West Germany, and he leveraged the “miracle” narrative in the CDU’s anti-
Soviet and anti-social democratic propaganda.288 Hailing (and using) the market economy as a 
means for Western integration, he became known for the “social market economy” and principles 
                                                
285 Their strategy was not centered on political parties but on networks of influence. Having elaborated their theory 
at length in publications and personal letters over the past decade, the public dissemination commenced: they met 
with German business groups, organized seminars, co-founded the Mont Pelerin Society, served on local and federal 
policy committees, and struck close ties with political figures in the CDU and the FDP. Some of the ordoliberals, 
like Miksch, even joined the SPD. Before representing the CDU in the Bundestag from 1953-65, Böhm worked as 
the minister of cultural affairs in Frankfurt and served on the Institutsrat at the Frankfurt School’s Institut für 
Sozialforschung. For a discussion, see Chapter 4. 
286 See Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 84. See also Frieder Vogelmann, “Michel Foucault’s Reading of 
Ordoliberalism” (forthcoming). 
287 “In den ersten Monaten nach der Währungsreform schien es, als würden die Skeptiker recht behalten, die Erhards 
Kurs für falsch hielten. Solche gab es auch in den Reihen von CDU und CSU… In den ersten Tagen waren die 
Läden leer gekauft worden, dann reagierten die ratlosen Konsumenten erbost gegen die Hektik, mit der die Preise in 
die Höhe kletterten. Ein großer Teil der Presse verlangte den Abbruch des marktwirtschaftlichen Experiments und 
die Entfernung des allem Anschein nach unfähigen Politikers Erhard. Im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat stellte die 
Opposition im Sommer und Herbst 1948 zweimal Misstrauensanträge gegen ihn. Die Gewerkschaften der britischen 
und amerikanischen Zone - die viereinhalb Millionen organisierte Arbeiter repräsentierten - riefen schließlich im 
November 1948 zum Generalstreik ‘gegen die Anarchie auf den Warenmärkte und gegen das weitere 
Auseinanderklaffen von Löhnen und Preisen’ auf. Etwa neun Millionen Arbeiter folgten der Aufforderung am 12. 
November 1948 und demonstrierten mit einer 24-stündigen Arbeitsniederlegung gegen die Marktwirtschaft.” 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, “Wirtschaftsentwicklung von 1945 bis 1949” (July 13, 2005). 
288 Ralf Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the ordoliberal foundations of the social market economy” in 
Mirowski and Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pelerin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 121. 
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of economic liberty, competition, growth, prosperity, and security.289 These postwar corporate and 
governmental campaigns proved so successful that, by the the Social Democratic Party’s Bad 
Godesberg conference in 1959, the party turned from a program of rational state planning to one 
that embraced key tenets of the social market economy. After Godesberg, the socialist party’s goal 
was no longer to overthrow and replace liberal capitalism, but to reform it according to principles 
of social justice.290 But prior to its emergence from WWII—that is, from the mythical Stunde Null 
or “zero hour” of 1945291—where exactly did this ordoliberal strategy come from? 
Before the Freiburg School became associated with the journal Ordo and the concept of 
ordoliberalism,292 their movement began with an interwar group called “the German Ricardians.” 
A series of personal exchanges and collaborative projects established the intellectual firmament 
for this group of scholars in law, economics, and sociology. The first meeting was held in 1926, 
attended by Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow and others. Led by 
Rüstow, a lapsed Marxist, the German Ricardians aimed at overcoming the dominance of the 
German Historical School by lending “greater validity and influence to the doctrine of free trade 
within economic theory.”293 It is unsurprising that their later analysis of interconnected orders of 
law, state, society bears the markings but resists the methods of the Historical School.294 While 
                                                
289 “In my opinion, the historic task of the Federal Republic in the second half of the 20th century that we have just 
entered upon is to underpin, to strengthen and to defend the free economic order of Europe with the full weight of 
German trade. The successful rehabilitation of my country must serve as clear documentary evidence to put before 
the still vacillating and doubting peoples, of the fact that only by firmly rejecting socialist dogmas, of whatever 
complexion, and by affirming a free economic order can mounting prosperity and genuine security be achieved.” 
Ludwig Erhard, Prosperity Through Competition (1957), emphasis mine. 
290 “When Willy Brandt took office in 1969 as the first postwar SPD chancellor,” as Tooze notes, “he did so in 
coalition with the liberal, free-market FDP.” Adam Tooze, “Which is worse?” in London Review of Books, Vol. 41 
No. 14 (July 18, 2019), pp. 19-22. 
291 For a treatment of this subject beyond the German case discussed here, see Elizabeth Carter, “From Myths to 
Markets: Power, Institutions, and the Reification of Imagined Histories” in European Journal of Sociology / 
Archives Européennes de Sociologie (2019). See also Jens Beckert, Imagined Futures (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2016). 
292 Founded by Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm in 1948, the journal is still in print, linked to Freiburg University 
and the Walter Eucken Institut. Its full title is ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
293 Once a student of Franz Oppenheimer, who famously preached the “third way” between socialism and 
capitalism, Rüstow was a “radical socialist and Marxist” and a member of Paul Tillich’s circle of “Religious 
Socialists” before he made an official break with the group in 1925; see Hauke Janssen, “Zwischen Historismus und 
Neoklassik: Alexander Rüstow und die Krise in der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre,” HWWI Research Paper 
(2009), 104. See also Alexander Rüstow, “Freie Wirtschaft – Starker Staat (Die staatspolitischen Voraussetzungen 
des wirtschaftspolitischen Liberalismus)” in Franz Boese (ed.), Deutschland und die Weltkrise, Schriften des Vereins 
für Socialpolitik, Bd. 187 (Dresden, 1932), 62-69. For their personal letters, see Hans Otto Lenel, “Walter Euckens 
Briefe an Alexander Rüstow,” 42 Ordo (1991), 11-14. On the name “German Ricardians,” see the following: “The 
reference to Ricardo evokes a model theoretic, deductive approach to economic theory that would have made him an 
obvious adversary of the German Historical School,” from “Introduction” in Friedrich August von Hayek, Business 
Cycles: The Collected Works of F.A Hayek, Part I, ed. Hansjoerg Klausinger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012), 3. 
294 As a point of comparison, see the following overview of Simon Clark, Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis 
of the State: “For the Historical School the role of the state was still to be defined in liberal terms, as an essential 
condition for the wellbeing of the individual, and it was in such terms that it developed its analysis of the role of the 
state in the reproduction of capitalist social relations… Roscher, Hildebrand and Knies, the older generation of the 
Historical School, all took up List’s emphasis on the national economy, formulated within an evolutionary theory 
that sought empirical laws of development, in order to situate German economic and social development within a 
national and historical context. However, their fear that the subordination of economic activity to self interest would 
give rise to growing class polarisation led them to criticise more sharply the economists’ preoccupation with purely 
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they shared the Historical School’s opposition to socialism, they saw its methodological approach 
as unwittingly abetting socialist forces. While Röpke and Rüstow developed an analysis that has 
been called “sociological neoliberalism,” Eucken and Böhm developed legal-economic program 
for “re-ordering” the economy. All four shared a culturally conservative diagnosis of the “social 
crisis” of interwar Europe, a desire to combat the extension of the modern welfare state, and a 
commitment to the competitive market order.295 
In comparison to the Methodenstreit of the Austrian School (Menger, Böhm von Bawerk, 
Wieser) and the Historical School (Schmoller, Knies, Sombart), ordoliberalism was a different 
kind of methodological endeavor. It also differed from perspectives like those of Joseph 
Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi, who shared the interwar consensus that capitalism would not 
survive emergent social democratic forces, and that socialism was in one form or another the way 
of the future.296 On the one hand, the ordoliberals agreed with Schumpeter and Polanyi on the 
significance of entrepreneurial subjectivity and the relative market embeddedness of 
individuals.297 On the other hand, they concurred with Mises and Hayek that “chaotic” state 
intervention into market developments would lead down the road to socialism.298 Rejecting 
socialism as a historical necessity, they argued that, with human action and economic wisdom, 
another “Order” is possible. 
This “order,” which they called the “Third Way” between laissez-faire capitalism and 
socialist collectivism, was pronounced the only programmatic alternative. To resolve the perpetual 
crisis of interwar Europe, they argued, economic policy cannot be subjected to “de-stabilizing” 
corporate cartels and “irrational” democratic input—lest liberal capitalism collapse into 
totalitarianism or (what, for them, was the same) socialism. In addition to the Methodenstreit, the 
interwar “socialist calculation debate”—which the previous chapter described as Methodenstreit 
2.0—formed part of the group’s discursive backdrop and anti-socialist impetus. In particular, they 
partly rooted their theories in Max Weber, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich von Hayek’s early 
formulations of market order – which is to say, in the new conceptual fault lines of “rational” vs. 
“irrational” political-economic forms and of the market economy vs. the “collectivist” planned 
economy. The ordoliberal field of adversity demanded, as Röpke put it in 1936, “constructing in 
                                                
economic motives. ‘Industrial feudalism’ and the growth of an agricultural proletariat would foster the growth of 
socialism and so had to be restricted by the State. They therefore laid an increasing emphasis on the need to consider 
the pursuit of economic goals within a broader social context, within which self-interest would be subordinated to 
morals, religion, custom and standards of propriety. The development of society could not be reduced to its 
economic development, for its moral development was equally important.” See also Peukert, Helge, “Walter Eucken 
(1891–1950) and the Historical School” in Koslowski (ed.) The Theory of Capitalism in the German Economic 
Tradition: Historism, Ordo-Liberalism, Critical Theory, Solidarism (Springer, 2000). 
295 As Ralf Ptak and Mark Blyth observe, ordoliberalism itself was responsible for the lack of domestic reception 
and interest in Keynesian economics – a legacy that continues in contemporary higher education, journalism and 
politics. See Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
296 See also Michel Feher, “The Age of Appreciation: Lectures on the Neoliberal Condition”; and Michel Feher, 
“Self-Appreciation; or, The Aspirations of Human Capital,” translated by Ivan Ascher, Public Culture, Volume 21, 
Number 1 (2009), pp. 21-41. 
297 For Röpke’s critique of liberal rationalism’s way of attempting to construct the disembedded yet freely 
associating individual [freischwebendes und beliebig sich assoziierendes Individuum zu konstruieren], see Röpke, 
Civitas Humana, p. 110. For a comparative account of Polanyi and ordoliberalism, see Woodward, “Polanyi and 
Ordoliberalism” (forthcoming).  
298 For the direct influence of Mises and Hayek, see Röpke (1936); Eucken (1939); and Nichols, Freedom and 
Responsibility, p. 135. For the predictions of their rivals, contrast Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944) with 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy (1944) and Polanyi, The Great Transformation (1944).  
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our imagination an economic order built on principles which are exactly the opposite of those of 
our present economic order.”299  
The calculation debate filled their arsenal against the “centralization,” “collectivism” and 
“planning” of state socialism and Keynesianism. But their critique was not confined to political 
economy alone. As Ralf Ptak observes, the focus on cultural theory in the work of Röpke, Rüstow, 
and Müller-Armack “reflected their search for a philosophical foundation and for additional 
legitimacy in social theory for the economic orientation of ordoliberalism.”300 Inspired in part by 
the intersecting paradigms of cultural critique, mass psychology, and objectivist social science—
that is, by Ortega y Gasset, Nietzsche, Le Bon, Pareto and others—they identified the “illnesses” 
of the age in massification, proletarianization, statification, spiritual collectivization, and 
civilizational decline. They also criticized features of Weimar parliamentarism301 and what they 
called “the tangle of historicism, relativism and fatalism,”302 to which they opposed an aristocratic, 
non-democratic disposition and an elitist, technocratic alternative.303 
First coined by Müller-Armack and later championed by Erhard, the “social market 
economy” became Germany’s postwar empty signifier par excellence.304 Müller-Armack was a 
careerist member of the Nazi Party with administrative, advisory and academic roles in the Third 
Reich, who quickly became a key ordoliberal theorist and one of Erhard’s “most trusted 
lieutenants.”305 After completing his dissertation under Eucken on Competition as Task (1938), 
Leonhard Miksch was once a member of the Nazi Party who later joined the SPD, wrote for the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and served as a key advisor to Erhard in economic policy and 
public relations.306 Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth were among the other 
ordoliberals who remained in Germany during the Third Reich.307 But thanks to Röpke and 
                                                
299 Röpke, “Socialism, Planning, and the Business Cycle” in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 44, No. 3 (June, 
1936), p. 318. 
300 Ralf Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the ordoliberal foundations of the social market economy” in 
Mirowski and Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pelerin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 116. 
301 See Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany,” p. 111; Bonefeld, “Ordoliberalism as Political Theology”; Biebricher, 
“Sovereignty, Norms and Exception in Neoliberalism,” in Qui Parle 23, No. 1 (2014). 
302 Böhm, Eucken and Grossmann-Doerth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936,” p. 17. 
303 “The collectivist state is rooted in the masses (to which professors can belong as well as workers) and it can only 
exist under conditions which, sociologically speaking, we term spiritual collectivization, that is, conditions of 
society for which precisely the extreme democratic development is an excellent preparation but which is the direct 
opposite of the liberal as well as the conservative-aristocratic ideal.” Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time, p. 86. 
304 Although similar terminology was used throughout the 1930’s and 40’s, most scholars cite Müller-Armack’s 
Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik, first published in 1946, as the first usage of the term. Müller-Armack’s 
arguments were made public earlier and the manuscript of the book, Nichols notes, was clearly written during the 
war: “The typescript…bears the handwritten date ‘May 44.’ It contains references … to the autarkical economy in 
Hitler’s Europe (Großraumwirtschaft) which ‘is today a reality.’ In the version published in 1946 this became ‘was 
a reality during the war.’” Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, p. 120. When Müller-Armack’s Münster institute 
for textile research was bombarded in the summer of 1943, he was forced to flee Germany and found security at a 
monastery in Vreden-Ellwick near the Dutch frontier where he continued his work on the post-war economy. With 
the help of the facilities, a rotaprint machine at the monastery, and his Dutch Protestant friends, he circulated his 
views to colleagues in Germany. See Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, p. 136.  
305 Nichols, pp. 144-45. Müller-Armack’s acquaintance with Erhard dates back to 1931; see Nichols, Freedom and 
Responsibility, p. 104. 
306 Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe (1938). His Nazi affiliation was likely unbeknownst to Eucken, as forthcoming 
research by Hermann Kocyba shows. 
307 In 1938 Franz Böhm published Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische 
Leistung [The Order of the Economy as Historical Task and as Constructive Legal Achievement], but was removed 
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Rüstow’s reputation as exiled anti-Nazis and stories of Böhm and Eucken’s internal opposition, 
most interpreters have passed over ordoliberalism’s compromised beginnings.308 After reuniting 
in Germany and at the Mont Pelerin Society after the war, the group mobilized in full force. Erhard 
worked with Rüstow, Röpke and Miksch to fuse ordoliberal imperatives with Cold War electoral 
strategy; tens of millions of Deutsche Marks were poured into propaganda for the social market 
economy; and Rüstow and Röpke became particularly influential in the CDU and FDP party 
platforms.309 
“Whilst the ordoliberal concept provides a concrete program for the political caste,” 
Starbatty observes, “Müller-Armack’s concept of Social Market Economy can, in a nutshell, be 
understood as a methodological principle.”310 “The fundamental principles of this social market 
economy,” Nichols adds, “formed the basis of Erhard’s policy from 1948 onwards.”311 The 
concept came to exemplify the West German embrace of market integration and the flurry of new 
commercial goods that arrived in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Despite the fact that few ordoliberals 
were enthusiastic about the “social” modifying “market,” the term served as an effective substitute 
for the idea of Wohlstand, the German word “prosperity,” “wellbeing” or “welfare” with the same 
root as the “welfare state” (Wohlfahrtstaat). In a private conversation with Hayek, Erhard clarified 
further: “I hope you don’t misunderstand me when I speak of a social market economy. I mean by 
that the market economy as such is social, not that it needs to be made social.”312 The rhetorical 
surplus of this signifier was more important and effective than Hayek seemed to realize.313 Well 
aware of this, Rüstow understood “the Social Market Economy as the realization of the neoliberal 
program.”314 
Long before Tony Blair, Bill Clinton and Gerhard Schröder popularized the term with 
neoliberal policies in the 1990’s, the ordoliberals coined the “Third Way” as a correlate for the 
                                                
from his university post in 1940 when he opposed an instance of anti-Semitism. Grossmann-Doerth was conscripted 
in 1939 and died in 1944 as military lieutenant. 
308 Remarkably, Röpke and Rüstow, the renowned anti-Nazis, hardly ever mentioned the Nazi regime during the 
war, and they wrote astonishingly little on it afterwards – a fact all the more striking when compared to German 
exiles like Hannah Arendt, the Frankfurt School, among so many others. The two also displayed little to no interest 
in analyzing the roots of this fascist cultural and political transformation.  
309 Erhard’s actions and the concept of the social market economy were officially endorsed in the CDU’s first party 
platform (1949), just before the parliamentary elections. See Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, pp. 145-50, 154; 
see also Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany,” pp. 120-21. For Rüstow’s active role as a propagandist and 
spokesperson of the social market economy, see Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, p. 154 and Ptak, 
“Neoliberalism in Germany,” p. 123.  
310 Joachim Starbatty, "Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft aus historisch-theoretischer Sicht" in Hans Pohl (ed.), 
Entstehung und Entwicklung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft (Stuttgart, 1986), p. 16. Starbatty is a German economist 
and was a co-founder of the AfD. 
311 Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, pp. 144-45. Müller-Armack’s acquaintance with Erhard dates back to 
1931. See Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, p. 104. 
312 Hayek, cited in Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany,” 107. 
313 Hayek considered the term both meaningless and dangerous: “A weasel was once said to be able to empty an egg 
without leaving a mark, and ‘social’ is in this sense a ‘weasel word’: a phonetic husk with only an echo of meaning.” 
Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Routledge, 1988), p. 117.  
314 Rüstow, “Die geschichtliche Beduetung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft” in Erwin von Beckerath, Fritz W. Meyer, 
and Alfred Müller-Armack (eds.), Festschrift für Ludwig Ehrard, Wirtschaftsfragen der freien Welt (Frankfurt am 
Main: Knapp, 1957), p. 76.  
  77 
social market economy.315 Like their engagement with “the Social Question,” discussed below, the 
“Third Way” was appropriated from leftist discourse as alternative to both capitalism and 
communism. The term originated with Franz Oppenheimer’s interwar work and was in the title of 
an essay by Rüstow’s in the 1949 issue of Ordo.316 From Rüstow’s days as a Marxist student of 
Oppenheimer to his postwar advocacy of a vitalist free economy, he pursued the quasi-religious 
mission of “reproducing interconnectedness between individuals.”317 For Röpke, the Third Way 
represented a comprehensive alternative and a means to reactivate the “life energies” of 
individuals, communities, and the economy.318 The concept opposed the state “planning” involved 
in “collectivism,” but also the law-like assumptions of laisser-faire liberalism. 
Against the “interventionist chaos” of state spending and “full employment” prescribed by 
Keynesianism, the ordoliberals called for a “market-conforming” system of formal rules and 
technocratic bodies. Here they found key allies in Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek, British 
economist Lionel Robbins, and Chicago economist Frank Knight.319 Economic order, they 
claimed, emerges vis-à-vis the governmental framework and “the rules of the game,” and only a 
principled approach to intervention would allow for price stability, sound money, controlled 
inflation, and economic freedom.320  
Together the Third Way and the Social Market Economy established a “firm frame” to 
“give the necessary support to the freedom of the market.”321 It was one of first test cases for what 
became key tactics in neoliberal strategy: discursive cooptation, political triangulation, and 
fantastical projection. Making enemies of socialists while pulling the center-left in their direction, 
claiming possession of the “true” program and the “only” solution for social ills and economic 
crises – these techniques proved indispensable for the “new” forms of postwar liberalism inside 
and outside of Germany.  
                                                
315 See Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time, p. 176; Rüstow, “Soziale Marktwirtschaft als Gegenprogramm gegen 
Kommunismus und Bolschewismus” in Albert Hunold (ed.) Wirtschaft ohne Wunder (Erlenback: Rentsch), pp. 97-
127. 
316 Franz Oppenheimer was Rüstow’s professor and Erhard’s dissertation adviser. He was a proponent of Marx’s 
social analysis but not in his economic analysis. See Franz Oppenheimer, Weder so, noch so: der dritte Weg 
(Potsdam: Alfred Protte Verlag, 1933). See Jan Hegner, Alexander Rüstow: Ordnungspolitische Konzeption und 
Einfluß auf das wirtschaftspolitische Leitbild der Nachkriegszeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: 
Lucius und Lucius Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), p. 18. See also Koslowski (ed.), The Theory of Capitalism in the 
German Economic Tradition: Historism, Ordo-Liberalism, Critical Theory, Solidarism (Springer, 2000). 
317 Rüstow, “Die gesellschaftliche Lage der Gegenwart in Deutschland: drei Vorträge gehalten in der Hochschule für 
Politik" (Berlin, 24. 10. 1925) in Blätter für religiösen Sozialismus, Bd. 7, Berlin 1926, 51-72. 
318 “[Men will allow collectivism] as long as they see no other positive goal, firm and tangible, before them; in other 
words, as long as they know of no counter-program to collectivism over which they can really wax enthusiastic. … 
what is still lacking today are the proper counter-arguments of an inspiring alternative program which will release 
new energies.” Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 142. 
319 The translation of Hayek’s essay “Individualism: True and False” was the first contribution in the first issue of 
Ordo. Hayek was asked to serve on the journal’s editorial masthead, a proposition he accepted.  
320 See also the following passage from Hayek: “If we are to judge the potentialities aright it is necessary to realize 
that the system under which we live choked up with attempts at partial planning and restrictionism is almost as far 
from any system of capitalism which could be rationally advocated as it is different from any consistent system of 
planning. It is important to realize in any investigation of the possibilities of planning that it is a fallacy to suppose 
capitalism as it exists to-day is the alternative. We are certainly as far from capitalism in its pure form as we are 
from any system of central planning. The world of to-day is just interventionist chaos.” Hayek, Collectivist 
Economic Planning, pp. 23-24. 
321 For a list of policy recommendations, see Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 179. 
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The Critique of “Capitalism” and the Rationality of the “Competitive Order” 
 
Economic freedom – to be more exact, competition – is indeed the conditio sine qua non of any 
recovery for our sick society.322 – Röpke 
 
The will to the competitive order is tightly entwined with the will to freedom.323 – Eucken  
 
For ordoliberal theorists, properly conceptualizing capitalism does not mean grasping the 
material or structural logic of capital (pace Marx) or releasing the natural laws of the market (pace 
“paleoliberalism”). Instead, this task rather means understanding the relationship between markets 
and the politico-juridical framework that structures them. It is only by “thinking in orders,” as 
Eucken called it, that an entrepreneurial ethos can be cultivated, socio-economic conditions can be 
stabilized, and irrational “collectivist” forces can be curtailed. The ordoliberals claim that the ideal 
of an “interdependence of orders” is not best conceived as a singular economic form called 
“capitalism”; this is not the capitalist mode production, der Kapitalismus, because no such thing 
exists. Because the market form is universal and transhistorical, there are a variety of possible 
arrangements, and thus a range of ways government can configure economic, social, and cultural 
transformation.324 In this way, ordoliberalism could be seen as studying the “varieties of 
capitalism” and offering a “systems theory” avant la lettre. “[T]here exist widely differing national 
types of capitalism,” explains Röpke, “a circumstance which provides us at the same time with an 
index of the possibilities of reform.”325 Like Eucken, Rüstow also insists that “all ‘monist’ 
explanations of a historical period must be deliberately avoided.”326  
From a philosophical perspective, then, the ordoliberals rejected, or placed in scare quotes, 
a number of inherited categories from “capitalism” to “socialism.”327 Eucken, for instance, called 
“capitalism” an abstract hypostatization, which is to say, the act of giving a concept the status of 
an independent and causally significant entity in the world.328 From a more sociological 
perspective, Röpke understood “capitalism” as just another word for “historical liberalism” or 
“paleoliberalism,” that is, “nothing other than the rotten and clogged form that the market economy 
took over the past one hundred years.”329 Rüstow likewise rejected the “corrupt” theologico-
metaphysical underpinnings of this “paleoliberal” capitalist intellectual tradition, which he 
                                                
322 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 180 (translation altered). 
323 Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 250 (translation mine). 
324 See also Foucault’s discussion in Birth of Biopolitics, p. 167. 
325 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 144. 
326 Rüstow, cited in Eucken, Foundations, p. 293. 
327 For the political, methodological and even theologico-metaphysical reasons, see Rüstow, Das Versagen des 
Wirtschaftsliberalismus. 
328 On capitalism and the general tendency toward hypostatization, see Eucken, Grundlagen, p. 252-3. See also: 
“The influence of economics on the study of economic history [die Wirtschaftshistorie] has often not been 
favourable because a system of concepts has been applied which does not do justice to historical reality. The very 
valuable works of Strieder are among those which suffer from a very extensive use of the term ‘Capitalism.’” 
Eucken, Foundations, p. 342. 
329 Röpke, Civitas Humana, p. 57. 
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examined in The Failure of Economic Liberalism as a Theologico-Historical Problem. To 
overcome such fraught conceptual and scientific legacies, they believed, a more adept theoretical 
apparatus is required. New methodological perspectives were necessary to correctly conceive and 
practically institute a more “rational” or “natural” economic order. This question of theory and 
practice had obvious resonance with the socialist and Marxist tradition – as communism, too, 
confronted the epistemological riddle of bridging the what and the how, the is and the ought. “What 
possibilities exist,” Eucken asked, “for the organization [Ordnung] of economic processes in the 
industrialized world?” Addressing the question to his favorite foe, he replied:  
 
This question cannot be resolved by saying, like Marx, that history will spring 
from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. Talk of this kind of freedom 
brings us nowhere. One makes the matter all too comfortable by simply speaking 
of new possibilities without offering an exact presentation of how orders should 
be built up and how they function. We need to ask the important question of what 
we find in history and what we do not find in history. That is not to say, however, 
that we could develop the new order only by looking backwards, as if progressing 
with our backs against the future. It is rather to say the exact opposite: Just as 
previously and currently realized forms of order depend on economic policy, so 
do possible forms of order. A new possibility must be found, one that is offered 
up by scientific inquiry.330 
 
Eucken’s initial reflections underscore the import of political economic knowledge and 
governmental technique for grasping or anchoring the historical plurality of (as yet unrealized) 
forms of order. In the name of sober, scientific analysis – “not the ideologies of capitalism, 
socialism, etc. but ordered thought [das ordende Denken] is what guides politically ordered action 
[ordnunspolitische Handeln]” – such forms are not determined by history or economy on their 
own. “A new possibility must be found,” explains Eucken, a possibility that is not simply a 
transitional form but that possesses stability and staying power.331  
 Eucken’s argument came with a twist. For his emphasis on a great “plurality of forms” 
ultimately yields the peculiar though “essential” conclusion that “the number of possibilities is 
few.” The number, in fact, is precisely three – the same conclusion drawn by Röpke, Rüstow and 
other ordoliberals.332 (The number three looms large in ordoliberalism, though it remains an open 
question whether this should be understood in a Christian or a phenomenological light.333) In 
Eucken’s account of “economic reality,”334 the only possible ways of guiding industrial economic 
                                                
330 Eucken, Grundsätze, pp. 242-43 (translation mine). 
331 Eucken, Grundsätze, pp. 242-43 (translation mine). 
332 See Röpke, Civitas Humana; Ernst Wolfram Dürr, Wesen und Ziele des Ordoliberalismus (Keller, 1954), p. 56; 
and Egon Edgar Nawroth, Die Sozial- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie des Neoliberalismus (Heidelberg: F.H. Kerle 
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333 Oppenheimer’s Third Way socialism was influential as a politico-methodological tactic. For the philosophical 
dimensions of the concept of “Ordo,” see Franz Böhm, “Die Idee des ORDO im Denken Walter Euckens,” in 
ORDO, Bd. 3 (1950), pp. xv–lxiv. 
334 “[T]he apparently unlimited range of economic forms … can be reduced to a limited number of typical economic 
orders, each with its particular variants, and that this provides a basis for understanding economic reality.” Eucken, 
Foundations, p. 274. 
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processes, we learn, are “through centralized state controls, through groups, and through 
competition.”335 The first two have been tested and failed, Eucken claims; the Third Way will be 
a charm. 
Eucken’s methodological sparring match with Marxist and socialist economics thus took a 
Weberian turn: the “essential” question of method ultimately turns on the correct usage of “real” 
and “ideal” types. With few exceptions, Weber’s role in the formation of ordoliberalism—and as 
Chapter 1 observed, neoliberalism more generally—has been overlooked by interpreters. Weber 
is cited in all of their major works, but his most important influence on ordoliberalism is subtler, 
appearing between the lines. In contrast to other common sources of inspiration – such as Ludwig 
von Mises – Eucken pays his due respect to Weber only when necessary. In his 1939 theoretical 
treatise, The Foundations of National Economy, for example, Eucken reserves a three-page 
footnote on typological method for his critical appraisal of Weber. Here, alongside typological 
thinkers from Aristotle to his father Rudolf Eucken, Eucken distinguishes his approach from 
Weber’s “ideal” and “pure” types.336 Like others in the Freiburg and Austrian Schools, Eucken 
references Weber’s Economy and Society to underscore the superior rationality of market societies 
versus centrally planned societies in the socialist calculation debate. 
Beyond the Austrian parallels, the ordoliberal approach is informed by a number of 
philosophical and political-economic currents. As Foucault noted, Eucken’s methodology could 
be located at the intersection of “neo-Kantian philosophy, Husserl’s phenomenology, and Max 
Weber’s sociology.”337 Eucken’s was an era of Kantian revival with a distinctly historicist 
disposition. Economic history and economic sociology were in close dialogue with philosophy 
about questions of methodology.338 Of equal importance for ordoliberal political economy, and 
particularly for Eucken’s methodological interventions, was the Methodenstreit rivalry between 
                                                
335 Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 243 (translation mine). 
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the German Historical School and the Austrian School.339 Eucken’s “morphological” method in 
Foundations can be read as a “synthesis” between these schools—a Kantian-Husserlian synthesis 
that seeks to resolve questions by juxtaposing “thesis” and “antithesis.” From the outset Eucken’s 
philosophical concerns revolved around rectifying the then dominant historiographical and 
conceptual approaches to political economy. This discipline, he suggested, should not be what the 
German Historical School proposed, a historicist analysis of economics that denies the existence 
of trans-historical laws and allows for unprincipled and chaotic forms of state intervention. Nor 
should it hold to the level of analysis advocated by the Austrian School, a theoretical science based 
on a methodological dualism that discards history and privileges a form of abstract economic 
reasoning to arrive at universally valid propositions and prescriptions.340 A “new orientation is 
needed,” Eucken argued – a Third Way, if you will.341 Neither approach to economic science will 
do by itself: the competitive order can only be achieved by making principled and productive use 
of history and theory.342 
This yielded a legally and sociologically informed approach to the significance of the 
institution in economic history and reality. “Capitalism” must be conceived in terms of institutional 
“forms,” methodological “styles,” and systemic “types” of economic order. For the ordoliberals, 
the problem of order (Ordnungsproblem) does not inhere in capitalism’s intrinsic contradictions. 
Rather, it is a problem of balancing, stabilizing and rationalizing conflictual processes of in 
different spheres of life. Economic, political, legal, social, and cultural orders act on one another 
in more or less “rational” ways.343 Their interactions are not a matter of a dialectical unfolding, 
but a series of “ordered” constructions, which must be conceptualized in terms of the 
“interdependence of orders.”344 That the governmental, legal, and social orders hang together with 
the economic order is a claim often accompanied by a direct swipe at the formulaic base-
superstructure model of orthodox Marxism. “It would be wrong,” Eucken argued, “to view the 
economic order as the base upon which the social, governmental, legal and other orders are based. 
Modern history teaches us just as clearly as earlier history that the governmental or legal orders 
also influence the formation of the economic order.”345 The agglomeration of economic interests, 
for example, can capture and pervert the political order: “The state first encourages the formation 
                                                
339 For an excellent study of Eucken and the Historical School, which strangely does not mention the role of the 
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344 This ‘interdependence of systems’ is an important fact of life, particularly of modern life.” Eucken, “What Kind 
of Economic and Social System?” p. 33 (English translation of “Das ordungspolitische Problem,” Ordo I, p. 72). 
345 Eucken, “What Kind of Economic and Social System?” p. 33 (translation altered).  
  82 
of private economic power and then becomes partially dependent on it… [and] not only do the 
methods of economic control mold the social structure, but the social structure also influences 
economic control.”346 More systematic than the Chicago School neoliberals treated in the 
following chapter, the Freiburg School insists that sociological, legal and historical study is 
necessary to comprehend and construct different economic orders. This German conception of 
order was built like a philosophical system, constructed through an idiosyncratic conceptual 
apparatus that aims at grasping and changing economic “reality” [Wirklichkeit].  
But how exactly does the competitive order result from this meta-doctrine? As a rule-bound 
institutional framework, the competitive order is the real type that the market economy takes when 
the “foundational principles” structure and delimit state intervention. Competition is both a means 
and an end of this framework; securing competition, however, means solving the riddle of state 
interventionism and corporate monopoly.347 The Freiburg solution to the complex question of the 
“when” and “how” of state intervention distinguishes them from Austrian absolutism and 
Chicagoan radicalism.348 This is both an epistemological and ontological question, a matter of the 
knowable and the touchable within “economic reality,” and each political rationality approaches 
the question differently.349 For the neoliberals, non-intervention is generally necessary in order to 
give full play to competition and the price mechanism. Here the ordoliberals overlap both with the 
“as if” full competition policy advocated by the marginalists and later by the American neoliberals, 
on the one hand, and with an already long-standing legal tradition of German anti-monopoly 
regulation, on the other. The latter, however, requires a new approach to the politico-juridical 
framework—the Ordnungsgefüge or the Ordnungsrahmen350—that structures economic 
processes.  
What constitutes “non-intervention,” and what are potential exceptions? Whereas Ludwig 
von Mises’ offered an absolutist answer – no intervention, period351 – the ordoliberals refused such 
an unqualified and, in their view, dangerous position. The topic of anti-monopoly regulation led 
to two heated exchanges between Mises and the ordoliberals – first with Rüstow at the 1937 
Colloque Walter Lippmann, and then with Eucken at the Mont Pelerin Society.352 Röpke got along 
with Mises better than Rüstow, who in a personal letter described Mises as “an old liberal ultra… 
who belongs behind glass in a museum.”353 According to the ordoliberals, an institutional 
framework is necessary to cultivate the optimal balance of forces and to prevent possible 
disruptions to the dynamic of competition. In order to “play the role of general regulator, of 
                                                
346 “This ‘interdependence of systems’ is an important fact of life, particularly of modern life.” Eucken, “What Kind 
of Economic and Social System?,” p. 33. 
347 For the way this “agenda” characterized the actual economic policies of West Germany from 1948 to the late 
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352 See R. M. Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pelerin Society (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995). 
353 Rüstow in a letter to Röpke, cited in Nichols, Freedom and Responsibility, p. 102. 
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principle of political rationality,” Foucault observes of the Germans, “the market must be possible 
in the first place.”354 In effect, the framework is what first gives form to a market economy and 
what then sustains, secures, and rationalizes it as an order of competition. “The economic order 
consists of the unity of forms in which the control [Lenkung] of everyday economic processes 
ensues in concreto… The activity of the state should be directed at the formation of ordered forms 
in the economy, not at the control of economic processes themselves.”355 
Interventions are not ruled out a priori; they must operate in principled and disciplined 
fashion. As the “ordering power” [ordende Potenz], the state must link its activity to predetermined 
principles.356  The problem, Röpke wrote early on, is that “the welfare state has no built-in self-
limiting capacity.”357 The state must learn from political economy that “an interventionist 
economic policy has its Rubicon.”358 Which is to say: governmental administrators and experts 
must discern “the many intermediary forms of economy policy which can neither be termed 
liberalism nor collectivism.” The central distinction, defined by Röpke and used by Eucken, is 
between “compatible and incompatible” intervention or “market conforming and market non-
conforming” intervention.359 “There are not two, but three possibilities,” Röpke and Eucken insist: 
“laissez-faire, compatible state intervention, and incompatible state intervention (planned 
economy).”360 Harking back to the socialist calculation debate and foreshadowing Hayek’s 
contention in The Road to Serfdom, Röpke and Eucken demand that governmental agencies respect 
and protect the price mechanism: “the price mechanism is an essential part of the mechanism of 
our whole economic system and one cannot do away with it without in the end being forced down 
a path leading to pure collectivism.”361 
The market economy does not succeed on its own; the “natural” outcome of free markets, 
the ordoliberals argued, was a myth propagated by paleoliberalism. This is a shared tenet across 
all branches of neoliberalism: the constructivist nature of its project.  
 
The starting point of neoliberalism is the admission, contrary to classical liberalism, 
that its political program will triumph only if it acknowledges that the conditions 
for its success must be constructed, and will not come about ‘naturally’ in the 
absence of concerted effort. This notion had direct implications for the neoliberal 
attitude toward the state, the outlines of what they deemed a correct economic 
theory, as well as the stance adopted toward political parties and other corporate 
entities that were the result of conscious organization, and not simply unexplained 
‘organic’ growths. ‘The Market’ would not naturally conjure the conditions for its 
own continued flourishing, so neoliberalism is first and foremost a theory of how 
to reengineer the state in order to guarantee the success of the market and its most 
important participants, modern corporation. Neoliberals accept the (Leninist?) 
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356 Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 336. 
357 Röpke, Against the Tide, p. 205. 
358 Röpke, Social Crisis, pp. 159-163. 
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precept that they must organize politically to take over a strong government, and 
not simply predict it will ‘wither away.’362 
 
In the ordoliberal view, it is necessary to construct the “economic constitution” and the strong state 
to secure economic growth and price stability. When the framework is in place, however, there is 
no need to intervene directly “since the economic process, as the bearer in itself of a regulatory 
structure in the form of competition, will never go wrong if it is allowed to function fully.”363 This 
implies that the question of intervention is always contextual, predicated on its formal nature, and 
aimed at securing the order from disruption and contamination. The framework uses the market as 
a means to achieve “optimal” and “full” levels of competition, price stability and social cohesion 
– that is, up to the (exceptional) point when it becomes unbalanced and disordered. This is what 
they call “crisis.” 
 Because ordoliberalism posits the existence of a “natural” order – which, when constructed, 
yields economic growth, social balance and thus also a form of political legitimacy – every 
aberration must be explained by a departure from the order’s principles or by the influence of 
outside factors. In the ordoliberal view, crises are either due to failed interventionism or to external 
threats.364 The question of interventionism – “too much” or “too little” – is typically answered with 
“too much.” Every instance of “direct” or “non-conforming” intervention signifies a breakdown 
of order or, from a Schmittian perspective, a state of exception. The ordoliberals therefore call for 
a strong state to reestablish order and to prevent disorder in the first place. As a multidisciplinary 
theory of political-economic power, ordoliberalism is in a unique place to affirm that power lies 
both in the political and the economic sphere, and it sees the former as a form-giver form to the 
latter. Or as Eucken put it: “The economic order is a tool for the implementation of power.”365  
Here we find the principal agent of techne, the means for producing stable order and for 
reconstructing economic and social forms. In doing so, this neo-liberalism need not be especially 
democratic, nor need it be particularly liberal. To be sure, its aspiration lies more in the former 
than in the latter. By “erecting a bar against the state… consisting of nonpolitical spheres,” Röpke 
explains, “the liberal principle… is compatible with democratic as well as non-democratic political 
systems.”366 Even though they need not necessarily come together, he adds, “[w]hen liberalism 
advocates democracy, it can do so only on condition that democracy is hedged in by such 
limitations and safeguards as will prevent liberalism’s being devoured by democracy.”367 The 
layers of equivocation in this concept of liberalism allow for an elision in neoliberal thought. 
Democracy ought not get in the way – particularly when it comes to economic policy. This is a 
trans-neo-liberal position, one shared by Hayek, Friedman and Buchanan as well. 
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Between the lines, then, ordoliberal texts betray what ordoliberal practice does in moments 
of crisis. To achieve its ultimate ends—order, stability, competition and “sound money”— 
informal and extralegal measures are necessary—measures that have been called “liberal 
authoritarianism.”368 Long before Wolfgang Schäuble – the arch-ordoliberal practitioner discussed 
in the next chapter – the founders had already made this possibility quite clear:369 
 
It is a permanent task of economic policy to lay down and enforce the norms and 
standards of economic life. There must always be certain laws and institutions 
which form the framework in which the economic process takes place… Within 
the legal and institutional permanent framework there will always produce certain 
frictions which are temporary by nature, changes which will bring hardship to 
certain groups, states of emergency, and difficulties of adjustment.370  
 
This line of thought draws directly on Carl Schmitt.371 The strong state is the paradigmatic 
producer and enforcer of ordoliberal order. The idea can be traced to Rüstow’s 1932 lecture on 
“Free Economy – Strong State”;372 it also runs back, Bonefeld observes, to Müller-Armack’s 1933 
argument that “socio-economic difficulties can only be ‘resolved by a strong state’ that ‘suppresses 
the class struggle’ and that thereby renders effective the free initiative of individuals within the 
framework of ‘decisive rules.’”373 In order to maintain the market order, this might entail what 
Rüstow (in 1932) and Röpke (in 1942) called  “dictatorship within the bounds of democracy.”374 
This is defined, Bonefeld observes, “as a commissarial dictatorship, which, as Schmitt argues, 
temporarily suspends the rule of law to restore legitimate authority in the face of an ‘extreme 
emergency.’”375 As early as 1931 Müller-Armack argued that, to “free economic activities” and 
“suppress the class struggle,” a strong state and a set of “decisive rules” are necessary to maintain 
                                                
368 Dieter Haselbach, Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft: Gesellschaft und Politik im 
Ordoliberalismus (1991); Moritz Krell, Der Ordoliberalismus als autoritärer Liberalismus: Eine theoretische 
Legitimation der präsidialen Ermächtigungsgesetze? (Grin Verlag, 2013). 
369 The EU’s informal governance through the Troika and the EC made this clear, yielding Greece’s Memorandum 
of Understanding and similar measures for Southern European countries who do not keep to the austere diet 
prescribed for them. See Christian Joerges, “The Crisis of Law in the Integration of Europe” (forthcoming); Thomas 
Biebricher, “Neoliberalism and Sovereignty”; Biebricher, “Neoliberalism and Democracy”; Sonja Buckel, Near 
Futures Online; Bonefeld; Butterwegge, Lösch and Ptak (eds.), Neoliberalismus: Analysen und Alternativen; 
Alexander Somek, “Authoritarian Liberalism,” Austrian Law Journal 1/2015, 67–87; http://alj.uni-
graz.at/index.php/alj/ article/view/37. 
370 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 186. 
371 For different accounts of the ordoliberals’ relation to Carl Schmitt, see Werner Bonefeld, The Strong State and 
the Free Economy (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017); Biebricher, “Sovereignty, Norms and Exception in 
Neoliberalism”; and Slobodian, Globalists. 
372 Rüstow, “Freie Wirtschaft – Starker Staat (Die staatspolitischen Voraussetzungen des wirtschaftspolitischen 
Liberalismus)” in F. Boese (ed.), Deutschland und die Weltkrise, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Bd. 187, 
(Dresden, 1932), pp. 62-69; reprinted in W. Hoch (ed.), Alexander Rüstow: Rede und Antwort, pp. 249-258. 
373 Müller-Armack (1933), p. 41; Bonefeld, Bonefeld, “Ordoliberalism and Political Theology: On the Government 
of Stateless Money” in Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics. 
374 Rüstow, “Freie Wirtschaft – Starker Staat.” Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1942), pp. 246-7. See also Werner Bonefeld, “Freedom and the Strong State: On German 
Ordoliberalism,” New Political Economy 17 (2012), 633-656, as well as Werner Bonefeld, “Ordoliberalism and 
Political Theology: On the Government of Stateless Money” in Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics. 
375 Bonefeld, “Human economy and social policy: On ordoliberalism and political authority,” p. 108. 
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economic order.376 For Hayek, too, the strong state could be conceived as an “economic planner 
for competition.”377 But if German neoliberalism aims at solving the riddle of interventionism and 
monopoly through a theory of crisis and its own “rational system of governmental intervention,”378 
it also aims to construct and accord itself with the rationality of the economic subject that its 
political rationality presupposes. 
 
Ordoliberal Philosophical Anthropology: The Economizing Subject 
 
Ordering means to order in freedom. Ordering a process means framing and patterning the factors 
that constitute it in such a way that the process administers itself in the desired direction. Ordering 
can only take place – as opposed to ‘regulating’ – when man orders his own conduct with 
discipline. – Leonhard Miksch379 
 
 Just as the socialist scientist examines “diverse economic forms [Wirtschaftsformen],” 
explains Eucken, “so must we study economic men [Wirtschaftsmenschen] in order to see man in 
the economy as he was and as he is.”380 The history of different – i.e., more or less principled and 
rational – economic orders reveals that “the competitive order” does not emerge and operate on its 
own. Despite its non-inevitability, this “type” of order does accord with “reality.” A strong state, 
a legal framework and constitutive principles are inter alia necessary for its functioning. Equally 
necessary, however, is the corresponding rationality of the economic subject. 
 “It may be objected,” Eucken notes, “that even though the variety of institutions can be 
reduced to types of economic order, the individual subject is always changing.” Diverse 
appearances of economic conduct across space and time “must be understood in their special 
intellectual, geographical, and political surroundings.”381 Rejecting Sombart’s “antithesis” 
between the Zwecksetzung of economic subjects in capitalist (“acquisitive”) versus pre- and post-
capitalist (“needs-based”) epochs,382 Eucken explains we find “in reality” that “the actions and 
plans of men are both uniform and varied.”383 They vary on the spectrum of “objectively” rational 
                                                
376 Alfred Müller-Armack, Staatsidee und Wirtschaftsordnung im neuen Reich (Berlin: Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1933), 
41. 
377 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944), p. 31. See Bonefeld, “Human economy and social policy: On ordoliberalism 
and political authority,” p. 108. 
378 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 121. 
379 “Ordnen heißt in Freiheit ordnen. Wenn man einen Prozeß ordnet, so bedeutet das, daß man die Faktoren, die ihn 
bestimmen, so gestaltet, daß er sich dann von selbst in der gewünschten Richtung vollzieht. Geordnet kann nur – im 
Gegensatz zu ‘geregelt’ – werden, wenn sich die Menschen diszipliniert verhalten.” Leonhard Miksch, cited in 
Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 179. 
380 Eucken, Foundations, p. 292 (italics in the original, translation altered); original in Eucken, Grundlagen, p. 220. 
381 Eucken, Foundations, p. 292; Eucken, Grundlagen, p. 206. 
382 “Sombart holds that all economic life before capitalism was for meeting needs… Capitalism with its desire for 
profit diverges strongly from this attitude. However, capitalism is now passing and the post-capitalist socialist 
economic systems will victoriously reintroduce the principle of meeting needs (or ‘production for use’). Then 
production will not be for monetary gain, but to provide consumers’ goods. This is Sombart’s argument, which we 
present here as representative of a whole trend of thought. It is no mere accident that such views have found wide 
public acceptance.” Eucken, Foundations, p. 292; Eucken, Grundlagen, p. 206. 
383 Eucken, Foundations, p.  293. 
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economic action, that is, according to the relative and “imponderable” influence of cultural ties 
and spiritual beliefs on economic behavior. They are uniform, however, in an important way—one 
that recalls Menger, Mises, and Robbins’ conception of economics examined in Chapter 1. Eucken 
writes: 
 
Constant: everywhere and at all times man finds himself in the daily situation of 
having to adjust his needs to the means at his disposal for satisfying them, and vice 
versa. In this respect nothing has altered fundamentally since the beginning of 
history. Not only is the human situation always basically the same, but also the 
actions intended to overcome the problem remain essentially constant. In their 
economic plans and their resulting actions men always and everywhere try to 
attain a certain end with as little expenditure of means and value as possible. They 
always follow ‘the economic principle.’384 
 
The economic principle constitutes a logical premise and universal pattern of conduct. Although 
there are “non-economic” characteristics important to explaining human behavior – as Eucken, 
Röpke, and Rüstow repeatedly aver – acting upon the economic principle is “a maxim of rational 
action in general.”385 Nor did Hayek hold a neo-classical or rational choice conception of the 
subject as fully rational actor. It should be further noted that this conception of the economizing 
and (ideally entrepreneurial) subject is neither Smith’s famous formulation of the individual 
pursuit of self-interest nor rational choice theory’s formulation of the strategic and instrumental 
pursuit of self-interested ends.  
At stake in this ordoliberal conception is a broader, more malleable conception of rational 
self-conduct. Subjects are not fully and objectively rational, competition-oriented, profit-seeking 
or self-interested in the first place. Economic man is not born, but made. Eucken’s umbrella 
definition of the economic principle – “men always and everywhere try to attain a certain end with 
as little expenditure of means and value as possible” – presages the redefinition of economics as 
the analysis of “scarce means among competing ends,” a definition that Becker later called 
“imperial” in that it covers nearly every aspect of life:386  
 
It is a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along with 
others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. 
Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences. The analysis assumes 
that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, 
loyal, spiteful or masochistic.387  
 
                                                
384 Eucken, Foundations, p. 281; the original reads “einen bestimmten Zweck mit einem möglichst geringen Aufwand 
an Werten zu erreichen.” Eucken, Grundlagen, p. 211. 
385 “Es ist eine Maxime des vernünftigen Handelns überhaupt.” Eucken, Grundlagen, p. 212. 
386 There is not yet an idea of the self-investing subject of human capital, however. Roots could be found in the 
ordoliberals’ formulation of investment in the knowledge, skills and “mentality” of workers (and all individuals). 
387 Becker, “The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior,” p. 1. 
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Though clearly less utilitarian than Becker, Eucken concurs in a significant way: at the basis of 
ordoliberal philosophical anthropology lay the economic schema.388 This provides a frame for 
understanding “the economizing subject” [Der wirtschaftende Mensch], the name of the 
concluding chapter in Eucken’s Foundations of National Economy which Hayek had translated 
into English after WWII.389 According to Eucken, the economic principle is any sort of 
“expenditure” of any kind of “value,” and therefore is considered a context-transcendent feature 
of rational conduct. For Eucken, this logic underlies the decisions of the Chinese peasant to 
perform sacrifice,390 the tribes of New Guinea to use magic, or the saint in the desert to eat 
locusts.391 In each of these cases and cultures, individuals “subjectively” hold to the principle as it 
corresponds to their respective beliefs and institutional orders. But in contrast to the “subjectively” 
rational French peasant—another example of man’s “imponderable” ties to land and community—
the modern American entrepreneur “objectively” acts upon the economic principle: “(1) he has a 
variable standard of unlimited needs; (2) he acts according to ‘the principle of maximum net 
revenue’; (3) he makes long-term economic plans; (4) he is generally little bound by traditional 
ties.”392 Economic rationality is a universal maxim, then, even if the social-scientific question 
remains how subjects “objectively” or “subjectively” act upon it. 
 The significance of this premise was also reflected in the socialist calculation debate. While 
working with a similar typological schema to Weber’s Economy and Society – i.e., the binary of 
market economy vs. centrally controlled economy, examined in the Chapter One – Eucken admits 
historical variance in the development and “rationalization” of modern techniques of 
calculation.393 The implication is that the conditions have already arisen for implementing and 
                                                
388 “[H]uman behavior is not only to be explained by the striving for the maximum profit, that is, by ‘capitalistic’ 
motives. Self-preservation, fear, hatred, the lust for power, love, humanitarianism, and other motives, determine in 
very differing degrees men's actions. But it is not to be concluded from this that because of extra-economic 
objectives and motives the economic principle is disregarded. The economic principle has nothing to do with the 
aims or purposes of human actions. The aims differ greatly and may be egoistic or altruistic, but it will always be 
according to the economic principle. The head of a monastery may well have no notions of aiming at the maximum 
profit and act entirely in the service of humanity, but in cultivating his fields, using raw materials, buying goods, and 
spending charitable gifts, he will be planning and acting in accordance with the economic principle. That is, he will 
be trying to fulfill a particular purpose with the minimum possible expenditure, in order to maximize the welfare 
from his fields, raw materials, etc.” Eucken, Foundations, p. 345 (italics added).  
389 See the translator’s note in T.W. Hutchinson, “Preface” in Eucken, Foundations (1950). 
390 “His everyday life is dominated by a belief in spirits and a worship of his ancestors. But however much he is 
bound by beliefs, superstitions, customs, and traditions, within this framework (or it might be said, with these data as 
a framework), he acts in accordance with the economic principle. He makes sacrifices partly from an ethical and 
religious sense of duty: to that extent the sacrifices are an end in themselves. Or he makes sacrifices in order to ward 
off a threatened crop failure: then they are a means to an end. In both cases he is acting according to the economic 
principle.” Eucken, Foundations, p. 281; Grundlagen, p. 211. 
391 “Travelers report that even today in certain villages in New Guinea, when houses are being built, a magician is 
commissioned for a fairly high fee to cast a spell on the beams. To us such expenditure seems an uneconomic and 
useless expense at variance with the economic principle, but to the people of this New Guinea tribe it is a necessary 
cost, and follows from the economic principle. Without it, according to what they believe, the purpose, that is, the 
building of the house, would not be carried out at the lowest cost. The house would be destroyed by floods and 
storms, and further heavy but avoidable expenditure would be necessary. It would be easy to add to these examples. 
Saints living in the desert on locusts and wild honey acted according to the economic principle, as do children 
influenced by ideas of magic. It is not to be confused with the striving for maximum profits or with the principles of 
‘capitalism.’” Eucken, Foundations, p. 282. 
392 Eucken, Foundations, p. 294; Eucken, Grundlagen, pp. 221-22.  
393 “It does seem, however, that in certain periods a fundamental change has taken place, for example, since the 
Renaissance, with the much more precise fixing of weights and measures, with the business of firms and households 
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optimizing the “objective” pursuit of the economic principle by individual subjects as well as by 
the competitive order as such. “[I]n the present age,” he concludes, “the divergence between 
subjectively following and objectively realizing the economic principle has become relevant and 
important in yet another way: it applies to the centrally administered economy, a form of order of 
great significance today.” Both “socialists” and “liberals” miss this distinction, he suggests: 
“Central administration chooses the plans that should be realized with a certain arbitrariness. It 
gazes right through the Gordian knot, which it is unable to untangle.”394  Centralized planning 
lacks the ability to measure scarcity [Knappheitsmesser] and thus cannot make good on the modern 
calculation techniques for the most objective realization of the economic principle. 
 Eucken’s philosophical anthropology provides another microscope sample of the fine line 
between the “constructivist” and “natural order” programs underpinning ordoliberal political 
rationality. The objectively “rational” economic action prescribed by ordoliberalism always 
already resides in “man” as such.395 More precisely, this form of rationality exists in and transcends 
man. The former is significant for the project of an “optimal” or “natural” order; the latter is what 
renders this “type” accessible to the “unitary theoretical apparatus” of the social scientist. 
Politically speaking, it is posited as the preexisting, not yet fully realized and therefore optimizable 
core of the economic subject. This comprises one of the constructivist and normative elements in 
ordoliberal political rationality: the competitive order at once presupposes and effectively produces 
economizing and entrepreneurial subjects. Moreover, as Miksch implies in the epigram above, 
freedom and order as such depend on subjects conducting themselves in a “disciplined” (i.e., 
“rational”) fashion. Entrepreneurial risk is to be permitted, if not promoted; not playing by the 
rules is to be punished, directly or indirectly. Decades before Becker’ theory of human capital, the 
“reality principle” of economic conduct appears in a subjectivist-universalist guise.  
 
The Racial Lining of Ordo-Typology 
 
In contrast to more economistic neoliberal currents, such as those of Mises or Friedman, 
the ordoliberals explicitly link their economic principles to a cultural and civilizational project. In 
this view, the strong state and competitive order not only make possible a particular “type” of 
subject, as examined above; they also allow for comparison between more or less disciplined and 
developed economies—a measure for postcolonial (under)development. Here again, Weber serves 
as a model for typologically tracking the relationship between culture, religion and economics.396 
                                                
accounted for in writing, with simple and double-entry book-keeping, balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and 
exact budgeting. Through such processes of rationalization, surely this means that a calculative economic spirit 
[rechnerischer Wirtschaftsgeist] previously unknown to mankind has been introduced into history? Historians have 
shown how gradual this development was and how the constant refinement of economic calculation altered the 
character of business management, which, in turn, influenced economic development. The knowledge of double-
entry book-keeping was a precondition for the south German expansion of the beginning of the sixteenth century.” 
Eucken, Foundations, pp. 282-3; Grundlagen, p. 212. 
394 Eucken, Foundations, p. 285; Grundlagen, p. 214. 
395 The gendered “man” stands in here for the universal “human”; the discourse frames der Mensch and homo 
oeconomicus as at once gendered and genderless, since the model’s universality effectively covers over questions of 
sex, gender and difference altogether. For studies of this in practice, see Leslie Salzinger, “Sexing Homo 
Oeconomicus” (forthcoming); and Brown, Chapter 3 in Undoing the Demos. 
396 “We want to understand the effects which the spiritual and intellectual characteristics of individual men in 
different periods, classes, or nations, exercise on actual economic events... It becomes possible in this way to 
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But beneath their own social scientific interests and economically liberal visions ran a culturally 
conservative undercurrent. As was already clear in their critique of laisser-faire capitalism and 
socialist collectivism, the ordoliberals believed that bolstering the rationality of competition was 
central to solving the “social crisis” of the time. The latter included sustaining the cultural and 
religious roots of Christian communities as a basis of Western civilization. 
Like Weber, Eucken, Röpke, Rüstow and Müller-Armack approached the question of 
religion in capitalist development as a constitutive part of their research agenda. Though the 
abstract contours of their philosophical anthropology covers over the Protestant roots and 
theological undertones,397 they glorified the calculative “ethic” of the entrepreneurial class – 
without the deeply ambivalent qualities of Weber’s study. Their narrative is not based in an account 
of historical “progress” or reason, but a series of formalist typological comparisons that served a 
different purpose: marking off “the West” from different cultures [Kulturkreisen] and advocating 
for an “Atlanticist” anti-socialist project – a post-war alliance for economic integration between 
Germany, England, France and the United States.398  
The ordoliberal “art of government according to the rationality of economic agents,” which 
Foucault sketched only in the context of Europe, is intertwined with a Euro-Atlantic project 
comprising normative and wide-reaching forms of governmentality on national, transnational and 
global scales.399 Perhaps the most revealing case of the ordoliberal schema in practice is Wilhelm 
Röpke’s defense of apartheid South Africa. According to Röpke, “the ‘rich’ countries of today are 
rich because, along with the necessary prerequisites of modern technology and its industrial use, 
they have a particular form of economic organization that responds to their spirit [Geist]”—a spirit 
that can only be found in “sharply curtailed areas… namely the fully developed industrial countries 
of the world.”400 Echoing Eucken’s praise of “objectively rational economic action” that resulted 
from the European “calculative economic spirit” [rechnerischer Wirtschaftsgeist],401 Röpke 
extends the comparative economic typology: “the South African Negro is not only a man of an 
utterly different race but, at the same time, stems from a completely different type and level of 
civilization.”402  
Here economic typologies blend together with cultural and racial essentialism as pro-
market measures are prescribed to enhance disciplined and “objective” self-conduct. “In his 
defense of South Africa,” Slobodian observes, “Röpke redefined ‘the West’ not as a racial or 
                                                
understand the religious, spiritual, political, and moral changes of periods like that in which Christianity arose, and 
to link this up with an accurate insight into the effects of such changes on the daily economic process.” Eucken, 
Foundations, p. 294. 
397 See Josef Hien, “The Ordoliberalism that never was,” Contemporary Political Theory Vo. 12, 4 (2013), 338-375. 
398 For studies of postwar Atlanticism, see Slobodian, “The World Economy and the Color Line: Wilhelm Röpke, 
Apartheid and the White Atlantic,” German Historical Institute Bulletin Supplement, No. 10 (2014): 61-87; Plehwe, 
“The Origins of the Neoliberal Economic Development Discourse” in Mirowski and Plehwe (eds.), The Road from 
Mont Pelerin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
399 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 313. 
400 Röpke, cited in Slobodian, “The World Economy and the Color Line,” p. 74. 
401 “Historians have shown how gradual this development was and how the constant refinement of economic 
calculation altered the character of business management, which, in turn, influenced economic development. The 
knowledge of double-entry book-keeping was a precondition for the south German expansion of the beginning of 
the sixteenth century. Where this knowledge was lacking or slow to penetrate, as in the Hansa towns, economic 
development was delayed. It would seem that the conclusion must be that, as the methods of economic calculation 
improved, a complete transformation occurred in men's attitude to economic life…” Eucken, Foundations, p. 283. 
402 Röpke, cited in Slobodian, “The World Economy and the Color Line,” p. 61. 
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civilizational space but one identified by a stable economy, market-friendly social behavior, and a 
welcoming investment climate. Like Adam Smith before him, Röpke would end by finding interest 
rates as the most reliable index for an area’s level of civilization.”403 Plehwe adds that Röpke’s 
belief about the South Africans’ “lack of punctuality, reliability, the inclination to save and to 
create” meant that industrialization schemes in the global South were “doomed to fail.”404 Röpke 
and his comrades married market competition to Christian conservatism on their trips to South 
America and other parts of the globe. While lobbying pro-market international institutions as part 
of what Slobodian has called the Geneva School of neoliberalism, Röpke’s popularity grew rapidly 
with the American New Right.405 Most of these developments preceded the neoliberal experiment 
in the Chilean coup of 1973 when, like in postwar West Germany, the “Chicago Boys” rapidly 
imposed the “price mechanism” by privatizing state industries and resources. 
But the ordoliberal approach came with an idiosyncratic idea of “natural order” that 
entailed – if only at “home” – that the protection of agricultural communities and the adjustment 
of non-competitive populations through governmental mediation. Thus their qualified 
prescriptions of the subsidiary principle, skills-training, and local negotiations—essential elements 
in the West-German “class compromise.” By temporarily assisting individuals and industries in 
crisis, the state could compel enterprises to adjust to new market conditions, with the ultimate end 
of instilling in them the rationality of competition, entrepreneurialism and self-help.  
Such approaches to local and global “market adjustments” – like the “uneven” differences 
they presuppose and produce – highlight a long and ambivalent legacy of liberalism. Echoing 
Hayek, Röpke argues that “liberal democracy creates a safety valve that makes revolution 
redundant.”406 He continues: “This highest form of social organization naturally presupposes that 
all groups are willing loyally to apply the rules of the game, which means that their attitude 
corresponds to the liberal philosophy.”407 In the new “international order,” the nation-state 
addresses or disciplines populations differently effected by market developments according to their 
relative technological development and (in)adequate levels of economic rationality. But before its 
postwar establishment, the project of postcolonial discipline was invented at home: namely, to 
counter the proletarian threat in the “irrationality” of the “collectivist” masses. For this the 
ordoliberals appropriated (and transformed) a concept that the socialists had long used for 
industrial inequality and exploitation more generally: “the social question.” 
 
On the Social Question: Deproletarianization as Government-Mentality  
 
                                                
403 Slobodian, “The World Economy and the Color Line: Wilhelm Röpke, Apartheid and the White Atlantic,” 
German Historical Institute Bulletin Supplement, No. 10 (2014), p. 65. Although Röpke also opposed the Marshal 
Plan aid because it represented the paradigm of “state planning,” he did so for somewhat different reasons.  
404 Cited in Slobodian, “The World Economy and the Color Line,” p. 74. 
405 See Slobodian, “Introduction” in Globalists; Slobodian, “The World Economy and the Color Line”; the 
Introduction in The Conservative Tradition in European Thought (1970); and Jean Solchany, “Wilhelm Röpke as 
Key Actor of Transnational Neoliberalism After 1945” in Re-Inventing Western Civilisation: Transnational 
Reconstructions of Europe in the Twentieth Century, Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Niklas Olsen, eds. (Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014). 
406 Röpke, Against the Tide, p. 92. 
407 Röpke, Against the Tide, p. 92.  
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We see the new social question with our own eyes day in, day out. The worker – and not only the 
worker – has become dependent on the machinery of the state and other public authorities… A 
new type of man [Menschentypus] is emerging, one that consists of massified and state-
dependent men. Step by step, all of life is being statified… And as soon as the mechanics for 
controlling the modern economy no longer function, the social question only becomes more 
intense.408 – Eucken 
 
[W]orking class problems are in the first place problems of personality.409 – Röpke 
 
 
 Ordoliberal political rationality aims – through the institutional framework, the strong state, 
and the dynamic of competition – to construct the practical reasoning of the subject within the 
competitive order. But another constitutive element, and “the central problem of our time,”410 was 
derived from leftist discourse.411 “The social question” or “the social problem” were common 
phrases from the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth century for the socio-economic 
inequality produced by industrial society.412 Just as Karl Marx first coined the word “capitalism” 
before it took on a life of its own, “the social question” emerged from the analytical and critical 
discourse of socialism. Each concept entered and altered the political imaginary of the time – i.e., 
offered a common sense way of conceptualizing the symptoms of class division and industrial 
immiseration for which capitalism was understood to be the cause.  
“The social question,” as one sociologist put it at the turn of the century, “comes from the 
consciousness of a contradiction between economic development and the social ideal of liberty 
and equality which is being realized in political life.”413 To which another scholar added: “The 
social question is always a question of the many against the few, and manifests itself invariably in 
a struggle over some form of institution; that is to say, a class struggle… The social question, then, 
has passed through two phases, the religious and the political, and is now in a third, namely, the 
economic. It is today, as it has always been, a question of popular freedom, a question of 
democracy.”414 The debate was waged, in other words, around familiar revolutionary and Marxist 
tropes, and it framed state policy well into the twentieth century.415 The social democrats and 
Christian socialists, like the Marxists, (largely) answered the question with the socialization of 
                                                
408 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” pp. 115-16. 
409 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 223. 
410 Solving the social question by understanding the “interdependence of orders” is the stated task of this book. 
Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 16. 
411 For contemporary usages of the term, see Pierre Rosanvallon, The New Social Question: Rethinking the Welfare 
State, translated by Barbara Harshav, foreword by Nathan Glazer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); 
Didier Fassin and Eric Fassin, De la question sociale à la question raciale? Représenter la société française (Paris: 
La Découverte, 2006). 
412 See for example Ferdinand Tönnies, Die soziale Frage bis zum Weltkriege (1907); and Adolph Wagner “Speech 
on the Social Question” (abridged), in Donald O. Wagner, ed. Social Reformers: Adam Smith to John Dewey (New 
York: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 489-506. 
413 Ira W. Howerth, “The Social Question of Today” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 12, No. 2 (Sept., 1906), 
pp. 254-268.  
414 Howerth, “The Social Question of Today.” 
415 For an account of this period in Germany, see Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: 
Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871 (Princeton University Press, 1958). 
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“the economic institutions of society” or “the means of production.”416 However, the approach of 
figures like Eduard Bernstein was more oriented to a welfare-state “reconciliation” of the social 
divide: “Now is the time to organize and concentrate the intelligence of all classes upon a rational 
solution… Intelligence is able to solve all social questions. There is only the matter of its 
application.”417 
For the Freiburg School, the social question did not signify a problem of socio-economic 
social justice, inequality or rights per se. Not unlike select members of the first-generation 
Frankfurt School, examined in Chapter 4, the Freiburgers understood it as an irrational effect of an 
institutional problem of order.” They saw it as a problem of massification, collectivization, 
proletarianization, de-personalization, and anonymization.418 Its roots lay in the equally mistaken 
creeds of laisser-faire liberalism and welfare-state interventionism. The ordoliberal “critique” of 
modern society aimed to reconstruct the governmental framework that produces structural effects 
in the first place—effects seen above all in the population’s “collectivist” mentality. 
For Eucken, the social question of the twentieth century was completely different from that 
of the nineteenth century; “it is not only a different question, but has also become much more 
difficult to resolve.” Back then, he explains, the social question emerged from industrialization, 
technologization, and great acts of liberal legislation like “freedom of contract, freedom of 
movement, and private property.” This split society into the “two hostile [feindliche] groups” of 
entrepreneurs and proletarians. While it appeared that political and legal rights were secured for 
all, industrial workers remained socially and economically unfree: “Dependent, they felt 
themselves at the mercy of ‘Capital,’ as it was crudely put, and this superior power was felt by the 
individual in the factory. Poor working conditions, insufficient compensation, long working hours, 
health impairment, child labor, and insecurity of existence… represented the social question of 
this time.”419 It became “the central question” of society, politics and culture. 
“Marx grasped the social question with the force and passion of his whole being,” writes 
Eucken.420 Because he saw in it “the agent of a lawful historical process [Agens des gesetzmässig 
ablaufenden Geschichtsprozess],” he interpreted “the social question and the property question as 
one question.” Engaging lengthy excerpts from Das Kapital,421 Eucken explains that, because 
Marx thought capitalist production would engender its own negation, he expected the social 
question to resolve itself “with the necessity of a natural process through the disappearance of 
                                                
416 “How are the economic institutions of society, in which so much power and privilege are concentrated, and 
which are essential to the well-being of all, to be organized and conducted so that their benefits may be justly shared 
by all members of society, and thus the last refuge of the spirit of selfish domination be, like the Church and the 
State, in the hands of the people?” Howerth, “The Social Question of Today.” 
417 “The forces which have brought society to its present degree of civilization will in the future, if aided by higher 
and higher degrees of individual and social intelligence, carry us onward and upward to heights of civilization yet 
undreamed of.” Howerth, “The Social Question of Today.”  
418 See Ernst Wolfram Dürr, Wesen und Ziele des Ordoliberalismus; and Werner Bonefeld, “Human Economy and 
Social Policy: On Ordoliberalism and Political Authority” in History of the Human Sciences 26 (2), 2013, pp. 106–
125. 
419 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” p. 113. 
420 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” p. 113. 
421 “Das Kapitalmonopol wird zur Fessel der Produktionsweise, die mit und unter ihm aufgeblüht ist. Die 
Zentralisation der Produktionsmittel und die Vergesellschaftung der Arbeit erreichen einen Punkt, wo sie 
unverträglich werden mit ihrer kapitalistischen Hülle. Sie wird gesprengt. Die Stunde des kapitalistischen 
Privateigentums schlägt. Die Expropriateurs werden expropriiert.” Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Band I (Berlin: DieU 
Verlag, 1951), 803, cited in Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 114. 
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private property and the ascendance of socialized property.” “Factually,” Eucken interjects, 
“workers’ conditions have improved and real wages have risen three- to four-fold in many 
industrial countries.” While technological developments, state regulations and reductions to the 
working day improved working and living conditions, “competition among firms began to benefit 
workers” and “trade unions altered the form of the market.” But these developments did not solve 
the social question. The attempt to address these problems through social policy [Sozialpolitik] led 
to “the great ‘statifications’ and ‘socializations’ of the past decades,” which in turn produced “the 
new social question.”422  
The new social question, according to Eucken, not only threatens industrial workers but 
also other social classes and positions like “farmers, craftsmen, traders and other free professions.” 
Whereas in the nineteenth century the social question took on a private character, “today it is 
contrarily tied to the very disappearance of the private character of life.”423 Many countries 
transformed—as Eucken explains using Mises’ terms—from a predominantly market economy 
[Verkehrswirtschaft] to a centrally administered economy [Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft]. 
According to Eucken, this means that “it is not the market making decisions, i.e., through the 
exchange of services for money, but rather the [state’s] allocation and distribution of jobs and 
consumer goods.” Under central planning, society could not “build itself up from spontaneous 
forces” as it should because “the carriers [Träger] and figures [Gebilde] of society are created 
[geschaffen] and controlled [dirigiert] from above.”424 In this socialist order, the state and the 
courts are pulled into the “gearbox” of powerful groups; the function of public and state law is 
altered; economic and social insecurity is heightened; bureaucracy is extended; individual self-
responsibility is reduced; and human freedom is threatened as “man is transformed into a segment 
within a great machine.” This represents “the great problem of order” [das große 
Ordnungspolitisches Problem].425 What is to be done? 
“The question cannot be solved,” Eucken explains, “if the state thoughtlessly undertakes a 
privatization of the economy and thus reverts to nineteenth-century conditions.”426 The question 
can only be addressed by “producing” a new, rational framework. Eucken’s solution returns to the 
question of form and the underlying dichotomy of the socialist calculation debate: “Here ‘planning’ 
is necessary; that is, ‘planning’ must be confined to the forms in which economic practices occur 
and must ensure that forms do not arise out of the economy that would threaten the free existence 
of economic actors or that would prevent a proper steering [Lenkung] of the overall economic 
process [wirtschaftlichen Gesamtprozesses].”427 Eucken declares that it is not the decision of the 
state to plan “economic processes”; these should result from the private plans of individuals, 
                                                
422 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 121. 
423 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 117. 
424 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 117. 
425 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 123.  
426 Since the nineteenth century, the heavy involvement of the state accelerated the process of industrial 
concentration, which “brings with it the danger that a mere liberation from state power would hand over many 
people to the domination of private entities of power.” While the nineteenth century acknowledged the necessity of 
political and legal freedoms through constitutional guaranties, says Eucken, it was mistaken in thinking that 
economic forms could be surrendered to laissez faire, that monopoly and concentrated power would resolve 
themselves, and that the development of sound national and international monetary orders [die Geldordnungen] was 
of any less importance. The ordoliberal credo, Eucken insists, bears repeating: “a free economic and social order 
cannot realize itself by itself, especially in the age of industrialization and technologization.” Eucken, “Die soziale 
Frage,” 118-20.  
427 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 120. 
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households and firms. At the same time, these actors should not decide on the economic 
“framework”; for it is “the obligation [Pflicht] of the state to autonomously determine the 
framework [den Rahmen autonom zu bestimmen] in which the economic process occurs,” to 
“guard and watch over” these processes and to “ensure that sufficient market forms [Marktformen] 
emerge in the labor and commodity markets.”428 Citing Hayek, Eucken argues that there is a 
difference between acting on the form of the market vs. intervening in the economic process itself. 
This distinction, which corresponds to the “antithesis” of a centrally administered economy and a 
market economy, can only be “transcended” through an ordoliberal “synthesis of ‘planning’ and 
freedom.”429 Only this kind of government framework—one capable of what Hayek called 
“planning for competition”—can deliver the ultimate end: freedom. Freedom rests in the “right 
forms of competitive markets,” Eucken argues, and it is only through freedom that the social 
problem can be solved. The ordoliberal program is “the only possible way” to grasp and solve the 
social question as the problem of freedom; and “it is precisely social reasons [soziale Gründe] that 
force us to follow this line of the competitive order.”430   
The ordoliberals transformed as they cribbed the social question from the socialists, along 
with key terms like “social policy” and “socialization” from the social scientists. Properly 
understood, social policy is of “a universal nature” since “there is nothing that would not be social” 
from the ordoliberal point of view. Just another word for economic policy, social policy is thus 
“identical with the order of the economy or with the politics of the economic constitution.”431 This 
links up with Röpke and Rüstow’s so-called “sociological neoliberalism,” which examines the 
symptoms Eucken mentions in greater depth. Like Eucken, Röpke and Rüstow do not believe that 
societal division is itself the problem. Drawing directly from Pareto, Ortega y Gasset, Le Bon and 
others who describe social structure as inevitably unequal and “pyramid” in form, they describe 
the “cure” to the “sickness” of the social question not in social equality but in harmony—or what 
Müller-Armack later called “social irenics.” This “cure” must strike at the very “collectivistic” 
desire to combat class inequalities by redesigning the competitive order itself.  
More so than Eucken, Röpke and Rüstow analyze the cultural, material and ideational 
preconditions of the competitive order. They examine massification and proletarianization not as 
the inevitable result of the relations of production, but as the conditions of “mentality” and 
“personality” that are malleable. In response to the “spiritual collectivization of our society and 
the resulting ‘revolt of the masses,’”432 Röpke declares, it is “imperative to retransform 
socialization into individualization.”433 Because irrational forms of socialization are an effect of 
the institutional framework, government must be re-rationalized around the basic principle and 
instrument of market society: private property. Theirs is neither a Lockean nor an inherently liberal 
justification of property ownership, however, but a strategic move to blunt the desire for revolution 
and to block the sociological trend of proletarianization: “The misery of ‘capitalism,’ we must 
point out to the socialists, is not due to some men owning capital, but rather to others not owning 
                                                
428 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 129-30. 
429 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 130. 
430 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” 131. 
431  “… daß die Sozialpolitik nicht als Anhängsel der übrigen Wirtschaftspolitik betrachtet werden sollte, sondern in 
erster Linie Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik zu sein hat. […] Es gibt nichts, was nicht sozial wichtig wäre. […] Richtig 
verstandene Sozialpolitik ist universaler Art. Sie ist identisch mit der Politik zur Ordnung der Wirtschaft oder der 
Wirtschaftsverfassungspolitik.” Eucken, Grundsätze (1952/2004), p. 313. 
432 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 142. 
433 Röpke, Against the Tide, p. 162. 
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any, and thus being proletarians.”434 Because the market is not conceived in terms of exchange but 
as a structure of competition, answering the social question is not about minimizing competition, 
but about properly ordering it and bringing more people into it. Privatization is the name of this 
game, and everyone must be “invested” in it. To this end, individuals must be stripped from state 
dependency and compelled to embrace self-responsibility. 
Just as “generalized dependency” must be reconfigured through a rationality of self-
responsibility, so must employment be recast in an anti-socialist light: the unemployed subject is 
no longer a victim of injustice but “a worker in transit,” an entrepreneur-to-be who adjusts from a 
less to a more competitive condition. Reintegrated in and through the market, competition compels 
the worker-as-entrepreneur to reason and behave with a more “objective” mentality. But the state 
must ensure some degree of stability lest the social bond tear at the seams. To this end the state 
requires both a quantitative calculus and a qualitative governmentality. It must individualize and 
entrepreneurialize according to a counter-rationality with a corresponding governmentality. 
Rüstow discloses the ordoliberal secret as follows: this concerns “the possibility to change the 
ruling views and to indirectly and imperceptibly alter the decisions of individuals by influencing 
their mentality.”435 “The effect of socialization on the social-psychic habitus of the workforce,” 
writes Röpke, “is a point of decisive significance.”436  
Government acts on economic forms to affect changes in “non-economic” spheres. In 
Rüstow’s famous formulation, the governmental approach to re-cultivating an entrepreneurial 
culture must be grounded in a Vitalpolitik, a bio-politics or politics of life: “An anthropologically 
founded Vitalpolitik, which is applied to the whole breadth of human things [menschlichen Dinge], 
administered accordingly and implemented differently from case to case… is the sole means by 
which massification can really be overcome.”437 For both Röpke and Rüstow, the socio-cultural 
sphere forms a primary site and object of governmental action. In Foucault’s notes on 
“individualization” in the Freiburg and Chicago Schools, he calls this a form of 
“environmentalism” or “environmentality” [environmentalité]: a technology that “rationalizes” the 
enforcement by modifying the terms and direction of “the rules of the game.”438 It is a way of 
acting on the “framework” and “milieu” of the population, or what the ordoliberals called the 
“social environment” [die soziale Umwelt].439  
Both Röpke and Rüstow see this form of governmental action within a “new” set of tasks 
and techniques for “third way” liberalism. Previous forms of liberalism were so charged with 
rationalism and “so alien to everything vital” that they “turned the proletariat into a problem which 
goes far beyond material conditions.”440 Adam’s Smith’s conception of the invisible hand, “which 
                                                
434 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 178. 
435 Rüstow, “Vitalpolitik Gegen Vermassung” in Masse und Demokratie, pp. 236-7. 
436 Röpke, “Sozialisierung,” p. 573, translation mine. He later adds: “Es sollte aber zugegeben werden, dass die 
Sozialisierung – wegen ihres unvermeidlichen streng rational-zentralistischen Charakters – an der gegenwärtigen 
seelischen Lage der Arbeiterschaft nicht sehr viel mehr als innerkapitalistische Reformen ändern könnte, sofern sie 
eben nicht die im kapitalistischen Großbetrieb erreichte Rationalität opfern will.” Röpke, “Sozialisierung,” p. 574. 
437 Rüstow, “Vitalpolitik Gegen Vermassung” in Masse und Demokratie, p. 236. 
438 See the manuscript notes included in Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 261. The original French reads 
“environnementalité” in Foucault (2004), p. 266. I am grateful to Thomas Lemke for bringing this to my attention. 
439 Foucault’s discussion of the ordoliberal framework notes the population, farmland, and various non-economic 
spheres that can be brought into the framework of the market and can be made to function as markets. See Foucault, 
Birth of Biopolitics; and Biebricher, “The Biopolitics of Ordoliberalism,” in Foucault Studies 12, 2011, pp. 171-91. 
440 Röpke, Social Crisis, pp. 52-3. 
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in reality is nothing but the ‘divine reason’ of deistic philosophy,” denies “the necessity of 
sociological limits and conditions circumscribing a free market.”441 “The average liberal” of the 
nineteenth century, remarks Röpke, “never thought of looking upon the social question as a 
problem of vitality – i.e., as a non-economic, spiritual problem posed by the industrial form of 
life.” This is where the rational design of a balanced competitive order meets the rational technique 
of government. Despite their critique of liberal and socialist rationalism, from Saint Simon to Karl 
Mannheim, this comes with its own kind of rationalism.442 “We have before us a very fertile field 
of co-operation between the social sciences and the science of engineering,” Röpke argues, a 
technological development which could ensure that the “most rational organization” of enterprises 
coincides with “the balance of society itself.”443 A “counteractive socio-political effort” 
[widergelagerte Gesellschaftspolitik] must stabilize the market economy, and a “structural policy 
[must] no longer assume the social preconditions of the market economy… as given, but modify 
them with a specific intent.”444 “What is sought,” in Foucault’s words, “is not a society subject to 
the commodity-effect, but a society subject to the dynamic of competition.”445  
Through these particular forms of governmental and economic “rationalization,” 
ordoliberalism calls for “the generalization and multiplication of the ‘enterprise’ form within the 
social body.” From this Foucault concludes that “what is at stake in neo-liberal policy” is making 
competition “the formative power of society.”446 It is what Chancellor Ludwig Erhard called the 
program of a “formed society.”447 “An important fact,” Röpke added, is that “the market economy 
as an economic order must be correlated to a certain structure of society and to a definite mental 
climate which is appropriate to it.”448 To this end ordoliberalism developed not only a political 
economy, a political theory, and a philosophical anthropology; it also developed a theory of history 
with a constructive task: “The desire [for the competitive order], or its absence, is by no means a 
question of the free and independent decision of the individual: it depends on the social climate in 
which the opinions and will of the people at the helm have developed. However, the factors which 
determine this climate can be described more accurately, and it is then only one step toward 
influencing them.”449  
 
Ordoliberalism as Inverted Marxism, or: The Theory of Historical Lag 
 
 
                                                
441 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 51. 
442 For his critique of Mannheim and “social engineering,” see Röpke, Social Crisis, pp. 158-9; and Röpke, The 
Moral Foundations of Civil Society, p. 63. 
443 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 137.  
444 Röpke, Civitas Humana (1944/1946), p.146. 
445 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 147-8. 
446 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 147-8. 
447 Erhard penned this phrase as Chancellor of Germany in 1965, having previously written Prosperity Through 
Competition. See Erhard, cited in Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany; see also Peter J. 
Katzenstein, “Economic Management in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in German Studies Newsletter, No. 8, 
Economic Challenges and Choices (July 1986), p. 5. 
448 Röpke, “Free Economy and Social Order” in Freeman (January 11, 1954). 
449 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 142 (translation altered). 
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The challenge of the present, Röpke wrote in 1941, lay in theorizing the historical forces 
behind “our great spiritual interregnum.” The question of what possibilities exist for “the 
incubation of the future” is also the question of whether the future can be “influenced by the weight 
and form of our participation in it.”450 In a chapter titled “Seed and Harvest of Two Centuries,” 
Röpke developed a theory of ideational production and delayed manifestation—a theory premised 
on the distinction between “the ripening content of ideas” and their “external development.”451 
The “gap” or “lag” between the two is what he calls “historical interference”: 
 
History apparently always takes its course in two phases, a phase of internal, mental 
incubation and a phase of external, physical realization, and there is a great time 
lag between these two. The most remarkable and confusing phenomena of 
interference result from the coincidence of the realization of an already completed 
mental process of preparation with the incubation of a period that is yet to come. A 
second illustration will serve to make this clear: the great waves of history reach 
our shores after the steamship which has caused them has long vanished over the 
horizon and even after another ship has passed. Applied to our problem, this means 
that we are living today in a period of realization whose incubation took place in 
the nineteenth century, whereas the external physical and socio-political 
happenings of the nineteenth century are essentially the fruits of the seed sown in 
the eighteenth century.452 
 
The same metaphor of a steamboat creating ripples of “historical lag” reappears in a 1948 essay 
by Eucken: 
 
Opinions are still circulating in a world, which is no longer real [Die Meinungen 
bewegen sich noch in einer Welt, die nicht mehr real ist]. When a steamboat travels 
against the current, the waves often only hit the bank long after the boat has already 
vanished. This applies just as much to the ideas that currently dominate the 
economic and social policies of the day. The nineteenth century has passed, but 
the ideas that emerged in it are still powerful. The anachronism of the dominant 
ideas is yet another essential historical fact.453  
 
                                                
450 Röpke, Social Crisis, pp. 54-55. 
451 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 55. 
452 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 54 (emphasis mine). Röpke adds: “We are beginning to understand what an outstanding 
part ideas play in historical development, the strange illusions men harbor concerning the place which they happen 
to occupy in history and the no less curious illusions of certain revolutionaries regarding the epochal novelty of their 
régime, which, far from being the first phase of a new era, is often only the last ripple of a declining one.” 
453 Eucken, “Die soziale Frage,” pp. 120-21 (italics in the original).  Eucken adds: “In order to overcome this 
anachronism – and thereby to create the path toward ascertaining the social question as it exists in the reality of our 
century – it needs to be perceived in its entirety.” Röpke’s book was first published in 1941, and Eucken’s essay 
appeared in 1948. Eucken does not cite Röpke, but the similarity in metaphor and argument is intriguing. 
  99 
The meaning of their parable is that, though socialist ideas abound, the time of ordoliberal ideas is 
coming soon.454 The steamboat metaphor evokes a regular pattern of ideational movements and 
conceptual artifacts, which linger in the thought and language. Despite the idealism of this theory, 
there are some resonances with Marxist methods. The delayed historical realization of latent 
structures does not depend on the materiality of the productive forces and of human labor, 
however, but on the quasi-organic and ideational obstacles that remain before their eventual 
“physical” exhaustion. 
Just as Marx offered a critique of reified concepts, which cover the interests of the ruling 
class and mystify consciousness as to their historical conditions of emergence, the ordoliberals 
were suspicious of flawed social scientific doctrines that originate from previous social formations. 
Socialist rationalism and national protectionism, Röpke explains, “have long since become part of 
our economic concepts.”455 Marx did not scientifically reveal the structure and trajectory of 
historical development, the ordoliberals argue, but was himself an ideational symptom of his 
historical moment’s mistaken view of socio-historical development. The ordoliberals not only 
repurposed the Kapitalismuskritik and Ideologiekritik of their social scientific adversaries, but 
sought to turn their own weapons against them. Indeed, they advanced a modified form of ideology 
critique against Marxism writ large—a form that mixes the material and ideological layers of the 
model, as they believed social scientific discourse spreads both “up” and “down.” Put another way, 
they claimed that Marx’s epistemology had ontological effects, which changed the historical 
reality it purported only to describe. 
The ordoliberals thus traced the crisis of liberalism back to the late eighteenth century, 
focusing in particular on flawed economic, social and political theories.456 For Röpke, the roots 
grew from the rationalist fantasies of the French Revolution of 1789, the triumph of international 
free trade with the English Repeal Act of 1846, and the anti-liberal counter-movements of 
Friedrich List (The National System of Political Economy of 1841) and Karl Marx (the Manifesto 
of 1847).457 For Rüstow, the origins reside in the theologico-metaphysical underpinnings of 
intellectual currents from Adam Smith and the Manchester School to Friedrich List and Karl 
Marx.458 For Eucken, the sources are social scientific assumptions about historical progress and 
law-like socio-historical necessity. For all of them, social scientific and ideological developments 
yielded a historic crisis with manifold effects. 
                                                
454 “Yet we must find comfort and encouragement in the thought that the external events of the present are part of a 
‘realization phase’ of a past and closed period … All this can afford us much enlightenment.” See also: “Many 
people curiously look upon today’s political epilogue to an old century as the prologue of a new one,” Röpke noted 
at the conclusion of Weimar, but “[t]hey do not know that there is always a great distance between concrete 
realization and mental preparation and that while politics today noisily thrash the sheaves of the nineteenth century, 
the soil has already been planted with new seeds.” Röpke, Social Crisis, pp. 54, 63 (translation altered). 
455 Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 56. 
456 For their theories of crisis, see Eucken, Grundsätze, pp. 12-16, 218-222, 309-12, 346; Röpke, Against the Tide; 
and Röpke, Social Crisis. Friedman’s famous theory of crisis is discussed in the following chapter: “Only a crisis – 
actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, actions that are taken depend on the ideas that 
are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive 
and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.” 
457 See Röpke, Against the Tide, p. 105; “England literally had had to choose between revolution and free trade and 
took the course that had become inevitable.” Röpke, Against the Tide, p. 10; see also Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 55. 
458 See Rüstow, Das Versagen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus als religionsgeschichtliches Problem [The Failure of 
Economic Liberalism as a Theological-Historical Problem]. 
  100 
Eucken underscores the importance of “foundational forms of political-economic thought” 
and argues that various notions – such as nationalism, equality, security etc. – have a significant 
impact on actual dispositions and developments. The most important premise in politics and the 
human sciences, as Hayek later argued himself, lay in the concept of history itself.459 Eucken’s 
examples range from the concept of reason in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) to the 
conceptions of history and consciousness in Das Kapital (1867) through the stated goal of Lenin’s 
State and Revolution (1917) “to organize the entire economy according to the model of the German 
post service.” Eucken’s aim is to reveal the teleological entailments of his adversaries’ 
overdetermined conceptual apparatuses. Because these conceptual legacies are both reflective and 
effective vis-à-vis “reality,” he argues, we must reconsider the philosophical trajectory of the social 
sciences and of political economy above all.  
Like his Austrian colleagues, from Böhm-Bawerk to Mises and Schumpeter, Eucken takes 
aim at the Marxist claim that capitalist competition will eventually kill itself off. He suggests that 
this thesis – namely, that the concentration of capital in increasingly few hands will lead to its 
eventual expropriation by an increasing large mass of exploited workers – stems from a larger 
interest in law-like necessity, or what Marx called the necessity of economic crises due to “the 
absolute, general law of capitalist accumulation.”460 Marx’s dark picture of the present, Eucken 
argues, is governed by ideas of progress [Fortschrittsidee] and inevitability [Zwangsläufigkeit], 
notions that have retained an “essential power” [Potenz] in the twentieth century. The “historical 
lag” of this idea that the economy will inevitably develop in the direction of centralized state 
planning shaped the intellectual and popular imagination of the early twentieth century. But Marx 
alone is not to blame, Eucken claims: “Today the oldest formulations still press upon us the most 
forcefully: specifically, the doctrine of Saint Simon from 1829/30. Saint Simon and the Saint 
Simonists in fact belong to the most characteristic and most significant phenomena that have 
shaped our age.”461 
Coupled with their appropriation of ideology critique,462 ordoliberalism’s “inverted 
Marxism” stems from an engagement with and inversion of alternative theories of historical 
transformation. Economic, material, and cultural preconditions play important roles in a given 
historical configuration or development, the ordoliberals argue, but it is the practical activity of 
ordering ideas that give them their form and that rationalize them in a specific direction.  
                                                
459 Even those interpreters who rightly identify such strands – for example, Nils Goldschmidt sees in Eucken’s work 
“a consistent search for an adequate idea of historical development” – nonetheless tend to miss or understate the 
influence socialist philosophers had on the formal components of their mode of inquiry. See Nils Goldschmidt, 
“Gibt es eine ordoliberale Entwicklungsidee? Walter Euckens Analyse des gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen 
Wandels” in Freiburg Institut für Allg. Wirtschaftsforschung, Abt. für Wirtschaftspolitik (2012). 
460 Marx, Das Kapital, cited in Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 203 (translation mine). 
461 The Saint-Simonian notion that “the golden age is before us, not behind us,” and that it will be realized through 
the perfection of the social order, had a substantial influence on the nineteenth century social sciences, particularly 
on the search for laws of historical development. Saint Simon, cited in Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 201 (translation 
mine). 
462 In this passage, for example, Röpke sees the goal as “liberation” from the constraints of ideology: “The mind is 
the ultimate and indispensable basis not only of revolutions, but also of the tyrannies which they bring down. Since 
they cannot rely on naked force alone, they require for their existence an uncritically accepted system of ideas (an 
‘ideology’) which, extending subjugation to the soul, turns the oppressed into the willing subjects and accessories of 
their rulers… Every liberation must in consequence being with that of the mind and in the process make use of the 
critical faculties and, accordingly, tyrannies are right in seeing in the free exercise of the mind their worst and, in the 
long run, invincible foe.” Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 40. 
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From their earliest writings, the ordoliberals used categories of ideology and superstructure 
to criticize the blind spots of laisser-faire liberals and their socialist adversaries. “Every period of 
slump has its ideological superstructure,” Röpke said just days before his departure from Nazi 
Germany.463 Their critique of ideology in political economy turned on a claim to an 
interdisciplinary “scientific” approach to law, political economy, and society as a whole. “When 
science turns itself from ideology to the facts and lets the historical moment realize itself in its full 
validity [voll zur Geltung kommen lässt],” Eucken wrote, “it serves freedom in a special way.”464 
Theoretical and scientific activity, properly understood, is just one step from practical resolutions: 
“To solve the modern problem of economic order through thoughtful preparation is the essence 
[die Sache] of science. The order to be sought is that which accords with the essence [der Sache], 
with the historical situation, and with man.”465 In his discussion of the tasks, ideals and value 
constraints of science, Eucken consistently cited Kant, Husserl and Weber.466 But he also saw 
science as a productive, constructive and creative endeavor that is connected to actual 
transformations—one that, despite its technocratic and elite-centered character, resonates with the 
early Frankfurt School’s neo-Marxist conception of praxis: interdisciplinary social science must 
aid the struggle to construct a more rational order.467 “Economic policy [Wirtschaftspolitik]” 
Eucken later concluded, “can give form to reality [die Wirklichkeit gestalten] and resist the danger 
of being dragged away by the current of history.”468  
Beyond this idiosyncratic notion of science and praxis the “inverted Marxism” of 
ordoliberalism also derives from the belief, shared by Mises and Hayek, that the elite, not the 
masses, shape the modes of thought and action of an age.469 The final sentence of Eucken’s 1938 
book Nationalökonomie wozu? makes this clear: “The chance of ordo-political thought 
[ordnungspolitischen Denkens] lies in its gradual molding of, and its permanent effect on, the 
                                                
463 See Röpke, “End of an Era?” in Against the Tide, pp. 79-80. Röpke gave this lecture at the dawn of National 
Socialism, on February 8, 1933 in Frankfurt am Main. He began the lecture with the words “Let us forget for a 
moment about Hitler and Hugenberg…” He later added: “There are no objective, no material, grounds for supposing 
that the current world crisis heralds the decline of the existing economic and social order and the dawn of a new 
historical era.” 
464 Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 225. “Only an outlook that is close to reality [wirklichkeitsnahe Anschauung] of the 
historical moment in connection with analytic thought can give an answer to the principle question of necessity or 
freedom. Our attempt lies in this direction.” See also: “The reader can test this out by examining any economic-
political act, which he witnesses in its emergence… He will bump against the historical ‘tendency’ of the emergence 
out of a particular constellation of conditions [Bedingungskonstellation], and retrospectively against a ‘moment of 
crisis’ in which a series of tendencies and constellation of conditions [Bedingungskonstellation] began.” Eucken, 
Grundsätze, p. 222 (translation mine). 
465 Eucken, Nationalökonomie wozu?, p. 86. 
466 He cites Kant on science and wisdom on the last page of Eucken, Nationalökonomie wozu?, p. 88; he defines 
science with reference to Husserl and Weber in Eucken, Foundations, pp. 303-4; and he pays homage to Weber’s 
notion of value neutrality in Eucken, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung,” in ORDO, Bd. 2 (1949), 
pp. 1-99.  
467 See Chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
468 He adds: “Science can only be free when ordered thought [das Denken in Ordnungen] represses thought in 
historical necessities.” Eucken, Grundsätze, p. 225.  
469 For Mises, “The masses favour socialism because they trust the socialist propaganda of the intellectuals. The 
intellectuals not the masses are moulding public opinion.” Mises, Socialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1951 [1922]), p. 540. According to Hayek, “It is the beliefs which must spread if a free society is to be preserved, or 
restored, not what is practicable at the moment, which must be our concern. But, while we must emancipate 
ourselves from that servitude to current prejudices in which the politician is held, we must take a sane view of what 
persuasion and instruction are likely to achieve,” in Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1948), p. 109. 
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leading classes [der führenden Schichten].”470 Theirs was a project that required a (scientific) 
vanguard, as Röpke and Rüstow repeated time and again.471 Before and alongside the Mont Pelerin 
Society, the Freiburg School thus saw themselves as part of this vanguard—a counter-hegemonic 
movement to transform not only economic policy but the meaning and experience of politics itself. 
 
*** 
 
 “To understand the social market economy as a new social market economy in the twenty-
first century we must first of all reorder the priorities of politics toward an understanding of politics 
that is directed ahead, toward future generations.” These are the words of Angela Merkel at the 
Davos World Economic Forum in January 2006, just two years before a devastating economic 
crash shook the globe. Here Merkel offered the world a distinctive approach to the 
conceptualization and practice of politics in the twenty-first century. Reordering the future 
priorities of politics did not mean combatting catastrophic climate change. “For us in Germany,” 
she explained, “that means first of all clearing up our financial situation, our budgets. We have a 
demographic problem. We know that we have too few young people and nevertheless we live at 
the expense of the future by running up debts. That means that we rob future generations of their 
room for investment and development and that is immoral.”472 
 A decade later, on the heels of the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the so-called Syrian 
refugee crisis, Chancellor Merkel reflected on her guiding principles in difficult times: “A great 
deal of what is current and topical today is built on the work of the great pioneers of economic 
thought, among whom Walter Eucken undeniably plays a very special role. Time and again his 
ordoliberal political principles [ordnungspolitischen Grundsätze] help to ensure that we do not 
lose view of the whole [das Ganze]. They are comprehensible and they provide orientation.”473 In 
this 2016 speech commemorating Walter Eucken’s legacy, Merkel was not just partaking in a ritual 
of the German establishment, but also illustrating the centrality of ordoliberal rationality to 
domestic and international governance. In her speech, Merkel affirms the Freiburg School’s 
profound influence on the design and direction of German economic policy from 1948 to the 
present. She also mirrors, in her own language, the ordoliberal conceptual framework in describing 
a variety of current and seemingly timeless tasks. Moreover, she declares that Eucken’s 
Ordnungspolitik provides the right economic approach for Germany domestically, for the 
European Monetary Union more generally, and for the current refugee situation specifically.474 
                                                
470 Eucken, Nationalökonomie wozu?, p. 87. 
471 Return to Röpke, Social Crisis, p. 54; see Röpke, Civitas Humana; see also the support of enlightened aristocrats 
in Röpke, “Die Massengesellschaft und ihre Probleme” in Masse und Demokratie. 
472 Angela Merkel, cited in Adam Tooze, Crashed, 96-7. 
473 Angela Merkel, "Rede beim Walter Eucken Institut in Freiburg" (Jan. 13, 2016, my translation). 
474 “What does this challenge presented by the refugees means for us now in Europe? We don’t just have a German 
internal market but also a single European market and a shared currency. The definition of the market indeed plays 
an exciting role in the question ‘How do I apply the ordo-political conceptions of Walter Eucken?’ [‘Wie wende ich 
die ordnungspolitischen Vorstellungen von Walter Eucken an?’] … A part of the search for a European solution to 
the refugee question involves, when we also include economic aspects, the question of the single market, the 
question of the shared currency and the necessary conditions such that both can in reality to come into operation” 
(Merkel 2016, my translation). For an example of this in German media, see: “Jeder Zweite findet den Kapitalismus 
‘nicht mehr zeitgemäß,’ aber nur jeder Vierte sagt das über die ‘Marktwirtschaft.’ Auf den ideologisch aufgeladenen 
Begriff kommt es also an. Ludwig Erhard, der 1948 gegen die Planwirtschaftler der CDU siegte, darf in Frieden 
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Beyond the full embrace of ordoliberalism, perhaps most noteworthy about this speech is the 
Chancellor’s direct avowal of the ordoliberal theory of history—a theory of historical 
transformation based on the science of political economy. 
In a unique theorization of the driving forces of historical change, the ordoliberals at once 
projected themselves into their own critical history and took hold of the political and theoretical 
levers they identified as most decisive. Though specific to the discipline of political economy, their 
discourse and governmental program exceeded it. Ordoliberalism has both served and exceeded, 
in other words, the restructuring of the economic “base” to serve class interests, the development 
of a form of political reason that sits atop yet institutionally structures economic dynamics, and 
the propagation of a “worldview” or “ideology” that justifies and mystifies the status quo. As a 
political rationality, ordoliberalism may consist of some or all of these elements – but it is not 
reducible to them. 
Following the unstable and inflationary crisis of the Weimar period and the socialist 
calculation debate’s reconceptualization of the “rationality” of capitalism, ordoliberalism designed 
an alternative method for the institution of political economic order. Theirs was the “competitive 
order,” the rationality of which corresponded to the subject of ordoliberalism’s philosophical 
anthropology [Menschenbild] – not, that is, the existing mentality of subjects, but a type of 
economizing and entrepreneurial self-conduct that needs to be actively constructed. This guided 
their approach to “the social question,” a phrase they appropriated from socialist discourse and put 
to new use: the problem was no longer socio-economic inequality but rather centralization, 
collectivization, and the “mass” mentality of dependence on the welfare state.  
Because the process of “civilizational decline” was engendered by both unprincipled 
laisser-faire liberalism and “chaotic interventionism” (socialism and Keynesianism), the solution 
was not a simple return to what they called “paleoliberalism,” nor was it to support any form of 
radically democratic decision making. Instead, the solution rested in a positive program for a 
“Third Way” neoliberalism, one founded upon a “strong state” that secures a competitive but stable 
market economy. This form of rationality entails a governmentality that propagates the logic of 
competition, induces entrepreneurial conduct, combats “proletarianization,” and shields the 
cultural, religious and moral ties of local communities. Not despite but because of this ostensible 
paradox, the ordoliberal project was harnessed to an expressly conservative conception of culture 
and a strategically pro-Western and anti-socialist strategy. 
The ordoliberals’ “steamboat” historiography, their notion of social science as the carrier 
of political-economic countermovements, their practice of ideology critique, and their self-
identification as a scientific vanguard – together these formed the “inverted Marxism” of 
ordoliberalism. This final part of the ordoliberal program comprised a theory of crisis and top-
down approach to elite influence – both of which catapulted them to the helm of postwar 
institutional design and economic policy. Following its transformative reprogramming of postwar 
liberalism, however, ordoliberalism has not comprised a fixed doctrine but a mutating set of 
principles, methods and strategies. Understanding the Freiburg School’s distinctive theoretical 
trajectory—and its relation to the Austrian, Chicago, and Frankfurt Schools—is crucial to grasp 
both the “political deficits” and the forms of “crisis management” prescribed by ordoliberal 
rationality. 
                                                
ruhen.” Josef Joffe, “Der böse Kapitalismus. Warum der Unmut? Das Gegenmodell DDR ist total gescheitert” in 
Die Zeit, Nr 47 (2014), 13. 
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Chapter 3 
Mutations of Neoliberal Rationality: 
The Chicago School, Market Rule, and Crisis Management 
 
 
[A]n economic theory of how markets operate is necessary to evaluate any significant new 
regulations and other government policies for financial markets… Some retreat from free market 
conservatism is to be expected as a result of the crisis, but it would be a serious mistake if the 
analysis of financial and other markets that becomes dominant in Washington gives insufficient 
weight to the enormous contributions of business competition in raising human welfare.  
– Gary Becker475 
 
 
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crash, critics announced the “crisis of 
neoliberalism” as the reigning paradigm of political-economic governance, expecting its imminent 
demise and replacement by a wholly new paradigm. What followed, however, were more of the 
same neoliberal measures that allegedly created the conditions for this crisis: liberalization, 
privatization, marketization, securitization, and austerity.476 The seeming paradox evoked different 
responses. To critics, this indicated that a neoliberalism lived on, albeit only as a kind of dead 
corpse, as a “zombie neoliberalism.”477 To Chicago School neoliberals like Gary Becker and 
Richard Posner, the financial collapse was no different than Hurricane Katrina where, under 
conditions of crisis, the state needed to step in because “the decision to abandon or not cannot be 
left to the market.”478 To some German onlookers, by contrast, this was indeed a crisis of caused 
by the Chicago School brand of neoliberalism, the solution for which was not an entirely different 
paradigm but a “return” to neoliberalism’s origins. 
From one side of the German divide, Hans-Werner Sinn, the country’s most influential 
economist, argued that left critics of “neoliberalism” are dishonest since they refuse to distinguish 
the “radical concepts of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School” from the “true concept of 
neoliberalism.”479 In reality, he insisted, the true neoliberalism—namely, ordoliberalism—is the 
                                                
475 Gary Becker, “The Future of Free Market Conservatism,” The Becker-Posner Blog (11/30/2008); 
https://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/11/the-future-of-free-market-conservatism--becker.html. 
476 Among the many works that responded to the financial crisis are Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, The 
Crisis of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), and Philip Mirowski, Never Let a 
Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown (London: Verso, 2014). 
477 For a discussion of debates over “zombie neoliberalism,” see William Callison and Zachary Manfredi, 
“Introduction: Theorizing Mutant Neoliberalism” in Callison and Manfredi, eds., Mutant Neoliberalism: Market 
Rule and Political Rupture (New York: Fordham University Press, forthcoming). 
478 Richard Posner, “Katrina, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Terrorism,” The Becker-Posner Blog (09/04/2005); 
https://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/09/katrina-cost-benefit-analysis-and-terrorism--posner.html; for a 
warning against the return of socialism, see also Posner, “Is Capitalism in Crisis?” The Becker-Posner Blog 
(02/12/2012); https://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/02/is-capitalism-in-crisis-posner.html; and Richard 
Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’o8 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009).  
479 Hans-Werner Sinn, “Der wahre Neoliberalismus braucht klare Regeln,” Die Welt (May 15, 2010). 
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“exact opposite” of the Americans’ reckless de-regulation that caused the financial crisis. Just as 
a fair soccer game requires clear rules and a referee, true neoliberalism relies on “the self-steering 
of the economy within an ordered framework [Ordnungsrahmen], though it doesn’t believe [sic] 
that this ordered framework can be created by the economy itself.”480 For Sinn, a strong state and 
an ordered framework are what produce trust, prevent chaos, and allow market competition to 
develop its beneficent forces.  
From the other side of German politics, Sahra Wagenknecht, a Ph.D. in economics and 
leading party politician in Die Linke, also lays claim to the ordoliberal legacy of the “social market 
economy.” In Freedom instead of Capitalism: On Forgotten Ideals, the Eurocrisis and Our 
Future, Wagenknecht argued that, to oppose Chicago School neoliberalism and to develop an 
effective alternative, the left should use draw on the powerful ideals provided by Walter Eucken 
and Ludwig Erhard. A left government on this model would construct a “mixed economy” using 
markets and re-distribution based on corporate-monopoly-crushing and financial-speculation-
taming principles. “Only a creative socialism,” Wagenknecht concluded, can redeem Erhard’s 
promise of “prosperity for all.”481   
Sinn and Wagenknecht’s critiques of Chicago School neoliberalism and their competing 
appeals to Freiburg School ordoliberalism represent an intriguing German strategy for political-
economic hegemony—particularly given that both branch off from the same family tree. But these 
traditions of thought and practice are neither static doctrines with fixed meanings nor “zombies” 
lurking in the post-crisis landscape. They are rather forms of a “mutant” neoliberalism subject to 
internally and externally induced tranformations—and thus forms with different conceptions of 
market and political rationality. In times of crisis, both ordoliberalism and neoliberalism may 
reveal themselves as aggressively pro-market and anti-democratic. And yet their imagination and 
practice of political economy bear important differences and consequences for critique, differences 
that the post-crisis emergence of rightwing formations—the AfD and Trump—make clear.  
Comprising three parts, this chapter first explores the shared theoretical premises of the 
Freiburg School and the Chicago School, marking their break as the latter evolved from the 1950s 
onwards. Thereafter, a newly deregulation and monetarist-oriented perspective helped to shape 
Chicago’s theoretical and policy framework, making it more open to speculative free market 
finance and less concerned with monopoly and balanced budgets than Freiburg ordoliberalism. 
Placing these divergences in historical and theoretical context, I suggest, can help elucidate an 
epistemic incongruity between them that persists to this day. 
Against this mid-century backdrop, the second part of the chapter turns to the European 
sovereign debt crisis as an exemplary scene of ordoliberal (vs. neoliberal) governance, the key 
features of which were overlooked by many critics. Here I read Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner as a practicioner of neoliberal rationality and German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble as a bearer of ordoliberal rationality.482 That neither recognized the other as such does 
                                                
480 Hans-Werner Sinn, “Der wahre Neoliberalismus braucht klare Regeln.” 
481 Sahra Wagenknecht, Über vergessene Ideale, die Eurokrise und unsere Zukunft (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 
2012), 61. 
482 During the financial crisis Geithner served as Treasury Secretary under the Obama administration. Objections to 
the use of “neoliberal” in this context should both consider the training and trajectory of Geithner in particular and 
the administration’s approach to the crisis more generally—an approach that has been called “privatized 
Keynesianism” for good reason. From Gary Becker’s perspective, Geithner surely followed the wisdom of his own 
brand of “market conservatism” to a greater or lesser extent: “I agree with Posner that the future of free market 
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not contradict this reading, but rather serves to elucidate their differences in practice. According 
to Geithner’s narrative, Schäuble and other officials of German-led Europe showed dangerous 
disrespect for the speculative “truth” of financial markets and an “Old Testament faith” in balanced 
budgets, which resulted in a punitive approach to debt-ridden countries such as Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy. What Geithner misses throughout his account, however, is the distinctly 
ordoliberal framework underpinning the EU’s economic governance. Budgets balanced by debt 
brakes, an inflation-focused central bank, a disregard for structural inequalities, a Union built upon 
principles of “stability,” “growth” and “competitiveness,” and yet dominated by a single export-
oriented economy—there is an order and a rationality to this “economic constitution” that is greater 
than the sum of its parts. The final section on the Schwarze Null (balanced budget imperatve) 
suggests that focusing criticism on the EU’s democratic deficits or conflicting national interests 
alone is insufficient to grasp the political deficits of the current order. 
 
Trans-Atlantic Bridges and Breaks: Freiburg Ordoliberalism and Chicago Neoliberalism 
 
As the previous chapter showed, ordoliberal scholars like Eucken, Böhm, Röpke and 
Rüstow shared a more or less culturally conservative diagnosis of the political and economic crisis 
of Weimar Germany, an economically liberal desire to combat the rise of the modern welfare state, 
and a commitment to a strong, autonomous state that could establish and secure a competitive 
market order. Thereafter, a blossoming network of ideas, scholars, politicians, and business 
interests crystallized in the interstices of Röpke and Rüstow’s “sociological neoliberalism” and 
Eucken and Böhm’s politico-legal programme for “re-ordering” the economy.483 When the Nazis 
took power, Röpke and Rüstow fled the country while Eucken and Böhm remained and focused 
on the scientific elaboration and possible implementation of their “ordo” programme. But, when 
the war ended, they were already mobilised, with allies at their side such as Alfred Müller-Armack, 
Leonhard Miksch and, most importantly, Ludwig Erhard.484 
                                                
policies in the United States has been damaged by the financial crisis, and by the continuing rise in unemployment 
and slowdown of the American (and world) economy. The degree of damage, however, will be determined by the 
length and severity of this recession. If the recession does not develop into a deep and prolonged depression, there 
will not be a sizable retreat from the market policies that have been in effect. The big victory of Senator Obama and 
the Democratic Party was not a referendum on free market policies. Rather it reflected the continuing unpopularity 
of the Iraq war and of the Bush administration, and months of growing concern about foreclosures, rising 
unemployment, and the weak economy. American voters seem to want greater regulation of the financial sector, not 
an abandonment of policies that generally have supported the private sector and competition. This is reflected in the 
economists Obama has appointed to top positions in his administration. These economists, such as Larry Summers 
and Paul Volker, have generally recognized the importance of competition as a way to regulate market behavior.” 
Gary Becker, “The Future of Free Market Conservatism,” The Becker-Posner Blog (11/30/2008); 
https://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/11/the-future-of-free-market-conservatism--becker.html. 
483 Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936” in Alan T. Peacock and 
Hans Willgerodt (eds.), Germany’s Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1989), 
22-23; originally published as “Unsere Aufgabe” in Ordnung der Wirtschaft 2 (Stuttgart/Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 
1936). 
484 They met with German business groups, organized seminars, co-founded the Mont Pèlerin Society, served on 
local and federal policy committees, and struck close ties with political figures in the CDU and the FDP. Their 
strategy was not centered on political parties but on networks of influence. Some of the ordoliberals, like Miksch, 
even joined the SPD. Böhm became a CDU representative in the Bundestag from 1953-65. 
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In 1948, before the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) had been written and the West German state 
even existed, the ordoliberals assisted Erhard in constructing the now famous, but then 
controversial,485 economic and currency reforms that introduced the Deutsche Mark and lifted 
nearly all price controls.486 Amidst the dire economic conditions of post-war Germany, their 
decrees to abolish the rationing of even the most basic goods needed for survival, in order to 
liberalise commodity prices and “unleash” the market forces of competition, were without 
precedent. They were the first to buck the dominant trend across the Euro-Atlantic towards social 
welfare-oriented “state planning.” Erhard implemented the reforms towards social welfare-
oriented “state planning” and against the Keynesian objections of the Allied authorities, the Social 
Democrats, and the labour unions.  
In parallel with the Freiburg School, the Chicago School also emerged from the political 
economic crises of the interwar period. Both schools believed themselves to hold the solution for 
overcoming crisis; both propagated programmes with explicit anti-socialist and anti-Keynesian 
impetus; and both saw themselves as possessing greater scientific objectivity than their 
predecessors and contemporaries. This much they shared before their first meetings at the 1938 
“Colloque Walter Lipmann” in Paris and—thanks to the co-ordinated efforts of Friedrich von 
Hayek and Wilhelm Röpke—the 1947 founding of the Mont Pèlerin Society. There were a number 
of disagreements in Mont Pèlerin, but a sense of shared mission united the trans-Atlantic 
intellectual vanguard. 
“Neo-liberalism” began as a movement aimed at the critical revision and programmatic 
transformation of liberal capitalism.487 Before the concept of “ordoliberalism” became associated 
with the Freiburg School around 1948, Rüstow had already coined “neoliberalism” at the 1938 
colloquium in Paris. Neoliberalism, in the original suggestion, was considered alongside other 
concepts like “neo-capitalism” and “social liberalism.” Rüstow and Röpke were conceptual 
entrepreneurs by nature, and they both made occasional use of “neoliberalism” in the 1950s to 
distinguish their program from the mistaken creeds of the past—that is, distinguishing the 
neoliberals (Neuliberalen) from old liberals (Altliberalen), and “neo-liberalism” from 
“paleoliberalism.”488 Other members of the group also tried the term on for size but, as we will see 
below, ultimately decided against it, with Hayek and Friedman eventually opting to carry the 
banner of “liberalism” unmoored by prefix.489 
In this respect the little-known trajectory of Friedman’s early career is revealing. Before 
moving to Chicago, Friedman worked at the U.S. National Resources Committee in 1935-37 under 
                                                
485 See the discussion in Chapter 2. 
486 Patricia Commun, “La conversion de Ludwig Erhard à l’ordolibéralisme (1930-1950)” [Ludwig Erhard’s 
conversion to ordoliberalism] in Patricia Commun (ed.), L’Ordolibéralisme allemand: Aux sources de l’économie 
sociale de marché [German ordoliberalism: origins of the social market economy] (Cergy-Pontoise: CIRAC, 2003). 
487 For accounts in this vein, see Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society; Dieter Plehwe and Bernhard 
Walpen, “Wissenschaftliche und wissenschaftspolitische Produktionsweisen im Neoliberalismus Beiträge der Mont 
Pèlerin Society und marktradikaler Think Tanks zur Hegemoniegewinnung und –erhaltung” in PROKLA: Zeitschrift 
für kritische Sozialwissenschaft, 115/29 No. 2 (1999), 203-235; and Thomas Biebricher Neoliberalismus zur 
Einführung (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2015). 
488 See for example Alexander Rüstow, “Sozialpolitik diesseits und jenseits des Klassenkampfes,” in 
Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft: Sinnvolle und sinnwidrige Sozialpolitik (Ludwigsburg: Hoch, 1959), 
20. 
489 See for example Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Stuttgart: Mohr Siebeck UTB, [1952] 2004). 
On this conceptual ambiguity, see also Philip Mirowski, “The Political Movement that Dared not Speak its Own 
Name: The Neoliberal Thought Collective under Erasure,” INET Working Paper No. 23 (2014). 
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Wesley C. Mitchell, the director of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) whose 
approach to economics incorporated instutionalism and statistical analysis as opposed to 
neoclassical price theory. Both Mitchell and Friedman believed that “economics could be 
established as a predictive science with a broad scope capable of yielding objective claims,” and 
both saw economists “as heavily involved in policy making, where they would not serve as partisan 
advisers but as neutral scientists who clarified available means and predicted the outcomes of 
various actions.”490 Their commitment to prediction and empiricism was based on a strong filiation 
between the natural and social sciences, and as Thomas Stableford notes, “the expansion of 
scientific economics was simultaneously the rationalization of politics.”491 Though the Chicagoans 
shared this brand of Weberian value-neutrality and this commitment to the rationalization of 
politics, their neoclassical assumptions made them Mitchel’s methodological opponents. 
Gradually, Friedman assimilated into Frank Knight and Henry Simons’ program, which included 
Econ 301 on price theory as a right of passage—a seminar initially taught by Jacob Vine, the 
program’s star economist and “stern disciplinarian” of price theory, and later by Friedman 
himself.492  
A turning-point came in Chicago when Viner and Oskar Lange left the programme in 1945-
46. Until then price theory was not only part of the Austrian, Walrasian and Marshalian 
approaches, but also the market socialist approach—as explored in Chapter 1—with Lange as one 
of its lead representatives. But after Lange’s departure and Simon’s death, Friedman’s views 
became dominant over the next two decades.493 Arguably the most important shift of all came 
when a group of the Chicagoans—Milton Friedman, Frank Knight, Aaron Director, and George J. 
Stigler—traveled to the remote mountain town of Mont Pèlerin, Switerzerland upon Hayek’s 
                                                
490 “Given this emphasis on prediction and empiricism, it should be unsurprising that both Friedman and Mitchell 
saw strong parallels between the physical sciences and economics. Just as the physical sciences provided objective, 
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492 See Jamie Peck, “Orientation: In Search of the Chicago School” in Van Horn, Mirowski and Stapleford (eds.), 
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invitation, co-founding the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. For Friedman, these meetings helped 
root the disciplinary stakes of neoclassical economics in the larger political struggle against 
“collectivism.” Collectivism was a broad concept for the neoliberals’ adversaries, such as 
Keynesianism, the Beveridge Plan, and socialist “state planning.” In a  1951 essay, “Neo-
Liberalism and its Prospects,” Friedman reveals his conversion to the neoliberal creed, the broad 
contours of which mapped onto the ordoliberal program: 
 
A new faith must avoid both errors [of laissez-faire capitalism]. It must… explicitly 
recognize that there are important positive functions that must be performed by the 
state. The doctrine sometimes called neo-liberalism which has been developing 
more or less simultaneously in many parts of the world and which in America is 
associated particularly with the name of Henry Simons is such a faith. No one can 
say that this doctrine will triumph. One can only say that it is many ways ideally 
suited to fill the vacuum that seems to me to be developing in the beliefs of 
intellectual classes the world over. Neo-liberalism would accept the nineteenth 
century liberal emphasis on the fundamental importance of the individual, but it 
would substitute for the nineteenth century goal of laissez-faire as a means to this 
end, the goal of the competitive order. It would seek to use competition among 
producers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among employers 
to protect workers and owners of property, and competition among consumers to 
protect the enterprises themselves. The state would police the system, establish 
conditions favorable to competition and prevent monopoly, provide a stable 
monetary framework, and relieve acute misery and distress. The citizens would be 
protected against the state by the existence of a free private market; and against one 
another by the preservation of competition.494 
 
Multiple influences shine through this short declaration; the rejection of laissez-faire” in the name 
of “competitive order” appears quintessentially ordoliberal.495 However, this critique of 
nineteenth-century liberalism’s purely passive view of the state can also be seen as a long-standing 
bridge between Freiburg and Chicago traditions of thought, one built before Friedman’s arrival. 
Henry Simons and Frank Knight were Friedman’s mentors and avid readers of Austrian and 
German economic theory. They both held “ordoliberal” positions in support of anti-trust measures, 
prioritizing formal “rules of the game” in economic and monetary policy, and envisioning 
economic competition as a necessary condition for a functional market order and human freedom 
more generally. Like the ordoliberals, Simons also considered it the task of the government to set 
up the “framework” which would ensure the proper functioning of market competition.496 Without 
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the “important positive functions performed by the state,” as Friedman put it, the “price system 
could not discharge effectively the tasks for which it is admirably fitted.”497 
 But this early consensus between the Freiburg and Chicago Schools, which largely hewed 
to “ordoliberal” premises, would slowly fracture over time. From the late 1920’s through the early 
1950s, Simons, Knight, Friedman, Stigler, Thorstein Veblen and other Chicago economists were 
concerned about the negative effects of monopoly. The trans-Atlantic agreement on this particular 
question, however, only briefly outlasted Henry Simons, who died in 1946. Led by Aaron Director, 
the budding Law and Economics movement played a key role in “revolutionizing” the postwar 
perspective in Chicago. As Van Overtveldt observes, “Director’s major innovation was to look at 
monopoly and antitrust legislation through the lens of price theory.”498 This was part of a critique 
of U.S. anti-trust legislation, which suggested that “important efficiencies were frequently realized 
through these practices, that the exercise of monopolistic power should not be exaggerated, and 
that often-assumed practices of monopoly, such as predatory price cutting, simply did not occur in 
real life.”499 Relatedly, the foundations of the post-Simon period were built upon the support of 
politically motivated corporate foundations and think tanks, such as the Volker Fund, which helped 
both guide and materialise Chicago’s more radically free market approach to political economy. 
For instance, Hayek persuaded Aaron Director to conduct the WVF-funded Chicago Free Market 
Study (FMS) on monopoly with Friedman and Edward Levi, the dean of the law school, which 
reached a monopolistic conclusion in 1952: “Though avowed to study and describe ‘a suitable 
legal and institutional framework of an effective competitive system,’ the FMS predominantly 
researched the issues of monopoly and corporations, transforming the fundamental economic 
approach to these issues and giving birth to a significant tenet of neoliberalism.”500 
As the Chicago School developed, monopolies came to be seen as benign—because always 
temporary—so long as competition can do its magic and the state does not get involved. When 
Friedman published Capitalism and Freedom in 1962 to popularize Chicago School ideas, he 
explicitly contrasted this interpretation of monopoly with the “old Chicago” views of Henry 
Simons and the “Freiburg School” approach of Walter Eucken.501 Simons had generally argued 
against state intervention, but accepted state ownership of particular industries in cases where 
market competition could not possibly be obtained. For Eucken and the ordoliberals, pure 
competition is only realised when the size and power of corporations is checked by strict anti-trust 
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regulations, lest big business become parasitic on the state and obstructive to competitive market 
forces. But now, according to Friedman, even if “technical monopoly” may result from market 
forces, private behemoths are best left untouched by state intervention or regulation because they 
will eventually be undone by the very forces of competition themselves: “both public regulation 
and public monopoly are likely to be less responsive to [the conditions of a rapidly changing 
society], to be less readily capable of elimination, than private monopoly.”502 The Chicago School 
evolution—from Simons’ original ordo-sympathies to the law and economics revolution—was 
complete. 
Beyond the question of monopoly, differences between the Freiburg and Chicago Schools 
are reflected in their views of monetary policy, finance, and budget deficits.503 On one side, 
ordoliberalism has always considered the stability of currency as the highest priority,504 
consecrated the Haftungsprinzip (liability principle) against the threat of “moral hazard” (taking 
riskes without suffering the consequences), favored de-centralised competition as a means for 
dissolving economic power, and permitted only “market conforming” state interventions that 
respect the price mechanism. The traditional ordoliberal model of finance is one in which a 
relatively large number of privately-owned firms compete against each other. As was the case in 
West Germany, these firms remain locally grounded by virtue of drawing their finances from loans 
provided by local and regional banks. The model also relies on an independent central bank—as 
was also the case with the West German Bundesbank—to secure the stabilising effect of “sound 
money” and to prevent excessive inflation. In turn, the central imperative for governent is to focus 
on saving and cost-cutting so as to avoid breaking the ordoliberal taboo: excessive state debt. This 
austerity-oriented model is based on a particular conception of stability shaped by a traumatic 
experience of crisis, as Wolfgang Schäuble recently affirmed himself. “While US policymakers 
like to focus on short-term corrective measures,” Schäuble writes, “we take the longer view and 
are therefore more preoccupied with the implications of excessive deficits and the dangers of high 
inflation.” The “aversion to deficits and inflationary fears,” Schäuble admits,  “have their roots in 
German history in the past century.”505 
On the other side, the Chicagoan evolution towards accepting monopoly and advocating 
monetarism effected a trans-Atlantic rift. But Chicago’s other foundational disagreement with 
Freiburg concerned the importance of balanced budgets. Friedman and his colleagues rode the free 
market tide during the 1950s and 1960s,506 unconcerned by the ordoliberal obsession with budget 
deficits. In the historical context of an American economy dominated by corporations in which 
ownership and management were dissociated—an important difference from the German model—
the Chicagoan trajectory dovetailed with the rise of rational choice theory and with a 
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“revolutionary” managerial theory which dictated that managers work for the good of the 
shareholders, rather than for their own interests.507 Competition thus accorded with the logic of 
managers competing among each other in order to attract investors and to satisfy shareholders.508 
And to organise this kind of competition, a de-regulated capital market was required. 
Financialisation soon paired well with this model of shareholder governance and with the 
neoliberal imperative to de-regulate—all to the benefit of large corporations and big banks.509 
Following the end of the Bretton Woods system and the stagflation crisis of the 1970s that 
called Keynesian assumptions into question, the Chicago School’s ready-made model found 
receptive audiences at the highest levels of government, industry and finance. Having learned their 
post-war lesson from the ordoliberals—perhaps even gleaning from their inverted Marxist theory 
of history— Friedman and others knew well that the “tide” of policy and opinion could be turned 
in moments of crisis. By the 1980’s, Friedman had achieved what, in 1951, was a utopian pining 
or article of faith: “neo-liberalism offers a real hope of a better future, a hope that is already a 
strong cross-current of opinion and that is capable of capturing the enthusiasm of men of good-
will everywhere.”510 After winning over Augusto Pinochet, Ronald Reagan and the Nobel prize 
committee, Friedman recapitulated his early theory of crisis in a new preface to the 1982 edition 
of Capitalism and Freedom: 
 
There is enormous inertia—a tyranny of the status quo—in private and especially 
governmental arrangements. Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real 
change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that 
are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to 
existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible 
becomes politically inevitable.511 
 
With a crisis-focused approach to the question of theory and praxis, this patient discursive practice 
proved indispensable for the materialization of both ordoliberal and neoliberal rationality in 
economics, law, and governmental practice. Despite their victories on each side of the Atlantic—
and around the globe—and despite popular perceptions by both advocates and critics that 
neoliberalism was something of a monolith—the bond between the two traditions had weakened. 
The 2008 financial crisis exposed their differences in monumental fashion.  
 
The Trans-Atlantic Divide on Crisis Management: Timothy Geithner and Wolfgang Schäuble  
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 “Real existing” ordoliberalism and neoliberalism have evolved, in the context of 
globalization, into what many post-Keynesian economists call export-based and debt-based 
growth models. The former model is about competing for foreign customers; the latter is about 
competing for foreign investors. At present, the two models have key features in common—such 
as keeping labor costs and public spending down—and they are partly complementary in that 
export industries need credit-subsidized consumers to sell their products. Yet their priorities are 
not the same, and their divergence on budget deficits reflects the rifts examined above. Indeed, 
these models have come to chafe against one another. For example, when U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner worried that German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and his Eurozone 
allies punish indebted people instead of helping them become solvent, if still indebted, consumers 
again. Conversely, German ordoliberals worried that when banks—especially their own, as with 
Deutsche Bank—get lured into the dangerous business of derivatives and investment banking, 
putting at risk the very export industries that they are supposed to finance. In these ways, at least, 
the original Freiburg-Chicago divide maps onto more recent trans-Atlantic rifts concerning modes 
of crisis management. 
The sovereign debt crisis revealed this divide between neoliberal and ordoliberal styles of 
reasoning, whether or not the practitioners perceived the divide themselves. In Stress Test: 
Reflections on Financial Crises, for instance, Timothy Geithner’s firsthand account unwittingly 
reproduced the gap between neoliberal and ordoiberal rationality.512 In 2010, “Europe was burning 
again,” writes Geithner, but at the G-7 meeting called in response, the Europeans “did not seem to 
have the tools or the desire to contain the fire.”513 Unsurprisingly, German and French leaders were 
unreceptive to Geithner’s approach and regarded him as “the walking embodiment of moral 
hazard.” “They still blamed our Wild West financial system for the meltdown of 2008,” he 
recounts, and they “weren’t going to be swayed by suggestions from the reckless American that 
they should take it easy on the reckless Greeks. In reality, Europe had enjoyed a wild credit boom 
of its own, with much of the risky borrowing in the periphery funded by risky lending by banks in 
the German and French ‘core.’”514 From Geithner’s perspective, the Europeans were demanding 
devastating austerity cuts while making low-ball loan offers to Greece, “at most 25 billion euros, 
which wouldn’t even cover its borrowing needs through the spring, combined with harsh demands 
for tax increases, spending cuts, wage freezes, and other austerity measures.” While Athens 
protested the proceedings, several German politicians declared, in all seriousness, that Greece 
should auction off the Acropolis. For his part, Wolfgang Schäuble said that, “Germany would slash 
its own budget in solidarity with the rest of the continent, to show that it wouldn’t ask for sacrifices 
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it wouldn’t make itself.” This action, Geithner thought, would only make the problem worse since 
“in the near term, the German government and German citizens need to do more spending and less 
saving.” Thinking aloud, he replied to Schäuble: “You know you sound a bit like Herbert Hoover 
in the 1930s. You need to be thinking about growth.”515 For Geithner, the only pacifying reports 
were to be found in subtle signals that catastrophic risk was off the table. Chancellor Merkel told 
Geithner and Obama, “we won’t do a Lehman,” suggesting by way of insult that Greece would 
not default on her watch like the Lehman Brothers and other large banks did on the Americans’. 
Geithner respected Merkel, but the feeling wasn’t exactly mutual: “she turned to me in that meeting 
with the President and said Paul Volcker had told her I was ‘very close to the markets,’ which I 
don’t think she meant as a compliment.”516 
Ironically, Geithner took Merkel’s non-compliment farily well. For his most consistent 
criticism of German-led Europe was not that their structural adjustment imperatives were 
disrepectful or pointlessly cruel, but that the leaders didn’t respect, much less understand, the 
market. Wolfgang Schäuble and Christine Lagarde were not simply harsh, but non-strategic, 
perhaps even irrational: “still insisting on draconian budget cuts, their harsh Old Testament 
rhetoric was roiling the markets, undermining the power of their aid.”517 Though Greece needed 
to rein in its deficit, Geithner argued, “imposing too much austerity too quickly would be 
counterproductive, further depressing its economy, shrinking its tax revenues, and actually 
increasing its deficit… The desire to impose losses on reckless borrowers and lenders is completely 
understandable, but it’s terribly counterproductive in a financial crisis.”518 
The “Wild West” of American neoliberalism seemed to be showing a Keynesian streak.519 
But the opposition at home (congressional Republicans) and the allies abroad (German-led 
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Europe) still had austerity on the mind. Frighteningly, Geithner remarks, the James Buchanan-
inspired rhetoric of the Republican Party about forcing “the federal leviathan to live within its 
means… sounded more committed to austerity than the Germans.”520 Austerity is fine in principle, 
Geithner explained, except when already anemic markets want you to spend. Though his own 
analysis did not take him so far, Geithner’s logic runs something like this: Europe is far too 
ordoliberal. If it cannot swing a bit of Keynesianism for the time being, it should at least follow 
neoliberal common sense: the truth of the market must determine state action, or, in other words, 
to achieve economic growth, you should always govern with the market, not against it. Beneath 
this neoliberal critique of ordoliberal rationality, however, lies an unseen split between two 
different conceptions of “the market” itself. For ordoliberals, austerity measures and balanced 
budgets are good because deficit spending distorts “the market,” primarily understood in terms of 
the “price mechanism,” and the negotiations that produce the “equilibrium” or “market-clearing 
price.” For Geithner, the market is clearly less about the negotiation than about the speculation of 
agents concerning what they think others think a security is worth.521 Thus the market whose truth 
Schäuble disrespects is a financial and speculative one. In good times, such speculative truths lead 
to the neoliberal promised land; in bad times, they must be heeded, lest market crises and other 
punishments will ensue. 
At this juncture, things were bad on both sides of the Atlantic. “The early fires of the 
European crisis,” Geithner laments, “contributed to the disappointment of our Recovery Summer.” 
While a bad economy drove up deficits, austerity fever continued to spread: 
 
Ireland’s support for its failing banks was on the verge of bankrupting its 
government… Spain and Portugal slashed spending in fruitless attempts to avoid 
ratings downgrades… Meanwhile, Germany was pushing for a European fiscal 
union with the power to restrain the borrowing and spending of its members.522 
 
By June 2012, Geithner writes, the crisis was burning hotter than ever: 
 
Austerity measures were prompting riots and strikes on the periphery while 
depressing growth across the continent. Spain, with its jobless rate approaching 25 
percent, needed a 100 billion euro credit line for its bank rescues. The debt-to-GDP 
ratios of Italy, Portugal, and Ireland all topped 110 percent, while Greece’s neared 
150 percent even after it haircut its bonds. Bank deposits were fleeing those 
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countries as well, and their governments were too deep in debt to do anything about 
it. Europe had failed to persuade the world that it would not allow a catastrophe. Its 
firewall still looked flimsy. Its politics were still a mess. Every time its leaders 
announced new measure to try to control the crisis, they undercut their message 
with bad execution, strict conditions, and moral hazard rhetoric emphasizing their 
limited ability and desire to rescue their neighbors. Its loan packages were often 
more stigmatizing than stabilizing. And the markets still thought there was a 
meaningful possibility of a cascade of defaults by countries or banks, or a 
devastating breakup of the eurozone.523 
 
Both sides were “stressed” as German-led Europe was failing its test.524 Whereas Geithner and 
Obama let politics serve the market, the Europeans were butting heads with the market in the name 
of “competitiveness,” “stability,” inflation, or the supposed sovereignty of rules. From the 
American perspective, they were dangerously ignoring both what the market thought and what it 
might do to them. As if a stubborn and old school Europe had never heard about the theory of 
(market) performativity. Yet, from the inverse angle, a German might say, Geithner’s narrative 
displayed no awareness of cultural and political difference—say, that a different rationality might 
be guiding a different governmental framework. The design of an “economic constitution,” the 
raison d’être of ordoliberal Europe, remained more or less unintelligible to American eyes.  
Meanwhile, and behind the scenes, Geithner spoke with his close colleague Mario Draghi, 
whom he encouraged to use the ECB to curtail the recklessly anti-market, crisis-inducing conduct 
of these European leaders. “Draghi knew he had to do more,” Geithner observes, “but he needed 
the support of the Germans to do it, and the Bundesbank representatives on the ECB kept fighting 
him.”525 For Geithner, this situation directly paralleled the U.S. collapse in 2008; his deliberations 
with Draghi were reminiscent of talks with Ben Bernanke, who ultimately decided “he would 
rather be hung for his own judgments than the judgments of the Feds’ inflation hawks.” Geithner 
explains that, in the ECB’s case, “there was no way any plan that could actually work would get 
Bundesbank support. He had to decide whether he was willing to let Europe collapse.” Thus, the 
imperative which he gave Draghi: “You’re going to have to leave them behind.”526 
It was in this context that Geithner flew to meet Wolfgang Schäuble on the German island 
of Sylt, his regular vacation spot. Geithner recounts the following about their conversation: 
 
He told me there were many in Europe who still thought kicking the Greeks out of 
the eurozone was a plausible—even desirable—strategy. The idea was that with 
Greece out, Germany would be more likely to provide the financial support the 
                                                
523 Geithner, Stress Test, 481. 
524 For an account of the policy errors between 2011-12, see also Martin Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan: The Future of 
the Euro and the Politics of Debt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). I am grateful to Stefan Eich for this 
and other suggestions. 
525 These Germans, Geithner continues, “didn’t have a plan to save Europe, but they knew what they were against. 
They took a strict interpretation of the limits of the ECB’s legal authority, and they opposed anything that could 
create moral hazard, which included just about any strategy that had a chance of calming the crisis.” Geithner, Stress 
Test, 482. 
526 Geithner, Stress Test, 482. 
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eurozone needed because the German people would no longer perceive aid to 
Europe as a bailout for the Greeks. At the same time, a Grexit would be traumatic 
enough that it would help scare the rest of Europe into giving up more sovereignty 
to a stronger banking and fiscal union. The argument was that letting Greece burn 
would make it easier to build a stronger Europe with a more credible firewall.527 
 
Geithner found Schäuble’s proposition “terrifying” and described his calls for austerity as colored 
by a vision of “Old Testament justice.”528 Geithner left Sylt more concerned than ever; a Grexit 
would create “a spectacular crisis of confidence.” After stopping by Frankfurt to see Draghi once 
more, he returned to Washington and consulted President Obama, who was also deeply worried: 
“The U.S. economy was still growing steadily but modestly; a European implosion could have 
knocked us back into recession, or even another financial crisis.”529 Beyond “their belated and 
often ineffectual attempts to imitate us,” he said, the Europeans had made a host of mistakes. 
However, he self-satisfyingly concluded, at least their failure “provides a pretty good 
advertisement for our crisis response.” Even this irritatingly Americentric angle leads to the same 
conclusion that many scholars of the EU have reached themselves:530 “A currency union without 
unified fiscal policies, banking policies, or political representation was not ideally situated to 
handle a monumental emergency. It was more proof that the American system, for all its faults, 
had a lot of strengths we took for granted.”531 
 
The Schwarze Null as End-in-Itself 
 
Geithner’s career between Wall Street and Washington—a New York central banker turned 
governmental crisis manager turned private equity investor—lends itself itself to a certain narrative 
of events in which the roles of governments, central banks, and private banks in “managing” crisis 
                                                
527 Geithner, Stress Test, 483. 
528 As Tooze observes, Geithner may not have been so far off in his religious interpretation of Schäuble’s 
motivations: “Schäuble’s ultimate source of optimism is the spiritual history of Europe. ‘The Reformation, already, 
was an answer to the search for orientation in uncertain times at the end of the Middle Ages,’ he said last year. 
‘Luther found an anchor in the freedom of Christian humanity. The West again and again draws on this strength, to 
face the unchained forces that threaten our freedom, our understanding of self-determination and human rights.’” 
See Tooze, “After the Wars.” 
529 Geithner continues: “As countless pundits noted, we didn’t want that to happen in an election year, but we 
wouldn’t have wanted that to happen in any year. Two days after I saw Draghi, the ECB laid the groundwork for a 
program it announced in early September called ‘Outright Monetary Transactions,” where it committed to buy the 
sovereign bonds of eurozone countries in secondary markets. The program was essentially a ‘Draghi Put,’ a promise 
to put a floor under bond prices in European countries, lowering their borrowing costs and making it clear that they 
would not be allowed to default. Draghi did not consult Merkel and Schäuble in advance, but they supported him 
publicly, even though the Bundesbank’s ECB representatives voted no. The announcement of the new bond-buying 
program—and Merkel’s vital support—persuaded the markets that the Europeans were serious about keeping the 
Eurozone intact… When central banks and governments take catastrophic risk off the table, markets become 
investable again.” Geithner, Stress Test, 484. 
530 Claus Offe, Europe Entrapped (Cambridge: Polity, 2016). 
531 Geithner, Stress Test, 484-85. 
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are thoroughly blurred.532 Geithner’s own Euro-crisis narrative of events corresponds to what the 
second-generation Frankfurt School sociologist Claus Offe has called, with less self-
congratulation, a “crisis of crisis management.”533 In Europe Entrapped, Offe offers an important 
if damning interpretation of the European Union’s own role in the crisis—a Union which, in his 
view, was already economically uneven, poorly designed, and democratically deficient before the 
crisis struck. Yet even Offe overlooks the significance of the EU’s “ordoliberal” bearings, a 
concept that makes no appearance in the book despite the significant attention he pays to 
Germany.534 The dilemma is, in Offe’s eyes, a structural issue: Germany is a powerful, self-
interested country that privileges its own export-oriented economic model. “As there is no longer 
a ‘national’ currency,” he writes, “the export surplus becomes sustainable endlessly, if only at the 
expense of others.” To this, he adds that “Germany, the global extreme case of an export surplus 
economy, has a strong interest in internal revaluation of its labor and public sectors, meaning an 
increase in infrastructure investment and public services, the strengthening of consumer demand 
through wage increases, and the raising of both minimum wages and maximum income.”535 Offe 
thus sees reason to believe that the centre may not hold: Germany will be forced to recognise that 
Member State economies are fundamentally and necessarily uneven, and to reconcile its interests 
with theirs for the common good of all. In one of only a few sanguine conclusions to the book, 
Offe opens up to an optimism that comes, of all places, from an American perspective: 
 
As American observers such as the prominent trade expert Fred Bengsten have 
argued, Germany must and eventually will cease to pursue its vital interest in the 
preservation of the common currency through financing the deficit of the losers 
alone; instead, it will turn to a (domestically as well as within the Euro zone) much 
                                                
532 See Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (Viking, 2018); Joseph Vogl, 
The Specter of Capital (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Joseph Vogl, “The Sovereignty Effect: Markets 
and Power in the Economic Regime,” translated by William Callison, Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social 
Sciences 23, no. 1 (2014); and William Callison, “Sovereign Anxieties and Neoliberal Transformations: An 
Introduction,” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 23, no. 1 (2014). 
533 “After an appropriate stint at a think tank to write his memoir and a quiet transition to Wall Street, President 
Obama’s first Treasury secretary, who left office in 2013, is now ready to make millions thanks to help from a big 
bank he used to regulate… Geithner has gotten a line of credit from JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s biggest bank, to 
invest in a new $12 billion fund at the private equity firm where he works, Warburg Pincus… [E]xecutives are 
signing up for a total $800 million and Geithner, as a top officer, is probably getting a sizable chunk of that. The 
returns on the private equity investment are bound to be much higher than whatever interest Geithner will be paying 
on the loan, so he is virtually guaranteed to make many millions in profit on the deal… There is nothing illegal in 
Geithner’s actions—provided his tax software or advisor can correctly calculate what he will owe the IRS—but his 
willingness to cash in on his time in government completes the picture of him as a poster child for much of what ails 
our current financial system”, available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/02/09/ex-treasury-secretary-
geithner-cashing-wall-street/80057762. See, also, Geithner’s most recent political commentary: “Of all the 
challenges facing economic growth, former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner believes the U.S. political 
situation is the worst. ‘I think the scarier things are really about politics, the scary erosion of the pragmatic center in 
politics, the diminished capacity to make sensible economic choices, something governments really have to do,’ 
Geithner said at the CNBC/Institutional Investor 2016 Delivering Alpha conference in New York,” available at: 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/13/bridgewaters-dalio-says-the-us-has-a-limited-ability-to-produce-economic-
stimulus.html. 
534 On the question of European vs. American federalism, see also Claus Offe, (interviewed by William Callison, 
Jonathan Klein, and Johann Szews), “The Fate of an Impasse: Europe, Year 2015” in Near Futures Online 1, 
“Europe at a Crossroads” (March 2016). 
535 Offe, Europe Entrapped, 46, italics in original. 
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more popular strategy of internal adjustment, its self-transformation into a less 
export-addicted economy. Rather than forcing cuts of wages and pensions in 
Greece and elsewhere at great costs in terms of political integration, why not 
increase wages and public spending in Germany and other core countries to the 
economic and political benefit of the EU as a whole?536 
 
This (American) optimism about German-led Europe was short-lived, as Offe would surely admit. 
A decade since the Eurocrisis struck, no such changes have ensued. Instead, the Grand Coalition 
of the CDU and the SPD has annually re-cathected to Schäuble’s passionate attachment: the 
balanced budget or Schwarze Null.537 In Schäuble’s understanding, as we saw above, Germany’s 
own balanced budget is an act of “solidarity” with the rest of Europe—a solidarity in austerity 
imposed on the EU’s “periphery.” Although this ordoliberal sleight of hand deserves to be 
criticized on its own terms—say, for covering over inequalities of power and downplaying the 
very human suffering that it reproduces—its (less apparent) normalizing function is equally 
deserving of attention. That is to say, within the extant framework of “ever greater integration”—
not a Social Europe modelled on a transfer union but a fiscal pact mandating debt brakes for bank 
loans—German Ordnungspolitik guarantees, through its very framing of domestic and 
transnational possibilities, that there is and will be no alternative.538 
 Marxists have depicted the German government’s crisis management as a mere tool of 
capitalist class interests, while pro-European liberals like Jürgen Habermas have reduced it to the 
mere blindness of national-state interests over the good of the Union. Yet both fail to perceive 
how these ostensible policy “choices” are part and parcel of a larger normative model rooted, since 
its very inception, in principles of technocratic control, “competitiveness,” and export-oriented 
                                                
536 Offe, Europe Entrapped, 47. 
537 Proposals from neo-Keynesians, both sanguine and realist, likewise aim at internal reform beginning with 
Germany; see for example, Heiner Flassbeck and Costas Lapavitsas, Only Germany Can Save the Euro, translated as 
Nur Deutschland kann den Euro retten: Der letze Akt beginnt (Frankfurt: Westend Verlag, 2015). Recently, and 
with good reason, some post-Keynesians saw the arrival of refugees in Germany as a potential boon that could lead 
to increases in state spending, employment and wages. Schäuble’s Schwarze Null stood in the way, however, as did 
a SPD that was generally unwilling to risk linking the task of refugee assimilation to a project of state infrastructure 
and social spending. For an example of this brief moment of opening and closure, see the conclusion that follows 
from Brigitte Young’s discussion of the German model, written between December 2015 and January 2016: 
“Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has recently declared that the integration of refugees takes priority over the zero fiscal 
target. This may open the lock to a new imaginary of a domestic-led growth model in Germany. In the process, it 
may also return the Eurozone to a much-needed balanced current account regime.” Brigitte Young, “Imaginaries of 
German Economic Success: Is the Current Model Sustainable?,” Near Futures Online 1 (March 2016), “Europe at a 
Crossroads.” 
538 See also Timo Harjuniemi, “Reason over politics: how The Economist has portrayed austerity since 1945,” LSE 
Blog (March 29, 2018), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/austerity-the-economist/. On the tension of the 
political and economic union, Milton Friedman’s contrasting prediction to both the ordoliberals and to Habermas, 
discussed in the next chapter, is revealing: “The drive for the Euro has been motivated by politics not economics. The 
aim has been to link Germany and France so closely as to make a future European war impossible, and to set the stage 
for a federal United States of Europe. I believe that adoption of the Euro would have the opposite effect. It would 
exacerbate political tensions by converting divergent shocks that could have been readily accommodated by exchange 
rate changes into divisive political issues. Political unity can pave the way for monetary unity. Monetary unity imposed 
under unfavorable conditions will prove a barrier to the achievement of political unity.” Milton Friedman, “The Euro: 
Monetary Unity To Political Disunity?” in Project Syndicate (1997); https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-euro--monetary-unity-to-political-disunity?barrier=accesspaylog. 
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growth. German ordoliberalism “frustrates” dualistic social scientists who see economic policy as 
a reflection of either interests or ideology because it is exemplary of how economic “interests” are 
constructed by a particular political rationality and with corresponding techniques of governance.  
Many observers were recently fooled, for example, by Schäuble’s intentions during his 
last-minute “intervention” to cancel the fines on Spain and Portugal’s deficit-to-GDP ratio. The 
stated aim of maintaining “stability” in southwestern Europe was revealed to be an attempt to defer 
fines until after the Spanish elections. Rescheduling the contentious and thus politicizable “debt 
brake” fines ensured that the leftist opposition, Podemos, could not criticize the EU’s punitive 
actions; that is, it ensured Rajoy’s conservative party would remain in power. That a single finance 
minister could direct and execute such an exceptional maneuver is remarkable not only because of 
its odd framing of the “rules” but also because of how little resistance it met. Asked about 
Schäuble’s strategic treatment of Spain’s penalty, Jean-Claude Juncker replied, with customary 
humor, that Germany possess quasi-religious authority on what constitutes the rule and the 
exception: “We must not be more Catholic than the Pope, but please make it known that the Pope 
wanted a fine of zero.”539 This was of course just a year after the crisis that almost delivered Grexit. 
During the Troika’s sovereign debt negotiations with Greece between 2014-15, a leftwing 
government led by Syriza was democratically elected with a mandate to oppose the imposition of 
austerity. After failed attempts to renegotiate better terms and a “haircut” (creditors accepting a 
partial loss to avoid risk of default) Syriza held a democratic referendum in which citizens voted 
against the German-designed austerity package. Threatening and even welcoming Grexit himself, 
Schäuble infamously remarked, “Elections change nothing. There are rules.” When asked to 
clarify, Jean-Claude Juncker added: “There can be no democratic choice against the European 
treaties.”540 
This swinging pendulum between punitive inflexibility and pragmatic maneuvering should 
not be mistaken for “ideological impurity” or reckless “power politics.” After a decade of Merkel 
“leading from behind” while Schäuble secured outcomes in advance and preferably behind the 
scenes, this is rather a quintessentially ordoliberal form of technocratic governance.541 Scholarly 
critics of ordoliberalism have thus described the Troika’s informal and extra-legal approach to 
governance as an “authoritarian liberalism” whose principle aim is to secure the competitive 
                                                
539 “Wolfgang Schäuble bails out Spain, Portugal: Germany’s finance chief intervenes to stop Commission sanctions 
against Iberian free spenders, partly to help political ally Mariano Rajoy in Madrid,” available at: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/wolfgang-schauble-bails-out-spain-portugal-sanctions-juncker-german-finance-
minister. On the results of Schäuble’s long-term deferral: “To comply with Brussels-mandated budget deficit 
reduction targets, the government aims to introduce a €118 billion spending cap for 2017 (€5 billion less than this 
year),” available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/spains-pm-announces-economic-deal. 
540 Schäuble’s sentences made media headlines in 2015. See for exeample Gavin Hewitt, “Greece: The Dangerous 
Game,” BBC News (February 1, 2015); www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31082656. For an overview of the events, 
see Pavlos Roufos, A Happy Future Is a Thing of the Past: The Greek Crisis and Other Disasters (Chicago: Reaktion 
Books, 2018). 
541 Having formally announced her campaign for another six-year term as Chancellor, Angela Merkel delivered a 
speech in December 2016 at the CDU’s conference. In the name of the social market economy, Merkel reaffirmed 
the government’s commitment to a balanced budget (Schwarze Null) as the party’s “trademark.” Such a “grandiose 
accomplishment” is not to be taken for granted and “should always be connected to the name Wolfgang Schäuble.” 
The focus on stable finances is part of a programme for “hard working people.” Merkel also argued that financial 
markets must be better regulated so as to prevent the speculative financial crises; that tax avoidance must be 
prevented; and that competitiveness must be strengthened across Europe. “CDU-Parteitag: Rede von Angela Merkel 
am 06.12.2016,” available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUqZHSK7Rt4. 
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order.542 Through technocratic and intergovernmental means, German officials and their European 
allies continuously refer to a pre-established framework and to defer even the first steps toward 
systemic reforms of a more “social” nature. As in Geithner’s case, however, this strategy appears 
to evade both interlocutors and critics of these actors. Jan-Werner Müller thus underscores what 
to many remains unintelligible: 
 
Ordoliberalism is what Angela Merkel wants for the Eurozone as a whole: rigid 
rules and legal frameworks beyond the reach of democratic decision-making… She 
is interested in power, not in ideology. And power means domestic power—she 
would never risk anything for broader European objectives in the way Kohl did (but 
Schröder didn’t). Germany, it seems, is becoming more German… What is much 
less likely, however, is that they will ever abandon ordoliberalism.543 
 
Foregrounding ordoliberalism’s roots in a German tradition of political economic thought 
displaces the hope of many onlookers that—in the unlikely event that they win enough seats to 
form a coalition without the Christian Democrats—the Social Democratic Party would initiate a 
change of course.544 As if Sigmar Gabriel’s consistent support of the Chancellor during the Greek 
debt negotiations was not enough, the SPD’s lack of vision for “a different Europe” and its non-
opposition to Schäuble’s Schwarze Null shows the depth of ordoliberal rationality across party 
lines.545 
                                                
542 See Christian Joerges, “The Overburdening of Law by Ordoliberalism and the Integration Project” and Werner 
Bonefeld, “Ordoliberalism and Political Theology: On the Government of Stateless Money” in Ordoliberalism, Law 
and the Rule of Economics; and Biebricher, The Political Theory of Neoliberalism. 
543 Jan-Werner Müller, “What do Germans think about when they think about Europe?,” London Review of Books 
No. 34 (2012).  
544 On ordoliberalism as a “tradition” as opposed to an “ideology,” see Kenneth Dyson, “Ordoliberalism as Tradition 
and as Ideology” in Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics. Guérot and Dullien note the following about 
ordoliberalism’s current cross-party reach: “some elements of the German approach to the euro crisis are unlikely to 
change, even if majorities shift. The mainstream neoclassical belief in the need for stricter fiscal rules is shared by 
the Social Democrats and also has strong support inside the Green party. The same goes for the question of current 
account imbalances. There is a broad consensus that the burden of adjustment should be borne by deficit countries. 
Although some Social Democrats would like to implement elements of an expansionary wage and fiscal policy that 
might lower Germany’s current account surplus, this is not official party position. A significant portion of the SPD 
still thinks that ‘Germany cannot be punished for its export successes.’ A change in government would therefore not 
overly affect the German position in this regard. The most decisive difference between the government and the SPD 
in the euro crisis is the different focus on growth. While the Social Democrats have been arguing that growth 
enhancing policies including fiscal stimuli are important in the crisis solution, the government has long held the 
position that structural reforms are good, but no additional money should be spent on growth programs.” Ulrike 
Guérot and Sebastian Dullien, “The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism,” Social Europe (July 30, 2012); 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/2012/07/the-long-shadow-of-ordoliberalism. 
545 As Tooze notes, “The notorious ‘schwarze Null’ (the fiscal surplus), popularly associated with Wolfgang Schäuble, 
is actually a creation of the SPD.” As Dieter Plehwe has noted, however, the SPD’s Peter Steinbrück came to the debt 
brake in a deal struck with the ultra-conservative CSU in order to preserve the level of horizontal redistribution among 
the German Länder (Länder Finanzausgleich) that was then under attack. See Adam Tooze, “Which is worse?” in 
London Review of Books, Vol. 41 No. 14 (July 2019), 19-22. 
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What I am suggesting is that the debate on German-led Europe requires greater attention 
to ordoliberalism as an economic tradition, institutional framework, and political rationality.546 
Within Europe, this would entail a different approach to politicisation and resistance as well as a 
different assessment of what must be overcome in the movement for a “different Europe”—a 
largely empty phrase that has disguised a lack of real reflection and commitment concerning 
alternative principles of distribution, transfer, participation and justice.547 Within Germany, this 
would involve a critical engagement with the stakes and trajectory of a popular, yet highly 
ambiguous, heritage. 
 
* * * 
 
The divergences between Freiburg School ordoliberalism and Chicago School 
neoliberalism possess an actuality that few foresaw before the crisis and many still cannot perceive 
today. As we saw above with Hans Werner Sinn and Sarhra Wagenknecht, German scholars and 
practitioners actively draw on ordoliberal principles to recommend particular courses of action and 
to criticize the assumptions and consequences of American neoliberalism. At the same time, 
Geithner criticised the EU’s ordoliberal priorities of strict rules, austerity measures, and balanced 
budgets during the Euro crisis—priorties that, in his eyes, looked like a moralised concept of fiscal 
discipline and a religiously-inspired condemnation of debtor’s justice. Not only did this approach 
ultimately prevail with minimal resistance (social democratic parties included); it was also 
embraced by the German media and citizenry. Following the final all-night negotiation on 
Greece’s Memorandum of Understanding in July 2015, domestic polls showed overwhelming 
German support for Merkel, Schäuble and the Troika’s course of action.548 A tradition that is not 
easily identified in the public discursive framework, and that thus often manifests without a 
corresponding concept, ordoliberalism remains a distinct mode of technocratic rationality and an 
object of popular investment, the political implications of which are manifold.549  
                                                
546 For a similar position, see Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau, The Euro and the 
Battle of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
547 For an analysis of the neoliberalization of social democratic parties and the demise of “Social Europe”—from 
Blair’s “Third Way” to Schröder’s “Agenda 2010”—see David J. Bailey, Jean-Michel De Waele, Fabien Escalona 
and Mathieu Vieira (eds.), European Social Democracy during the Global Economic Crisis: Renovation or 
Resignation? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014); and Bailey, De Waele and Escanola’s individual 
contributions in Near Futures Online 1, “Europe at a Crossroads” (March 2016). 
548 An ARD survey conducted on 13 July 2015 showed that 87 per cent of Germans thought the conditions for 
Greece were adequate or too soft while 13 per cent said they were too tough. Two-thirds approved of Schäuble and 
Merkel’s leadership during the negotiations. For the long-term stability of Schäuble’s domestic approval rating 
(around 75%) in December 2015, see: http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/bilder/crchart-1705~_v-videowebl.jpg. 
549 Though it lies beyond the scope of this article, another important question in this regard concerns the relationship 
between the framework guiding German-led Europe and the rise of extreme right-wing movements and political 
parties across the continent. Schäuble made has made his position quite clear on these matters—i.e., increasing 
levels of xenophobia and Euroscepticism—and famously so when he blamed the rise of the AfD on the policies of 
the European Central Bank. When asked “[i]f the economic medicine in the euro zone is the right one and is 
working, then how do you explain why there’s such a big voter backlash against the political establishment now?,” 
Schäuble (2014) replied: “Perhaps the cause is that, when people have the feeling they’re actually doing quite OK, 
democratic public opinion keeps a critical distance from the decision makers. Maybe that’s one of the reasons why 
democratically elected governments quickly lose support after they take office. Maybe it’s not such a bad thing. A 
critical public is something you have to deal with.” 
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Analysts and opponents of the EU’s “crisis of crisis management” would do well to engage 
with—rather than ignore or dismiss—the deep investments and living legacies of ordoliberalism 
when seeking to forge future alternatives. Despite their long-running studies of the European 
Union, for example, Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck have consistently reduced 
ordoliberalism to neoliberalism while failing to critically confront either until after the crisis of 
2008. Rather than offer a sustained and politically-engaged critique of the features and effects of 
the duel rationalities that laid the conditions for crisis, these and other thinkers have fastened to 
the same outmoded systems-theoretic formulations of rationality that were part of contruct the 
project they now criticize—a project that is splitting, and splitting them, along supranational vs. 
national lines. 
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Chapter 4 
A Rational Administration of Things:  
The Frankfurt School, Weberian Dialectics, and Political Deficits 
 
 
In the closing months of 2018, Frankfurt School philosopher Jürgen Habermas joined 
former SPD finance minister Hans Eichel, CDU ordoliberal Friedrich Merz, and three others in 
composing a call to action of their own. “Far more than an economic project,” they explained in 
the Frankfurt Handelsblatt, the European Union is “a cultural project and a civilizational leap for 
which the entire world envies us.” Depicting the EU as an embodiment of Immanuel Kant’s 
“Eternal Peace,” the authors warned that “muddling through from crisis to crisis endangers 
everything we have achieved.” In the face of resurgent nationalism they called “for a Europe that 
protects our way of life and produces prosperity for all.”550 
Habermas’ public interventions in cooperation with some of Germany’s marquee 
neoliberal reformers, like his previous dialogue with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, embodies the 
genealogical riddle of this chapter: the Frankfurt School’s transformation from interwar neo-
Marxism to contemporary political and economic liberalism.551 As in previous chapters, the central 
aim here is to track the construction and subsumption of the political within this particular tradition. 
In this respect, the most revealing features of the post-crisis Frankfurt School can be found in 
Habermas’ debate with Wolfgang Streeck—the former a member of the Frankfurt School’s 
“second generation,” the latter a member of the Cologne School who studied under the Frankfurt 
School—about the relationship between capitalism and democracy.552 Concerned about the EU’s 
“democratic deficit,” Habermas had recently given his full-throated support to French President 
                                                
550 Hans Eichel, Jürgen Habermas, Friedrich Merz, Bert Rürup, and Brigitte Zypries, “Time to wake up: We are 
deeply concerned about the future of Europe and Germany” in Handelsblatt (10/25/2018); 
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60. Geburtstag von Prof. Nida-Rümelin am Freitag, 28. November 2014, in München, available at http://gerhard-
schroeder.de/2014/11/28/philosophie-und-politik/. 
See also Stefan Lüddemann, "Von Günter Grass bis Jürgen Habermas: Für Willy Brandt und die Es-Pe-De 
getrommelt," in Osnabrücker Zeitung (27.04.2013), https://www.noz.de/deutschland-
welt/politik/artikel/347553/von-gunter-grass-bis-jurgen-habermas-fur-willy-brandt-und-die-es-pe-de-
getrommelt#gallery&0&2&347553; Michael Rutschky, "Sozialdemokratismus, die beste aller Welten? Politik trifft 
Philosophie im Willy-Brandt-Haus" in Deutschlandfunk (13.11.2004),  
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Werner A. Perger, “Schröders Denker" in Die Zeit (2. Juli 1998), 
https://www.zeit.de/1998/28/Schroeders_Denker/komplettansicht. 
552 Streeck studied in Frankfurt with Theodor W. Adorno, Claus Offe, Jürgen Habermas, and others. See Wolfgang 
Streeck, Buying Time; Wolfgang Streeck, “Crisis and Critique of Social Sciences: Wolfgang Streeck in 
Conversation with Riccardo Emilio Chesta” in Sociologica 3 (2016). 
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Emmanuel Macron, whose proposals include a European army, a common budget, unemployment 
insurance, and labor market reforms.553 Spurred by Angela Merkel’s “welcoming” refugee policy 
and the Brexit referendum, Streeck allied himself with German politician Sahra Wagenknecht’s 
Aufstehen (Stand Up) movement, which called for a “strong social state” to reclaim national 
sovereignty, combat EU technocracy, control illegal migration, preserve cultural autonomy, pursue 
peaceful foreign policy, and make good on the promise of the social market economy.554 Whereas 
Habermas urged “deepening” the political and monetary union through a number of institutional 
tweaks, Streeck argued for its “dismantling” through a return to the nation state.  
To many readers, Habermas and Streeck’s debate about “what is to be done” came as a 
surprise, if only because of their overlapping sociological declensions. Not only had Habermas 
likened Streeck’s Buying Time (2014) to Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,555 
but the two had overlapping conceptual schemas. They shared a Weberian perspective on the EU’s 
“legitimation crisis,” a common defense of the “lifeworld” against market rationality, and a similar 
systems-level ideal of enhanced “societal steering.”556 But by 2015 Habermas and Streeck had 
parted ways, albeit both in the name of rationality and democracy, as the far right rapidly ascended 
into parliament and the center-left steadily imploded. Though they identified “irrationality” with 
different domains, their analyses suffered from the immurement of a top-down, structural vantage 
point on the amorphous subjects below. Instead of engaging the polyphonic demands and currents 
of really-existing democratic subjects, Habermas and Streeck could only theorize putatively 
democratic identities and aspirations vis-à-vis a political pathway to a rational ideal they had 
already established themselves. 
While marking parallels with the century-long trajectory of neoliberal theory—such as the 
attempt to tame “irrationality”—this chapter examines some of the key methodological shifts 
within the Frankfurt School’s conception of politics that led to the Streeck-Habermas predicament. 
It locates what I call “dialectical blockage” in its fusion of neo-Marxist theory and Weberian 
typology. Here I adopt a skeptical suspicion that some critical theory awkwardly or incoherently 
subordinates dialectical thinking to images of binary social systems. Though I acknowledge in 
passing other potent frameworks within this tradition, such as Freudian psychoanalysis,557 this 
chapter will specifically track the Weberian dialectics of (ir)rationality as generating a particular 
form of political deficit. I will argue that the subsumption of the political – i.e., collective struggles 
among evolving identities yielding contingent outcomes – to domains of culture, technology and 
morality was an animating drive in postwar Critical Theory. 
 
                                                
553 See for example Habermas, “For God's sake, spare us governing philosophers!” in El País (May 25, 2018), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/07/inenglish/1525683618_145760.html 
554 See Quinn Slobodian and William Callison, “Pop-Up Populism: The Failure of Left-Wing Nationalism in 
Germany” in Dissent (Summer 2019). 
555 See Habermas’ praise on the back cover of Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic 
Capitalism (New York: Verso Books, 2014). 
556 “Societal steering” is a concept, from Gesellschaftssteuerung and Gesellschaftslenkung, that replaces an earlier 
vocabulary and ideal of the rational “administration of things” [Verwaltung der Dinge]. 
557 For examples of excellent work using this part of the Frankfurt School to understand contemporary politics, see 
Robyn Marasco (ed.), “The Authoritarian Personality” in South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 117, Issue 4 (October, 
2018); and Jeremiah Morelock, Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism (London: University of Westminster 
Press, 2018). 
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The chapter begins by examining Critical Theory’s political foundations which, situated in 
practical relation to collective movements and liberation projects, specifically aspired to 
proletarian revolution, a paradigmatic Marxist commitment, and a rationally planned socialist 
economy [Planwirtschaft], an orthodox stance in the socialist calculation debate. During the early 
period of the Institute for Social Research, members envisioned a form of “rational planning” that 
overlapped with the socialist economic theory of Otto Neurath, the favorite punching bag of 
Ludwig von Mises as examined in Chapter 1. As an economic administrator in revolutionary 
Munich—a period when the elder Max Weber and the young Max Horkheimer and Friedrich 
Pollock were also in the city—Neurath sought to establish a moneyless economy based on non-
exploitive production and societally administrated goods. Following the swift defeat of the 
workers’ councils and the rise of Nazi fascism, the Frankfurt School eventually changed its views 
on rational planning. Central to this development was Pollock’s Weberian-inflected account of 
“state capitalism,” which became particularly influential for Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse’s 
diagnoses of politics, economy, and culture. Premised on the “primacy of the political,” state 
capitalism used rational techniques to perpetuate irrational domination, effectively undercutting 
the group’s original hope for rational planning tout court. While often equating the political with 
state power, the group lost hope in the erstwhile dream of subordinating economics (profit-driven 
labor exploitation) to politics (rational administration and distribution). The state was no longer 
understood to be capable of indefinitely containing capitalist contradictions, staving off economic 
crises, and incorporating a docile working class. In short, rather than oppose and overcome 
capitalist irrationality, the state could permanently negate a rational (socialist) order. Inasmuch as 
“politics” referred to collective ambitions to control state institutions, then, politics came to be the 
problem rather than the solution.  
The second section tracks the methodological reconfiguration of Critical Theory in its 
fusion of Weberian ideal types with neo-Marxist dialectics, which yielded what I call a Weberian 
dialectics of “instrumental” vs. “substantive” rationality. In Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s central 
text, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Critical Theory disavowed the political domain it had discovered 
in workers’ councils and had idealized in hopes for rational socialist planning. World-making 
possibilities derived from political contestation now appeared to be negated by the irrational 
rationality of “the culture industry,” a political-economic-cultural apparatus seemingly total in 
scope. Utopian meditations on objective reason had gradually yielded to a modified postwar ideal: 
“a rational administration of things without a rational administration of people.”  
The third and fourth sections engage Adorno and Marcuse on the rationality of culture and 
technology, respectively, which replaced revolutionary political practice as their objects of hopeful 
critique. My account of Adorno proceeds from a close reading of his essay “Culture and 
Administration,” which advanced “aesthetic rationality” as the preferred alternative to Weberian 
“administrative rationality.” Here Adorno developed concrete proposals to insulate administrative 
expertise from democratic influence. The political horizon of Adorno’s postwar thinking, I 
suggest, lay in a liberal melancholy for rational or “bourgeois” individualism and a perceived need 
for political structures that could protect the rationality of any remaining high culture from 
irrational intrusion—a Weberian distinction between administration and culture that Habermas 
would later modify in his account of the “colonization of the lifeworld.” Shorn from expressly 
political content and from radical ambitions like socialist planning, his new ideal of “a rational 
administration of things” now appeared more like technocracy with a human face. 
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Next I will turn to the dialectical blockage in Marcuse’s analysis of technology and politics, 
focusing on two 1964 works: “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber” and 
One-Dimensional Man. Marcuse’s analysis of political technology paralleled Adorno’s and 
Horkheimer’s of state capitalism, but his idiosyncratic interpretation of Weber retained hope for 
dialectical “explosions” and for rational-socialist planning. He argued that the conditions of 
possibility for socialism—advanced technology and surplus wealth—already existed under 
contemporary capitalism, albeit programmed by the “irrational rationality” of exploitation and 
profit. But because technology is socially conditioned and exploitable by an alternative political 
rationality, he proposed that a socialist state could seize and redeploy this technological “base” 
and usher in a “qualitatively different rationality.” Though Marcuse’s Weberian dialectics were 
theoretically insightful and politically potent, he ultimately became trapped in a dialectical 
blockage of his own. The resulting analysis demanded a familiar “leap” out of the totalized order 
it depicted as a historical necessity. Like his colleagues, Marcuse rendered the binary 
instrumental/substantive rationality into a hypostasized structure, projected onto capitalism and 
socialism as mirror images of each other. 
The penultimate section explores Habermas’s reconstruction of rationality and politics. His 
key interventions here worked through reinterpretations of “rationalization,” notably in Weber’s 
principal texts. Habermas’s paradigm shift from the first generation’s “philosophy of 
consciousness” to his theory of “communicative rationality” comprised three key junctures in 
which Weber figured crucially: the engagement with Marcuse on epistemology, science, and 
technology in the 1960s; debates in Luhmannian systems theory and neo-Marxist state theory in 
the 1970s; and the development of a general social theory of communicative reason in the early 
1980s. I claim that Habermas’s evolving use of Weberian dialectics and growing faith in liberalism 
narrowed his political thought to the dual aims of securing normative legitimation and 
domesticating systemic irrationality.  
 The final section examines how such political deficits structure the Habermas-Streeck 
debate over the crisis of Europe. Whereas each address institutional reform from above, they also 
ascribe (ir)rationality to protests within the lifeworld down below. That this tradition aspires to 
tame irrationality by instantiating particular concepts of rationality should come as no surprise. 
Such political deficits do not imply that the resources and insights of the Frankfurt School must be 
discarded tout court, however. Instead, they urge us to politically and theoretically reconnect the 
relation between critique and crisis on which Critical Theory was founded. The accounts in this 
final chapter thus focus on how the methodological development of the Frankfurt School follows 
similar trajectories as the Austrian, Freiburg and Chicago Schools: the gradual, cumulative 
detachment from political struggles conceived as tendentially irrational and an enduring dialectical 
blockage of technocratic rationality, both of which can be understood as political deficits. 
 
The Institute for Social Research and the Rationality of Socialist Planning 
 
A prodigal child of Weimar politics, “Critical Theory” was born to dialectical parents: 
revolutionary dream and totalitarian nightmare. In 1918-19 the German “November” Revolution 
erupted across a redrawn and war-torn nation, establishing worker councils and city communes, 
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most famously in Munich and Berlin.558 Having lost the Great War, the German Empire was 
toppled but soon, too, were the workers’ revolutions down below—to wit, by the violent hand of 
a state controlled by the Social Democratic Party. So began the Weimar Republic, the first 
democracy in German history.  
In the wake of failed revolution emerged a younger generation of praxis-oriented 
intellectuals. During the 1919 political revolts, the young Horkheimer and Friedrich Pollock were 
studying in Munich, captivated by Weber’s analysis of workers’ councils, while Marcuse was 
organizing with fellow communists in Berlin until Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg’s 
assassination. While Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno pursued philosophy, other activists and 
thinkers built the Frankfurt School’s institutional foundations, beginning in 1923 with the “Marxist 
Workweek” [Marxistische Arbeitswoche] collective organized by Karl Korsch, György Lukács, 
Friedrich Pollock, Felix Weil, and Karl August Wittfogel, among others. The initial program 
emerged from the unique approaches to Marxist theory provided by Korsch (Marxismus und 
Philosophie, 1923) and Lukács (History and Class Consciousness, 1923), both members of the 
Communist Party.559 The group’s intellectual-political mission was also inspired – like that of 
Hayek and his neoliberal cohort – by the British Fabian Society. Thanks to funding from Weil’s 
family fortune, their collaboration yielded instant results: the first openly Marxist, university-
affiliated research institution in what would become Critical Theory’s birthplace: the Institute for 
Social Research in Frankfurt am Main.560  
Alongside Carl Grünberg, “father” of Austro-Marxism and first director of the Institute, 
Pollock and Weil mapped out an interdisciplinary approach for the Institute.561 Reflecting its 
members’ diverse interests, the Institute’s research agenda included a six-pronged program:  
 
                                                
558 As students in Munich, Horkheimer and Pollock attended Max Weber’s lectures in 1919 before fleeing the 
revolutionary upheaval and state repression that ensued. 
559 György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1923/1971). See also Andrew Feenberg, Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory (Totowa, N.J.: Rowan and 
Littlefield, 1981). 
560 The Institute was also designed in opposition to Adenauer’s own Institute in Cologne, which attempted to check 
the ascendance of radical labor and Marxist currents. Weil lobbied administrators for a formal connection to the 
University of Frankfurt, as opposed to founding a private Marxist research institute at arm’s length from the state. 
He wrote that scientific socialism was entitled to university research and discussion; “the results of scientific 
research in the field of Marxism could perhaps be of greater interest to a wide range of social classes [breite 
Volksschichten] than the research results of other disciplines.” Felix Weil, cited in Michael Buckmiller, 
“'Marxistische Arbeitswoche' 1923 und die Gründung des 'Instituts für Sozialforschung'" in Wilhelm van Reijen and 
Noerr, G. Schmid (es.), Grand Hotel Abgrund: Eine Fotobiographie der Frankfurter Schule (Hamburg: 1988), p. 
170 (my translation). On the founding of the Institute of the Institute for Social Research, see Martin Jay, The 
Dialectical Imagination (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt 
School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
561 Previously professor of Staatswissenschaften in Vienna and editor of one of the most important publications of 
the time, Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, Grünberg’s students included Max 
Adler, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding and Karl Renner, among others. See Carl Grünberg, Anfänge der kritischen 
Theorie: Festrede gehalten zur Einweihung des Instituts für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt a.M. 
(1924). On Grünberg’s impact, see Markus Niedobitek, “Brüche und Kontinuitäten in der Ausrichtung des Instituts 
für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt zwischen 1923 und 1933,” available at http://use.uni-
frankfurt.de/frankfurtersoziologie19191933/niedobitek/. 
561 Weil, cited in Buckmiller, Grand Hotel Abgrund, 17.  
  129 
1) historical materialism and the philosophical foundation of Marxism; 2) theoretical 
dimensions of political economy [theoretische Nationalökonomie]; 3) problems of the 
planned economy [planwirtschaftliche Probleme]; 4) the past and present situation of the 
working class; 5) sociology; and 6) history of socialist doctrines and parties.562  
 
The first three prongs addressed the theoretical and practical foundations of socialist planning. 
This is because the early Institute for Social Research was part of the same “socialist calculation 
debate” examined in Chapter 1, opposed to nascent neoliberals and reform socialists. Each camp 
staked out a position in the debate about whether the “rational” techniques developed under 
capitalism and transformed by the state-controlled war economy [Kriegswirtschaft] would succeed 
under a socialist government. For liberals and neoliberals, as we saw in previous chapters, socialist 
planning threatened to exacerbate market turbulence through “irrational” state interventions. For 
socialists and Marxists, by contrast, the real threat was capitalism itself, with its inherent 
tendencies toward crisis and its “irrational” foundations of greed, exploitation, and domination.  
The early Frankfurt School united in believing—pace Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von 
Hayek—that human reason is capable of planning a truly egalitarian society. In contrast to the 
systematic irrationality of capitalist exploitation, they argued, a “rational social order” would 
abolish capitalist domination, better meet human needs, and yield the conditions for human 
freedom. The socialist calculation debate thus served as a scientific proxy battle within a larger 
political, class war. Weil was the first to intervene with a critique of Karl Polanyi’s essay on 
socialist calculation and accounting.563 Grünberg shared Weil’s orthodox view that state socialism 
can (and would) “completely” supersede capitalism in all of its (ir)rational economic forms. After 
Pollock completed his dissertation on Marx’s theory of money, he visited the Soviet Union in 
1927-28 to research socialist planning firsthand.564 The Soviet state, he concluded, had neither 
developed a compelling system of “rational planning” nor achieved a truly socialist economy.565 
In light of Pollock’s and other reports, Horkheimer also grew increasingly skeptical about Soviet 
planning, despite his early sympathies with Luxemburg and Lenin. Nonetheless he continued to 
believe—as did the more orthodox members of the Institute—that the promise of socialism lay not 
just in overcoming capitalist exploitation, but in using planning to resolve the problem of 
“economic value” once and for all. Into the 1930’s most all of the group—including Henryk 
Grossman, Otto Kirchheimer, and Franz Neumann—held onto the hope that “the demise of the 
system [will come] within a relatively short period of time.”566  
In 1931 Horkheimer became director of the Institute nearly a decade after the Marxistische 
Arbeitswoche had set the initial agenda. Although socialist planning did not disappear from group 
                                                
562 Weil, cited in Buckmiller, Grand Hotel Abgrund, 17.  
563 Felix Weil, “Gildensozialistische Rechnungslegung: Kritische Bemerkungen zu Karl Polányi: ‘Sozialistische 
Rechnungslegung,’” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. 52 (1924), 196-217. 
564 Pollock’s 1923 dissertation on Marx’s theory of money was never published, though the text is available in the 
archives Frankfurt. Upon his return to Frankfurt from the Soviet Union, Pollock published the results of his 
fieldwork, taught at the university, assumed the temporary role of the Institute he cofounded in 1923, and worked 
with Weil on managing the Marx-Engels-Archivgesellschaft mbH, which was geared toward the publication of the 
Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA). 
565 Pollock, Die Planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion 1917-1927 (1929) [Attempts at Planned Economy 
in the Soviet Union, 1917–1927]. 
566 William Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law. 
Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press (1994), 162. 
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research under Horkheimer’s direction, it slid from the foreground to the background of their 
vision. Rooted in the German Historical School tradition, Grünberg held the directorship in 
conjunction with a university chair in Political Economy [wirtschaftliche Staatswissenschaft]. But 
as Horkheimer announced in his augural address, “it is appropriate for the chair at our university, 
which is connected with the directorship of the Institute for Social Research, to be transformed 
into a chair in Social Philosophy and reassigned to the Department of Philosophy.”567 Though 
Horkheimer urged continuing research on “theoretical economics, economic history, and the 
history of the labor movement,” the Institute’s new basis would be in Social Philosophy. This 
approach would address “the fate of humans not as mere individuals, but as members of a 
community” and concern itself “with phenomena that can only be understood in the context of 
human social life, with the state, law, economy, religion – in short, with the entire material and 
intellectual culture of humanity.”568 With Kant, Hegel and Marx as its methodological guideposts 
and the social totality as its aspirational object of inquiry, Social Philosophy became the Institute’s 
meta-disciplinary compass.   
Horkheimer soon coined the concept of “Critical Theory” in order to capture the self-
reflective core of this interdisciplinary project. He developed the concept negatively, or 
dialectically, against existing philosophical and methodological systems, which he grouped under 
the label of “Traditional Theory.” With natural science as its regulative ideal, Traditional Theory 
considers the investigation of facts to be independent of the conceptual system that attempts to 
grasp them, thus perpetuating the “false consciousness of the bourgeois savant in the liberal era.”569 
By contrast, Critical Theory opposes the facade of disinterested science, acknowledges the 
evaluative orientation and social positioning of the researcher that shapes the production of 
knowledge, and embraces its own political partiality [Parteilichkeit] to ongoing struggles for 
human emancipation. In the words of Angela Davis, a future student of the Frankfurt School, 
Critical Theory “privileges the role of philosophical reflection while simultaneously recognizing 
that philosophy cannot always by itself generate the answers to the questions it poses.”570 
Philosophy, in other words, is necessary for critical reflection and orientation, but is also relatively 
impotent and secondary to the world-making struggles to realize a more rational society. For this 
reason, Critical Theory required not only the guidance of social scientific knowledge, but also an 
essentially (if indirectly) political link to the struggles of the oppressed. The latter constitutes a 
commitment to “praxis,” the notion that theoretical activity is connected to and conditioned by 
social struggles against domination. Familiar from Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach,” this notion of 
praxis rejects the position that changing consciousness alone suffices to change the world; realizing 
this task is rather activity of collective social and political action.571  
                                                
567 Max Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research” 
in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings of Max Horkheimer (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
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568 Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research.”  
569 Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. 
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Below we will track different ways the political foundation of critical theory and practice 
was marginalized by changing historical circumstances and new methodological commitments. 
What needs to be underscored in this context, however, is that Critical Theory’s practice-oriented 
project of knowledge production and critique was not an infelicitously designed endeavor from the 
start. The Institute’s political-economic interventions were increasingly subordinated to social-
philosophical criticism, as typified by Horkheimer’s attacks on the socialists of the Vienna School 
positivists and Sartre’s existentialism rather than the liberal and Keynesian social and economic 
theorists of his time.  
The constructivist strands of neoliberalism—as developed by the Austrian, Freiburg, and 
Chicago Schools—hardly fit the Frankfurt School’s typological characterization of Traditional 
Theory. As the neoliberals sought to undermine socialist planning at both the theoretical and 
practical level, Horkheimer dismissed them as irrelevant critics of merely “economic-technical 
considerations.”572 Meanwhile Pollock cited neoliberal positions on the socialist calculation debate 
in his own account of totalitarian planning.573 And though the neoliberals subscribed to the fact-
value distinction—the key element of Traditional Theory, according to Horkheimer—they did not 
simply bracket science from politics, as the previous three chapters demonstrated. Instead, they 
used scientific methodology as a political strategy in a more effective and far-sighted project than 
their leftist opponents. Despite its many virtues, then, in this context Critical Theory misconstrued 
its own object of (ideology) critique by reading rival epistemologies and methodological disputes 
at a surface (or non-strategic) level. It is in this sense that the Frankfurt School theorists were (and 
remain) opposed to basic insights of Science and Technology Studies about the performativity of 
social scientific knowledge or, from a Foucauldian angle, about the ability of discourse to construct 
and constitute its own objects. It was less neoliberalism than Critical Theory itself, as will become 
clear, that increasingly perceived social scientific knowledge as a neutral instrument in the service 
of existing power structures.574 
When the Nazis seized power in 1933, the mostly Jewish and Marxist researchers were 
forced to alter their activities and go into exile. As partisans of proletarian revolution, they were 
also forced to revise their more or less optimistic outlook on the demise of capitalism. The political 
economists of the Institute, such as Pollock, Kurt Mandelbaum and Gerhard Meyer, reoriented 
theory to major questions about the conditions for a socialist transition and the techniques that 
might implement socialism.575 In the 1934 issue of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Horkheimer 
                                                
572 The full passage reads: “The bureaucracy has taken control of the economic mechanism, which slipped away 
from the control of the bourgeoisie’s pure profit principle. The specialist concept of economics, which in contrast to 
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wrote a preface to Meyer and Mandelbaum’s “On the Theory of the Planned Economy” [“Zur 
Theorie der Planwirtschaft”], underscoring the necessity of researching and achieving a socialist 
planned economy.576 By decade’s end, however, Horkheimer had grown deeply skeptical on this 
subject. The “rationality” of planning, which underwrote the promise of liberation, had been 
instrumentalized for the purpose of ever-greater domination.  
With the suicide of their colleague Walter Benjamin, the collective vision darkened in the 
1940’s. Horkheimer handed off administrative duties to Pollock and wrote “The End of Reason” 
in close collaboration with Adorno, who had joined the Institute in full capacity in 1938.577 
Marcuse, Neumann, and Otto Kirchheimer were isolated from the members in New York and Los 
Angeles as they worked for the US government as mother-tongue interpreters of developments in 
fascist Germany. Meanwhile two essays in the Zeitschrift—Pollock’s “State Capitalism” and 
Horkheimer’s “Authoritarian State”—marked a turning point for Critical Theory.578  
Pollock applied the notion “state capitalism” to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, sparking an intra-Institute dispute with Neumann, who called the concept a 
contradiction in terms.579 The disagreement concerned whether the Nazi state remained “capitalist” 
at its core, or whether it had become an entirely different Behemoth, as Neumann called it.580 By 
implication, the debate also addressed a broader, even weightier question: Can the progressive use 
of economic planning lead to a socialist (i.e., marketless) order, or will state planning instead yield 
a totalitarian society? Drawing from both market socialist and the neoliberal contributions, Pollock 
rejected the central premise but mirrored the binary framework of the socialist calculation debate. 
Markets and planning, he argued, were not fundamentally irreconcilable. At the same time, he 
divided the future of state capitalism into two paths: democratic or authoritarian planning. “The 
main obstacles to the democratic form of state capitalism,” he explained, “are of a political nature 
and can be overcome by political means only.”581 Noting the disappearance of revolutionary 
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of the market system by economic planning.” In essay’s final sentence, Pollock adds: “Some of the best brains of 
this country are studying the problem of how such planning can be done in a democratic way, but a great amount of 
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Pollock, “State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations” [1941] in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, 
Bronner and Kellner, eds. (London: Routledge, 1989), 101. 
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politics, Pollock pointed to a socialist solution but lacked a political agent capable of realizing it. 
Due to this gap between theory and practice, Pollock and his colleagues tended to make Nazism, 
New Dealism, and Bolshevism into historical necessities. All of these orders corresponded to the 
totalizing logic of state capitalism, but all contained the conditions of their own overcoming: the 
centralization and totalization of political and economic power. The final political-economic 
conditions for socialism, in other words, lay in state capitalism, in “the replacement of ‘partial’ 
organization through a ‘total’ organization” of the means of production. At the same time, 
however, totalitarian states sought the same processes and goals for their own ends.582 
Horkheimer’s essay “The Authoritarian State,” published in a volume dedicated to 
Benjamin, seized on the same tendencies. Premised on Pollock’s concept of state capitalism, the 
article oscillated between ambivalence and pessimism about Critical Theory’s foundational 
concept—from reason and revolution to planning and politics itself. “State capitalism,” 
Horkheimer observed, “is the authoritarian state of the present.”583 That the state could deploy 
instrumentally rational techniques of “planning” in the service of death and domination did not 
preclude using them to achieve freedom and emancipation.584 Yet in looking backward and 
forward, Horkheimer found only evidence to the opposite. Marx “indicted bourgeois society” and 
“discovered the secret of the economy itself,” Horkheimer remarked. But his future-oriented 
analysis came with a notable blind spot: “Marxist science constitutes the critique of bourgeois 
economy and not the expounding of a socialist one; Marx left that task for Bebel.”585 Horkheimer 
asserts that, in using the language of “transformation” rather than “revolution,” Bebel had already 
reduced the latter to “the intensive transition to state capitalism which was then already announcing 
itself” and to a “doctrine of midwifery [that] degrades the revolution to mere progress.”586 Yet 
                                                
582 In a review of Pollock’s argument, Meyer wrote: “Ist sozialistische Gesellschaft in unserem Sinne (d. h. auch 
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vereinbar?" Gerhard Meyer, “Neue Literatur über Planwirtschaft” in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (No. 1, 1932), 
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gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftsystems objektiv interessiert sind, um so dringender wird die Frage nach der Möglichkeit, 
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583 Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State” (1940) in Essential Reader, 96 (emphasis in original). Reflecting on the 
period at the end of his life, Horkheimer wrote: “Already near the end of the twenties, certainly by the beginning of 
the thirties, we were convinced of the probability of a National Socialist victory, as well as the fact that it could be 
met only through revolutionary actions. That it needed a world war we did not yet envisage at the time. We thought 
of an uprising in our own country and because of that, Marxism won its decisive meaning for our thought.” 
Horkheimer, “Foreword” in Jay, The Dialectic of Imagination, xxv. 
584 Between the rational ideal and the dark reality of planning—between its socialist promise and its wartime 
practice—Horkheimer still held out hope. At least a few passing lines in his 1940 suggest as much: “The historical 
contradiction, of demanding at the same time both rational planning and freedom, emancipation and regulation, can 
be overcome.” Horkheimer, “Authoritarian State.” 
585 Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State.”   
586 Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State.” 
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even revolution should not be trusted to deliver its ultimate promise: the end of exploitation.587 
What the transition to state capitalism had unleashed, according to Horkheimer, was the necessary 
elements to “rationalize eternal domination.”588 In concert with Hayek’s attack on socialist 
planning in The Road to Serfdom, Horkheimer quoted from Pirou’s Néo-libéralisme, néo-
corporatisme, néo-socialisme: “There is no other socialism than that which is achieved by 
authoritarian means.”589 The turn in outlook at this period is what John Abromeit calls “the end of 
early Critical Theory.”590 
Somewhat ironically, then, early Critical Theory simultaneously discovered and abrogated 
the political. On the one hand, state capitalism attested to the political possibility of using 
administrative planning to more egalitarian ends than pursued under liberal capitalism. On the 
other hand, it challenged the orthodox Marxist understanding of the political domain itself.591 For 
it arose alongside what interwar intellectuals—leftists, liberals, and conservatives—called the 
“primacy of politics” [Primat der Politik]. Previously, in the wake of WWI, Walter Rathenau gave 
expression to a common belief that “Economy is destiny,” to which Lenin heretically responded: 
“Politics cannot but have precedence over economics.”592 Here as elsewhere, Lenin represented a 
certain kind of vanguardism; toward the end of Weimar Republic, the “relative autonomy of the 
political” was widely accepted. Citing Carl Schmitt, for example, the German ordoliberal 
Alexander Rüstow proclaimed that “the economy is not our destiny; the state is our destiny, and 
the state is also the destiny of the economy.”593 The primacy of the politics became legible for 
Horkheimer and Pollock in the transition from liberal capitalism to state capitalism, “from a 
predominantly economic to an essentially political era.”594 This transformative process, Pollock 
explained, featured a “replacement of the economic means by political means as the last guarantee 
for the reproduction of economic life, [which] changes the character of the whole historic 
period.”595 
Importantly, however, this historic shift to state capitalism also appeared to undermine or 
even invert the “base-superstructure” model of Marxist analysis. According to historical 
                                                
587 “Revolution brings about what would happen without spontaneity in any case: the socialization of the means of 
production, planned management of production, and unlimited control of nature. And it also brings about what will 
not happen without resistance and constantly renewed efforts to strengthen freedom: the end of exploitation. Such an 
outcome is not a further acceleration of progress, but a qualitative leap out of the dimension of progress. The rational 
is never totally deducible.” Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State.” 
588 Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State.” 
589 Gaëtan Pirou, Néo-libéralisme, néo-corporatisme, néo-socialisme (Paris, Gallimard, 1939), 173, cited in 
Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State” (1940) in Essential Reader, 115. 
590 John Abromeit, “State Capitalism: The End of Horkheimer’s Early Critical Theory” in Max Horkheimer and the 
Foundations of the Frankfurt School (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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Friedrich Pollock, “Die bessere Ordnung” in Sans Phrase: Zeitschrift für Ideologiekritik, Heft 5, (1941/2014). 
592 “Politics cannot but have precedence over economics. To argue differently, means forgetting the ABC of 
Marxism.” Lenin, Selected Works, vol. IX, p. 54. This passage is also cited in Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 
401. See also V. I. Lenin, Staat und Revolution. Die Lehre des Marxismus vom Staat und die Aufgaben des 
Proletariats in der Revolution (Berlin: Rote Fahne, 1918/1919). 
593 In the same year as Rüstow, Werner Sombart, the renowned historian of capitalism and socialist-turned-proto-
Nazi, also argued “the economy is not our destiny.”  
594 Friedrich Pollock, “State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations” [1941] in Critical Theory and Society: A 
Reader, Bronner and Kellner, eds. (London: Routledge, 1989), 101. 
595 Pollock, “State Capitalism,” 101. 
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materialism, the representational and institutional forms of a society—politics, culture, art, 
religion, ideology—are shaped by underlying and more primary socio-economic dynamics. Within 
a particular mode of production, a material “base” of technological forces and class relations 
determine such “superstructural” phenomena. Yet the new form of state capitalism, in Pollock’s 
understanding, pointed to “the growing use of economic planning by government direction as a 
means to contain capitalist contradictions indefinitely.”596 Under these conditions, Pollock and 
Horkheimer believed, any “rational” developments within state capitalism—e.g., class conflict—
could only “manifest themselves by means of irrationalities in the planning process.” For this 
reason, as William Scheuerman notes, they seemed fairly confident that “state capitalism would 
overcome all potential immanent threats to its basic workings.”597 A politically reinforced 
capitalism, not proletarian revolution, lay on the horizon. 
A tension emerged from the Frankfurt School’s passionate attachment to rational planning, 
one its members understood as an “objective contradiction” in the mode of production. The current 
order of (state) capitalism was not producing its own gravediggers, in other words, but making 
effective use of “planning” to contain the contradictions of capitalism. All the wealth and 
technology to transcend capitalism were already in existence, but the (political) means to such a 
socialist overcoming—not simply class consciousness and proletarian revolution, but also 
objective reason and individual Enlightenment—were caught in the gears of a hyper-rationalized 
machine. This thesis not only marked a turning point in the mid-century, but became central for 
the Frankfurt School’s entire trajectory. For it shaped what was seen as a possible object of study, 
a possible agent of change, and a possible (or rational) alternative within “the iron cage”—from 
Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and Jürgen Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis to Claus 
Offe’s Europe Entrapped and Wolfgang Streeck’s Buying Time.  
Amidst WWII, politics was on trial above all for its revolutionary miscarriage, and for this 
Horkheimer issued a damning verdict:  
 
Politics, the rediscovery of which in the Renaissance was a theoretical advance, has 
become, in thinking under monopoly [capitalism], even more an ideological category than 
the laws of the market under liberalism: with its aid the surface is hypostatized… The 
governments are executive mechanisms which cannot rationally understand the actual 
state of the forces on which they depend, but merely feel their concrete effects.598  
 
As politics was equated with the state, instrumental rationality was identified with irrational 
domination.599 Without the prospect of political transformation, the (ir)rationality of the system 
became the primary, tendentially total object of inquiry—over and above the possible agents, 
conditions, and mechanisms of its transformation. With all of its liberatory promise and oppressive 
perils, “the political” was seen as inherently suspect—the baby in the bathwater of “rational 
planning.”  
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598 Horkheimer, “Zur Ideologie der Politik heute (Fragment)” in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 12, Frankfurt am Main 
(1968), 317, italics mine. 
599 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, 234. 
  136 
The task of Critical Theory shifted from analyzing the obstacles and aiding the struggle of 
workers’ liberation to taking stock of the eclipse of reason in the aftermath of a historical event 
(Nazism) and a political non-event (Revolution). In a more Hegelian register, Adorno later wrote, 
“Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was 
missed.”600 In this context, the question became: Can the failure of Marxist theory be explained in 
Marxist terminology? Can dialectical blockage be explained dialectically? The critical piece to the 
puzzle was discovered in Max Weber.  
 
Weberian Dialectics and the Critique of Irrational Rationality 
 
The revolutionary promise, so palpable after WWI, had been buried by the wreckage of 
WWII. As Horkheimer and Adorno reflected on how and why, their methodical skepticism gave 
way to totalizing pessimism. The workers’ movement and Enlightenment philosophy, which 
together formed the foundation of early Critical Theory, became objects of ruthless critique 
themselves.601 Without connection to a political subject or project—to proletarian resistance or 
rational planning—critique turned back on itself. After the eclipse of the political, only the rational 
critique of reason remained. And so Horkheimer and Adorno channeled their damning reflections 
on the state of reason into Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Reason and unreason, they argued, form a historical dialectic that began long before, 
unfolded through, and finally inverted the Enlightenment itself. The Nazi cooptation of the 
working classes, the catastrophic development of Stalinism, and the mass character of US state 
capitalism all spoke to practical and scientific failures of Marxist materialism. Class conflict could 
no longer be understood as the motor of history. In its place Horkheimer and Adorno placed 
instrumental rationality—the knowledge and mastery of external nature exercised as power. The 
cunning of instrumental reason was not endemic to an economic order like capitalism or a political 
form like the state, however. It was rather discovered in a philosophical anthropology of 
instrumental cunning, a part of Western culture that descends from its earliest documents, like the 
Greek epic of Odysseus. At the very heart of rationality, Horkheimer and Adorno argued, is a 
struggle between the alienated subject with internal and external nature, a struggle won only at the 
price of domination: “the awakening of the subject is bought with the recognition of power as the 
principle of all relationships.”602 The Enlightenment view of scientific knowledge as power, 
exemplified in figures like René Descartes to Francis Bacon, valued rationality qua logical 
regularity, predictability, calculation, and control. In turn, this perspective on the natural world 
was applied to the study and the self-understanding of human beings, whether in the realm of 
politics, economics, society or art. Thanks to the ascent of instrumental rationality and advanced 
technology, corporate firms, political parties and cultural institutions could both account for and 
actively construct the reasoning and desires of their objects: the masses. The cunning of rationality 
qua adaptive survival lay in its rise to dominate its own progenitors—and all planetary life—via a 
dialectical inversion into myth and the obliteration of rational individuals.  
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Horkheimer and Adorno inscribed whatever Marxist categories remained into the 
psychodynamics iterated by Nietzsche and Freud, wielding alienation, reification, and commodity 
fetishism as powerful tools of analysis. But their account of this historical dialectic—the 
rationalization of the world through which unreason reigns supreme—relied most heavily on a 
different, unnamed figure: Max Weber.603 As Dana Villa observed,  
 
It is noteworthy that Weber’s name nowhere appears in Dialectic of Enlightenment, even 
though it is impossible to imagine the book without him. Indeed, it is arguable that main 
points of his influence—his concept of rationalization, his account of the triumph of 
Zweckrationalität, his focus upon the role self-denial or an inner-worldly asceticism plays 
in this triumph, and his depiction of the ‘steel housing’ created by bureaucratization—
outweigh Horkheimer and Adorno’s borrowings from both Freud and Marx. No doubt 
their failure to give credit where credit is due is tied to both authorial pride and the anxiety 
of influence. But it is also tied to their insistence that Weber’s work expressed what 
Horkheimer (in The Eclipse of Reason) termed ‘subjective’ form of reason.604  
 
Weber’s concept of Zweckrationalität, whose significance for the early neoliberals was examined 
in Chapter 1, constitutes an ideal type of “means-ends” or “purposive” conduct. This 
“instrumental” and merely “subjective” form of rationality posits no higher ends other than the 
desires, preferences, or values of a given individual. Instrumental rationality simply designates the 
selection of effective or efficient means to reach a given end.  
Weber elaborated this form of rationality in different parts of his writings and in relation 
to various domains of life.605 Not unlike the Austrian School, the Frankfurt School appropriated 
Weber’s contextually nuanced concept of Zweckrationalität and turned it into an overarching 
category for their own purposes. Put another way, Weber was interpreted in terms of a singular 
account of “rationalization,” an account associated with his most famous formulations about the 
“warring gods” of value pluralism, the “steel housing” of Western modernity, and the 
“disenchantment of the world.” In this simplified Weberian narrative that was hardly Weber’s 
own, the Frankfurt School found more than just a source of inspiration and target of critique; they 
also found a master signifier for their critical project.  
“Instrumental rationality” not only became the Frankfurt School’s primary object of 
critique, but also the privileged pole of the dialectic and the launching pad for any positive account 
of reason. What Horkheimer and Adorno lamented in the Dialectic, after all, was not simply that 
unreason and domination reigned supreme but that objective reason had been destroyed, from 
                                                
603 Lukács had already absorbed these and other Weberian concepts in History and Class Consciousness: Studies in 
Marxist Dialectics (1923), from which the Frankfurt School drew since its inception, as mentioned above. 
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within and without, by its subjective and instrumental flipside.606 Critical Theory was founded 
upon Kantian and Hegelian understandings of the former, which distinguished between reason 
[Vernunft] and understanding [Verstand]. Whereas the faculty of “understanding” comprises a 
passive mode of cognition, “reason” or “critical rationality” constitute a more active process of 
human reflection, a higher tribunal that can distinguish essence from appearance, and a reflexive 
capacity that can grasp (literally, begreifen) objects through the mediation of conceptual thought 
(Begriffe). Enlightenment reason thus has a negative character that submits “the given” to 
judgment as well as modification. Or as Marcuse put it, “What exists is not immediately and 
already rational but must rather be brought to reason.”607  
The larger historical process examined in the Dialectic and in other works like Marcuse’s 
One-Dimensional Man, discussed below, was understood in Weberian terms as the formalization 
of substantive reason. For Weber himself this was not an inevitable, one-sided process that could 
be understood through a singular logic. But with the use of Weberian dialectics, the Frankfurt 
School could easily narrate it as such. This was partly because, though rationality may have a 
double valence with both formal and substantive expressions, Critical Theory ultimately took 
reason to be unified. As Habermas later insisted, rationality “always has a normative content.”608 
Or in Adorno’s classically negative formulation: “Dialectical reason is, when set against the 
dominant mode of reason, unreason; only in encompassing and cancelling this mode does it 
become itself reasonable.”609   
No matter its modifier—e.g., the technical, technological, political, or administrative 
forms of rationality discussed below—the “dominant mode of reason” was understood as 
instrumental in a Weberian sense; as such, it was seen to lack a normative or objective basis, both 
complicit with and a tool of human domination. Thus no matter what is made of the Frankfurt 
School’s dialectical conceptions of critical reason—from “aesthetic rationality” to 
“communicative rationality”—it is important to underscore the Weberian backdrop of postwar 
Critical Theory’s development. For instrumental rationality not only became the (negative, or non-
normative) basis of a philosophy of history, a philosophical anthropology, and a general social 
theory. It also became their way out of the social calculation debate: the (ir)rationality of market 
exchange and the (ir)rationality of state planning were equated with the instrumental reason as 
such. This Weberian conception of markets and states, however, did not even accord with Weber’s 
own studies, as Chapter 1 already made clear. Yet not only did the Frankfurt School use Weberian 
dialectics to generalize concepts beyond Weber’s comparatively careful application. It also made 
a negative image of Weber central to their endeavor, predicating their positive positions on what 
Villa rightly called a “caricature” of Weber’s own.610 For members of both the first and second 
generation, Weber was seen both as the stoic prophet of irrational charismatic dictators who 
emerge almost by necessity from the so-called “iron cage” of modernity and as the exemplary 
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culprit of the methodological “irrationality” and political “decisionism” of the age since he 
appeared to lack recourse to an emphatic concept of reason.611  
Of particular importance are two strands of the tradition’s Weber reception: first, their 
categorical hypostatization of formal/instrumental and substantive/normative rationality, which 
Weber rarely performed himself; and second, the reduction of politics to the state as a field of 
instrumental, functional, and administrative domination, a model that Weber only pursued with 
notable qualifications.612 It was this double move, the following sections argue, that conceptually 
and methodologically underwrote the Weberian dialectics and much of the political deficits of the 
Frankfurt School. Two core concepts of postwar Critical Theory attest to their Weberian 
supplement to neo-Marxism. “State capitalism” and the “culture industry” were not only 
introduced as correctives to orthodox materialism. Weber on the front end and Marx on the back, 
these concepts welded the superstructure to the base, the cultural to the economic, the symbolic to 
the material—all as forms of domination and production.  
Put another way, explaining the failure of the proletarian revolution and the absence of 
capitalist crisis required more than mere ideology critique. It demanded a generalized vocabulary 
for describing the instrumentality of the social totality, an appreciation for how the 
“rationalization” of individuals, collectives, and institutions was not a one-sided process but a top-
to-bottom perversion of a so-called rational reality or “social totality.”613 Recall that, in Weber’s 
classical account of bureaucracy, the authority of instrumental-legal rationality facilitates a kind 
of auto-functionality of social order. Administrative structures accrue legitimacy because of their 
relative efficiency—not despite but because of their seemingly unpolitical operations, unthinking 
enforcement of rules, narrow-minded focus on cases without any higher purpose. Similarly, the 
very concept of the culture industry conveyed conformity without individuality, uniformity 
without difference. Machinic, standardized, and everywhere the same, society was depicted as a 
perpetually expanding factory without an escape hatch.   
In view of such tendentially totalizing processes, instrumental rationality became both the 
glue holding the analysis together and the logic holding the system together. The critique of 
rationality folded Weberian typologies into neo-Marxist dialectics, forming a new Weberian model 
                                                
611 Marcuse: “[The] rational administration of masses and things cannot do without the irrational charismatic leader. 
For the administration would tend, precisely to the degree to which it is really rational, to the abolition of 
domination (and to the administration of things).” Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max 
Weber” in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (London: MayFlyBooks, 1968/2009), 164. 
612 But Weber understood the political as an arena of struggle, conflict and shared values 
This is not to imply that Weber was not himself fixated on the state, both in terms of his sociological methodology 
and in terms of his personal politics. As if the following line from “Politics as a Vocation” were read literally: “What 
do we understand by politics? The concept is extremely broad and comprises any kind of independent leadership in 
action. One speaks of the currency policy of the banks, of the discounting policy of the Reichsbank, of the strike 
policy of a trade union; one may speak of the educational policy of a municipality or a township, of the policy of the 
president of a voluntary association, and, finally, even of the policy of a prudent wife who seeks to guide her 
husband. Tonight, our reflections are, of course, not based upon such a broad concept. We wish to understand by 
politics only the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership, of a political association, hence today, of a state.” 
[“Wir wollen heute unter Politik nur verstehen: die Leitung oder Beeinflussung der Leitung eines politischen 
Verbandes, heute also: eines Staates."] Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., pp. 77-128, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. 
613 Together this formed a new and powerful “whole,” a new phase within the social “totality.” See Martin Jay, 
Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas (1984). 
  140 
of Marxism—a Webermarxismus, in Habermas’s terms.614 In contrast to Lukacs’ Marxist-
Weberian critique of capitalism and reification, however, theirs was a dialeciticization of Weberian 
typologies without a proletarian telos, a dialectical Weberianism of an entirely new kind.615 
Bureaucratic rationality (or state administration) and formal rationality (or scientific knowledge) 
were now welded together with the market rationality (or the exchange principle), perpetuating 
capitalist domination. To this Horkheimer added his own “racket theory” of monopoly capitalism, 
which foregrounded the coercive power of organized cliques under state capitalism. Replacing the 
“purer” principle of individual exchange under liberal capitalism, this form of social, political and 
economic order was modeled on brute principles of power.616 Or as Adorno put it, “late or 
postliberal capitalism as well as post-fascist society superimpose the full reign of the 
organizational principle over that of the exchange principle.”617 
In view of the horror of a racket-governed world—which Horkheimer projected equally on 
the total war of WWII and the Keynesian political economy of the postwar period—an 
emancipated society was imagined as its inversion, “a racketless society.”618 Much like Walter 
Eucken’s own critique of state socialism, corporate monopolies, and the fusion of economic and 
political power they imply,619 Horkheimer no longer praised and prescribed “rational planning.” 
Instead, he identified more regressive pathologies of state capitalism that undermined the project 
of truly rational planning—from monopolistic price fixing to mass manipulation by the culture 
industry. 
Both state capitalism and the culture industry used “rational planning” for manipulative 
and exploitative (which is to say irrational) ends. Formally rational domination was the kind of 
irrational rationality that Weber himself observed in the subjection and separation of workers 
from the means of production. Nonetheless, this was a form of irrationality that Weber—in his 
“private” preferences for anti-socialism and liberal nationalism—considered justifiable from the 
perspective of the functional, formal, and economic rationality of market exchange. For the 
Frankfurt School, this double-edged sword of rationality and irrationality animated their 
construction of a general social theory, though it also deprived them of a political theory, of a 
political project, and of any conception of collective political agency.  
It was not just the conservative tendencies that followed the Institute’s experience of exile 
back to postwar Germany. And it was not just the failure of the proletariat to realize itself as the 
subject of history. It was also, in this reading, the inversion of rational planning into its very 
opposite; instead of socialist planning for an emancipated society, the political foundation of early 
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Sociology of Class Relations,” Issue #18 of Non-Site (January 11, 2016), https://nonsite.org/the-tank/max-
horkheimer-and-the-sociology-of-class-relations. 
619 See the discussion of “the social question” in Chapter 2. 
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Critical Theory, it was now domination qua “planning considered as an end in itself.”620 “All life 
today tends to be increasingly subjected to rationalization and planning,” concluded Horkheimer’s 
Eclipse of Reason.621  
This political loss and subsequent critique of rational planning was connected to a different 
and taboo-laden topic: the turn against radical democratic politics, in the robust sense of the 
term.622 The skepticism about the irrational masses, made explicit in the discussion of the culture 
industry, raised critique to the most abstract and totalizing levels. To be sure, Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s “fear of the masses” was neither unique nor surprising for refugees returning to the 
hardly de-Nazified population of postwar West Germany. Nonetheless, the historical and 
conceptual parallels with the neoliberal critique of democracy are noteworthy.623 Indeed, though 
the postwar Keynesian mentality came to form the image of technocratic managed politics, it was 
the anti-political animus and general demoskepticism of both neoliberal and some leftist 
intellectuals that would loom large later in the century. Wedded to a critique of “state capitalism,” 
the critique of mass culture and the culture industry concept was ancillary to what the neoliberals 
called “collectivism.” For however bad and irrational liberalism may have been, the movement to 
state capitalism was seen as quashing the Enlightenment heritage of bourgeois individuality 
altogether.  
The Frankfurt School increasingly conceived bourgeois individuality and critical 
rationality as preconditions for a political revolution in which they no longer believed. And so the 
individual became the final battleground of Critical Theory. Though this battle was not without 
politics, it was, without doubt, delinked from collective struggles and from a robust engagement 
with the political. More than revolutionary hangover, what haunts their postwar texts is the loss of 
bourgeois culture as such. As Horkheimer explained, “the more planned the society, whether in 
late democratic or totalitarian form, the more removed from reality are bourgeois culture and 
sensibility.”624   
From Adorno’s Minima Moralia to Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason—and, in more 
constructive fashion, Habermas’ Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere—the Frankfurt 
School’s relation to liberalism resembled something like a homesickness, even if they longed for 
a home they never loved in the first place. Weimar Germany was a political home that, with time, 
was experienced as a tremendous loss. But here again, as Michel Feher has observed, the left did 
not hold a monopoly on melancholy.625 The Austrian School emerged through a melancholy of its 
own, shaped as it was by life under the Austro-Hungarian Empire—a political and economic order 
they never loved till it was gone. The dissolution of the Austrian Empire after WWI and the 
interwar collapse of the world economy that followed, as Quinn Slobodian demonstrated, 
propelled the neoliberals to model future orders on ideals from the past.626 And as the tide of history 
                                                
620 The full passage reads: “Once the utopia which inspired the hopes of the French Revolution had been absorbed, 
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rushed against them, the early neoliberals looked backwards to move forwards. But whereas the 
Austrian School look for principles of political and economic order, the Frankfurt School looked 
backwards for the principles of Enlightenment philosophy.627 What resulted was an impressive 
project to refortify reason against a range of hostile threats, real and perceived. But the effect, as I 
will suggest, was also a series of political deficits—the replacement of politics by rationality as 
both an object of critique and an aspiration for collective life. 
Increasingly, in the 1950’s and 60’s, the first and second-generation critical theorists turned 
their focus to culture. At the same time, administration became a central theme, thanks in part to 
the rise of cybernetic and systems theory. With obvious echoes of Weberian concepts, Horkheimer 
and Adorno now borrowed a highly ambivalent ideal from the “utopian” socialist Saint Simon: a 
“rational administration of things” without a “rational administration (domination) of men” 
[Verwaltung der Dinge ohne Verwaltung/Herrschaft über Menschen]. Kirchheimer had likewise 
envisioned such “a leap from the domination of men” to “the administration of things” [der Sprung 
von der Herrschaft über Menschen zur Verwaltung der Dinge].628 “[P]recisely to the degree to 
which it is really rational,” wrote Marcuse, administration would tend toward “the abolition of 
domination (and to the administration of things).”629 This ideal was formulated against state 
capitalism, which “administers the control of men by things.” Franz Neumann, one of the few 
members to explicitly grapple with democratic and political theory, claimed that “[when] the 
sovereign power ceases to be sovereign,” it “is no longer an external power confronting the 
subjects. It is rather society itself which governs and administers itself.” In contrast to socialism, 
Neumann argued, fascism does not and could never have a political theory because “a political 
theory cannot be nonrational.”630 Critical Theory, even as political theory, was rationalist to its 
core—or it was nothing at all. 
Once key to the progressive movement of reason in history, the political became the most 
daunting domain to contest and overcome by reason—whether through culture, technology, or 
morality. 
 
Adorno, the Ideal of Culture and the Dialectics of Ideal Types 
 
Administration is necessary: the administration of things is necessary, but not the administration 
of men. – Adorno631  
 
“Whoever speaks of culture speaks of administration as well, whether this is his intention 
or not.” So begins Adorno’s “Culture and Administration” (1960), an essay which, alongside 
“Culture Industry Reconsidered” (1963), tarried forward with the main theses in Dialectic of 
                                                
627 See Horkheimer’s explicit rejection of political economy in favor of philosophy in the “Postscript.” 
628 The ambivalence of administration can be deciphered by comparison to other ways of imagining the “right 
disposition” of people and things: government, rule, distribution and so on. 
629 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 164. 
630 Franz Leopold Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944 (Chicago: 
Ivan R Dee, 2009), 464. 
631 Adorno, in Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Eugen Kogon, "Gespräch über die verwaltete Welt und die 
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Enlightenment. Both essays rest on Critical Theory’s distinction between a normative ideal (culture 
as it could and should be) and its actually existing condition (the culture industry). And yet each 
offers a strikingly different conclusion. One argues that culture qua culture industry has been 
engulfed by instrumentality and commodification, with no form of resistance in sight. The other 
suggests that the “true” concept of culture, seen in its dialectical relationship with administration, 
is not opposed to but actually depends on the latter for its very survival. In turn, this essay 
concludes with an extraordinary homage to the political judgment of the enlightened individual 
and to the necessity of administrative expertise.  
Though not all members of the Frankfurt School were as consistently and as negatively 
dialectical as Adorno, they all drew from Marxist dialectics and Weberian typologies. Recall that, 
though forged of eminently Marxist material, the culture industry concept required Weberian 
supplements. Containing its own thesis, the concept fused economic “production” (Marx) with 
cultural “rationalization” (Weber). Economic forces and cultural forms were molded into one and 
the same machinic process of political-economic reproduction; as two sides of the same coin, they 
formed modernity’s steely shell. But the dialectical Weberianism examined above was above all 
a method that made use of Weber’s ideal types (substantive and instrumental rationality) in a 
dialectical fashion he never intended. For Weber, such “ideal” categories were experimental and 
hypothetical types fashioned by the research, which do not reflect but help to map the social world. 
In the Frankfurt School’s usage, as Adorno’s essay makes clear, they are taken to be animating 
forces of philosophical anthropology and constitutive logics of the social world. The political 
prescriptions—and the political deficits—that result are more of a reflection of this method than 
an actual account of how politics, whether in the narrow sense of governmental rule or the more 
robust sense of shared power and substantive conflict.  
 Culture and administration, according to Adorno, comprise fundamentally different forms 
of rationality. While the rationality of administration is pegged to “instrumentality,” the rationality 
of culture is defined more evasively. “It is only through deviation from prevalent rationality that 
culture displays its ratio,” Adorno tells us. This (negative) characterization is consistent with 
Adorno’s general approach, which refuses to (positively) articulate the ideal that contrasts with a 
given reality. “Culture,” he explains, “is the perennial claim of the particular over the general, as 
long as the latter remains unreconciled to the former.” “As that which goes beyond the system of 
self-preservation of the species,” he adds, “culture… involves an irrevocably critical impulse 
towards the status quo and all institutions thereof.”632 Here the concept of true culture, like the 
Frankfurt School’s conception of emphatic Reason, turns on the implicit but unmanifest ideals of 
Western modernity, such as freedom and truth. Thus, similarly for Marcuse, the true concept of 
culture is negative and thus categorically opposed to one-dimensional society: Because culture is 
a space for critical thought, it is also the site of potential “progress.” After becoming intelligible 
through the onset of bourgeois “affirmative culture,” it can separate itself from “the everyday 
world.”633  Adorno, Marcuse and Horkheimer thus pitted (true) culture against “civilization,” 
which referred to the world of labor and necessity, of instrumentality and unfreedom as opposed 
to the higher and more autonomous activities of art. Only indirectly and non-instrumentally can 
the latter become political, which is to say, spark consciousness about worldly contradictions. Such 
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an indirect link between culture and emancipation is why Adorno and Marcuse focused on 
aesthetics through their final reflections in Aesthetic Theory (1970) and The Aesthetic Dimension 
(1978), respectively. 
In this way, “the cultural” parallels—or replaces—more the canonical accounts of “the 
political,” as discussed in the dissertation’s introduction. “[T]hat which is specifically cultural,” 
writes Adorno, “is that which is removed from the naked necessity of life.” Recall that, for 
Aristotle, politics was similarly defined in terms of a philosophical anthropology with its own 
spatio-conceptual demarcations. To be fully human, Aristotle suggested, is to be embedded in 
communal relations. To be Zoon politikon is “to rule and be ruled,” to partake in collective 
practices of governing, to be “subject” to the powers and laws that our one’s own.634  Whereas for 
Arendt, freedom manifests in politics as the world-making realm of speech, action and “natality,” 
for Adorno freedom is expressed in culture as a sphere of autonomy that is “removed from the 
naked necessity of life.” Because Adorno tended to equate politics with administration, the more 
robust sense of the word was either disavowed or reinscribed into the sphere of culture. 
Adorno elaborated culture and administration through their dialectical flipsides. While 
culture expresses autonomous and critical individuality, administration exhibits heteronomous 
political rationality. His account of the latter is attributed to Max Weber, the only author cited in 
this essay. “According to Max Weber’s thesis,” Adorno wrote, “administration by its very nature 
excludes individual arbitrariness in favor of an objectively regulated process.” In this way 
administrative rationality is “alien to the immanent ratio of the object,” for “the essence of 
administrated rationality… does nothing but order and cover over.”635 Because of the domination 
inherent to administration, Adorno suggests, its rationality is itself irrational. 
Figured in the narrow sense of techne, politics is neither a site of potential freedom nor an 
end in itself; it is, at best, a mere means for securing freedom’s conditions. In this sense, Adorno’s 
essay preordained later developments. For freedom was not just culturalized, but Kantianized: it 
was often equated with the morally autonomous individual who acts but is not acted upon, never 
a “mere means” but an “end in itself.” The aporia of culture and administration was restrained to 
and could only be resolved by these terms: “The self-consciousness of this antinomy and the 
consequences thereof are the first demands which would have to be made upon an administrative 
praxis which is mature and enlightened in the Kantian sense.” Adorno’s account oscillated, 
however, between a Kantian concern and a Hegelian logic. The Kantian account featured the 
priority of moral autonomy above ends like communal belonging; the Hegelian rendered 
                                                
634 Adorno penned his thoughts on culture at the same time that Hannah Arendt made an ostensibly inverse move to 
politics. Borrowing from these Aristotelian distinctions, Arendt carved off “the political” from “mere life” (survival 
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impossibility of politics culture became the formal scene of freedom for Adorno.  
635 Adorno, “Culture and Administration.” 
  145 
rationality through the conceptual mediation of the subject and object of thought. Applied to his 
own opposition: “For that which is administered, administration is an external affair by which it is 
subsumed rather than comprehended [begriffen].”636 Against the domination with which politics 
is implicitly equated, Adorno’s formulations evoked a “rational politics” through which politics 
would finally become transparent. Put another way, the generality of administration should but 
cannot yet respect the particularity of its object: “every particular rationalization benefits the 
irrationality of [existing reality] and… strengthens the pressures of a bland and reconciled 
generality upon the particular.” Ethically and epistemologically, superimposed instrumentality 
cannot be reconciled: “administration necessarily represents—without subjective guilt and without 
individual will—the general against the particular.”637 In his more exclusively philosophical works 
like Negative Dialectics, Adorno responds with an ethico-epistemological imperative: lest it 
repress the totalitarian lessons of its past, thought must respect “the priority of the object.”638 
Viewed more politically, in our own sense of the term, different questions come into view. 
What is the object of administration? Adorno did not say, nor did he distinguish between different 
levels or kinds of rational regulation. “Alien to the immanent ratio of the object,” administration’s 
objects seems to span autonomous human beings and non-human things. Leaving aside any strict 
line between the human and non-human, as problematized by “new materialisms,” we might ask: 
What is Adorno implying about the rationality of control, on the one hand, and the rationality of 
freedom, on the other? What are the preconditions of freedom, even if only cultural freedom? To 
whom is freedom ascribed, and who decides? Here again the lapsed faith in a planned economy 
reappears. For Adorno only said so much: that which is truly cultural is the “non-planned,” which 
is in turn equated with the “free,” the “critical” and the “spontaneous.” Culture is here the 
spontaneous order of freedom, recalling the order Hayek restricted to the economy until he later 
applied it to culture himself—though in an evolutionary and conservative sense.  
In a dialectical pivot, however, Adorno’s essay opens up to the hidden potential of 
administration. The “non-planned,” it turns out, can also be secured and sustained by planning—
if only in its truly rational form. “The antinomy of planning and culture results in the dialectical 
idea of absorbing that which is spontaneous and not planned into planning, of creative space for 
these factors and of a strengthening of their possibilities.”639 However abstract it may appear, this 
sentence represents the essay’s most practical conclusion. Paralleling a different neoliberal logic 
concern market-conforming democracy—a form of political control that is necessary to secure 
freedom—this is less a political paradox than a political deficit. For it ultimately amounts to a form 
of enlightened technocracy: “Planning of the non-planned would have to establish at the outset the 
degree to which it is compatible with the specific content of the non-planned, that is, to what degree 
planning from this perspective is ‘rational.’”640 The only way to solve this problem in practice 
depends, then, on a “rational” understanding of this problem itself: what is needed is the cultural 
expert-turned-administrator. Adorno thus submits: “Administration which wishes to do its part 
must renounce itself; it needs the ignominious figure of the expert.” One example he offers is a 
city administration deciding “from which painter it should buy paintings,” to which he answers: 
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the administration must “rely on people who have a serious, objective and progressive 
understanding of painting.”641 
Against its own antinomic background, the essay concludes that “the necessity of the 
expert” cannot be overcome. Begrudgingly, Adorno does register some “notorious” criticisms of 
his conclusion: yes, the administrator “makes his decision from on high, thus extinguishing 
spontaneity”; yes, “it is a difficult matter to distinguish him [the expert] from the apparatchik”; 
and yes, “the judgment of an expert remains a judgment for experts and as such ignores the 
community from which… public institutions receive their mandate.” Yet “even if one were willing 
to concede the correctness of some of the aspects mentioned here,” Adorno argues, “distrust toward 
the argument of the man on the street… will remain: the state of consciousness according to which 
one is to orient himself from the perspective of this argumentation is in truth the very state of 
consciousness which would have to be overcome by any culture sufficient to its own concept.”642 
If culture were to realize the freedom promised by its very concept, in other words, these 
democratic objections to expert judgment would never arise in the first place. To attain the utopia 
of Kultur, it appears, requires technocracy with a human face. 
Acknowledging that “it would take an expert to decide who the experts are – and this leads 
into a vicious circle,” Adorno counters that, ultimately, “the relation between administration and 
expert is not only a matter of necessity, but it is a virtue as well.”643 The real danger is not the 
antinomy sketched above, but rather the objections to administrative expertise that result from it. 
The latter’s protest “is of an illusory democracy” which as “an offshoot of that totalitarian 
technique tries to gain life through the exploitation of plebiscite forms of democracy.” Adorno’s 
rebuttal is styled with Nietzschean flare: “What such voices of the popular soul hate most is 
anything of free spirit; they sympathize with stale reaction.”644  
The essay thus ends by juxtaposing aspirationally enlightened experts with the deceits of 
mass democracy. Only “the spontaneous consciousness, not yet totally in the grips of reification,” 
Adorno argues, “is still in a position to alter the function of the institution within which this 
consciousness expresses itself.”645 Only autonomous subjects with specialized expertise, in other 
words, can make decisions for culture from above and change the nature of institutions from 
within: “Whoever makes critically and unflinchingly conscious use of the means of administration 
and its institutions is still in a position to realize something which would be different from merely 
administrated culture.”646  
From this follows a partial defense of the actually existing representative institutions of 
Western liberalism. In a bizarre shift from his previous depiction of “the administered world” [die 
verwaltete Welt] as “total” in reach, Adorno posits the existence of individual freedom within the 
halls of governmental power: “For the present, within liberal-democratic order, the individual still 
has sufficient freedom within the institution and with its help to make a modest contribution to its 
correction.”647 While praising technocratic liberalism, which, “by virtue of the powers of men of 
insight,” permits culture’s vestigial survival, Adorno submits a final warning about the potential 
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despotism of “the common will” and democratic reason. Oddly, on his behalf, Adorno marshals a 
reconstructed testimony from Walter Benjamin: 
 
A cultural policy which has rid itself of social naiveté must see through this complex 
without fear of the mass of majorities… [D]emocracy through representation, to which 
even the experts in the administration of cultural matters owe their legitimation, 
nonetheless permits a certain balance; it makes possible the hindrance of maneuvers 
which serve barbarism through the corruption of the idea of objective quality by means 
of callous appeal to the common will. Walter Benjamin’s thought on critics whose task 
it is to uphold the interest of the public against the public itself can be applied to cultural 
policy as well. To serve this purpose is the duty of the expert. The longing for 
individuals who might work beyond the realm of expertise usually characterizes only 
regression or the desire for technicians of communication, with whom – simply 
because they are lacking any real understanding of matters – one can get along better 
and who dwell all the more conformingly within their own policy.648  
 
Leaving aside his questionable invocation of Benjamin, Adorno’s claim is a familiar one. In the 
previous chapter it was found on both sides of the socialist calculation debate—from the economic 
rationality neoliberalism to the orthodox approach to a rationally planned economy. Safely in the 
postwar “center,” technocratic liberalism appeared in similar light—and no less, in the Frankfurt 
School. In each case we find the same form of argument: the technocratic instance is needed to 
mitigate and tame popular “irrationality.”  
For Adorno, “irrationality” takes on a double figure: it is inherent to the commodifying 
logic of the culture industry and to the political rationality of administration. Thus he could argue: 
“That irrationality expressed in the independence of administration in its relation to society is the 
refuge of the inhibited development of culture itself.”649 Regardless of capitalist or socialist 
contexts, it is only through the (tendentially technocratic) judgment of enlightened experts that 
political rationality can realize cultural rationality. 
Kulturkritik is given the modernist task of “keeping up with culture at its most advanced,” 
while also pointing to the contradictions that underlie such advancement.650 But Adorno’s reluctant 
resolution not only supported the technocratic tendencies formulated above; it also offered a 
different perspective on a paradox many have long puzzled over: How could he so ruthlessly 
criticize radio as a technology of mass regression while also appearing on radio—no less than 
hundreds of times in postwar Germany—in an educational capacity? To answer this question, both 
sides of the coin need to be seen at once: culture as Bildung and culture as commodified “industry.” 
Despite the irrationality of “industry,” experts remain necessary for Enlightenment. Adorno 
believed their role in administration and media must be secured if a post-Nazi, enlightened public 
was to (re)emerge. 
 Before turning to Marcuse, we should note that the form of this political deficit—i.e., the 
critique of political rationality as instrumentality—resembles those examined in previous chapters. 
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Based on the privatized freedom of the postwar imaginary, this form could even be called “the 
cultural” or “inverted Hayekianism.” For without the ideal of a rationality planned society, the 
main threat was now the planned serfdom of the individual: “Spontaneity diminishes because total 
planning takes precedence over the individual impulse, predetermining this impulse in turn, 
reducing it to the level of illusion, and no longer tolerating that play of forces which was expected 
to give rise to a free totality.”651 The Frankfurt School increasingly envisioned freedom as the free 
play of socialized, autonomous, sovereign individuals, the political framework for which was not 
stated but presumably liberal and minimally planned. Like market Hayekianism, cultural 
Hayekianism still requires certain kinds of formal and decisive interventionism. For each, the true 
dangers lie in rationalized planning and the irrationality of “plebiscite democracy.” As a proxy for 
rationality and truth, a key threat to culture was democracy itself.652  
 
Marcuse, Transformation, and Technological Rationality at “the Base” 
 
One of Critical Theory’s most forceful accounts of political rationality was one of its very 
first. In 1941 Herbert Marcuse wrote “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” (1941), 
anticipating the themes of his most famous study, One-Dimensional Man (1964), and a related but 
lesser-known essay, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber” (1964). Over 
these two decades, Marcuse’s concepts remained remarkably consistent, albeit with some 
adjustments to his key term, “technological rationality.”653  
Marcuse’s early essay defined technics [Technik] as a constitutive yet politically neutral 
part of the social process, whereas technology [Technologie] was ascribed an a priori political 
content. As he succinctly explained in Soviet Marxism, “Modern machinery is susceptible to 
capitalist as well as socialist utilization. This amounts to saying that mature capitalism and 
socialism have the same technical base, and that the historical decision as to how this base is used 
is a political decision.”654 As a “material” element in the forces of production, the Marxist schema 
endowed technology with a key role in the historical process: technology constituted both the 
actual means of capitalist domination and the potential means of socialist liberation. Although the 
relative autonomy of the “political decision” evolved out of interwar debates, Marxist 
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historiography had long cast technology as politically ambivalent—as either determined or 
transcendent, depending on its relation to capital. 
Marcuse’s early essay underscored the historical plasticity of techne in relation to three 
forms of rationality: critical, individualistic, and technological rationality. Based on the distinction 
between reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand) discussed above, “critical rationality” 
designated the capacity for autonomous reason, related to yet distinct from the concept of 
“individual rationality”: 
 
The principle of individualism, the pursuit of self-interest, was conditioned upon the 
proposition that self-interest was rational, that is to say, that it resulted from and was 
constantly guided and controlled by autonomous thinking. The rational self-interest did 
not coincide with the individual’s immediate self-interest, for the latter depended upon 
the standards and requirements of the prevailing social order, placed there not by his 
autonomous thought and conscience but by external authorities.655  
 
Historically, individualistic rationality stemmed from radical Puritanism, which set the individual 
in opposition to society, and from liberalism, which promised an appropriate “social and economic 
setting” for (white male land-owning) subjects to pursue a life consistent with this form of 
rationality.656 In Weberian spirit, Marcuse conceived liberalism (and liberal capitalism) as both 
undergoing and producing rationalization, a process that installs “formal rationality” into new sites 
of individual and collective life.  
Rooted in the logics of commodity production and market competition, however, 
individualistic rationality eventually birthed a new form of “organized” or “monopoly 
capitalism”—terms that Marcuse, like his first-generation colleagues, contrasted with the “laissez-
faire liberalism” that preceded them. It was only through postliberal capitalism, Marcuse argued, 
that “individualistic rationality transformed into technological rationality.” Technological 
rationality characterizes “the pervasive mode of thought and even the manifold forms of protest 
and rebellion. [It] establishes standards of judgment and fosters attitudes which make men ready 
to accept and even to introject the dictates of the apparatus.”657 ​ Increasingly, he added, “all 
domination assumes the form of administration.”658 This was all part of a historic shift from “the 
individual” to “the masses,” from the presumed autonomy to the manifest heteronomy of the 
subject. In its technological guise, rationality could no longer acts as a “critical force.” “The 
technological power of the apparatus,” Marcuse explained, “affects the entire rationality of those 
whom it serves,”659 transmuting both ratiocination and desire. Propagating individual conformity 
and social control, technological rationality circulates in various sites from the “scientific 
management” of corporations and the disciplinary control of schools to the political system bereft 
                                                
655 Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” in Essential Reader, 140. 
656 Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” in Essential Reader, 156-57.  
657 Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” in Essential Reader, 141. 
658 Marcuse put it this way: “With the rationalization of the productive apparatus, with the multiplication of its 
functions, all domination assumes the form of administration. At its peak, the concentration of economic power 
seems to turn into anonymity.” Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (1955), 79. 
659 Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” in Essential Reader, 141. 
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of “oppositional” parties. The demise of the proletariat and of economic liberalism have their roots 
in technological rationality.  
Technological rationality thus replaced “ideology” as the privileged object of critique,660 
reflecting another major shift in Marxian-Weberian heuristics. Similar to the concept of the culture 
industry, technological rationality implied the fusion of “base” and “superstructure.” The “social 
totality” was not just economically determined, but conditioned by an infrastructural rationality 
that cut across once quasi-autonomous spheres of politics, culture, art, and society. Anticipating 
similar twists from Foucault and Deleuze by several years, Marcuse no longer modeled power on 
the shape of a pyramid, as subjectivity and technology were both dynamic and entangled. Because 
such a “form of rationality” does not emanate from a singular source, it becomes conceptually, 
technically and psychically linked to the logic through which the capitalist system (and its 
functional support, the state) continuously reproduces and legitimizes itself.  
The first generation was united in rejecting the “false materialism” of orthodox Marxists 
and the “bourgeois idealism” of Vernunftsphilosophie. And yet Marcuse’s materialist approach to 
technology—what he called “materiellen Daseinsverhaeltnisse,” or material relations between 
rational beings-in-the-world—was even more idiosyncratic than that of his colleagues.661 Whereas 
Horkheimer and Adorno assembled a new philosophy of history upon a dialectic of (ir)rational 
techne, Marcuse offered a more contextual and political analysis of particular historical forms of 
rationality. He viewed instrumental reason as “historically contingent in ways that leave a mark 
on modern science and technology,” and thus understood “the essence of technology… to be 
historical and reflexive, like the essence of other social institutions.”662 Thus while Horkheimer 
and Adorno disavowed the ideal of rational planning and set their skeptical sights on the culture 
industry, Marcuse continued to engage questions from the socialist calculation debate: “The 
control of man by things can be deprived of its irrationality only through the rational control of 
man by man,” he wrote. “The question, therefore, is for socialism, too: ‘who, then, is supposed to 
take over and direct this new economy?’”663 Whether he was able to develop this as a political 
question beyond the orthodox rubric of revolution was another matter, however.  
In the 1964 essay on Weber’s concept of capitalism, Marcuse’s analysis plays out 
somewhat differently than twenty years prior. In Weber, the “formally” reflexive form of 
technological rationality organizes practical techne via separation (or what Parsons, Luhmann and 
Habermas later called differentiation): the functional separation of systemic reproduction from the 
determination of common ends. The problem, as Marcuse saw it, was that different spheres are 
animated by the functionality of Zweckrationalität, not the goals of Wertrationalität. In line with 
positivist epistemology, social science disconnected scientific activity from value judgments, just 
as technological rationality severed political forms from substantive values.664 Whereas Habermas 
later thematized this separation in terms of the normative validity of communicative discourse, as 
                                                
660 At the same time, however, technological rationality was often understood as a form of ideology itself, including 
the idea of “the end of ideology.” 
661 These concepts show the lingering influence of Heidegger’s categories Marcuse’s thinking. 
662 Andrew Feenberg, “Marcuse or Habermas: Two Critiques of Technology,” Inquiry 39/1 March 1996. 
663 Max Weber, cited in Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 160. 
664 His 1964 critiques came at the peak of the postwar Keynesian welfare state. While Marcuse wrote, Lyndon B. 
Johnson proposed the “Great Society” in the US and the British Labour Party campaigned and won on the promise 
of a nationally planned economy which, propelled by the “white heat of the technological revolution,” would 
achieve 25% GDP. This promise aimed at even more economic growth than the already record-breaking levels. The 
Labour party won and, thanks to poor timing, the crisis of Keynesianism ensued. 
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discussed below, Marcuse thematized it in terms of the plasticity of technology and the versatility 
of political forms.  
Fittingly, this is where the concept of “rationality” takes on the modifier of “political,” and 
where Marcuse’s own theory of “political rationality” comes into view. Just as Marcuse’s essay on 
Weber observed that “formal technical rationality turns into material political rationality,”665 One-
Dimensional Man announced that “[t]echnological rationality has become political rationality.”666 
By political rationality Marcuse meant an overdetermined blend of formal and substantive 
rationality that programs different forms of power:  
 
Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology 
‘subsequently’ and from the outside; they enter the very construction of the technical 
apparatus. Technology is always a historical-social project: in it is projected what a 
society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a ‘purpose’ of 
domination is ‘substantive’ and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical 
reason.667 
 
Political rationality is determined by the substantive orientation of power relations. In this way, 
Marcuse both offers a critique and reconstruction of Weber’s concepts, rendering political his 
allegedly “formal” theory of state and capitalist rationalization. Put another way, Marcuse called 
Weber’s bluff on the value neutrality of science and on the formal-substantive binary in real-
existing forms rationality. Distinctions between politics and economics, and between the state and 
capitalism, that Weber had largely accepted and reified were themselves value systems and 
technological configurations that need to be critically interrogated and politically overcome. 
From the perspective of capitalist rationality, Marcuse explained, everything that falls 
outside of its own logic is irrational, formally speaking. From the point of view of the “economic 
apparatus of capitalism,” the satisfaction of human needs is thus a “by-product” rather than an end: 
“the apparatus, which dictates its own objective administration, is itself instrument, means—and 
there is no such things as a means ‘as such.’ Even the most productive, most reified apparatus is a 
means to an end outside itself.”668 Historically, Marcuse argued, Weber’s concepts could anticipate 
but could not grasp the political-economic transformations to come. Theoretically, however, 
Marcuse found effective resources in them for a radical critique of capitalism, the state, and their 
union in state capitalism. Echoing Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse believed that “precisely to 
the degree to which it is really rational,” administration would tend toward “the abolition of 
domination (and to the administration of things).” But rather than securing this ideal, the inverse 
form of rationality “administers the control of men by things.”669 This totalizing vision and 
dialectical blockage of political-economic power meant that technological rationality lent itself to 
                                                
665 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 167.  To this he adds: “But if technical 
reason thus reveals itself as political reason, it does so only because from the beginning it was this technical reason 
and this political reason, that is, limited in the specific interest of domination. As political reason, technical reason is 
historical.” Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” in Negations, 169.  
666 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, (London: Routledge Classics, 1964/2002), xlvii.  
667 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 168. 
668 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 163. 
669 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 167. 
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outbursts of irrationality, that history was programmed not for progress but for regress, that 
authoritarianism was a more likely result than the welfare state.670  
Mirroring Adorno’s interpretation of Weber, as discussed above, Marcuse argued that 
“formal reason” reaches “its own limit” and swings into irrationality. Without political critique or 
an external normative criterion, Weber’s value neutrality was aligned with capitalist and the state 
power. From the latter’s perspective, embodied by administrative rationality, domination is seen 
as an effective necessity. And if, for Weber, “rationality is embodied in administration,” then 
“legislative power must be irrational,” “reason ends in irrational charisma,” and “plebiscitary 
democracy is the political expression of irrationality-become-reason.”671 Well before Nazism, 
Weber had called attention to the danger of an administrative apparatus that, “by virtue of its own 
rationality,” can be submitted to the values and control of “an irrational supreme authority.”672 But 
he had also disavowed any critical perspective capable of challenging such a dialectical turn. 
Despite this compelling reading of Weber, Marcuse’s own dialectical Weberianism landed 
him in an unworkable place between philosophy of history and political theory. For his political-
theoretical analyses could only enter through the back door of an all-encompassing theory of 
history—one that made technological domination and technological liberation into the central 
political antinomy. With little use for Pollock and Neumann’s more nuanced studies of states and 
markets, and with little reflection on the question of democratic planning,673 Marcuse thus 
reconstructed the concepts and stakes of the socialist calculation debate around two dialectical 
poles. Capitalist domination and socialist liberation, each representing a political form that 
differently “rationalizes” the same technological base:674 “Capitalism, no matter how 
mathematized and ‘scientific’, remains the mathematized, technological domination of men; and 
socialism, no matter how scientific and technological, is the construction or demolition of 
domination.”675 Resistance to technological rationality and systemic imperatives were not posed 
as genuinely political questions, in our sense of them term, but in the form of individual 
imperatives (the “Great Refusal”) or decisionistic inversions (the inversion of state capitalism into 
a “planned economy”).676 Legacies of such individualistic and systemic solutionism can be seen 
                                                
670 Adorno put it a different way: “My innermost feeling is that at the moment everything has shut down, but it could 
all change at a moment’s notice. My own belief is as follows: this society is not moving towards a welfare state. It is 
gaining increasing control over its citizens but this control grows in tandem with the growth in its irrationality. And 
the combination of the two is constitutive.” See Adorno in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Towards a 
New Manifesto (London: Verso, 2011).  
671 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 164. 
672 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 165. 
673 Marcuse’s meditations on the question of planning were generally philosophical rather than political: “Materialist 
theory moves beyond historical relativism in linking itself with those social forces which the historical situation 
reveals to be progressive and truly ‘universal’.… For the material conditions of life, previously unmastered, can now 
be incorporated into a general plan. They can be organized through and by individuals’ social freedom; that is, they 
can be linked to the ‘essence’ of the individual. At the end of the process, when former social antagonisms have 
been overcome in such a community, the ‘subjectivity’ of materialist theory becomes objectivity – in the form of an 
existence where the interests of individuals are truly preserved in the community.” Marcuse, “Concept of Essence” 
in Negations, 5. 
674 Marcuse also suggested socialism would require a different version of technology, an idea Habermas deemed too 
utopian. 
675 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 161. 
676 “However, the executive and supervisory functions would no longer carry the privilege of ruling the life of others 
in some particular interest. The transition to such a state is a revolutionary rather than evolutionary process, even on 
the foundation of a fully nationalized and planned economy.” Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 48. 
  153 
in contemporary imperatives from Bernard Harcourt’s revolutionary call to “Opt Out” of social 
media to Aaron Bastani’s plea for “Fully Automated Luxury Communism.”677  
Though capitalism may “deliver the goods,” Marcuse always insisted that it must not be 
confused with genuine freedom: “Distribution of the necessities of life regardless of work 
performance, reduction of working time to a minimum, universal all-sided education toward 
exchangeability of functions—these are the preconditions but not the contents of self-
determination.”678 Notwithstanding his influence on and engagement with the student movement 
later in the decade, it is precisely this question—the preconditions and practices of self-
determination—which he often displaced by submerging the political to the technological while 
casting freedom and spontaneity in terms of sexual liberation.679 This despite the fact that Marcuse 
simultaneously sought to rethink “technology” itself, albeit with a Hegelian twist. 
 Concluding with the imperative to refuse and revolt against technologies of consumption 
and control, Marcuse’s analysis offered little strategic or institutional connections for such 
resistance. If directed by a different political rationality, Marcuse argued, technical reason could 
serve liberatory ends and yield a “qualitatively different rationality.”680 But from the outset of One-
Dimensional Man, Marcuse admitted that he would vacillate between “two contradictory 
hypotheses”: “1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for 
the foreseeable future; 2) that forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and 
explode the society.”681 The encasement of capitalist (ir)rationality and the possibility of a 
dialectical “explosion” are not simply “contradictory hypotheses,” however.682  They are also 
symptoms of postwar Critical Theory’s blocked dialectic, which in this context manifest in an 
inability to theorize between the Marxist revolutionary impulse and the Keynesian approach to 
political economy—indeed, at the historical height of the welfare state’s power and promise before 
the neoliberal revolution.  
 Animated by an emphatic concept of reason,683 the aspirational reconciliation or sublation 
                                                
677 Bernard Harcourt, Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2015); and Aaron Bastani, Fully Automated Luxury Capitalism (London: Verso, 2018). 
678 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 47. 
679 Like in other sections of this chapter, here I am seeking to characterize some animating features in Marcuse’s 
conceptualization of politics and economy in terms of a Weberian dialectics of (ir)rationality. There are of course 
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Essay on Liberation (1969); Marcuse, “Marxism and Feminism” in Women’s Studies, Volume 2 (1974), 279-288; 
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680 Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 169. 
681 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 5. At the book’s conclusion, Marcuse added: “The unification of opposites in 
the medium of technological rationality must be, in all its reality, an illusory unification, which eliminates neither 
the contradiction between the growing productivity and its repressive use, nor the vital need for solving the 
contradiction” Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 260. 
682 When the dialectic is blocked, as Adorno admitted himself, thought “leaps” for a “way out,” searching in vain for 
an agent of emancipation: “My innermost feeling is that at the moment everything has shut down, but it could all 
change at a moment’s notice. My own belief is as follows: this society is not moving towards a welfare state. It is 
gaining increasing control over its citizens but this control grows in tandem with the growth in its irrationality. And 
the combination of the two is constitutive.” Adorno in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Towards a New 
Manifesto (London: Verso, 2011). 
683 See for example: “In the equation Reason = Truth = Reality, which joins the subjective and objective world into 
one antagonistic unity, Reason is the subversive power, the ‘power of the negative’ that establishes, as theoretical and 
practical Reason, the truth for men and things—that is, the conditions in which men and things become what they 
really are. he attempt to demonstrate that this truth of theory and practice is not a subjective but an objective condition 
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(Aufhebung) of these binaries and blockages is not rooted in a revolutionary subject but in a 
rationality of inversion that transitions from capitalism to socialism: “There is continuity in the 
revolution: technological rationality, freed from irrational restrictions and destructions, sustains 
and consummates itself in the new society.”684 But like Adorno, this mode of dialectical 
Weberianism carried the necessity of both retaining and overcoming administration: “While the 
creation of these preconditions may still be the result of superimposed administration, their 
establishment would mean the end of this administration.”685 Such an “undervaluation of the 
complexity and specificity of the problem of institutions,” as Ferio Cerutti noted, was a key failure 
of the first-generation thinkers that “calls into question whether they can be seen as capable of 
even appearing to offer a political theory.”686  
Having submerged the technical into the social and identified the political as a merely 
“decisive” element for a system of values and ends, Marcuse opened paths compatible with 
Foucault’s reflections in the late 1970’s and recent work in science and technology studies. In 
Marcuse, the “essence of technology is shown to be historical and reflexive, like the essence of 
other social institutions” and as “such an institution, its rationality is always implemented in value-
biased forms subject to political critique.” More than Habermas, “Marcuse was right after all to 
claim that technology is socially determined,” Andrew Feenberg observed, “even if he was unable 
to develop his insight fruitfully.”687  Even if his Weberian resolution did not offer a properly 
political diagnosis, Marcuse grasped the crisis of Marxism as an epistemological crisis. But 
“socializing” or “returning” the means of production to the producers themselves could not result 
from a dialectical sleight of hand. Without a conception of the political beyond technology, 
Marcuse proved incapable of addressing his own Weberian question: “who, then, is supposed to 
take over and direct this new economy?”688 
 
Habermas’ Dialectic of Rationalization: The Stalemate of System and Lifeworld 
 
As the torch carrier of the Frankfurt School’s “second generation,” Jürgen Habermas 
sought to resolve the conceptual and practical dilemmas bequeathed by the earlier generation of 
Critical Theory. Attuned to its dialectical blockages from the start, he began to interrogate 
questions of rationality and technology, or what he called the “Dialectic of Rationalization,” in his 
very first publications.689 Following Adorno’s lead, he sought to “take up systematically what 
Lukács and Korsch represented historically: the theory of reification as a theory of rationalization, 
                                                
was the original concern of Western thought and the origin of its logic—logic not in the sense of a special discipline 
of philosophy but as the mode of thought appropriate for comprehending the real as rational.” Marcuse, One-
Dimensional Man, 127-28.  
684 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 25. 
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686 Ferio Cerutti, “Technik und Politik” in Kritik und Utopie im Werk von Herbert Marcuse, ed. Institut für 
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687 See Andrew Feenberg, “Marcuse or Habermas: Two Critiques of Technology,” Inquiry 39/1 March 1996: 45-70; 
see also Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999). 
688 Max Weber, cited in Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” 160. 
689 Habermas, “Die Dialektik der Rationalisierung: Vom Pauperismus in Produktion und Konsum,” in Merkur, VIII, 
78, 1954. For a contextual discussion see Friedrich Kießling, Die undeutschen Deutschen: Eine ideengeschichtliche 
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in Max Weber’s sense.”690 At each stage of a project remarkable for its scope and consistency, 
Habermas thus reorganized the coordinates of a tradition whose promise he considered as yet 
unrealized. In examining Habermas’ internal reworking of Critical Theory, this section will focus 
on three key junctures of its development: his systems-theoretic engagement with Marcuse in the 
1960’s, his interventions “legitimation crisis” debates in the 1970’s, and his normative 
reconstruction of Weber into a theory of communicative rationality in the 1980’s. Although 
Habermas critically engaged the first generation’s dialectical blockages in each of these phases, 
he ultimately reconstituted their structure in another form—one that similarly subordinates politics 
to a particular form of rationality and that has since guided his institutional appraisals on the 
European Union. 
“Not a 1968er, but a 1945er,” Thomas Meaney observed, “Habermas was among the first 
young Germans for whom the war provided a conversion experience away from nationalism.”691 
After the Institute for Social Research re-opened in 1951, Horkheimer and Adorno recommenced 
their teaching at the University of Frankfurt and took on a new set of students, with Jürgen 
Habermas among them. In a political and academic context dominated by conservatism, they 
pursued a more muted form of critical inquiry, worried that overtly “radical” politics could play 
into “the authoritarian horizon.” Horkheimer and Adorno thus hid early issues of the Zeitschrift 
from students in the Institute’s basement and sought connections with elite circles in Adenauer’s 
West Germany. On the Institute’s board of directors, for instance, they placed Franz Böhm—the 
co-founder of Freiburg School ordoliberalism, discussed in the previous chapter, who in the 
postwar period served as a professor in Frankfurt, Culture Minister in Hessen, and Bundestag MP 
in the CDU.692 In 1954 they received a contract to conduct “business climate” research, later 
inviting the business group to a 1958 conference titled “What Can Sociology Contribute to 
Economy and Administration Today?”693 Around this time Habermas wrote an op-ed against 
nuclear armament, “Unrest as Citizen Duty,” calling for democratic participation in governmental 
decisions.694 Adorno and Horkheimer both distanced themselves from the protests,695 though 
                                                
690 The full passage reads: “I had read Lukács… Then I read The Dialectic of Enlightenment and the first things 
published by Adorno after the war. That gave me the courage to read Marx systematically and not simply 
historically. Reading Adorno had given me the courage to take up systematically what Lukács and Korsch 
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“The Dialectics of Rationalization” in Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas, ed. Peter Dews 
(London: Verso, 1986), 89. 
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692 See Hermann Kocyba, "Die 'eigenartige Nachbarschaft' von Ordoliberalismus und Frankfurter Schule: Michel 
Foucault über das 'Deutsche Modell'" in i-lex, 21, 2014, 75-95 (www.i-lex.it). 
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“Neues zur Gründungslegende der Bundesrepublik: Horkheimer gegen Habermas, dazwischen Adorno” in Die Zeit 
(Sept 20 1996). 
694 Jürgen Habermas, "Unruhe erste Bürgerpflicht" in Diskus 5, 1958. 
695 Adorno called the police to remove a student occupation, led by the Socialist German Student Union (SDS), at 
the Institute for Social Research in 1969. In a letter to Herbert Marcuse, Adorno explained: “Things have been 
terrible again here. A SDS group led by Krahl occupied a room in the Institute and refused to leave, despite three 
requests. We had to call the police, who then arrested all those who they found in the room; the situation is dreadful 
in itself, but Friedeburg, Habermas and I were there, as it happened, and were able to guard against the use of 
physical force.” Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, “Correspondence on the German Student Movement,” in 
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Horkheimer went further in judging “den dialektischen Herrn H.” (Habermas) too “radical” for the 
Institute. Böhm, a member of the Institute’s Vorstand, called the “class-baiting” student protests a 
“brutalization of political discussion and erosion of the Basic Law.”696  
Habermas moved to Marburg to write his Habilitation under Wolfgang Abendroth, a co-
author of West Germany’s Basic Law, before returning to Frankfurt and assuming Horkheimer’s 
chair in philosophy and sociology in 1964. With his panoramic study of The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), Habermas reinterpreted the emergence of 
Enlightenment reason not simply as the product of literary and philosophical texts but also arenas 
of bourgeois public discourse that challenged political authority.697 In the movement from 
seventeenth-century salons and coffee houses to postwar commercialized capitalism, Habermas 
identified a different kind of Verfallsgeschichte—a more historically contextualized dialectic of 
public reason that, in the twentieth century, was subverted by irrational powers it had made 
possible. 
In reflecting on the emergence of the modern public sphere, Habermas’ early work 
addressed the issue of politics by focusing on its distinctly “modern” character, which he generally 
equated with the use of positivist science, technique and technology. This was but one part of his 
examination of foundational questions in Critical Theory, such as the relationship between theory 
and practice, knowledge and interests, and science and politics.698 In Theory and Practice (1963), 
he distinguished the “new” or “modern” from the “old” or “classical” forms of political knowledge 
and activity. The latter “classical doctrine of politics,” represented by Aristotle’s practical 
philosophy, had been “broken off conclusively by the critique of Historicism” in the nineteenth 
century. Similar to Condorcet’s liberal bifurcation of the ancients and the moderns, Habermas 
claimed the “old” conception of political life had become “alien to all of us,” a consequence of 
classical currents “drying up” with Thomas Hobbes and the increasing “scientification of 
politics.”699  
Like Horkheimer and Adorno, he believed philosophical positivism and political 
technology formed the core problem of modernity, an intuition that guided him into debates with 
functionalist and neo-conservative sociologists.700 As a participant in discussions about objectivity 
and value neutrality at a 1964 conference in Heidelberg, “Max Weber and Sociology Today,” he 
led the dialectical charge against the formalist reception of Weber in contemporary sociology. The 
Webermarxismus approach was represented by Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas, the 
latter “systems theory” approach by Talcott Parsons, Leopold von Wiese and Niklas Luhmann.701  
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Habermas’ ongoing exchange with Luhmann was arguably the most formative of all his 
noteworthy debates, given the increasing incorporation of the machinery of systems theory into 
Critical Theory—turning, for example, the binary of “system and environment” into one of 
“system and lifeworld.” Eventually published as Theory of Society or Social Technology?, 
Habermas and Luhmann responded to one another regarding an enterprise to which they were 
equally committed: developing a systematic and universalistic social theory.702 Through his 
critique of Luhmann’s functionalism, as well as his engagement with neo-conservative theorists 
of the “technocratic state” like Helmut Schelsky and Arnold Gehlen, Habermas        (re-)discovered 
the stakes of a general theory of society, constructing, perhaps unwittingly, a seemingly 
unbridgeable opposition between the normative and the political.703  
Soon he put this evolving conceptual apparatus to work in a 1968 essay dedicated to 
Marcuse on his seventieth birthday, “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology.’” Here Habermas 
reconsidered the notion of technological rationality in both Marcuse and Weber.704 Far better than 
others, Habermas observed, Marcuse used Weber’s concepts to perceive the new in capitalist 
formations. Thanks to the notion of technological rationality, Marcuse was able to map the 
changing relationship between “the economy and the political system” in the transformation from 
liberal to monopoly capitalism: “If society no longer ‘autonomously’ perpetuates itself through 
self-regulation as a sphere preceding and lying at the basis of the state—and its ability to do so 
was the really novel feature of the capitalist mode of production—then society and the state are 
no longer in the relationship that Marxian theory had defined as that of base and 
superstructure.”705 Under postwar capitalism, the responsibility for containing and steering the 
“irrational rationalities” of “the system” rest on the shoulders of the state. “The key to analyzing 
the changed constellation,” Habermas contended, is “Marcuse’s basic thesis according to which 
technology and science also take on the function of legitimating political power.”706 Here, we see 
the early significance of Habermas locating the question of politics exclusively within (the sphere 
of the state, and characterizing it specifically in terms of the state’s role in managing technologies 
                                                
702 Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Was Leistet die 
Systemforschung, ed. Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main.: Suhrkamp, 1971/1990). For an excellent reading of 
this debate, see Ari Edmundson’s dissertation (UC Berkeley). 
703 See Helmut Schelsky, “Der Mensch in der Wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation” in Auf der Suche nach der 
Wirklichkeit: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Düsseldorf/Köln: Diederichs, 1965): 439-481; Arnold Gehlen, Die Seele im 
technischen Zeitalter: Sozialpsychologische Probleme in der industriellen Gesellschaft, Rowohlt, No. 53, Reinbek 
(1957). For his part, Streeck claimed limited knowledge of their postwar significance: “So ahnten wir nichts von der 
Blütezeit der deutschen Soziologie unter dem Nationalsozialismus; machten uns die Soziologie als sozialistische 
Revolutionstheorie zurecht, hielten Freyer und Gehlen für bizarre Randerscheinungen in einer Disziplin, in der sie 
eigentlich nichts zu suchen hatten (auch, weil Adorno seinen tiefen Respekt für Gehlen für sich behielt), und sahen 
in jemandem wie Schelsky eine Art von sozialdemokratischem Jugendforscher und Universitätsreformer. 
Aufklärung über das Ausmaß unserer Missverständnisse gab es erst später, jedenfalls nicht während eines 
Frankfurter Soziologie-Studiums in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren.” Wolfgang Streeck, “Von der 
Gesellschaftssteuerung zur sozialen Kontrolle Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert Soziologie in Theorie und 
Praxis,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (1/2015); 
http://www.mpifg.de/people/ws/downloads/Von_der_Gesellschaftssteuerung_zur_sozialen_Kontrolle.pdf 
704 The conference was Max Weber und die Soziologie heute: Verhandlungen des 15. Deutschen Soziologentages in 
Heidelberg, 1964. See Jürgen Habermas, “Diskussionsbeitrag,” in Otto Stammer (ed.), Max Weber und die 
Soziologie heute (Tübingen: Mohr, 1965), 74–81. See also Habermas, 'Technology and Science as "Ideology"', in 
Toward a Rational Society, trans. J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.  
705 Jürgen Habermas, “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’” in Toward a Rational Society, trans. J. Shapiro 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 101. 
706 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 100-101. 
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for the effective and “rational” administration of social life.   
In contrast to Marcuse’s continuous embrace of Marx, however, Habermas found it 
necessary to retain the heuristic of Weberian rationalization but to eschew the priority of Marxist 
political economy: “Capitalist society changed to the point where two key categories of Marxian 
theory, namely class struggle and ideology, can no longer be employed as they stand.”707 “A 
critical theory of society,” he added, “can no longer be constructed in the exclusive form of a 
critique of political economy.”708 Like Adorno and Horkheimer’s own discovery of “the political” 
with the rise of “state capitalism,” Habermas confronted it in the emergence of “postliberal” order. 
Following the Weberian conceptual path already blazed by Marcuse, the “new” conception of 
politics is technical and instrumental in its systemic character – and in this sense, we see already 
the early signs of Habermas’ tension-filled affinity with a particularly liberal account of politics as 
technical administration. While the “tasks of government action present themselves as technical 
ones,” Habermas remarked, “the new politics of state interventionism requires a depoliticization 
of the mass of the population.” State intervention now secured “the private form of capital 
utilization and to bind the masses’ loyalty to this form.”709 The “depoliticization of the masses” 
proved effective because, as Marcuse had already noted, “technology and science also take on the 
role of an ideology,” with technocracy serving as “an ideology for the new politics.”710 
Significantly, Habermas added, “technocratic consciousness” is “more difficult to criticize” than 
ideology and “less vulnerable to reflection” because “it is no longer only ideology.”711  
From a theoretical point of view, Habermas concurred with both his Frankfurt colleagues 
like Claus Offe and his functionalist adversaries like Luhmann: as “technique” and “technology” 
supplant “practice,” the “new politics” eliminates the “practical substance” of politics as such.712 
This could be altered, in Habermas’ view, neither by the “old” conception of politics nor by “new 
social movements.” To recover the substance of political practice, he rather looked to the 
normative bearings of discourse and rationality. While on the one hand Habermas’ 
acknowledgement of the penetration of technology and administration into social life reveal his 
extension of the radical elements of Marcuse’s critical project. Ironically, however, as he departed 
from an analysis of “legitimation crises” for a systematic theory of communicative action, he ran 
into a new “dialectical blockage” by failing to critically evaluate how such forms of mass 
administration and technological management could be identified and resisted as depoliticization 
when the normative horizon of theory and practice is either legitimation or system rationalization. 
Indeed, by simply accepting the functional and technical conception of power, Habermas’ account 
became narrower than Marcuse’s: “Insofar as government action is directed toward the economic 
system’s stability and growth,” Habermas argued, “politics now takes on a peculiarly negative 
character.” The theoretical focus then becomes tracking the balance between normative 
                                                
707 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 107. As he later put it, “When the forces of production enter into a baneful 
symbiosis with the relations of production that they were supposed to blow wide open, there is no longer any 
dynamism upon which critique could base its hope.” Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve 
Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 116. Having given up on the primacy of 
Marxist categories, Habermas folded their structure into his own binary built on a distinction between “work” (the 
sphere of technical, means-end rationality) and “interaction” (the sphere of normative, linguistic and symbolic 
rationality). 
708 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 101. 
709 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 102. 
710 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 106. 
711 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 111. 
712 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 102-3.  
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legitimation, on the one hand, and taming systemic risk and dysfunction, on the other.713 Here we 
can see, already in this middle-period reformulation, Habermas’ departure from Marcuse’s 
conception of “substantive” or “material political rationality.” 
From Legitimation Crisis (1973) and up to Theory of Communicative Action (1981), 
Habermas sought to rebuild Critical Theory as a “general theory” of social systems, a theory 
universalistic in its both socio-historical and normative scope.714 Through this turn toward a 
multilevel form of systems analysis, he attempted to retain his normative commitment to the role 
of reason in social and political life by reworking the Weberian schema premised on the fact-value 
and formal-substantive binaries.715 He did not seek to rehabilitate the logic of dialectical inversion, 
nor did he engage different forms of political economy—such as Keynesianism, ordoliberalism, 
or neoliberalism—as “instrumental-substantive” hybrids subject to political transformation. 
Instead he sought to revise and reconstruct the Weberian concept of rationality in systematic 
fashion, thereby recasting the notion in newly normative light. But before rooting rationality in the 
quasi-transcendental reservoirs of language and lifeworld, Habermas tested out a variety of 
conceptual strategies—typological, anthropological, and evolutionary—to normativize 
“rationality” and “rationalization” out of Weber.716 In yet another reconstitution of Weber’s 
typological schema, the Frankfurt School equated the existing form of the political with the 
technical mechanisms called strategic, administrative or instrumental rationality, and opposed this 
to substantive rationality. Responsible for taming and steering these “irrational” dynamics, the 
state and the political are understood as one subsystem among others, which can be contested or 
legitimated only through substantive rationalization qua communication, or the form of politics 
Habermas would soon circumscribe to deliberative democracy. This formed the basis of a 
normative conception of moral-procedural legitimation: “The moral realization of a normative 
                                                
713 His critique became increasingly thin as he observed that politics becomes oriented “not toward the realization of 
practical goals but toward the solution of technical problems.” Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 102-3. For his 
reading of Luhmann on the political system, see Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 134. 
714 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Volume 1), 
trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). For a discussion of Friedrich von Hayek and Niklas 
Luhmann alongside “Habermas’s own proposal for a rational consensus view of morality which could lead to a new 
Sittlichkeit,” see Raymond Plant, “Jürgen Habermas and the Idea of Legitimation Crisis,” European Journal of 
Political Research 10 (1982), 341-352. 
715 Against the backdrop of recent work on economic performativity, Habermas is unable to see is the role played by 
political economy itself in this transformation. As Feenberg wrote, Habermas’ “defense of modernity… seems to 
concede far too much to the claims of autonomous technology. His essentialist picture of technology as an 
application of a purely instrumental form of nonsocial rationality is less plausible after a decade of historicizing 
research in technology studies.” Feenberg, “Marcuse or Habermas: Two critiques of technology,” Inquiry 39(1) 
March 1996: 45-70; Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999). 
716 Habermas originally elaborated the epistemology of his critical theory in Knowledge and Human Interests 
(1968). During this time period, he developed Horkheimer and Adorno’s Ideologiekritik of positivism by identifying 
and improving “systematically distorted communication.” In conjunction with this project, he postulated “the 
existence of three anthropologically deep-seated interests of human beings, to which three categories of knowledge 
and rationality correspond.” In brief, he argued that the aim of social sciences is to investigate these three 
“knowledge constitutive interests”: a “technical” interest in control, a “practical” interest in understanding others, 
and an “emancipatory” interest in liberation from structures of domination. The “emancipatory” interest takes 
precedence over the former two interests because it grounds the possibility of a critical theory of society, which has 
its roots in reason, understood as the capacity of humans to be self-reflective and self-determining. See Stephen K. 
White, “Reason, Modernity, and Democracy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K. White 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6. 
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order is a function of communicative action oriented to shared cultural meaning and presupposing 
the internalization of values.”717 
Contra the methodological dead end of “the philosophy of the subject” represented by 
Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, Habermas argued that 
rationality is not based on “the relation of a solitary subject to something in the objective world 
that can be represented or manipulated, but [on] the intersubjective relation that speaking and 
acting subjects take up when they come to an understanding with one another about something.”718 
Contra Weber and Luhmann, he suggested it is thus possible to “vindicate the power of 
discursively attained, rational consensus against the Weberian pluralism of value systems, gods 
and demons.”719 Through these debates, as well as philosophical exchanges with Karl-Otto Apel 
through which he developed a model of discourse ethics based on the “ideal speech situation,” 
Habermas was moving toward the completion of a decades-long project: the reconstruction of 
reason “after its eclipse.”720  
In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas systematically reconstructed the work of 
Horkheimer and Adorno, who he claimed were “in agreement with Weber—the ‘arch-positivist’—
on one point: Objective reason cannot be restored, not even in dialectical concepts.”721 He argued 
that the dead end of the Dialectic of Enlightenment demanded a paradigm shift from the 
contemplative philosophy of consciousness to an intersubjective theory of communicative 
action.722 Habermas contrasted the critical element of his approach from their philosophy of the 
subject as follows: 
 
My thesis concerning the colonization of the lifeworld, for which Weber’s theory of 
societal rationalization served as a point of departure, is based on a critique of 
functionalist reason, which agrees with the critique of instrumental reason only in its 
intention and in its ironic use of the word reason. One major difference is that the theory 
of communicative action conceives of the lifeworld as a sphere in which processes of 
reification do not appear as mere reflexes—as manifestations of a repressive integration 
emanating from an oligopolistic economy and an authoritarian state.723 
 
                                                
717 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 107. 
718 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Volume 1), 392.  
719 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 107. 
720 For an extensive treatment of Habermas’s “pluralization of reason,” see Jay, Reason After Its Eclipse. 
721 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Volume 1), 372. 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s notion of “instrumental reason is set out in concepts of subject-object relations. The 
interpersonal relation between subject and subject, which is decisive for the model of exchange, has no constitutive 
significance for instrumental reason.” Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, vol. 1 of The Theory of 
Communicative Action, 379. 
722 The shift also resulted from criticism of Knowledge and Human Interests. Forced to revise his conception of self-
reflection, Habermas’s 1973 essay, “A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests,” distinguished “self-
reflection” from “rational reconstruction.” Thereafter Habermas “aligns his own effort with that of rational 
reconstruction, believing that only a rational reconstruction of universal competencies can provide an adequate 
basis” for his intersubjective social theory. See Alway, Critical Theory and Political Possibilities, 103. 
723 Habermas, “The Tasks of a Critical Theory of Society,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, 304-5. 
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Systemic rationalization qua the “colonization the lifeworld” is a form of domination that can 
never be total because of the way Habermas defines the lifeworld: namely, an inexhaustible 
background of cultural norms and linguistic forms incompatible with systemic rationality. 
Proceeding from the lifeworld, communicative action represents a “positive” form of 
rationalization.724 When domination-free discourse is linked to institutional procedures, Habermas 
argued, it makes good on the normative or substantive content of Wertrationalität through purely 
formal procedures.725 Only by rescinding the normativity of the theorist and placing it in the 
participants of communication can “the Weberian thorn in critical theory,” be overcome.726  
In Habermas’ version of the linguistic turn, language thus becomes the primary medium, 
categorical framework, and normative foundation of communicative rationality.727  Motivated by 
the “co-operative search for truth” and compelled only by “the forceless force” [der zwanglose 
Zwang] of the better argument, rational argumentation aims at mutual understanding 
[Verständigung]. Practical discourse allows actors test their normative claims vis-à-vis a 
“generalizable interest” on the model of consensus.728 In this process Habermas found a kind of 
aspirational generalizability and universality that the proletariat had previously represented 
politically.729 But now, Habermas wrote, rationality “is no longer ascribed to the individual actor 
or to a macrosubject at the level of the state or the whole of society,” but rather to “the linguistic 
medium through which interactions are woven together and forms of life are structured.”730 Like 
                                                
724 Rationality “is understood to be a disposition of speaking and acting subjects that is expressed in modes of 
behavior for which there are good reasons or grounds. This means that rational expressions admit of objective 
evaluation.” Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Volume 
1), 22. 
725 “Rationalisierung auf der Ebene des institutionellen Rahmens kann sich nur im Medium der sprachlich 
vermittelten Interaktion selber, nämlich durch eine Entschränkung der Kommunikation vollziehen. Die öffentliche, 
uneingeschränkte und herrschaftsfreie Diskussion über die Angemessenheit und Wünschbarkeit von 
handlungsorientierenden Grundsätzen und Normen im Lichte der soziokulturellen Rückwirkungen von 
fortschreitenden Sub-Systemen zweckrationalen Handelns - eine Kommunikation dieser Art auf allen Ebenen der 
politischen und der wieder politisch gemachten Willensbildungsprozesse ist das einzige Medium, in dem so etwas 
wie 'Rationalisierung' möglich ist” (Habermas 1968/1989, 100); Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action: 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Volume 1), 118-19. 
726 The grand philosophical tradition “cannot simply be renewed with its systematic pretensions; it has ‘outlived’ its 
own claims; in any case, it cannot be renewed in the form of philosophy.” Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Volume 1), 378. 
727 Incorporating American pragmatism and speech act theory of C.S. Peirce, J.L. Austin and John Searle, Habermas 
extended a “formal-pragmatic” approach to language and social interaction. The normative content of 
communicative rationality consists in the fact that, in procedural discourse, participants must commit themselves to 
pragmatic presuppositions (like ascribing identical meaning to expressions and connecting utterances to validity 
claims) with the aim of achieving common ground in understanding. Implicit in the “communicative competence” 
possessed by normal speakers, rationality is “expressed in a decentered complex of pervasive, transcendentally 
enabling structural conditions, but it is not a subjective capacity that would tell actors what they ought to do.” 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 4.  
728 See the discussion in McCarthy, “Introduction,” The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society (Volume 1), ix. 
729 “What today separates us from Marx are evident historical truths, for example, that in the developed capitalist 
societies there is no identifiable class, no clearly circumscribed social group which could be singled out as the 
representative of a general interest that has been violated… Both revolutionary self-confidence and theoretical self-
certainty are gone.” Jürgen Habermas, “Reply to my Critics” in Habermas: Critical Debates, J. Thompson and D. 
Held, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982). 
730 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. 
William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1996), 3. 
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the first-generation ideal of a “rational administration of things,” Habermas’ deflated ideal became 
enhancing the capacity of society to “steer itself” upon the basis of rational legitimation, on the 
one hand, and ensuring an institutionally protected lifeworld, on the other hand.  
Later, in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas linked the discourse ethics of 
communicative action to the procedural democracy of law-making such that law is understood “as 
a category of social mediation between facts and norms.”731 Because a modern tension exists 
between positive law and democratic legitimacy, he argued, it must derive its validity not from the 
power of the state but from the “communicative power” of the citizens it governs. Habermas thus 
cites Hannah Arendt’s formulation, claiming that law and communicative power have their co-
original source in the “opinion upon which many publicly [are] in agreement.”732 Practical 
discourse provides the model for the deliberative will-formation of citizens that in turn forms the 
basis of a legitimate state. The ideal is that, “when the democratic constitutional state is functioning 
well, it continually ‘translates’ communicative power into administrative power.”733  
Despite his efforts to offer a new systematic account of Critical Theory, supplying it with 
quasi-transcendental normative foundation, Habermas’ work nevertheless reproduced earlier 
schemas of his intellectual forebears when theorizing politics. Put another way, while reworking 
the Weberian binary of substantive vs. formal rationality and allowing the latter to both 
procedurally legitimate and delimit the former, he reprogrammed but did not redress first 
generation’s political deficits. This had less to do with his formidable political disposition to 
current events, however, than with the ways he sought to conceptually engage other paradigms of 
analysis and to methodologically revise Critical Theory as a whole. In combining systems theory 
and analytic philosophy in his normative account of legal legitimation, for example, Habermas 
reinstitutes binaries of form vs. content in a thin liberal universalism.734 When “the dialectic of 
form and content that Hegel located in Kant is moved to the very heart of discourse ethics,” as 
Blaug observes, “Habermas accepts that discourse ethics is formalistic, yet by claiming that all 
theory should do is to ‘explain the moral point of view’ (the form), he is able to preserve a space 
for discourse between participants (the content).735 The formal or procedural elements of moral 
decision- and agreement-making are then inherently more primary than are their substantive 
content or discursive conditions of possibility, so long as the latter falls within the pre-established 
limits of political and economic liberalism. In this way, Habermas employed a common strategy 
of twentieth-century social, economic and political thought, one examined throughout the entirety 
                                                
731 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 1.  
732 Hannah Arendt, cited in Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 147. 
733 Stephen K. White, “Reason, Modernity, and Democracy,” 12. 
734 Social norms and are not subject to “truth claims” like the facts of the “objective world,” but they are subject to 
intersubjective assessment with respect to their “rightness” or “legitimacy.” At the same time, Habermas claims, 
“cultural values do not appear with a claim to universality, as do norms of action.” Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Volume 1), 20. This bridge between the lines (or 
rationalities) that constitute and circumscribe moral validity and legitimacy, on the one hand, and of cultural values 
and identity, on the other, finds expression in Habermas’ exceptionalist approach to the institutions of the European 
Union, discussed below, and to European culture more generally. The latter is understood as a more or less coherent 
whole that both incorporates and transcends the historical problems of German national culture, which in turn allows 
for his view of the EU as inherently progressive “culturally and civilizationally,” as described above on the first 
page of this chapter. 
735 Ricardo Blaug, Democracy, Real and Ideal: Discourse Ethics and Radical Politics (Albany: State University of 
New York, 1999), 16-17.  
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of this dissertation: reconfiguring the boundaries of the political by redrawing the line between 
“the rational” and “the irrational.”  
As I discuss in the final section, the failure to provide a more robust account of politics that 
is not merely reducible to technical rationality set limits on Habermas’ own interventions into 
political life. Unable to imagine politics as more than a technocratic project of rational steering on 
the one hand or general agreement procured via rational communication on the other, he cannot 
but offer minor endorsements, or prescribe minor rational fixes, for political institutions like the 
EU—even at the moment when this very institution was being “colonized” by technocratic reason 
with disastrous effects on the European “lifeworld.”  
 
Crisis, Disruption and the Dream of a Rational Politics 
 
 Recent challenges to liberal democracy, more than the financial crisis that preceded them, 
helped lay bare the political fault lines beneath different approaches to critique. Reading the 
Frankfurt School’s response to these challenges against its own internal (dis)continuities—from 
the rationality of a socialist planned economy to that of liberal democratic legitimacy—helps 
reveal the both contributions and failures of this tradition. The contemporary debate discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter is a paradigm example of this problematic: today Habermas and 
Streeck both see the stakes of critique in retaining or restoring a semblance of rationality, 
democracy, and control of unfettered capitalism against the destruction of the lifeworld. Behind 
their personal-political investments in the question of German and European (supra)nationalism, 
however, the debate hinges on a deeper set of Weberian binaries and conceptual systems—binaries 
and systems this chapter has sought to make visible.  
In his Adorno Lectures at the Institute for Social Research, published as Buying Time: The 
Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (2013), Streeck drew from the theoretical texts of 
Marcuse and Habermas examined above and updated the conceptual apparatus from the 
“legitimation crisis” debates.736 “It will be recalled from the 1960s and 1970s that perceptions of 
political and cultural ‘one-dimensionality’ may generate an outbreak of ‘irrational,’ ‘unrealistic’ 
or ‘merely emotional’ protests, which then—precisely because they are what they are—do not fail 
to have an effect,” he wrote.737 And it is precisely this kind of expressive rupture with the 
rationality of “technocratic modernization,” as Marcuse and Habermas previously described, in 
which Streeck places his current (anti-)political hopes—that is, an acceleration rather than a delay 
of the crisis of democratic capitalism: 
 
If constructive opposition is impossible, those who are not content to end their life paying 
off debts incurred by others have no other option than destructive opposition. This is 
needed to strengthen the delaying effect of what is left of democracy in national 
                                                
736 “My book treats the financial and fiscal crisis of contemporary democratic capitalism in the light of Frankfurt 
School crisis theories of the late 1960s and early 1970s when Adorno was still active and when, of course, I was 
studying in Frankfurt. The theories I address were attempts to grasp the incipient radical changes in the postwar 
political economy as aspects of a process encompassing the whole of society, in which more or less eclectic use was 
made of elements of the Marxist tradition.” Streeck, Buying Time, 10.  
737 Streeck, Buying Time, 161.  
  164 
societies… If being rational means accepting as self-evident that the demands of ‘the 
markets’ on society must be met, at the expense of a majority who have nothing to show 
but losses after decades of neoliberal market expansion, then indeed irrationality may be 
the only remaining form of rationality.738 
 
Unable to rely on Marcuse’s belief in a dialectical inversion of the status quo, however, Streeck 
concludes his influential study with a desperate plea for something like the Great Refusal, a 
seemingly “irrational” gesture to negate the dominant form of “rationality.”739 But here too 
Streeck’s logic has even deeper Weberian bearings than Marcuse and Habermas’ own.  
 Streeck based his critique of “Hayekian neoliberalization” on a distinction between the 
Staatsvolk vs. the Marktvolk—“the people” of the state vs. “the people” of the market. The former 
represents the interests of nation-state democracy, the latter the interests of unfettered financial 
markets. The ideal of the Staatsvolk lay in “social justice,” the ideal of the Marktvolk in “market 
justice.” Each embodies a form of rationality irreconcilable with the other, one being “substantive” 
and the other merely “formal.” Citing Weber’s chapter in Economy and Society discussed in 
Chapter 1, Streeck thus fully accepts formal-substantive binary used by the early neoliberals to 
construct their anti-socialist project: “social justice is material, not formal, in nature—and so it 
cannot but appear irrational, arbitrary and unpredictable in terms of the formal rationality of the 
market.”740 Not only does this mirror the neoliberal framework while railing against its effects; it 
also suggests that neoliberal rationality will soon reach its own limits out of a Polanyian 
necessity—that is, a “countermovement” against the Marktvolk’s “grotesque claims on the human 
lifeworld” and “forcible annihilation of particularistic structures of social solidarity.”741 The EU’s 
economic constitution, which constitutionally secures market competition and prohibits indebted 
state spending, serves as Streeck’s model of supranational market justice as opposed the (strangely 
essentialist site of) social justice, the nation state. Recalling an idyllic period of postwar stability, 
his call is thus “to defend and restore as far as possible what remains of those political institutions 
that could perhaps help up to modify and replace market justice with social justice.”742 Carrying 
forward the legacy of postwar Critical Theory, Streeck’s own political deficits derive from formal-
                                                
738 Streeck continues: “In the language of sociological theory, outbursts of rage are expressive, not, as appropriate in 
economic matters, instrumental. Rather than risk being trapped by ‘rational,’ constructive proposals in the fulfilment 
logic of international financial diplomacy, for which the Staatsvolk must first render unto the Marktvolk that which 
is their due, a social movement against the consolidation state should take time to display in public its anger at the 
demands made on them by post-democratic capitalism.” Streeck, Buying Time, 159-161. 
739 In a generous interpretation, Streeck’s juxtaposition of rationality and irrationality reflects Marcuse’s concluding 
questions in his essay on Weber: “Is there perhaps already in Max Weber’s concept of reason the irony that 
understands but disavows? Does he by any chance mean to say: And this you call ‘reason?’” Marcuse, Negations, 
169. 
740 Streeck, Buying Time, 59. 
741 “Hayek rightly insisted that such systems [of distributed intelligence] are superior to planned ones; what he could 
not see, as an economist, was Polanyi’s insight, in his debate with Hayek, that the market-obedient world shaped by 
transnational capitalism… could only take root through planning because it presupposed the forcible annihilation of 
particularistic structures of social solidarity.” Streeck, Buying Time, 184. 
742 Put another way: “My concern in the book is to preserve the possibility of converting the remains of postwar 
social democracy into barricades against technocratic encroachment, in the best case to accumulate a set of hard 
‘restrictive conditions’ for the politics of neoliberal social reorganization—conditions that this time would be not 
market constraints but, as it were, lifeworld constraints.” Streeck, Buying Time, 236. 
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substantive juxtaposition where the very concept of the latter serves as its own kind of normativity 
without reference to the actions or desires of actual political actors.  
By comparison, Habermas’ response to the financial crisis combination of state debt and 
market turbulence, or what he called a “collision of functional and systemic imperatives,” largely 
resembled his earlier analysis in Legitimation Crisis.743 But unlike his debate with neo-Marxist 
theorists in the 1970’s, Habermas neither anticipated nor hoped for the crisis of capitalism writ 
large. Rather, since the 1980’s, he has sought after its rational stabilization and supranational 
legitimation. “Habermas has put all his world-historical chips on the EU,” as Thomas Meaney 
observed.744 Any movement that does not push for greater European cooperation is said to 
constitute a form of “regress.” While Habermas describes the current state of the EU as a 
catastrophic failure, he also claims that those who protest against a progressive project like his 
own “can only regress into the expressive and the irrational.”745 And at the same time that he writes 
off a depoliticized citizenry as an agent of change, he places his hope in “moral outrage” and calls 
for bold elite action.746 Hewing to the functionalist imagination of “output legitimacy,” Habermas 
argues that only after—as an effect of—these reforms will a politicized and pro-European public 
emerge.747 Here we see how the turn to a liberal, technocratic model of politics sets the limits of 
Habermas’ own political imagination. Unable to conceive of a role for political struggle itself in 
challenging the colonization of the lifeworld by technical reason, Habermas instead assumes that 
whatever forms of technical reason have “emerged” to govern social life must be preserved and 
defended against their “irrational” challengers. Because his theory cannot conceive of political life 
in more robust terms, it falls victim to the trap of seeing major political ruptures as themselves 
“irrational disruptions” of the social order, rather than asking whether politics might itself be a 
scene of reason’s remaking.  
                                                
743 Jürgen Habermas, cited in Georg Diez, "Schluss jetzt!" in Der Spiegel 47 (21.11.2011), interview and review of 
Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011). 
744 “In a recent series of debates with Wolfgang Streeck, Habermas made some questionable pronouncements. He 
has referred to European monetary union as the ‘cunning of economic reason’ for providing the technological 
bedrock required for a global society. He described Emmanuel Macron as someone who ‘stands out above the 
European leadership because he assesses each current issue from a broader perspective and is therefore not simply 
reactive.’ Whether that perspective is the vantage point of global capital or that of the future of humanity seems at 
the very least an open question.” Thomas Meaney, “Living in a critical condition: Jürgen Habermas at 90” in The 
New Statesman (June 26, 2019); https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2019/06/living-critical-condition-j-
rgen-habermas-90. 
745 Habermas, “For God's sake, spare us governing philosophers!” in El País (May 25, 2018), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/07/inenglish/1525683618_145760.html 
746 Martín Steinhagen, "Habermas und die Hoffnung auf moralische Empörung" [Habermas and the Hope for Moral 
Outrage], Frankfurter Rundschau (June 21, 2019); https://www.fr.de/kultur/literatur/maulwurfsarbeit-irrealis-
12566336.html 
747 In a post-Brexit interview Habermas said, “only a properly functioning core Europe could convince the presently 
polarised populations of all member states that the project makes sense…. [This is] the alternative of a deepened and 
binding co-operation within a smaller circle of states willing to cooperate. Such a Euro-Union has no need to seek 
out problems just to prove its own capacity to act. And, on the way thereto, the citizens will realize that such a core 
Europe will deal with those social and economic problems that lie behind the insecurity, the fear of societal decline 
and the feeling of losing control.” Habermas in Thomas Assheuer, “The players resign: Interview with Jürgen 
Habermas” in Zeit (Nr. 26/2016); https://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-07/juergen-habermas-brexit-eu-crises-
english/komplettansicht 
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Thus while Habermas embraced an investment banker-turned-President who promised to 
“modernize” the French labor market on the model of Gerhard Schröder,748 Streeck made a call to 
“take back control” and attacked the “identitarian left” for its “progressive neoliberal” betrayal of 
“left behind” citizens.749 Streeck claimed that Habermas delinked political theory from political 
economy; Habermas charged Streeck with a backwards-looking nationalism incapable of 
achieving its own goals.750 In a narrow sense, they reveal one another’s flaws. But the problem 
with this debate, as we have seen, is that the critique of rationality has transformed into moralistic 
and anti-political appeals when there is no political subject from which or with which to theorize.  
To the dilemmas of an EU in crisis, Habermas offered the resolution of rationalist 
legitimation, an institutionally stabilized form of capitalist democracy. Streeck instead provided a 
dialectics of non-resolution and political rupture, necessitated, as he saw it, by an iron cage of pro-
market technocracy seemingly global in its reach. And yet these Weberian binaries of formal and 
substantive rationality cannot offer a properly political meditation on the crises they seek to 
resolve. Perhaps it is time, then, to redress the critique of technocratic rationality—not through 
another, more rational fix, but through a deeper reckoning with this tradition’s own political 
deficits. 
  
                                                
748 “El País: Politically isolating a population of around two million people with aspirations to be independent is not 
realistic. And not easy. Habermas: It’s a clearly a problem… Q. What is Spain’s role in the construction of Europe? 
A. Spain simply has to support Macron. Q. Macron is a philosopher like you. Do you think politics and philosophy 
work well together? A. For God’s sake, spare us governing philosophers! However, Macron inspires respect because 
in the current political landscape, he’s the only one who dares to have a political perspective; who, as an intellectual 
and a convincing orator, pursues the political targets set out by Europe; who, in the almost desperate circumstances 
of the elections, showed personal courage and, until now as president, has done what he said he would. And in an 
era characterized by a paralyzing loss of political identity, I have learned to appreciate these personal qualities 
despite my Marxist convictions. Q. However, it is impossible to know yet what his ideology is, or if he even has 
one. A. You’re right. I still can’t see what convictions lie behind the French President’s European politics. I would 
like to know if he is at least a convinced left-leaning liberal, which is what I hope.” Habermas, “For God's sake, 
spare us governing philosophers!” in El País (May 25, 2018), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/07/inenglish/1525683618_145760.html 
749 Streeck specifically calls for “constructing institutions through which markets could once again be brought under 
control: markets for work that leave room for social life, markets for consumer goods that do not destroy nature, 
markets for credit that do not become the large-scale production of irredeemable promises” (237). Of Habermas 
Streeck writes: “The blind spots in Habermas’s anti-national Europeanism are interestingly linked to his system-
theoretically neutered [sic] concept of capitalism. What remains at the end are normative prescriptions of rational-
cum-moral cosmopolitan political conduct for which there is no real world out there that could live by them. One 
must be afraid that all a theory of this sort can do is move the theorist into a position of moral superiority.” Streeck, 
“What About Capitalism? Jürgen Habermas’s Project of a European Democracy,” Verso Blog (January 28, 2016); 
https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2454-what-about-capitalism-jurgen-habermas-s-project-of-a-european-
democracy 
750 Jürgen Habermas, “Democracy or Capitalism? On the Abject Spectacle of a Capitalistic World Society 
fragmented along National Lines,” Reset (July 2013); https://www.resetdoc.org/story/democracy-or-capitalism-on-
the-abject-spectacle-of-a-capitalistic-world-society-fragmented-along-national-lines/ 
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Conclusion:  
Political Deficits in the Twenty-First Century  
 
 
The image of a modern, rational, smoothly functioning social order emerged from wartime 
devastation, revolutionary upheaval, and economic crisis one century ago. Interwar social 
scientists of different political persuasions framed this image with ideals of stability, automaticity, 
and rationality—ideals that had more to do with curtailing than empowering a recently expanded 
democratic citizenry, “the demos,” or an increasingly organized working class, “the proletariat.” 
A struggle between different projects—Leninist vanguardism, council communism, state 
socialism, social democracy, economic liberalism, and fascism, among others—put the image into 
particularly sharp relief. It was the desire to establish a more rational order in this context that 
animated the four intellectual movements examined in this dissertation: the Austrian School, 
Freiburg School, Chicago School, and Frankfurt School. While the neoliberal theorists of the 
former three schools constructed “demoskeptic” theories of economic rationality with the goal of 
“deproletarianization,” the critical theorists fashioned a practical orientation to the workers’ 
movement with an ideal of rational planning that they would eventually disavow. 
From the rise of neoliberal and critical theory amidst interwar crisis to their descendants’ 
responses to the 2008 financial crisis, this dissertation underscored the role of theoretical 
production—e.g., social scientific methodology, philosophical anthropology, or what I have called 
political epistemology—in the construction and delimitation of the political imagination. I have 
argued that the Austrian, Freiburg, Chicago and Frankfurt Schools each began with unique 
scientific and political perspectives on markets and planning in the “socialist calculation debate”; 
that each drew for distinct methodological reasons from Max Weber’s binary typology of formal 
vs. substantive rationality; and that each built evolving research programs on different forms of 
political deficits. The dissertation defined these “deficits” in relative rather than absolute terms: 
namely, as the rationalization and subordination of the political (qua collective dynamics of self-
governance, power-sharing and world-making) vis-à-vis other domains of life. It registered how 
these schools differently pursued a double move: to tame or abolish the latent “irrationality” of the 
political by constructing visions of “rationality” over and above it. 
Current political schisms are often interpreted in terms of substantive divisions (e.g., 
rightwing nationalism vs. leftwing egalitarianism) or in relation to recent historical developments 
(e.g., neoliberal austerity and financial deregulation). This dissertation has argued that the form 
and content of these schisms need to be unearthed in order to grasp them within a larger frame. 
Recent scholarship has contributed to this task by showing that the institutional project of 
neoliberal actors aimed to “encase” the market dynamics and “enchain” the legal systems of 
democratic nation states.751 I have attended to a different dimension of the neoliberal project by 
tracing its interwar foundations prior to any particular policy implementation: this involved 
scrutiny of the epistemological and conceptual framing of the early neoliberals, and the centrality 
of their respective notions of rationality within it. This framing did not simply target an already 
                                                
751 See in particular Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018). 
  168 
anemic form of (liberal) democracy and the policies Keynesian economists prescribed for it. It also 
sought to disarm the imaginative appeal of socialist “collectivism,” while undercutting the 
evaluative and discursive bearings of the political more broadly. Through binary typologies like 
markets vs. planning, formal calculation vs. substantive values and rationality vs. irrationality, a 
Weberian-inflected framework structured left, liberal and even non-liberal responses to the crisis 
of liberalism—often to displace political dynamics and the problem of mass democracy. What we 
are witnessing today—beyond ostensibly “raw” or seemingly “political” reactions to the effects of 
neoliberal austerity—is an antipolitical current of thought and action conditioned by the political 
deficits of twentieth-century formations. 
 
* * * 
 
Despite its nearly century-long trajectory, many readers first came across the concept of 
“neoliberalism” in the months after the 2008 crisis. Associated with a “depoliticized” free-market 
order, neoliberalism was blamed for the crash and proclaimed to be in “crisis.”752 But it was not 
until the Brexit referendum and Trump election of 2016 that commentators announced “the end of 
neoliberalism” and “the return of the political.”753 All the while, however, neoliberal and far-right 
forces had cross-pollinated. Today there are populist rightwing parties, and then there are 
neoliberal populist rightwing parties. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some of the most potent mutants 
stem from the same countries as the Austrian, Freiburg and Chicago Schools: the FPÖ (Freedom 
Party of Austria), the AfD (Alternative for Germany), and a U.S. Republican Party increasingly 
dominated by Trump and the Alt-Right. What distinguishes the rightwing populists—such as 
Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement national in France or Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord in Italy754—
from the neoliberal rightwing populists is the latter’s deep origins in neoliberal rationality.755 
Founded as an anti-Euro party by an ordoliberal economist in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis, for instance, the AfD has transformed into a far-right populist force that dominates 
                                                
752 See Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, The Crisis of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011); and Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism (London: Polity, 2011). In the years that 
followed, Crouch came to ask: “Can capitalism be reshaped so that it is fit for society, or must we acquiesce to the 
neoliberal view that society will be at its best when markets are given free rein in all areas of life?” Crouch, Making 
Capitalism Fit for Society (Polity, 2013). His latest work seeks to rehabilitate the “positive contributions of 
neoliberalism.” See Crouch, Can Neoliberalism Be Saved from Itself? (Social Europe Edition, 2017). For a 
discussion of what many post-crisis commentators called “zombie neoliberalism,” see William Callison and Zachary 
Manfredi, “Introduction: Theorizing Mutant Neoliberalism,” in Callison and Manfredi, eds., Mutant Neoliberalism: 
Market Rule and Political Rupture (New York: Fordham University Press, forthcoming). 
753 For prominent analysts with different interpretations of the former, see Naomi Klein, “It Was the Democrats’ 
Embrace of Neoliberalism that Won It for Trump,” The Guardian (Nov. 9, 2016); Cornel West, “Goodbye, 
American Neoliberalism: A New Era is Here,” The Guardian (Nov. 17, 2016); Nancy Fraser, “The End of 
Progressive Neoliberalism,” Dissent (Jan. 2, 2017); and Martin Jacques, “The Death of Neoliberalism and the Crisis 
in Western Politics” The Guardian (Aug. 21, 2016). For two of many headlines announcing the latter, see Pablo 
Bustinduy and Adrià Porta, “Populism and the Return of the Political” in Open Democracy (Dec. 6, 2016); and 
Naomi Resti Anditya, “Right Wing Populism in Democratic Countries: The Return of the Political” in Publikasi IIS 
(Sept. 30, 2017). 
754 See Melinda Cooper, “Anti-Austerity on the Far Right,” in Mutant Neoliberalism. 
755 See Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe, “Neoliberals Against Europe,” in Mutant Neoliberalism; and Slobodian, 
“Neoliberalism’s Populist Bastards,” Public Seminar (February 15, 2018); 
http://www.publicseminar.org/2018/02/neoliberalisms-populist-bastards/. 
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German public discourse. Touted as the “party of professors” due to its high number of PhD-
holding politicians, the AfD has built a xenophobic, Islamophobic, ultra-nationalist, and 
historically revisionist program on its ordoliberal foundations. Its leaders call for a strong state, 
free markets, lower taxes, and welfare cuts in the same breath as border security, migrant 
deportation, and ethno-cultural homogeneity. Their far-right companion in Austria, the FPÖ, was 
founded decades earlier as an economically liberal, anti-socialist, and pan-German nationalist 
party by politicians with Nazi backgrounds. The FPÖ held power in a governmental coalition for 
two years, until a scandal fractured its partnership with the VPÖ (Austrian People’s Party) in the 
summer of 2019.756 Together the two parties comprise a unique blend of technocratic and 
authoritarian neoliberalism, implementing pro-austerity, anti-immigrant and ultra-nationalist 
measures with majority support from the citizenry. Whereas the AfD makes paeans to the Freiburg 
School, the FPÖ trumpets the views of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich A. von Hayek and the 
Austrian School.757 Fittingly, neoliberal think tanks like the Friedrich Hayek Society and the 
Friedrich Hayek Institute—based in Germany and in Austria, respectively—have lent their support 
to these parties.758 Finally, the U.S. Republican Party has rebranded itself in Donald Trump’s 
image, seeking to marry corporate tax cuts and the “destruction of the administrative state” to 
traditional morals and nationalist wall-building.759  
 
The rise of the FPÖ, AfD and Alt-Right would ostensibly confirm so many post-2016 
announcements of the “return of the political.” But does the far right’s ascendance represent the 
negation of what I have called political deficits in this dissertation? Is “the return of the political” 
an adequate conceptualization of our current moment, implying as it does both an ironic reversal 
                                                
756 See Ruth Wodak, “Austria’s smoking gun: Strache, ‘Ibiza-Gate,’ and ‘Saint’ Sebastian” in Open Democracy 
(July 6, 2019); and Quinn Slobodian, “Europe’s far right is joining forces with libertarian climate deniers” in New 
Statesman (May 17, 2019); https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2019/05/europe-s-far-right-joining-forces-
libertarian-climate-deniers.  
757 See, for example, the press release on the FPÖ’s website, “Pisec: Wirtschaftskammer Wien nimmt sich der 
Erinnerungskultur an den Ökonomen Ludwig von Mises an" (June 1, 2016); https://www.fpoe.at/artikel/pisec-
wirtschaftskammer-wien-nimmt-sich-der-erinnerungskultur-an-den-oekonomen-ludwig-von-mises-an/; see also 
Quinn Slobodian, “The Rise of the Right-Wing Globalists,” New Statesman (Jan 31, 2019); 
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2019/01/rise-right-wing-globalists; Stephan Pühringer and 
Christine Stelzer-Orthofer, "Neoliberale Think Tanks als (neue) Akteure in österreichischen gesellschaftspolitischen 
Diskursen," ICAE Working Paper Series, No. 44 (January 2016). 
758 Each of these groups was recently shaken by controversy. Founded in Freiburg and based in Berlin, many 
members quit the Friedrich Hayek Society due to internal divisions about the far right. Based in Vienna, the 
Friedrich Hayek Institute was embroiled in a money-laundering scandal with far-right parties in the European 
Parliament and U.S. think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute. See Marine Strauss and Boris 
Groendahl, “Austrian Group at Heart of EU Nationalist Funding Draws Scrutiny,” Bloomberg (June 6, 2019). 
759 Steve Bannon announced this “destructive” agenda at the 2017 meeting of CPAC, the annual convention of 
conservatives that just one year prior had shunned Bannon and his colleagues from attending as audience members, 
much less as center-stage speakers. Now the headliner, Bannon added: “The way the progressive left runs is that if 
they can’t get it passed, they’re just going to put it in some sort of regulation in an agency. That’s all going to be 
deconstructed.” Beyond the expected praise from his own white nationalist site Breitbart, other neoliberal and 
neoconservative outlets like National Review approved of Trump and Bannon’s shared mission. See David French, 
“Trump Wants to Deconstruct the Regulatory State? Good. Here’s s How You Start,” National Review (February 24, 
2017); see also, Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, “Bannon vows a daily fight for ‘deconstruction of the 
administrative state,’” The Washington Post (February 23, 2017). See also Wendy Brown, In the Ruins of 
Neoliberalism: The Rise of Anti-Democracy in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019). 
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(of neoliberal depoliticization by rightwing political reaction) and an ultimate revelation (about 
the inherent limits of neoliberal rationality)?  
This is certainly the way many scholars and critics have characterized our time, namely by 
framing the far right as a reactionary “return of the repressed,” a resurrection of “the political,” or 
a reassertion of “the demos.” “Given the once fashionable view that we live in an age of 
postdemocracy, or even postpolitics,” Adam Tooze observed, the events of 2008 and 2016 came 
as “something of a surprise.”760 Like the Obama agenda it sought to overturn, “the first phase of 
the Trump administration was also molded by the legacy of 2008, but in the negative.”761 Both 
administrations were shaped by the aftereffects of the financial crisis, Tooze argued, though 
Trump’s rise represented a more distinctly political reaction to it. Similarly, in his pathbreaking 
study of neoliberalism as a global order of free-market “encasement” by political institutions, 
Quinn Slobodian concluded that the Brexit referendum revealed how, despite the neoliberals’ best 
intentions, “the demos—for better or worse—is not yet undone.”762  
 Whereas Tooze and Slobodian simply register the formal manifestation of “politics” or 
“the demos” as evidence of neoliberalism’s contestability in the post-2016 context, a number of 
critics have offered an entirely different interpretation that equates features of “populism” with 
“politics” or “democracy” as such. In “The Return of the Repressed” and other recent 
interventions, for instance, Wolfgang Streeck explains that the “rediscovery of democracy as a 
political corrective… benefits exclusively new kinds of parties and movements whose appearance 
throws national political systems into disarray.”763 These are what global elites call “populism,” a 
concept denoting “left-wing and right-wing tendencies and organizations alike that reject the TINA 
[‘there is no alternative’] logic of ‘responsible’ politics in a world of neoliberal globalization.”764 
“The fissure between those who describe others as ‘populists’ and the objects of their description,” 
Streeck argues, “is the dominant political fault line in the crisis-ridden societies of financial 
capitalism.”765 The two options, he asserts, are further “regress” on the one-way street of economic 
globalization or “progress” through U-turn that restores “nation-state control.”766 Streeck explains 
his logic as follows: “[N]ow that the former advocates of the plebeian classes have switched to the 
                                                
760 Tooze, Crashed, 614. Earlier in the book Tooze writes: “Angela Merkel’s first government was a grand coalition 
with the defeated SPD. Fiscal consolidation, like Hartz IV, commanded a consensus across German politics. The 
finance ministry was claimed by Peter Steinbrück… [who] was profoundly committed to a supply-side, anti-
Keynesian vision of economic policy. For him restoring ‘fiscal room’ was not merely a matter of financial stability. 
The ossification of the government budget under the impact of quasi-automatic entitlement spending and interest 
payments was indicative of a broader problem affecting the developed world: the crisis of democratic politics and 
democratic participation… [T]his led to disaffection among the voters and the splintering of the party-political 
landscape, with the once-dominant CDU and SPD huddling together in the center. It was not for nothing that 
‘postdemocracy’ became one of the buzzwords of German political discussion in the early 2000s.” Tooze, Crashed, 
96-7. 
761 Tooze, Crashed, 580. 
762 Slobodian, Globalists, 286. As discussed below, since writing this book Slobodian has carefully tracked this 
seeming “reaction” as a movement from within, not against, neoliberalism. 
763 Wolfgang Streeck, “The Return of the Repressed,” New Left Review 104 (March 2017). 
764 Wolfgang Streeck, “The Return of the Repressed.” 
765 To this he adds: “The issue at stake is none other than the relationship between global capitalism and the state 
system. Nothing polarizes the capitalist societies of today more than the debates about the necessity and legitimacy of 
national politics” Wolfgang Streeck, “The Return of the Repressed.” 
766 Wolfgang Streeck, “Reflections on political scale,” Jurisprudence, 10:1 (2019), 1-14; Wolfgang Streeck, How 
Will Capitalism End? (London: Verso, 2016); for a critique, see Tooze, “A General Logic of Crisis” in London 
Review of Books, Vol. 39, No. 1 (January 5, 2017). 
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globalization party, so that if their former clients wish to complain about the pressures of capitalist 
modernization, the only language at their disposal is the pre-political, untreated linguistic raw 
material of everyday experiences of deprivation, economic or cultural.”767 Whereas the center-left 
social democrats were supposed to represent the interests of the working classes, in other words, 
they implemented neoliberal policies that betrayed their own democratic “clientele.” Because 
Streeck sees populist disruption as the only way to render the “pre-political” shriek of these 
“silenced” citizens into a properly political voice, it comes as no surprise that he sought to 
jumpstart one such project himself—a return of the repressed, understood as a populist restoration 
of the postwar welfare state.768  
There are more nuanced and robust precedents for such a vision of the political premised 
on nation-state horizons. In fact, one of the most familiar formulations emerged as a reaction to 
neoliberalism’s rightwing rollout in South America (via the IMF’s structural adjustments and 
Pinochet’s liberalization measures) and in Britain and the U.S. (via the Thatcher and Reagan 
“revolutions”). In 1985, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe advanced a post-Marxist response in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy that encouraged the left to “restore the centrality of politics over 
the tyranny of market forces.”769 At times the authors depicted the logic of politics as inherently 
opposed to that of capitalism; at other times they described the pro-market right as a hegemonic 
force that had successfully seized the core elements of the political for itself. They observed that, 
despite its economic individualism, neoliberalism proved effective at constructing a shared 
discourse, forging affective bonds to a leader, and securing the levers of state power. At the most 
general level, however, Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructural reformulation of the political as a 
hegemonic relation rendered it in a universalistic, formalistic and omnipresent light.770 Though 
more nuanced than Streeck’s reinterpretation of “democracy” as a populist U-turn from one-way 
globalization back to the postwar welfare state, it comes as no surprise that Mouffe’s For a Left 
                                                
767 Streeck, “The Return of the Repressed.” 
768 The vanguardist quality of this response is not hidden in this particular text, which schematizes the relationship in 
functionalistic terms: “The cosmopolitan identitarianism of the leaders of the neoliberal age, originating as it did in 
part from left-wing universalism, calls forth by way of reaction a national identitarianism, while anti-national re-
education from above produces an anti-elitist nationalism from below.” Streeck, “The Return of the Repressed.” For 
a critical discussion of Aufstehen (‘Stand Up’), see Quinn Slobodian and William Callison, “Pop-Up Populism: The 
Failure of Left-Wing Nationalism in Germany” in Dissent (Summer 2019). 
769 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 
(London: Verso, 1985/2001), xix. They described the nature of this development as follows: “If neo-liberal ideas 
have acquired an unquestionable political resonance, it is because they have permitted the articulation of resistances 
to the growing bureaucratization of social relations to which we referred earlier. Thus the new conservatism has 
succeeded in presenting its programme of dismantling the Welfare State as a defence of individual liberty against the 
oppressor state.” Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 175. 
770 “A hegemonic relation has, no doubt, a universalistic dimension, but it is a very particular type of universalism 
whose main features it is important to point out. It is not the result of a contractual decision, as in the case of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, for the hegemonic link transforms the identity of the hegemonic subjects. It is not necessarily 
linked to a public space, as with Hegel’s notion of a [bureaucratic] ‘universal class,’ for hegemonic rearticulations 
start at the level of civil society. It is not, finally, like the Marxian notion of the proletariat as a universal class, for it 
does not result from an ultimate human reconciliation leading to the withering away of the State and the end of 
politics; the hegemonic link is, on the contrary, constitutively political. What, in that case, is the specific universality 
inherent in hegemony? It results, we argue in the text, from the specific dialectic between what we call logics of 
difference and logics of equivalence.” Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, xii-xiii.  
  172 
Populism (2018) was read as a kind of playbook by actors on both the nationalist left and the 
nationalist right.771 
It is not entirely incorrect, of course, to call the post-2008 far right a “political reaction” 
with hegemonic aspirations. But the sense of the word “political,” in the accounts rehearsed above, 
is a narrow one—an “official” category that denotes the contestability of economic ideas or the 
primacy of state power. What the dissertation has sought to uncover, by contrast, is how the early 
neoliberal intellectuals sought to cast a whole range of properly “political” values, experiences and 
dispositions as “irrational” and thus as beyond the pale of systemic, functionalist and market 
“rationality.” With the aspiration to reshape laws and institutions, the neoliberals launched a 
political project that aimed to subordinate the political, in both the formal and the broader sense 
of the word. This double valence of the political—similar to “the critique of irrational rationality” 
or calls for “the democratization of democracy”—offers a more capacious way of reading the 
present against the historical and conceptual lines mapped by this dissertation.  
In what follows I will suggest that such an alternative conception, as found in sociologist 
and cultural theorist Stuart Hall and political theorist Sheldon Wolin, captures a sense of the 
political whose absence (or deficit) is constitutive of the neoliberal and far-right hybrids described 
above. The reason for turning to Hall and Wolin here is neither to idealize nor to rehearse the 
entirety of their thinking about politics and power. Rather, the goal is to register how they might 
help us understand what is missing from the far-right hybrids discussed above and from the 
formulations of the state and politics in the theoretical projects examined in this dissertation. 
Additionally, they may offer a counter-reading to two interpretive responses to our current 
predicament: one that would completely write off the idea of “the (democratic) people” because 
of the populist right’s efforts to claim it for themselves; and another that would either reclaim or 
invert the “political” or “populist” logic of the far right in order to defeat it. There is a difference 
between the invocation of and the disposition toward collective self-government, between the 
assertion and the practice of democracy, between the destruction and the cultivation of powers 
shared in common. And it is through this kind of distinction that, with the help of Hall and Wolin, 
we may better grasp the dilemmas of the political in a world remade by neoliberal rationality. 
 
* * * 
 
For Stuart Hall and Sheldon Wolin, the political is distinct from any given political order 
or particular set of governmental practices, a starting point that undoubtedly parallels that of other 
well-known thinkers. From Claude Lefort and Jacques Rancière to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, political and social theorists have differently defined and differentiated le politique (or 
“the political”) and la politique (or “politics”).772 Yet because Hall and Wolin seek to historicize 
                                                
771 Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Mouffe could thus write The Return of the Political with a modified 
Schmittian conception that underscored the potency of ethnic, religious and nationalist identities. In 2018, Mouffe 
called For a Left Populism, with the ear of political leaders in Podemos, La France insoumise and Aufstehen, among 
other movements. See Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993); Mouffe, For a Left 
Populism (London: Verso, 2018). For a critical review, see Thea Riofrancos, “Populism Without the People: On 
Chantal Mouffe” in N+1 (November 23, 2018). 
772 For these thinkers, the distinction between the political and politics maps onto the philosophical distinction 
between the ontological and the ontic. Marchart documents the historical context of this conceptual maneuver as 
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rather than formalize the meanings and manifestations of the political, they are especially apt 
guides for present-minded theory. Specifically, Hall and Wolin grasp the construction of 
collectivities—including that of “the people”—without essentializing the latter’s identity, 
structure, or mode of appearance. In this sense, they diverge from Carl Schmitt, who, like Max 
Weber, was state-centric in his political vision and prone to “substantialize” collective conflict.773 
A less formalistic, more diagnostic approach to the political is needed, however, and this Hall and 
Wolin offer in spades.  
Hall and Wolin were among the more astute analysts of neoliberalism at the moment of its 
Euro-Atlantic ascendance, even though they developed their respective understandings of the 
political long before, and as early as the 1960’s. Like Michel Foucault, they perceived the centrality 
of economic theory in neoliberal strategies for market rule, the significant role of the “strong state” 
in pushing through neoliberal reforms, and the way new discourses of libertarian anti-statism were 
only seemingly paradoxical in their legitimation of each. Unlike Foucault, however, Hall and 
Wolin also accounted for Thatcherism and Reaganism as political and even populist programs—
despite the fact that depoliticization was one of the core objectives of these programs.774 The 
Thatcher and Reagan revolutions resignified political subjects as entrepreneurial subjects, they 
explained, just as “the (democratic) people” was reconjured as “the market’s people.”775 In a word, 
Hall and Wolin sought to account for the constructive character of the political deficits whose 
epistemological programming this dissertation has examined.   
Whereas Hall’s approach to the political stems from Gramsci and post-Marxist theory, 
Wolin’s is derived from strands of radical and republican democracy from the ancient Athenians 
through Niccolò Machiavelli to Alexis de Tocqueville. Significant for Hall is the notion that 
political action creates the conditions within which legislation and identity formation take place, 
that discursive struggle reshapes the modality, intelligibility and thus contestability of certain 
forms of “justification.”776 Wolin’s rendering of the political does not deny the place of cultural 
                                                
follows: “While the conceptual differentiation between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ (or la politique and le politique) 
can be traced back, in the French context, to Paul Ricœur’s ‘The Political Paradox’ [1963], it forcefully reemerged 
in the 1980s when many philosophers—among them Jean-François Lyotard, Claude Lefort, Alain Badiou, Jacob 
Rogozinski, Jacques Rancière, and Étienne Balibar—were invited by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue Labarthe 
to give lectures at the Center for Philosophical Research on the Political (Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le 
politique) and discuss what the founders referred to as the ‘retreat of the political.’ From then on what can be called 
‘the political difference’ has been canonized as a basic conceptual differentiation.” Oliver Marchart, “Democracy 
and Minimal Politics: The Political Difference and Its Consequences” in The South Atlantic Quarterly 110:4 (Fall 
2011), 965. For an overview, see also Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in 
Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh University Press, 2007); and Martin Jay, Chapter 2 in The Virtues of 
Mendacity, in particular 120-29. 
773 Schmitt’s own formalistic mode of “substantialization” infamously yielded the omnipresent if often latent binary 
between “friend and enemy,” which he understood to be the most “essential,” “existential,” and “extreme” of all. 
See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1932/1996). For my reading of 
Schmitt in relation to some of the dissertation’s core themes, such as the relationship between the political and the 
economic, see “Sovereign Anxieties and Neoliberal Transformations,” Qui Parle Vol 23 No 1 (Fall/Winter 2014). 
For an excellent “experimental” study of the imagined relationship between the political and the economic, see 
Chapter 1 in Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). 
774 In Foucault’s defense, however, he was working on neoliberalism before and then at the dawn of Thatcher’s 
project. For a critical discussion of Foucault on this question, see the Introduction in this dissertation. 
775 See Sören Brandes, “The Market’s People: Milton Friedman and the Making of Neoliberal Populism” in Callison 
and Manfredi (eds.), Mutant Neoliberalism. 
776 See “Introduction” in Stuart Hall, The Great Moving Right Show. 
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and conflictual strategies, though he underscores the promise of the political as something more 
than mere conflict. The political, in Wolin’s view, is about “the common,” that is, about both the 
cooperative and conflictual dimensions of commonality. The political conveys the negotiation of 
a world that is shared yet also defined by difference. Or, in Wolin’s words, “the problem of the 
political is not to clear a space from which society is to be kept out but it is rather to ground power 
in commonality while reverencing diversity—not simply respecting difference.”777 For Hall and 
Wolin, then, politics inflects the powers that shape individual and collective life, but the political 
names the possibility of both reshaping and sharing in these powers collectively. 
It is in this sense that “the political” pertains to a particular mode of experience of and 
orientation to a world shared in common. This iteration of its meaning neither seeks to eliminate 
power nor denies power’s role in shaping the conditions under which collective world-making 
becomes possible. This is also why the political, for Hall and Wolin, is something that can be 
diminished or lost and by the same token, can be rediscovered and remade.778 Thus, at the 
beginning of the 1980’s, Hall and Wolin identified the stakes of Thatcherism and Reaganism as 
an “authoritarian populism” that at once deployed politics and eviscerated the political qua an 
affirmation of the public and orientation toward the common good.779 Fusing “traditional 
conservative moralism” with “abstract economic theory,” neoliberal practitioners, according to 
Wolin and Hall, were attacking the political as they pursued new experiments in liberalization, 
privatization, monetarism, tax cuts, union busting, and the demolition of the welfare state.  
 
* * * 
 
Many have conceptualized the far right as a form of (re-)politicization that responds to and 
(mis)represents popular grievances about these programs, whether driven by economic frustration 
or racial animus or the former converted to the latter. The same interpreters often equate the so-
called return of “politics” with the heightened relevance of “identity,” describing each (particularly 
                                                
777 Wolin, “Democracy and the Political,” 249. Hans Sluga underscores the inseparability of “politics” and “the 
common good” in similar fashion, though he also acknowledges, with Arendt and Schmitt, that the political implies 
a fundamental, irresolvable kind of uncertainty. Thus, differently than Wolin’s promise, Sluga’s point about the 
political speaks to early twentieth-century concerns about the (ir)rationality of politics itself. Here I focus in 
particular on the attempt of the human sciences to secure rationality and absolve irrationality, once and for all. See 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition; and Sluga, Politics and the Search for the Common Good.  
778 “The loss of the political is a clue to its nature: it is a mode of experience rather than a comprehensive institution 
such as the state. The thing about experience is that we can lose it and the thing about political experience is that we 
are always losing it and having to recover it. The nature of the political is that it requires renewal.” Wolin, 
“Democracy and the Political,” 248. See also the following elucidation of Hall’s notion: “The crucial issue is that 
any site in the social formation, in any particular moment, can become the condensation of political antagonisms; the 
site of evolving, potential political forces; and the terrain on which political allegiances are made or unmade. How 
this occurs, or where the terrain is to be located, is a contingent matter that no formal theory of politics can stipulate 
or anticipate. In this sense, the place of politics is frequently displaced, meaning that what is significant politically 
may not inhabit, or only partially inhabit, the institutional arrangements of formal politics.” Sally Davison, David 
Featherstone, Bill Schwarz and Michael Rustin in Hall, The Great Moving Right Show, 6-7. For a celebrated study 
that centers on the displacement of politics in contemporary political theory, see Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and 
the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
779 See Wolin, “The New Public Philosophy” [1981] in Fugitive Democracy, 379-93; and Hall, The Hard Road to 
Renewal. 
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in their “populist” varieties) as potentially “dangerous” or even “irrational.”780 Even as these 
interpretations of the post-2016 “backlash” cast politics as a matter of individual or group identity, 
they continue a long tradition of tarnishing politics. Simultaneously, they also cast markets as free 
of politics and as inherently democratic in nature.781 Such equivalences between politics and 
identity lend a technocratic vision of market rule the veneer of rationality. And they constitute the 
latest attempt to reframe irrationality (now equated with “both sides,” the far right and the far left) 
around a particular ideal of rationality, presented from above as enlightened and without 
alternative. 
Such views of the far right as an irrational if genuinely political rebellion acknowledge 
that formal mechanisms of democracy, such as elections and legislation, can be used by 
movements explicitly hostile to democracy. Yet they rarely reflect on how, beyond a lust for power 
or an antipathy to liberalism, many such movements also comprise a mutant form of neoliberalism, 
one employing new modes of attack on the preconditions of democratic politics. Current strands 
of the far right seek to undermine not just consensus-oriented rational debate (as conceptualized 
by Habermas and deliberative democrats) or a shared belief in democratic institutions (as flagged 
by liberals worried by “norm erosion”). Much like the “demoskepticism” described in previous 
chapters, they also undercut the very idea of a continuously contested and constructed domain 
comprising a diversity of collective subjects, values and programs.782 In a word, neoliberalism has 
not yielded a return of the political, but a revolt against its more robust manifestations.  
Seen through Hall and Wolin’s formulation of the political, the neoliberal and far-right 
hybrids described above—the FPÖ, the AfD, and the Alt-Right—may be better understood as 
expressions of political deficits than of robust political dispositions. Much of the far-right 
“reaction” could even be called antipolitical in orientation—that is, animated by a desire to 
constrain rather than cultivate the common, to extinguish rather than negotiate difference, to 
totalize rather than share in power. Perhaps it should come as no surprise, then, that these forces 
do not simply seek to subvert the idea and practice of making a world-in-common, but actively 
seek to advance its annihilation—inter alia, through expansive climate-denial campaigns 
supported by think-tank networks and funded by the oil and gas industry.783 From another angle, 
                                                
780 Francis Fukuyama nicely encapsulates this trajectory. Of his own book, The End of History, he wrote: “I argued 
that liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of 
human government’ and as such constituted ‘the end of history.’ That is, while earlier forms of government were 
characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was 
arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions.” Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 
(1992), xi (emphasis mine). In the post-2016 context, he now underscores the importance of “identity” in human 
relations, seemingly as a proxy for “irrationality,” a small degree of which is perhaps necessary. He blames the rise 
of the right on “identity politics,” which he understands as beginning with social movements in the 1960’s and 
directly leading to Trump. See Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (2018); 
and Fukuyama, “Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy” in Foreign Affairs 
(Sept./Oct. 2018).  
781 For just one recent example, see Deirdre McCloskey, Why Liberalism Works: How True Liberal Values Produce 
a Freer, More Equal, Prosperous World for All (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming). 
782 That social scientific and political discourses are increasingly dominated by forms of neonaturalism—the attempt 
to re-root individual and collective proclivities in allegedly “natural” foundations such as race, ethnicity, sex, 
genetics, intelligence and so on—fits rather than contradicts an antipolitical context like this. 
783  For just one of countless examples, see the following: “The AfD has been denying human-made climate change 
on its social media pages since 2016… The fact that many mainstream politicians from across the political divide in 
Germany supported a 16-year-old female activist who was virtually unknown until a few months ago, allowed the 
party to present belief in climate change as irrational, hysteria, panic, cult-like or even as a replacement religion. 
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there are also numerous liberal and libertarian currents—from Third Way centrists to conservative 
libertarians—that have made use of far-right victories by casting doubt on democratic practices 
while representing their own technocratic and market solutions to “irrationality” as the only 
alternative (again).784  
There are many potential counterexamples to the political deficits for which we are 
accounting, such as the feminist movement Ni una menos across South America, the anti-eviction 
PAH movement led by Ada Colau and other community organizers in Barcelona, the pro-refugee 
sea-rescue Seebrücke movement in Germany, the climate-action movements partly inspired by 
Greta Thunberg across Europe, the airport protest movement against the “Muslim Ban” in the U.S., 
among countless others.785 But a detailed discussion of these and other movements, which aspire 
to reshape the framing and experience of politics in a radically democratic fashion, is unlikely to 
satisfy skeptics. For it is true that the notion of the political in Hall and Wolin is based on a “value” 
commitment—opposed, as it were, to formalist, proceduralist, technocratic, economistic, 
aprioristic, algorithmic or other approaches prone to eschew the imbrication of politics, values, 
and collectivities. Such a widely-shared value commitment to the political, however, forms a 
necessary precondition of democratic self-governance, understood in the broadest sense of 
collectively deciding the principles by which “we” live.786 Put another way, this is not about the 
normativization but rather the affirmation of the political as a site and source of collective values—
values without which any substantive manifestation of “democracy” is not possible. 
 This returns us to the dissertation’s central concern: the historical and epistemological 
formation of neoliberal rationality before, and then evolving through, the institutional and 
ontological effects it generated. It returns us, in particular, to Friedrich von Hayek’s call for the 
“dethronement of politics,” where politics is understood less in the “official” sense of the term 
than the sense described here: the negotiation and pursuit of collective values, the care and 
                                                
Attacking Greta, at times in fairly vicious ways, including mocking her for her autism, became a way to portray the 
AfD’s political opponents as irrational.” Jakob Guhl, cited in Kate Connolly, “Germany’s AfD turns on Greta 
Thunberg as it embraces climate denial: Rightwing populists to launch attack on climate science in vote drive before 
EU elections” in The Guardian (May 14, 2019). See also Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and 
Climate Change Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
784 For a pointed example, see the jacket cover of Against Democracy by libertarian scholar Jason Brennan, who 
previously authored Markets without Limits and who argues here that “democracy should be judged by its results—
and the results are not good enough. Just as defendants have a right to a fair trial, citizens have a right to competent 
government. But democracy is the rule of the ignorant and the irrational, and it all too often falls short... Brennan 
argues that a new system of government—epistocracy, the rule of the knowledgeable—may be better than 
democracy, and that it’s time to experiment and find out.” Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016). 
785 “Conservative” counterexamples are also possible, though given the attributes of contemporary forces discussed 
above, a degree of skepticism is required. Some on the French right have hailed the gilets jaunes (Yellow Vests) 
movement as one such example, while others have contemplated the U.S. Tea Party movement—despite its 
libertarian core, racist themes, and sources of funding (“astroturfing”)—as another possibility. For a reflection on 
the latter, see Stephen K. White, A Democratic Bearing: Admirable Citizens, Uneven Injustice, and Critical Theory 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
786 At different points the dissertation has contrasted such a view with the neoliberal concept of “consumer 
sovereignty,” which understands the price mechanism as the real site and source of “democracy.” In this counter-
view, the market satisfies both individual and systemic rationality by taking into account individual (as opposed to 
group) choices via the formal medium of money and of prices, and the “substantive” values of group decision-
making are constructed as a source of irrationality at best and unfreedom at worst. 
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cultivation of the common, and the aspiration for political equality and freedom which any specific 
manifestation of radical democracy, properly so called, requires as its condition of possibility. 
Like so many twentieth-century theorizations of rationality, the neoliberals’ conceptual 
schema rested on the Weberian distinction between formal and substantive rationality. Calculative 
or economic value, according to Weber’s typology, is of a wholly different type, and on a different 
epistemic plane, from non-economic or substantive value—different, that is, from any kind of 
“collective” value. Based on methodological individualism, formal rationality lies in the 
(economic) value generated by the market mechanism. Based on the “ultimate ends” of individuals 
and groups, substantive rationality lies in the (political, social, cultural, religious) values of 
different worldviews. Hayek’s objection to “substantive” orientations and institutions—which he 
variously called “collectivism,” “constructionism,” “socialism,” and “democracy”—is that the 
pursuit of collective (political) values not only intrudes on individual freedom,787 but also 
irrationally disrupts market rationality.788 The solution is to construct a political institution that 
keeps politics and economics in their proper places;789 such an institution would not plan for any 
substantive or democratic value in particular (social equality or racial justice) but would only “plan 
for competition.” A competitive market order secured by the rule of law (as distinct from 
democracy) is the only way of preventing democratic-political dynamics from “imposing a single 
scale of values, the ‘social goal.’”790 
                                                
787 “Political freedom in the sense of democracy, ‘inner’ freedom, freedom as the absence of obstacles for the 
realization of our wishes, or especially the ‘freedom from’ fear and want, all have little to do with individual 
freedom and often stand in conflict with it… The freedom we are concerned with, that alone can serve as the general 
principle of politics, and that was the original goal of all free movements, exclusively consists of the absence of 
arbitrary force.” Hayek, "Die Ursachen der ständigen Gefährdung der Freiheit," Ordo, vol. 12, 1960-61, 103-9, 
translation mine. 
788 The danger of socialism and any formation other than economic (neo)liberalism, in Hayek’s words, is that it will 
“replace the impersonal and anonymous mechanism of the market by collective and ‘conscious’ direction of all 
social forces to deliberately chosen goals.” Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1948/2001), 20-21. 
789 Hayek criticized one of his socialist contemporaries in this way: “‘In a socialist society,’ [Dickinson] says, ‘the 
distinction, always artificial, between economics and politics will break down; the economic and the political 
machinery of society will fuse into one.’ This is, of course, precisely the authoritarian doctrine preached by Nazis 
and Fascists. The distinction breaks down because in a planned system all economic questions become political 
questions, because it is no longer a question of reconciling as far as possible individual views and desires but one of 
imposing a single scale of values, the ‘social goal’ of which socialists ever since the time of Saint-Simon have been 
dreaming. In this respect it seems that the schemes of an authoritarian socialist, from those of Professor Hogben and 
Lewis Mumford, whom Dickinson mentions as an example, to those of Stalin and Hitler, are much more realistic 
and consistent than the beautiful and idyllic picture of the ‘libertarian socialism’ in which Dickinson believes.” 
Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948/2012), 207; also in Hayek, 
Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism (New York: Augustus Kelley, 
1935).  
790 Less an exception to than an evolution of this view, as Melinda Cooper and Wendy Brown have explained, is the 
relationship the neoliberals came to see between free markets and traditional morals. Yet this, too, required a 
feverish effort to subordinate the political to market dynamics and to private households—with the “customary” 
forms of hierarchy, domination, and value they harbor. See Melinda Cooper, Family Values: Between Neoliberalism 
and the New Social Conservatism (New York: Zone Books, 2017); and Wendy Brown, In the Ruins of 
Neoliberalism (Columbia University Press, 2019). Hayek argued that “the advance of morals should lead to a 
reduction of specific obligations towards others” and that this “requires” to some degree “the reduction of the range 
of duties we owe to all others.” Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice (London, 
Routledge 1976/1982), 89-90. As João Rodrigues observes, “This evolving and adaptable moral code, the moral 
economy of neo-liberalism, goes against ingrained moral atavisms, which permanently try to re-create, through anti-
market changes in the provision process, conditions for a communal life where people might have a host of shared 
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 If this neoliberal logic is to some degree the culprit of the 2008 finance crisis, the 2016 
political crisis or the ongoing crises of our time, the natural conclusion might seem to be some 
kind of inversion: the subordination of the formal to the substantive, of the economic to the 
political, of capitalism to socialism, or a similar operation. And this is indeed what many on the 
Left argue for today. Yet the dissertation has shown that, conceived as such, this solution remains 
trapped within the same binary schemas of rationality and politics that emerged in the early 
twentieth century. And it was with these schemas—from marginalist axioms to Weberian 
typologies—that the Austrian, Freiburg and Chicago Schools constructed their own rationalities. 
Each rationality was not confined to market logics, however, but acknowledged from the start the 
necessity of remaking commonplace epistemological, institutional and political coordinates.  
Among the many ironies of neoliberalism’s historical trajectory is that its model for 
remaking both elite and public orientations to the common was partly inspired by their socialist 
adversaries. “The masses favor socialism because they trust the socialist propaganda of the 
intellectuals,” Mises observed in 1922, concluding that “the intellectuals not the masses are 
molding public opinion.”791 Later Hayek wrote “our concern” must be “the beliefs which must 
spread if a free society is to be preserved, or restored, not what is practicable at the moment.” 
“While we must emancipate ourselves from that servitude to current prejudices in which the 
politician is held,” he added, “we must take a sane view of what persuasion and instruction are 
likely to achieve.”792 That these theorists linked concept and knowledge production to a 
comparably far-sighted vision of historical and political change offers lessons well beyond an 
“ideology critique” that underscores internal contradictions, such as the violation of their stated 
commitments to scientific objectivity or Weberian “value neutrality.” 
In view of the far-reaching neoliberal effort to reconstruct the subjects and objects of 
“rational” debate, Hall accounted for the vision of Thatcherism as follows:  
 
Its success is partly the result of the right, not the left, taking ideas seriously. The radical 
right is not hung up on some low-flying materialism which tells them that, of course, 
ideas are wholly determined by material and economic conditions. They actually do 
believe that you have to struggle to implant the notion of the market; and that, if you talk 
about it well enough, effectively and persuasively enough, you can touch people’s 
understanding of how they live and work, and make a new kind of sense about what’s 
wrong with society and what to do about it.793  
 
With some exceptions, the neoliberal theorists of course focused more on crafting ideas for elites 
and reshaping powerful institutions than on public engagement and persuasion of “the masses.” 
Yet these thinkers knew that they, like those who would later advance their visions, were also 
engaged in a constructive project: an attempt to reconfigure the coordinates of experience and 
reflection in terms of rational vs. irrational courses of thought and action. In turn, left approaches 
to the “ideology” or “normative” critique of state capitalism, including some of those advanced by 
                                                
ends.” João Rodrigues, “The Political and Moral Economies of Neoliberalism: Mises and Hayek,” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics Vol. 37, No. 5 (2013), 1013.  
791 Ludwig von Mises, Socialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922/1951), 540. 
792 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 109. 
793 Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal, 188. 
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the Frankfurt School, sought in vain a reversal of political-economic “irrationality” through a 
technological, aesthetic, or moral rationality of their own formulation. More often than not, the 
neoliberal thesis was contested with a counter-thesis, though each shared the same basic premise, 
the same structural framework in which particular modes of intervention are possible while others 
are simply not.  
When Hall described “the crisis of the left” as “a sort of mirror-image of Thatcherism,”794 
he invoked a mimetic image of politics in which the terms of debate are ceded and the conditions 
of action are assumed—even when, or precisely because, they have already been successfully 
constructed by the adversary. This imitation precludes diagnostic insight and social transformation, 
Hall suggested, “if we go on thinking the same things we have always thought and doing the same 
things we have always done—only more so, harder, and with more ‘conviction.’”795 Hall and 
Wolin do not offer us “solutions” to current dilemmas, but they do serve as guides for breaking 
out of the Weberian trap that operates through positing and then embracing binaries, particularly 
those that enframe economic and political questions in terms of their rationality and irrationality. 
 In tracking the way the early neoliberals methodologically programmed the categories of 
possible debate and action, I have neither separated their interventions into discourse and 
knowledge production from the task of public persuasion nor rendered it fully autonomous from 
the powers of political economy that undoubtedly contour each. Instead, I have attempted to 
conceptualize the construction of neoliberal rationality as an intervention that prefigured and 
guided discourses and practices that have transformed the world we now inhabit. To the extent that 
emancipation, freedom, and a livable future is still possible, these not only demand collective 
struggles that challenge the strictures set by neoliberalism; they also require an appreciation of the 
political as a precondition for thinking and making the world otherwise. As a work of political 
theory, this dissertation has emphasized the role that history and theory have as part of this task—
that is, as activities that may be productive of the political. 
Accounting for our political deficits requires historical examination, careful 
conceptualization, and democratic contestation of neoliberalism’s far-right mutations, which are 
now targeting all but the narrowest forms of commonality, democracy, and solidarity. Instead of 
harnessing critique to the subsumption or rationalization of politics, a critical theory responsive to 
this predicament would do well to pursue more expansive visions of the political than those 
inherited by the twenty-first century. 
 
 
 
                                                
794 Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal, 11. 
795 Instead, Hall added, “[i]t means a qualitative change: not the recovery of ‘lost ground’ but the redefinition, under 
present conditions, of what the whole project of socialism now means.” Hall, “Introduction,” The Hard Road to 
Renewal, 11. 
